GEORGETOWN COLLEGE v. JOHN S. ALEXANDER, ANDREW B. ALEXANDER, JAMES G. ALEXANDER, GLADYS D. ALEXANDER, DAVID ALEXANDER RUSSELL, JULIA RUSSELL LEGGETT, VIRGINIA LOCKETT RUSSELL, HARRIETT DONAHUE, MARY LOCKETT RAMFT, DONALD DONAHUE, III, STUART ALEXANDER, JR., AND CORDELIA KUBALE, AND DAVID ALEXANDER RUSSELL, JULIA RUSSELL LEGGETT, VIRGINIA LOCKETT RUSSELL, HARRIETT DONAHUE, MARY LOCKETT RAMFT, DONALD DONAHUE III, STUART ALEXANDER, JR., AND CORDELIA KUBALE v. HON. LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE GEORGETOWN COLLEGE, JOHN ALEXANDER, ANDREW ALEXANDER, JAMES ALEXANDER, AND GLADYS ALEXANDER
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AUGUST 29, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000651-MR
GEORGETOWN COLLEGE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 87-CI-04316
JOHN S. ALEXANDER, ANDREW B. ALEXANDER,
JAMES G. ALEXANDER, GLADYS D. ALEXANDER,
DAVID ALEXANDER RUSSELL, JULIA RUSSELL LEGGETT,
VIRGINIA LOCKETT RUSSELL, HARRIETT DONAHUE,
MARY LOCKETT RAMFT, DONALD DONAHUE, III,
STUART ALEXANDER, JR., AND CORDELIA KUBALE,
APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2002-CA-000735-MR
DAVID ALEXANDER RUSSELL, JULIA RUSSELL LEGGETT,
VIRGINIA LOCKETT RUSSELL, HARRIETT DONAHUE,
MARY LOCKETT RAMFT, DONALD DONAHUE III,
STUART ALEXANDER, JR., AND
CORDELIA KUBALE
CROSS-APPELLANTS
v.
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HON. LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 87-CI-04316
GEORGETOWN COLLEGE, JOHN ALEXANDER,
ANDREW ALEXANDER, JAMES ALEXANDER, AND
GLADYS ALEXANDER
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
CROSS-APPELLEES
BARBER, JUDGE:
This appeal involves the construction of a Will
and three competing claims to the proceeds from the sale of a
tract of land following the life tenant’s death.
and claimants to the proceeds are:
The parties
(1) Georgetown College,
residuary beneficiary under the Will; (2) the Mattie Anderson
heirs, represented by David Alexander Russell, Julia Russell
Leggett, Virginia Lockett Russell, Cordelia Kubale, Harriett
Donahue, Mary Lockett Ramft, Donald Donahue III, and Stuart
Alexander, Jr., who assert that the reversion passes to them by
way of intestacy (hereinafter “Cross-Appellants”); and (3) the
Harriett Alexander heirs, John S. Alexander, Andrew B.
Alexander, James G. Alexander, and Gladys Alexander
(“hereinafter “Harriett’s heirs”), in whose favor the trial
court granted summary judgment.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The trial court’s Opinion and Order, entered March 15,
2002, provides in relevant part:
The facts . . . are undisputed . . . . The
testatrix, Mattie Anderson, died on April 6,
1936. Her Last Will and Testament (“the Will”)
was probated on April 8, 1936. . . .
Among other assets, the testatrix disposed of a
thirty-two (32) acre tract of land on the
Georgetown Pike in Fayette County, which has been
the subject of this action. The pertinent parts
of the Will [footnote omitted] are as follows:
Item II
I will and bequeath to Margaret D.
(“Peggy”) Alexander, eldest daughter
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of James S. and Katherine Alexander,
of Mercer County, Kentucky, my home
place in Fayette County, Kentucky,
consisting of about 32 acres of land
located on the west side of the
Georgetown Pike, where I now live, her
said father and mother as well as her
younger sister, Harriett E. Alexander,
to have the privilege of occupying the
said 32 acres home place with the said
Margaret D. Alexander as a home as
long as the said Margaret may need
them, or as they may agree among
themselves, to have, hold, use and
enjoy all the benefit and income
therefrom by the said Margaret D.
Alexander for and during her natural
life, and to be entitled to full and
complete possession of said farm
immediately after my death.
If the said Margaret D. Alexander
should die leaving a child or children
surviving her, then in that event, the
said 32 acre tract of land shall vest
in fee simple in such child or
children in equal shares to have, hold
and dispose of as such child or
children may see proper, but if the
said Margaret D. Alexander should die
without a child or children surviving
her, then said 32 acre tract of land
shall go to and vest in her younger
sister, Harriett E. Alexander, to
have, hold, use and enjoy all of the
same and all income thereform [sic]
for and during her natural life, her
father and mother, the said James S.
and Katherine Alexander, to have the
privilege of occupying the said home
place of 32 acres of land with the
said Harriett E. Alexander as a home
as long as the said Harriett may need
them, or as they may agree among
themselves, the said Harriett E.
Alexander along with her father and
mother to have and be entitled to
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immediate possession of said farm
immediately after my death, and after
the death of said Harriett E.
Alexander, should the said Margaret D.
Alexander then be dead without leaving
surviving her a child or children as
hereinbefore provided, the said 32
acres farm shall vest in fee simple in
the lawful heirs of said Harriett E.
Alexander, to have, hold, use and
dispose of as such heirs of said
Harriett E. Alexander may see fit and
proper.
ITEM VIII
I will, leave and bequeath to
Georgetown College, . . . in fee
simple, all of my farm of about 71
acres of land located on the
Georgetown Pike in Fayette County,
Kentucky, to be sold and conveyed by
said college in due time and the
proceeds thereof to be added to and
become a part of the permanent
endowment fund of said college. . . .
And also, if, after all other bequests
hereinbefore set out and provided for
have been paid, settled and satisfied,
there should remain other or
additional money or funds in the hands
of my executor than that herein
devised or bequeathed, I will and
bequeath such other or additional
funds or money to said Georgetown
College and the same shall be paid to
said College and shall be added to and
become a part of the permanent
endowment fund of said college, in
addition to the proceeds of sale of
the aforesaid 71 acre farm.
At the time of the testatrix’s death, she was
unmarried and had no children [footnote omitted],
and was 79 years of age. Her parents were also
then deceased, and she apparently had no living
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siblings. . . . [T]he testatrix’s second cousin,
James S. Alexander’s two daughters were Margaret
D. Alexander, born March 8, 1918 [footnote
omitted] and Harriett E. Alexander, born November
8, 1920 [footnote omitted]. When the Will was
executed in 1934, Margaret was 16 . . . and
Harriett was 13. . . . Both Margaret and
Harriett survived the testatrix, with Harriett
Alexander dying on June 24, 1992, and Margaret
Alexander dying on May 10, 2001. Both Harriett
and Margaret died unmarried and without issue.
This action was originally instituted pursuant to
KRS Chapter 389A in order to sell the 32
acres. . . . The proceeds of that sale currently
held by the Master Commissioner of the Fayette
Circuit Court are approximately $1,300,000 (the
“Fund”).[1] The claimants to the Fund are (1)
the heirs of Mattie Anderson, the First
Intervening Plaintiffs (the “Anderson heirs”),
who are a class represented by David Alexander
Russell, Julia Russell Leggett, Virginia Lockett
Russell, Cordelia Kubale, Harriett Donahue, Mary
Lockett Ramft, Donald Donahue, and Stuart
Alexander, Jr. [footnote 8, provides: All named
Anderson heirs are relatives on the testatrix’s
maternal side. The Court’s opinion is that any
heirs on the paternal side are virtually
represented by these claimants. . . .] (2)
Georgetown College, the Second Intervening
Plaintiff (“the College”), and the (3) the heirs
1
By order of February 9, 1989, the Fayette Circuit Court found
that under Will, Margaret D. Alexander is life tenant to the
subject premises; that the remaindermen and other parties
entitled thereto cannot be determined until Margaret’s death and
may include persons not yet born; that sale of the property for
the purchase price of $1,000,000.00 is in the best interest of
all the parties, including any unborn persons; further, that the
interest of the life tenant should continue “as to the funds
derived from the sale and that said proceeds should be
reinvested and income therefrom distributed as set forth in KRS
389A.030(6).” The circuit court approved the sales agreement,
and directed that the remaining sums from the sale of the
property, after payment of the real estate commission and costs,
be held by the Master Commissioner, subject to further orders of
court.
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of Harriett Alexander, the Defendants (“the
Alexander heirs”), John S. Alexander, Andrew B.
Alexander, and James G. Alexander [footnote 9
provides: The Alexander heirs are a part of the
broader group of heirs of Mattie Anderson. If
the claim of the Anderson heirs prevails, the
Alexander heirs would share proportionately. If
the claim of the Alexander heirs prevails, they
take to the exclusion of the other Anderson
heirs.]
In interpreting wills, courts are guided by the
principle that the testatrix’s intention must be
determined by language of the will. Clarke v.
Kirk, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 936, 938 (1990). If the
language used is a reasonably clear expression of
intent, then the inquiry need go no further. Id.
The court is limited to the four corners of the
document. Brunson v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
Ky. App., 752 S.W.2d 316, 317 (1988). The
question is not what did the testatrix intend,
but what she actually did by the express terms of
the Will, giving the language used its ordinary
meaning. Scheinman v. Marx¸ Ky., 437 S.W.2d 504,
508 (1969).
Under Item II of the Will, the testatrix created
a life estate in favor of her cousin,
Margaret . . . with a remainder in favor of
Margaret’s children. In the even Margaret died
without children, the testatrix provided that
Harriett was to have a life estate, “and after
the death of said Harriett . . . should the said
Margaret . . . then be dead without leaving”
surviving children, fee simple title to vest in
the lawful heirs of Harriett. The issue in this
case is caused by the fact that Harriett
predeceased Margaret.
The trial court relied upon Andrew’s Executrix v.
Spruill2 for two “well known and oft cited” rules of
construction, namely:
2
271 Ky. 516, 112 S.W.2d 402, 408-409 (1937).
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(1) An intention to dispose of the entire estate
is presumed, and this presumption is overcome
only where the intention to do so is plain,
unambiguous, or necessarily implied; and (2) in
the event of ambiguity, the law favors a
construction of the will which disposes of the
entire estate of the testatrix.
Noting that the language expressing a remainder in
favor of Harriett’s heirs was “no more or less” ambiguous than
that in Spruill, the trial court concluded:
Margaret had a life estate, with a remainder in
favor of her children; upon the failure of that
class, the testatrix created a life estate in
favor of Harriett, and upon the death of both
Harriett and Margaret, a remainder in favor of
the heirs of Harriett. The phrase “should the
said Margaret D. Alexander then be dead without
leaving her a child or children as hereinbefore
provided” does not require Harriett to survive
Margaret in order for Harriett’s heirs to take
the remainder, but rather reaffirms that the
primary beneficiaries of the farm were Margaret
and her children, if any, and expresses that
Harriett’s heirs were subject to a continuing
life estate in favor of Margaret, if Margaret
were still living. The phrase also mandates that
the class of Harriett’s heirs is to be determined
following the death of Margaret.
* * *
[T]he Court is of the opinion that the language
of the Will, taken as a whole, manifests an
intention on the part of the testatrix to leave
the 32 acre farm to . . . Harriett’s heirs
following the death of both Harriett and
Margaret, it is unnecessary to decide between the
claims of the College and the Anderson heirs with
respect to whether the reversion passes to the
Anderson heirs in intestacy, or to the College
under the provisions of Item VIII of the Will, or
whether certain Anderson heirs are excluded by
the terms of the Will.
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The trial court granted the Alexander heirs’ motion
for summary judgment, denied the motion of the other parties,
and directed the Master Commissioner to pay the funds held in
three equal shares to the heirs at law of Harriett E. Alexander
as determined on May 10, 2001, namely John S., Andrew B. and
James G. Alexander.
On March 29, 2002, Georgetown College filed a notice
of appeal to this Court (No. 2002-CA-000651-MR); on April 8,
2002, Cross-Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court
(No. 2002-CA-000735-MR, which has been designated as the crossappeal).
On that same date, Cross-Appellants filed an amended
notice of appeal, “for the purpose of correcting the style of
the action to reflect the matter consolidated with the original
action.”
On appeal, Georgetown College asserts that the trial
court erred by failing to give effect to the Will language and
making the devises in Item II substitutional; further, that the
proceeds pass to the College under the residuary clause of the
Will.
Cross-Appellants assert that the trial court erred by
failing to rule that the proceeds held by the Master
Commissioner pass to them under KRS 394.500, because both
contingent remainders failed.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment
is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
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genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
There is no
requirement that we defer to the trial court, because factual
findings are not at issue.3
First we address Georgetown College’s argument that
the trial court “violated” rules of construction in construing
the life estates to Margaret and Harriett as successive instead
of substitutional.
Georgetown College insists that the trial
court failed to recognize the “substitution strategy used by
attorney Thompson in drafting Mattie Anderson’s Will.”
According to Georgetown College, “[t]he Will language which
compels this result is the requirement that the life estate to
Harriett . . . take effect immediately upon Matter [sic]
Alexander’s death.” (Emphasis original.)
Georgetown College
reasons that because Margaret was alive when Mattie died, the
alternate present devise to Harriett was “inoperative and a
nullity.”
Georgetown College submits that a reversion in the
proceeds was created in Mattie Anderson’s Estate, because the
only effective devise was Margaret’s life estate.
We disagree.
The trial court states that “[u]nder Item II of the
Will, the testatrix created a life estate in favor
3
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
-9-
of . . . Margaret . . ., with a remainder in favor of Margaret’s
children.
In the event Margaret died without children, the
testatrix provided that Harriett was to have a life
estate. . . .”
The trial court rejected Georgetown College’s
argument that the gift to Harriett, and subsequently her heirs,
was conditioned upon Margaret’s prior death.
The court noted
the relative ages of Mattie, Margaret and Harriett, at the time
the Will was prepared, citing Jennings v. Jennings,4 to the
effect that extrinsic evidence is permitted to describe the
conditions surrounding the testatrix, so that the interpreter
might better appreciate her situation and discern her intent.
The trial court viewed neither the language of Item II, nor the
circumstances surrounding the Testatrix at the time she executed
the Will, as supporting Georgetown College’s argument.
we.
Nor do
Moreover, we believe that Section 4 of Item II further
supports the trial court’s interpretation.
In that paragraph,
Mattie bequeathed to Margaret, or to her guardian if Margaret
was not yet 21 years old, the sum of $500.00 to be paid in cash,
as soon as possible after Mattie’s death:
[R]ealizing that after my death the said Margaret
is to occupy the said 32 acre tract of land as a
home and it will be necessary to have some ready
money with which to seed, stock or equip said
farm, or make minor repairs, or to cover
necessary expenses of planting, producing or
harvesting and marketing a crop, . . . .
4
299 Ky. 779, 782, 187 S.W.2d 459, 462 (1945).
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By contrast, no such provision was made for Harriett.
The provision of “ready money” for Margaret, and the lack of any
“ready money” for Harriett to take care of the 32-acre tract,
detracts from any argument that the devises to the two sisters
were substitutional.
As is said in 23 R. C. L. 552:
"Concurrent or alternative contingent remainders
or contingent remainders with a double aspect are
created by limitations to one for life, with
remainder in fee to his children or issue or
heirs, and in default of such children, issue, or
heirs, to another."5
In his chapter on future interests, Moynihan explains:
A remainder is a future interest created in a
transferee which can become a present possessory
estate only on the expiration of a prior estate
created in favor of another transferee by the
same instrument. [footnote omitted]. Thus, A
owning Blackacre in fee simple conveys it “to B
for life and then to C and his heirs.” B has a
possessory life estate, called the particular
estate, and C has a remainder in fee simple. C’s
future interest was originally called a remainder
because on the expiration of B’s life estate the
land “remained” away from A, the transferor,
instead of reverting to him. At common law the
number of remainders which can be created is
unlimited. [footnote omitted] Thus, A might
convey to B for life, then to C for life, then to
D for life, then to E and the heirs of his body,
then to F and his heirs. All of the transferees
except B have remainders since the interest of
each can become a possessory estate upon the
5
Moorman's Ex'r and Trustee v. Board of Sup'rs of Jefferson
County, 192 Ky. 242, 232 S.W. 379, 380 (1921).
-11-
expiration of the prior estates.6
Upon Mattie’s death, Margaret had a possessory life
estate in the subject 32 acres, and Harriet and Harriet’s heirs
had alternative remainders, contingent upon Margaret’s dying
without child or children surviving her.
Cross-Appellants assert that the contingent remainder
to Harriet’s heirs failed, and that they are entitled to the
proceeds as Mattie Anderson’s heirs at law under KRS 394.500.
They contend that the reference to Harriet’s “lawful heirs” is
to lineal descendants, rather than to collateral heirs, and that
Harriet died without lineal descendants.
Further, Cross-
Appellants contend that to “construe ‘heirs’ to mean Harriett’s
collateral heirs under the laws of descent and distribution
would grant a fee interest in Margaret, since Margaret survived
Harriett as one of her heirs.”
We agree with the trial court’s analysis that the term
“lawful heirs” is to be given its technical meaning.
Appellants’ argument fails for several reasons.
Cross-
First, it
disregards the fact that the Will was prepared by an attorney
who, as the trial court stated, “presumably knew the difference
between the terms ‘heirs’ and ‘children.’”
The attorney used
those different terms in Item II of the Will referring to
Margaret’s death without surviving “child or children” and
6
Moynihan, Real Property §13, pp. 117-18 (2nd Ed. 1988).
-12-
referring to the “lawful heirs” of Harriett.
Moreover,
Harriett’s “lawful heirs” could not include Margaret, contrary
to Cross-Appellants’ reasoning, because Harriett’s life estate
could only take effect upon Margaret’s death without child or
children surviving her.
The contingent remainder to Margaret’s child or
children was not extinguished until Margaret died, childless.
“The possibility of issue is never considered
extinguished. . . .
[W]omen are presumed capable of having
children as long as they live.”7
At the time of Margaret’s
death, Harriett was already dead.
The contingent remainder in
Harriett’s heirs did not then fail, it vested.
We are not
persuaded by the Cross-Appellants’ argument that Harriet
surviving Margaret was a condition precedent to Harriett’s heirs
taking the remainder.
Were we to construe the Will as Cross-
Appellants urge, Mattie Anderson would have died intestate as to
her own home place.
Kentucky law holds that “[t]here is a
presumption against intestacy, and when two possible
constructions of a will present themselves, the one which
results in complete testacy should prevail.”8
The trial court’s
7
Aulick v. Summers, 186 Ky. 810, 217 S.W. 1024, 1025 (1920);
Walton v. Lee, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 159 (1982).
8
McKee v. Johnson, Ky. 312 S.W.2d 902, 903 (1958).
-13-
construction -- that the language of the Will does not require
Harriett to survive Margaret -- results in complete testacy.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly
construed the language of the Will as manifesting an intention
to leave the 32-acre farm to Harriett’s heirs, following the
death of both Harriett and Margaret.
We do not reach the
remaining issues raised by Georgetown College and the CrossAppellants.
The Opinion and Order of the Fayette Circuit Court
entered March 15, 2002, is affirmed.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BAKER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS
APPELLEE, GEORGETOWN COLLEGE:
Mark T. MacDonald
Karen Greenwell
Tracy Todd Blevins
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
GEORGETOWN COLLEGE:
Karen Greenwell
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSS
APPELLEES, JOHN ALEXANDER,
ANDREW ALEXANDER, JAMES
ALEXANDER AND GLADYS
ALEXANDER:
Foster Ockerman, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES/CROSS APPELLEES,
JOHN ALEXANDER, ANDREW
ALEXANDER, JAMES ALEXANDER AND
GLADYS ALEXANDER:
Foster Ockerman, Jr.
Madeline Taylor Baugh
Lexington, Kentucky
-14-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/CROSS
APPELLANTS, DAVID ALEXANDER
RUSSELL, JULIA RUSSELL
LEGGETT, VIRGINIA LOCKETT
RUSSELL, HARRIETT DONAHUE,
MARY LOCKETT RAMFT, DONALD
DONAHUE, III, STUART
ALEXANDER, JR., AND CORDELIA
KUBALE:
Glen S. Bagby
J. Robert Lyons, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES/CROSS APPELLANTS,
DAVID ALEXANDER RUSSELL,
JULIA RUSSELL LEGGETT,VIRGINIA
LOCKETT RUSSELL, HARRIETT
DONAHUE, MARY LOCKETT RAMFT,
DONALD DONAHUE III, STUART
ALEXANDER, JR., AND CORDELIA
KUBALE:
J. Robert Lyons, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
-15-
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