ROBERT BYRD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000600-MR
ROBERT BYRD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Robert Byrd has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence entered by the Clark Circuit Court on
March 14, 2001, following his conditional plea of guilty1 to the
charge of theft by unlawful taking over $300.00.2
Byrd claims
that certain incriminating statements he made to his neighbor,
Ernest Estes, were required as part of an agreement with police,
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.030.
and therefore, use of them to incriminate him would be violative
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.3
Having concluded that the statements made by Byrd
to Estes were independent of any agreement with the police, that
the statements did not involve state action, and that the
statements were freely and voluntarily given, we affirm.
The evidence at the suppression hearing showed that on
July 11, 2000, Robert Byrd stole a John Deere lawn tractor from
Estes’s yard in Winchester, Kentucky.4
On the same day, several
firearms were reported missing from Dennis Tankersley’s
residence in Clark County, Kentucky.
Shortly thereafter, the
Clark County Sheriff’s Department began investigating the
missing firearms.
During the course of the investigation,
Detective Arlen Horton of the Clark County Sheriff’s Department
received information suggesting that Byrd and Joey Johnson may
have been involved in the theft of the firearms.
Johnson was
already in custody due to his involvement in an unrelated
burglary.
Det. Horton then decided to contact Byrd in an effort
to solidify his case against Johnson and to obtain further
information related to the Tankersley burglary.
3
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the
use at trial of any statements obtained from a suspect as a result of police
coercion. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3
L.E.2d 1265 (1959). Moreover, the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination contains a similar prohibition. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000).
4
The tractor was valued at over $2,000.00.
-2-
On Friday, September 8, 2000, Det. Horton attempted to
locate Byrd at his aunt’s house.
Byrd’s aunt, Mattie Byrd,
informed Det. Horton that Byrd was working with his father and
that she would be happy to accompany him to Byrd’s place of
employment.
Det. Horton then proceeded to Byrd’s place of
employment and when he arrived he asked Byrd if he would be
willing to speak with him.
Det. Horton then read Byrd his
Miranda5 rights and Byrd orally agreed to waive his rights.6
Byrd was placed in the front seat of Det. Horton’s vehicle and
his aunt was placed in the back of the vehicle.
Byrd’s father
was also present during the interview.
Det. Horton asked Byrd what he knew about the
Tankersley burglary and Byrd told him that he was not present
when the firearms were stolen.
Byrd did, however, state that on
July 7, 2001, Johnson called him and informed him that he had
two guns and that he needed some help selling the guns.
Byrd
further stated that after speaking with Johnson he picked him up
and they sold the guns.
Det. Horton informed Byrd that he would
not charge him as an accomplice if he came into the Sheriff’s
office on Monday, September 11, 2000, gave a written statement,
and agreed to testify against Johnson at trial.
More precisely,
Det. Horton testified that he told Byrd that “since you just
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
6
Byrd also signed a written waiver.
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gave him [Johnson] a ride and stuff; took him up there so he
could get rid of them; I’m not going to charge you.
I can
charge you as an accomplice or for complicity, but I’m not going
to if you’re willing to testify.”
Det. Horton also informed
Byrd that if he was involved in any other crimes, “this was the
time to tell [him].”
On Monday, September 11, 2000, Byrd went to the Clark
County Sheriff’s office.
Det. Horton then informed Byrd of his
rights, and Byrd’s aunt, who was present throughout the
interview, informed Det. Horton that she would like to speak
with her attorney, Larry Roberts, on Byrd’s behalf.
Upon
discussing the situation with Byrd’s aunt, Roberts asked to
speak with Det. Horton, who informed Roberts that he intended to
use Byrd as a state’s witness against Johnson and that Byrd
would not be charged with burglary in the first degree7 if he
cooperated.
Det. Horton also informed Roberts that as a part of
the agreement Byrd was required to divulge everything he knew
about the Tankersley burglary and/or any other crimes he may
have been involved in.
Upon the advice of counsel, Byrd waived his right to
remain silent and proceeded to give a written statement
describing what he purported at that time to be his part in the
Tankersley burglary.
7
In addition to admitting that he had
KRS 511.020.
-4-
helped Johnson sell the stolen firearms, Byrd confessed to
having stolen two loads of lumber from Kroger and to having
stolen a concrete saw from a construction site.
Byrd also
admitted that he had received $50.00 from Johnson for his part
in the fencing of the firearms and he agreed to testify against
Johnson at trial.
Det. Horton informed Byrd that this was his
last chance to “come clean” about everything he knew.
Byrd
again denied being present with Johnson at the Tankersley
residence when the firearms were stolen.
Det. Horton then told
Byrd that he would not charge him for any of the offenses Byrd
admitted to committing in his written statement.
On Wednesday, September 13, 2000, Byrd returned to the
Clark County Sheriff’s office and spoke with Detective Don
Bellamy.8
Det. Bellamy advised Byrd of his rights and Byrd again
agreed to waive his rights.
Byrd then proceeded to tell Det.
Bellamy that he had in fact participated in the Tankersley
burglary with Johnson and that he drove the getaway car and
served as the lookout while Johnson burglarized the Tankersley
residence.
Byrd also informed Det. Bellamy that on July 7,
2000, he had stolen a John Deere lawn tractor from his neighbor,
Ernest Estes, and that he had dumped the tractor in the Kentucky
River.
Det. Bellamy testified at the suppression hearing that
8
Byrd claims that he originally paged Det. Horton who returned his call and
instructed him to go to the Sheriff’s office and to ask to speak with Det.
Bellamy.
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he was not aware of any “deal” Byrd had with Det. Horton when he
interviewed Byrd.
Det. Bellamy immediately called Det. Horton
and advised him of Byrd’s confessions.
Det. Bellamy also
contacted Det. Steve Caudill of the Winchester Police Department
and informed him that Byrd had confessed to stealing Estes’s
lawnmower.9
Det. Horton then came to the Sheriff’s office to speak
with Byrd.
Det. Horton asked Byrd why he lied to him about his
involvement in the Tankersley burglary.
Byrd told him that he
was scared and that he was afraid of going to jail.
Det. Horton
then informed Byrd of his rights and Byrd once again waived his
rights via a written waiver.
Byrd then provided a written
statement detailing his involvement in the Tankersley burglary
and the theft of his neighbor’s lawnmower.
Det. Horton informed
Byrd that he was going to charge him as an accomplice in the
burglary, i.e., criminal facilitation, because he had missed the
deadline for “coming clean” and because he had lied to him on
two previous occasions.
Det. Horton did not charge Byrd for the
crimes he admitted to committing in the written statement he
provided on September 11, 2000, i.e., fencing and theft.
On October 11, 2000, Det. Caudill contacted Byrd’s
parents and informed them that he would like to speak with Byrd
at the Winchester Police Department.
9
Byrd and his parents met
Since the theft of the lawnmower occurred in the City of Winchester, the
Winchester Police Department had jurisdiction over the crime.
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with Det. Caudill that day and Byrd informed the detective that
he would like to speak with his attorney prior to any
questioning.
Det. Caudill acquiesced in Byrd’s request and his
attorney, Larry Roberts, subsequently asked to speak with the
detective over the phone.
Det. Caudill then informed Roberts
that he was unwilling to grant Byrd immunity and that any
incriminating statements he made would be used against him.
Byrd declined to speak any further with Det. Caudill and he was
subsequently charged with the theft of Estes’s lawnmower based
upon the statements he had made to Det. Horton and Det. Bellamy
at the Clark County Sheriff’s office.
Shortly thereafter, Byrd
approached his neighbor, Ernest Estes, and apologized for
stealing his lawnmower.10
Byrd told Estes that he was high on
drugs when he stole the lawnmower and he promised Estes that he
would make restitution.
On January 11, 2001, Byrd was indicted by a Clark
County grand jury for criminal facilitation to commit first
degree burglary11 and theft by unlawful taking over $300.00.
On
April 20, 2001, Byrd filed a motion to suppress the
incriminating statements he had made to Det. Horton and Det.
Bellamy and a motion to dismiss the indictment.
10
A hearing was
The record is unclear as to the day and time Byrd spoke with Estes,
however, it appears this conversation took place sometime in October after
Byrd spoke with Det. Caudill.
11
KRS 506.080(1).
-7-
held on May 11, 2001, after which the trial court granted Byrd’s
motion to suppress and denied his motion to dismiss the
indictment.12
The trial court reasoned that the statements made
by Byrd to Det. Horton and Det. Bellamy “were voluntary only to
the extent that [Byrd] believed he would not be charged for the
crimes to which he confessed.”
The trial court further reasoned
that since the Commonwealth had failed to prove that Byrd’s
confession was voluntary and knowing, that it was tainted and
therefore inadmissible.
The trial court did, however, conclude
that Byrd’s statements to Estes were independent of his
confessions to the police.
Consequently, on February 5, 2002,
Byrd entered a conditional plea of guilty on the theft charge
and the Commonwealth recommended that the facilitation charge be
dismissed.13
On March 14, 2001, the trial court entered its
final judgment and sentence.
Byrd was sentenced to prison for
one year and ordered to pay court costs of $108.00.
This appeal
followed.
Byrd claims on appeal that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment as the statements
he made to Estes were involuntarily given and therefore
12
The order granting Byrd’s motion to suppress his confession and denying his
motion to dismiss the indictment was entered on June 27, 2001.
13
On February 7, 2002, Byrd filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the
indictment, claiming that “[his] offer of restitution and apology to [Estes]
was not an independent act, but rather an action instituted and demanded by
the police.” The trial court entered an order denying Byrd’s motion on
February 8, 2002.
-8-
violative of his due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.14
Byrd claims that his
“offer of restitution and apology to Estes was not an
independent act, but rather an action instituted and demanded by
the police” as a condition of the agreement not to prosecute
him.
The proper standard of review of a trial court’s
ruling on a motion to suppress was stated in Commonwealth v.
Neal:15
An appellate court’s standard of review
of the trial court’s decision on a motion to
suppress requires that we first determine
whether the trial court’s findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence. If
they are, then they are conclusive. Based
on those findings of fact, we must then
conduct a de novo review of the trial
court’s application of the law to those
facts to determine whether its decision is
correct as matter of law [footnotes
omitted].16
Thus, we begin our analysis with the trial court’s findings of
fact.
14
Byrd’s motion to dismiss the indictment was essentially a motion to
suppress the incriminating statements he made to Estes and it will be treated
as such for purposes of this appeal.
15
Ky.App., 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (2002).
16
Id. (citing Adcock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998); and
Commonwealth v. Opell, Ky.App., 3 S.W.3d 747, 751 (1999)).
-9-
After holding a suppression hearing on the
admissibility of Byrd’s confessions to Det. Horton and Det.
Bellamy, the trial court found these incriminating statements to
be inadmissible.
However, the trial court subsequently found
that the incriminating statements Byrd had made to Estes were
voluntary, that they were in his own self-interest, and that
they were not made as part of an agreement with the police.
Therefore, the trial court concluded that the incriminating
statements made by Byrd to Estes were independent of the taint
associated with the confessions Byrd had given to Det. Horton
and Det. Bellamy.
The trial court relied on several factors in
making this finding.
First and foremost, Byrd failed to offer
any testimony at the suppression hearing suggesting that he was
directed by any of the detectives working on his case as part of
an agreement to contact Estes and to apologize or to offer
restitution.
Although Estes testified at the suppression
hearing that on the same afternoon he spoke with Byrd he was
contacted by one of the detectives and informed that he would
get full restitution for his mower within a week, it is
significant that Byrd’s confessions to Det. Horton and Det.
Bellamy occurred on September 8th, 11th, and 13th, and Estes’s
conversation with the police took place in October, at least
three weeks later.17
17
Moreover, Estes was not even sure which detective he spoke with. If Estes
-10-
In addition, as the Commonwealth amply brings to
light, Byrd’s own attorney even stated in open court that he was
the one who told Byrd to apologize to Estes and to offer
restitution.
This fact alone negates Byrd’s argument on appeal
that his “offer of restitution and apology to Estes was not an
independent act, but rather an action instituted and demanded by
the police.”
Thus, we hold that the trial court’s findings of
fact in this regard are supported by substantial evidence and
not clearly erroneous.
Consequently, the question now becomes,
“whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is
or is not violated.”18
Byrd claims the statements he made to Estes were
involuntary as they were a product of an agreement he had
entered into with Det. Horton.
Specifically, Byrd claims Det.
Horton assured him that he would be granted immunity for any
statements he made concerning criminal activity.19
Byrd relies
on Canler v. Commonwealth,20 to support his argument that any
statement obtained by law enforcement officials in violation of
had spoken with Det. Caudill as opposed to Det. Horton or Det. Bellamy,
Byrd’s argument would be even more suspect as Det. Caudill specifically
declined to enter into any immunity agreement with Byrd.
18
Adcock, 967 S.W.2d at 8. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).
19
While Kentucky does not recognize the concept of “immunity” as promised by
the prosecution, it does require the prosecution to honor its agreement not
to prosecute. Commonwealth v. Blincoe, Ky.App., 34 S.W.3d 822 (2000).
20
Ky., 870 S.W.2d 219 (1994).
-11-
an express agreement between the police and a defendant will be
deemed involuntary and therefore inadmissible.
We agree with
Byrd’s reading of Canler as it is well settled that any
statements obtained by police coercion or deception will be
deemed involuntary under the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
However, we do not believe the statements made by Byrd to Estes
were the product of any police coercion or deception.
Moreover,
we are of the opinion that the factual scenario present in
Canler is clearly distinguishable from the case sub judice.
Canler involved an involuntary confession that was
obtained in violation of an express agreement between the police
and the defendant, Jeffery Canler.
Canler was suspected of
criminal abuse pertaining to a five-month-old infant his wife
was babysitting.
After consulting with an attorney, Canler
agreed to submit to a polygraph examination in an effort to
clear his name.
The agreement was specifically conditioned on
the requirement that “there not be any questions other than the
polygraph test itself.”21
Due to a conflict in his schedule,
Canler’s attorney was not present during the examination.
However, prior to the examination, Canler did sign a waiver that
included his Miranda rights.
Following the actual examination,
which lasted approximately seven to ten minutes, the examiner
21
Id. at 220.
-12-
proceeded to question Canler for approximately two hours, and,
as a result, Canler admitted to abusing the infant.22
The trial court suppressed Canler’s confession, but
the Court of Appeals reversed in a 2-1 decision.
The majority
opinion reasoned that since Canler had initiated the
interrogation by agreeing to take the polygraph test, he invited
the examiner to ask any questions pertaining to the alleged
abuse of the child.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed and
reversed the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court concluded that
the trial court had properly found that Canler had not assumed
at the time he took the polygraph test that any other questions
would be asked of him after the examination had ended.
The
Supreme Court noted that “[Canler’s] attorney clearly requested
and received a specific agreement to the effect that no
questions, other than those relating to the polygraph test,
would be asked.”23
The Supreme Court also placed a great deal of
emphasis on the fact that one of the detectives involved in the
case testified that he intended to obtain a confession from
Canler as a result of the polygraph examination.
The Supreme
Court was simply unwilling to allow a confession that had been
obtained in violation of an express agreement with the police to
be allowed as evidence.
22
Id. at 221.
23
Id.
-13-
In the case sub judice, Byrd claims that “[l]ike
Canler, [he] and his counsel were given assurances on which [he]
relied when making his apology to Mr. Estes.”
his statement to Estes “was involuntary.”
Thus, Byrd claims
However, the record
is devoid of any evidence indicating that Det. Horton ever
informed Byrd that he would be granted immunity for any
incriminating statements he made to Estes concerning the theft
of the lawnmower.24
In fact, Det. Horton informed Byrd on
September 13, 2001, that he was going to charge him as an
accomplice in the burglary, i.e., criminal facilitation, because
he had missed the deadline for “coming clean” and because he had
lied to him on two previous occasions.
Thus, Byrd’s reliance on
Canler is clearly misplaced as the police coercion and deception
that was present in Canler is absent in the case sub judice as
there was no agreement between Byrd and Det. Horton concerning
the statements he made to Estes.
Byrd argues on appeal that “[t]he underlying, premier
question before this Court is to determine whether or not the
statement to Mr. Estes was in fact made before or after the
confession made to the police.”
Even if we were to accept
Byrd’s framing of the issue, there is not overwhelming evidence
in support of Byrd’s contention that the detectives involved in
24
The underlying agreement in Canler was critical to the Supreme Court’s
holding.
-14-
this investigation required him to apologize to Estes and to
offer him restitution.
Similarly, we do not believe the
detectives ever informed Byrd that he would be granted immunity
for any incriminating statements he made to Estes concerning the
theft of the lawnmower.
The evidence showed that Det. Horton
informed Byrd on September 13, 2001, that he was going to charge
him as an accomplice in the burglary, i.e., criminal
facilitation, because he had missed the deadline for “coming
clean” and because he had lied to him on two previous occasions.
Thus, Byrd has failed to demonstrate that the statements he made
to Estes were obtained by state action, much less as a result of
any coercive conduct on the part of the police.
Byrd’s claim also fails because there was not
sufficient state action or police coercion so as to render his
statements to Estes involuntary.
It is a well settled principle
that only state action implicates a defendant’s rights under the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution.25
As was stated by the United States Supreme Court
in Connelly:
25
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473
(1986). Connelly was adopted for purposes of the Kentucky Constitution in
Commonwealth v. Cooper, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 75, 76 (1995). See also Adkins v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 779, 790-91 (2003); and Fields v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 12 S.W.3d 275, 283 (2000).
-15-
The most outrageous behavior by a
private party seeking to secure evidence
against a defendant does not make that
evidence inadmissible under the Due Process
Clause [citations omitted].
. . .
We hold that coercive police activity
is a necessary predicate to the finding that
a confession is not “voluntary” within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . .26
Moreover, the same result has been reached under the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
As was stated
by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad:27
“Indeed, far from being prohibited by the
Constitution, admissions of guilt by
wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently
desirable . . . [.] Absent some officially
coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment
privilege is not violated by even the most
damning admissions.”
As was stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Illinois:28
“We need not hold that all evidence is
‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because
it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is
‘whether, granting establishment of the
26
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-167.
27
470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291, 84 L.E.2d 222 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 52
L.Ed.2d 238 (1977)).
28
422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)(quoting Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963)).
-16-
primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguished
to be purged of the primary taint’”
[citations omitted].
We believe the incriminating statements Byrd made to
Estes are “sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.”
Byrd spoke with Estes only after consulting
with his attorney and his attorney even admitted in open court
that he was the one who told Byrd to apologize to Estes and to
offer restitution.
For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment
and sentence of the Clark Circuit Court is affirmed.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Larry S. Roberts
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-17-
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