UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION v. KAREN HOLROYD BULT, Individually BULT; LEE E. SITLINGER; and SITLINGER, McGLINCY, STEINER, THEILER & KAREM
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JUNE 6, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: June 27, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000482-MR
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN K. MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-000120
v.
KAREN HOLROYD BULT, Individually
and as Executrix of the Estate of
ASHLEY HOLROYD BULT; CRAIG BETENSON
BULT; LEE E. SITLINGER; and SITLINGER,
McGLINCY, STEINER, THEILER & KAREM
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
United Services Automobile Association (USAA)
appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court following
a jury verdict in favor of Craig and Karen Bult.
The Bults had
filed a complaint alleging bad faith on the part of USAA in
settling an insurance claim.
USAA also appeals from the post-
trial award of the Bults’ attorney’s fees.
We reverse and
remand.
On the evening of July 18, 1997, Ashley Bult, the
fifteen-year-old daughter of the Bults, was critically injured
in a single-vehicle accident.
She was a passenger in an
automobile owned by Hal and Cheryl Metcalfe and operated by the
Metcalfes’ son, Chad Metcalfe.
Chad had obtained his driver’s
license less than three weeks before the accident.
He admitted
that he was “going for a thrill” as he drove at an excessive
rate of speed in an attempt to render the vehicle airborne at a
railroad crossing.
Chad lost control of the car, and it
collided with a tree.
The impact occurred at the rear passenger
door where Ashley was seated.
injuries.
Ashley sustained grievous head
She never regained consciousness and died the
following day.
Two other passengers in the car, Jennifer Lord
and Natasha Maze, also sustained serious physical injuries as a
result of the accident.
Both the Metcalfes and the Bults carried their
automobile insurance coverage with USAA.
notified USAA of the accident.
The Metcalfes immediately
On Saturday, July 19, 1997, a
USAA representative contacted the parents of all of the injured
passengers -- including Craig Bult -- to inform them of USAA’s
involvement.
On Monday, July 21, 1997, John Moriarty, a senior
claims adjuster for USAA, was assigned to handle the claims
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arising from the accident.
He mailed forms to all those injured
in the accident in order to initiate the payment of basic
reparations benefits (BRB’s).
Cheryl Metcalfe suggested that
Moriarty let some time pass before contacting the Bults again.
Moriarty waited a few days before telephoning the
Bults’ home on August 8, 1997.
He testified that Karen Bult
informed him that she and her husband did not want to discuss
insurance matters at that time.
At trial, Karen acknowledged
receiving the call from Moriarty.
However, she disagreed with
Moriarty’s recollection of what transpired.
Karen disputed
expressing any disinclination to discuss insurance matters;
rather, she testified that she told the adjuster that her
husband handled such matters and that Moriarty should contact
him.
She also testified that she did not mention the call to
her husband.
Moriarty did not hear from the Bults after his
telephone call of August 8.
He phoned a second time on October
9, 1997, and again spoke with Karen.
He informed Karen of the
$100,000 limit of liability available under the Metcalfes’
policy and the availability of a seat belt death benefit of
$15,000.1
He also reminded her that she and her husband had not
1
The figures of $15,000 and $25,000 are used interchangeably and
contradictorily with reference to the seat belt benefit. A summary at
Exhibit 20 (page 4) of the appellant’s brief reveals that a check for $25,000
was issued in error when in reality the seat belt benefit was for $15,000.
Moriarty had been proceeding under the mistaken belief that the Metcalfes’
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yet filed a claim for underinsured motorist coverage (UIM)
and/or other benefits available under their own automobile
policy.
He requested that they send him a death certificate and
a short biography of Ashley.
Moriarty testified that Karen
replied that she would relay the information to Craig and that
they would be in touch with him.
At trial, Karen recalled
discussing some of these coverages with Moriarty.
Once again,
she testified that she referred Moriarty to her husband as she
had following the previous contact.
Although she did inform
Craig of this call, he did not return Moriarty’s call.
Nor did
the Bults send the requested documents.
Finally, on October 23, 1997, after having heard
nothing from the Bults, Moriarty sent them a certified letter.
First expressing his sympathy at Ashley’s death, Moriarty
informed them as follows:
We are the insurance company for Hal G.
Metcalf[e]. Mr. Metcalf[e]’s Liability
Policy has a $100,000 limit as well as a
Seat Belt Death Benefit of $25,000.2 I am
prepared to offer you those amounts at this
time.
Since you are USAA members, I have taken the
liberty of opening a claim under your
Underinsured Motorist Policy.
vehicle was equipped with air bags, which would have entitled the Bults to
the $25,000 benefit. For death to a passenger wearing a seat belt where air
bags were not involved, the benefit was $15,000 instead of $25,000.
2
Refer again to footnote one.
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I realize that you are dealing with a
difficult loss, and I look forward to
hearing from you when the time is right.
Instead of responding to this letter, the Bults
conferred with two attorneys.
In early November 1997, they
contracted with the appellee, Lee Sitlinger, for legal
representation.
On December 10, 1997, nearly five months after
the accident, the Bults, through their attorney, made their
first demand for benefits under their own policy.
They
requested only the payment of no-fault payments, submitting for
payment some of the medical bills incurred as a result of
Ashley’s hospitalization.
The Bults did not mention Moriarty’s
offer to set up an UIM file.
In his response to Sitlinger’s letter of December 10,
1997, Moriarty sent a letter on December 22, 1997, outlining his
unsuccessful efforts to establish communication with the Bults.
He informed Sitlinger that he would be on vacation until after
the holidays and promised to resolve the Bults’ claims “in an
amicable fashion” upon his return to the office.
In January
1998, Moriarty began paying the outstanding medical bills
presented to him.
On February 23, 1998, USAA sent a check for
$28,306.87 to Anthem, the Bults’ health insurer, to which the
hospital had submitted its bills.
Thereafter, between the
middle of February and the first of May of 1998, USAA paid the
Bults the amounts due under their policy in the order in which
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they were demanded by their attorney.
By the first week in May,
the Bults had received all of the benefits to which they were
entitled under their own policy, including: $300,000 in UIM
benefits, $70,000 in BRB’s, and $15,000 -- the seat belt death
benefit.
On January 8, 1998, the Bults filed a claim in the
Jefferson Circuit Court against Hal, Cheryl, and Chad Metcalfe.
Karen, as administratrix of Ashley’s estate, sought damages for
Ashley’s wrongful death; both Karen and Craig sought damages for
their loss of Ashley’s consortium; and Holly Bult, Ashley’s
adult sister, sought damages for the loss of her sister’s
consortium.
On May 12, 1998, the Bults amended their complaint
to allege entitlement to $200,000 of UIM coverage provided by
the Metcalfes’ policy.
They had by now received $300,000, the
limits of UIM coverage under their own policy.
In September
1998, the Bults received permission to file a second amended
complaint in which they sought to hold CSX Transportation, Inc.,
jointly liable for Ashley’s injuries.
They alleged that CSX was
aware of the “dangerous, hazardous and unsafe condition” of the
railroad crossing where the accident occurred.
The trial was scheduled to commence in April, 1999.
Prior to trial, the court dismissed Holly Bult’s claim for loss
of her sister’s consortium.
Citing Pridham v. State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co., Ky. App., 903 S.W.2d 909 (1995) (review denied),
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the trial court granted USAA’s motion for summary judgment on
the first amended complaint, finding no liability on the part of
USAA to the Bults for $200,000 of UIM coverage provided by the
Metcalfes’ policy.3
Finally, it granted CSX’s motion for summary
judgment on the issue of its liability.4
The only claims remaining to be resolved were the
Bults’ negligence claims against the Metcalfes.
were settled on the morning of trial as follows:
These items
the Metcalfes
agreed to pay the Bults $25,000 immediately and to give the
Bults a note for an additional $25,000 to be paid within six
months and to be secured by a lien on the Metcalfes’ home5; the
Metcalfes agreed (as previously offered by USAA on October 23,
1997) to pay the Bults $100,000, the maximum amount of liability
coverage in the Metcalfes’ USAA policy; the Metcalfes agreed to
assign to the Bults any bad faith claim they may have against
USAA; and the Bults agreed to release the Metcalfes from any
further action or claims.
Although the parties agreed that the
Metcalfes would be entirely released by the payment of $150,000
3
The rule of Pridham dictates that where a passenger in a one-car accident
has recovered policy liability limits, no UIM will be available.
4
The Bults appealed the summary judgment in favor of the railroad. On
November 3, 2000, this Court reversed the judgment, holding that the
testimony of the Bults’ expert, if believed, could support an apportionment
of the fault for the fatal accident against CSX. On June 21, 2001, the Bults
settled their claim against CSX for $200,000.
5
After obtaining a financial statement from the Metcalfes, the Bults agreed
to reduce the Metcalfes’ personal contribution to a one-time payment of
$35,000.
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(later reduced to $135,000), they agreed that a bench trial
would be conducted to determine the actual amount of damages
suffered by the Bults.
Even though all of the defendants either
had been dismissed from the lawsuit or had been released by
settlement, the trial court agreed to permit the Bults to have a
trial in order to ascertain the damages to which they might have
been entitled had they not settled.
On June 10, 1999, the court entered a judgment in
which it determined that the Bults had sustained damages in the
amount of $2,313,071.20.6
The Bults then filed a third amended
complaint, claiming that USAA had acted in bad faith in its
handling of the Metcalfes’ defense and in its handling of the
first-party benefits owed under the Bults’ insurance policy.
The bad faith claims were tried before a jury in
October 2001.
The Bults asked the jury to award them $1.8
million -- the difference between the trial court’s
determination of damages and the amount that they actually
recovered from USAA.
They sought a similar amount for their
humiliation and embarrassment.
Asking that the jury be
“generous” in setting damages on their first-party claim of bad
6
This amount included the following elements of damage: $7,757.54 for
funeral and burial expenses; $31,268.66 in medical expenses; $100,000 for
Ashley’s mental and physical pain and suffering; $2,049,255 for Ashley’s loss
of power to labor and earn money; $100,000 for the Bults’ loss of consortium;
and $25,000 in punitive damages.
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faith, the Bults urged the jury to send the insurance company a
message by assessing hefty punitive damages.
The jury found in favor of USAA on the assigned claim
and found that the Bults would not have settled their claim
against the Metcalfes for the policy limits -- regardless of the
manner in which USAA handled the claim.
Nonetheless, the jury
found that USAA acted in bad faith in its handling of some of
the benefits to which the Bults were entitled under their own
policy.
Accordingly, it awarded the Bults $100,000 in
compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.
A
judgment of $1,100,000 was entered on October 26, 2001.
On
February 26, 2002, the trial court denied USAA’s motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) or for a new trial.
It also awarded the Bults an additional judgment against USAA in
the amount of $366,667 for their attorney’s fees.
This appeal
followed.
USAA argues that the trial court erred in failing to
grant its motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) based on an absence of
sufficient evidence to support a claim for bad faith.
USAA
contends that the Bults failed to meet their burden of
presenting evidence of the type of gross misconduct necessary to
establish a claim for bad faith in the context of the handling
of insurance claims.
We are compelled to agree with USAA.
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Actions for bad faith insurance claims settlements in
Kentucky may arise either under common law or by way of the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, KRS7 304.12-230.
The
definitive case on the subject is Wittmer v. Jones, Ky., 864
S.W.2d 885 (1993).
Wittmer holds that in order to prevail on a
bad faith claim, the insured must prove the following elements:
(1)
Id. at 890.
the insurer must be obligated to pay
the claim under the terms of the
policy; (2) the insurer must lack a
reasonable basis in law or fact for
denying the claim; and (3) it must be
shown that the insurer either knew
there was no reasonable basis for
denying the claim or acted with
reckless disregard for whether such a
basis existed.
Holding that “there is no such thing as a
‘technical violation’ of the UCSPA,” Wittmer defines and
prescribes the nature of evidence that must exist in order for
the matter to be properly submissible to a jury:
Before the cause of action [for bad faith]
exists in the first place, there must be
evidence sufficient to warrant punitive
damages:
“The essence of the question as to
whether the dispute is merely
contractual or whether there are
tortious elements justifying an award
of punitive damages depends first on
whether there is proof of bad faith and
next whether the proof is sufficient
for the jury to conclude that there was
‘conduct that is outrageous, because of
7
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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the defendant’s evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of
others.’” [Citations omitted.]
(Emphasis added.)
This means there must be sufficient
evidence of intentional misconduct or
reckless disregard of the rights of an
insured or a claimant to warrant submitting
the right to award punitive damages to the
jury. (Emphasis added.)
Id.
See also, Guaranty National Insurance Company v. George,
Ky., 953 S.W.2d 946 (1997), and Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Glass, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 437 (1997, modified 1999).
The evidentiary threshold is high indeed.
Evidence
must demonstrate that an insurer has engaged in outrageous
conduct toward its insured.
Furthermore, the conduct must be
driven by evil motives or by an indifference to its insureds’
rights.
Absent such evidence of egregious behavior, the tort
claim predicated on bad faith may not proceed to a jury.
Evidence of mere negligence or failure to pay a claim in timely
fashion will not suffice to support a claim for bad faith.
Inadvertence, sloppiness, or tardiness will not suffice;
instead, the element of malice or flagrant malfeasance must be
shown.
A review of the evidence presented by the Bults
reveals a complete absence of the type of conduct required to
meet this standard.
The Bults had carried both homeowners and
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automobile insurance coverage with USAA for many years prior to
the accident.
As late as the trial on their claims of bad
faith, they continued to insure their home with USAA.
Although
the Bults made several claims under their automobile insurance
policy over the years, they testified they were unaware that
they were entitled to any sums under their own policy to
compensate them for their daughter’s injuries since the accident
did not involve their vehicle.
Because they were unable to pay
the medical and funeral expenses that they had incurred, they
testified that were humiliated by the receipt of dunning notices
from the providers of those services.
The Bults denied ever receiving the forms mailed by
Moriarty immediately after the accident to commence the payment
of BRB’s.
However, they acknowledged receiving Moriarty’s phone
calls and his letter of October 23, 1997, tendering an offer to
give them the Metcalfes’ policy limits and offering to open a
claim under their own policy for UIM benefits.
They testified
that they did not respond to the letter because friends had
encouraged them to retain legal counsel.
Four expert witnesses testified for the Bults:
John
W. Partlow, an insurance litigation consultant; Michael
McDonald, a former judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court and of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, who had worked as an insurance
claims adjuster in the 1960’s; Martin Huelsmann, a law school
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professor; and Larry Franklin, a practicing attorney.
In
support of their opinions, the experts alluded to one or more of
the following facts which they believed to be elements of bad
faith on the part of USAA:
the insurer’s failure to employ
separate claims adjusters for each of its two insureds;
Moriarty’s initial setting of the reserve for the company’s
liability for Ashley’s death at $75,000; USAA’s failure to
inform the Bults of all the benefits to which they were entitled
under their own policy immediately following the accident;
USAA’s failure to offer the $100,000 liability coverage before
October 23, 1997; Moriarty’s failure to follow by letter his
phone calls of August and October 1997; USAA’s failure to send a
personal representative to the Bults’ home to establish a line
of communication; USAA’s failure to supervise Moriarty more
carefully; the failure of USAA to maintain a sufficient staff to
handle complex claims more promptly; and USAA’s failure to pay
the first-party benefits in a more timely manner.
The Bults contend that this lengthy recital of alleged
omissions is not merely indicative of bad faith but that it also
constitutes compelling evidence of the insurer’s misconduct.
We
disagree.
It would most assuredly have been the better practice
for USAA to employ two separate adjusters to avoid even the
appearance of a conflict of interest.
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However, the Bults point
to no statutory or common law duty requiring an insurer to
assign two separate claims adjusters under the circumstances
presented in this case.
Moreover, it is undisputed that neither
the Bults nor their attorney requested that a separate adjuster
be assigned to handle their claims.
There is no evidence to
indicate that a separate adjuster to handle the Bults’ firstparty claims would have been more successful than Moriarty in
establishing communication with the Bults.
The Bults admitted
that their refusal to respond to Moriarty’s calls and letters
had no relation to the fact that he was handling the claims of
others involved in the accident.
Representatives of USAA testified that it was the
company’s normal practice to assign separate adjusters in cases
involving a collision among multiple vehicles for which it
provides insurance.
However, it deviated from that policy and
allowed Moriarty to handle all the claims in this matter because
there was only one car involved (eliminating any dispute as to
which driver was at fault) and because there was no question
that the damages would exceed the available limits of coverage
under both policies.
Thus, USAA contends that its decision not
to assign a separate adjuster did not create a conflict of
interest in handling the claims –- nor did it cause any
prejudice to the Bults.
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The Bults’ experts testified that the use of one
adjuster created the potential for the improper handling of
claims because it might enable the adjuster to leverage the
coverages owed under one of the policies against the other.
However, the existence of a mere potential for conflict does not
suffice to meet the burden of proof imposed upon the Bults.
It
was incumbent upon them to prove that USAA did in fact act
improperly in handling their claims.
The potential for mischief
must be shown to have ripened into the reality of tortious
conduct:
We recognized in Wittmer, supra, that to
find bad faith there is a threshold, and the
evidence must be sufficient to establish
that a tort has occurred.
Guaranty National Insurance Company v. George, supra, at 949.
The Bults did not allege nor did they present evidence
that Moriarty (or any other representative of USAA) offered them
any amount less than the total benefits provided for in their
own policy as well as the liability limits of the Metcalfes’
policy.
Thus, there was no evidence of the type of leveraging
suggested by the conjecture of the Bults’ expert witnesses.
While assigning two adjusters might have hastened or expedited
the process of handling the many claims that arose from the
accident, the use of only one did not give rise to any
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reasonable inference that USAA was motivated by evil design or
reckless disregard for the rights of the Bults.
Next, the Bults’ experts found evidence of bad faith
from the amount of reserve set by Moriarty.
While he originally
set a reserve under the Metcalfes’ liability policy at $75,000,
within a matter of days Moriarity’s supervisor increased the
reserve to the full limits of liability of $100,000.
Nevertheless, Judge McDonald testified that:
[w]hether [Moriarty] was low balling it or
not, there’s an inference that he was gonna
try to low ball it and get the thing settled
for $75,000.00.
In a similar vein, attorney Franklin told the jury that by
setting the reserve at $75,000, USAA had created the potential
of cheating the Bults out of their $300,000 of UIM coverage:
Well, I’m a former military person as you’ve
heard and I’m with USAA, too, and I was – I
was outraged to see this kind of conduct by
USAA. It’s not what I want to see from
people that are supposed to represent us
because [setting the reserve] is the first
sign of bad faith. If you got a $100,000.00
coverage and you know the liability’s
absolute and they had this boy’s statement
where he said it was just me, I was driving,
nobody did anything else, and he said,
Ashley’s got her seat belt on and then she
dies and know all of that, that all they got
is $100,000.00, why would you set the
reserve for $75,000?
. . . And the treacherous part to me is if
the family – the Bults were then told well
we have $75,000 for you, if they would’ve
accepted that, it would’ve totally knocked
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out their $300,000 underinsured motorist
they had in their own policy.
Now, the problem with all this is as lay
people we don’t usually know all the
intricacies of policies. You ever read one,
it’ll put you to sleep, boring as can be,
but they had rights and USAA had both
families insured. These are families that
lived together in the same neighborhood,
these are families that prayed together for
their children’s sake at the hospital.
These are families that didn’t need to be
pitted against each other. They just needed
for the company that they both paid their
hard earned money to, to do the right thing
for them, and by setting that limit at
$75,000.00, had they taken it, then the
underinsured motorists couldn’t come into
play because under the law they wouldn’t
have exhausted all the insurance that was
available on the car that she was in.8
Judge McDonald further outlined that the purpose for
setting a reserve is to satisfy state regulatory statutes and to
guarantee that the insurer will have the ability to pay a claim
once its liability has finally been established -- either by
settlement or judgment.
It is certainly possible that the
amount of reserve set by an adjuster could be indicative of bad
faith if the insurer has denied a claim or has attempted to
“low-ball” a claim.
It is undoubtedly a red flag.
8
However, we
This is a small portion of the statements made by attorney Franklin in his
capacity as a witness while standing in front of the jury. USAA objected to
the trial court’s allowing the witness to make a closing-type argument to the
jury as well as to his misstatements about the law concerning underinsured
motorist coverage. Because of our ruling that the evidence was insufficient
to be submitted to the jury in the first instance, it is not necessary for us
to address USAA’s argument that it is entitled to a new trial based on the
prejudice created by Franklin’s alleged misstatement of the law or as to
conduct more befitting counsel than a witness.
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believe that the reserve set in this case did not constitute bad
faith on the part of USAA for two reasons:
(1) the reserve was
very quickly increased by the company after further
investigation; and (2) there was never an actual attempt to
negotiate or to settle the claim for $75,000.
The pitfalls
described in Franklin’s testimony never materialized in the
actual course of conduct by USAA in processing the claim.
The remaining issues about which the Bults’ experts
testified involved:
Moriarty’s failure to follow up his
telephone conversations with letters; his failure to meet with
the Bults in person; and his failure to contact them earlier
than August 8, 1997.
While this evidence would at the most
perhaps indicate neglect on Moriarty’s part, it falls far short
of reckless disregard of the Bults’ rights or of a malevolent
plot to deprive them of the benefits provided by their
automobile insurance policy.
In making the following
observation about the case to the attorneys outside the presence
of the jury, the trial judge accurately reflected upon the
insubstantial nature of these complaints:
I know everybody would agree, it’s just—it’s
just a shame that we’re even here. I – I
mean, if just a few little things would’ve
been done differently, we wouldn’t be here,
and – and I think—USAA can make a very good
argument to the jury. The few little things
that could – would’ve been done differently
to have kept us [away from] here would’ve
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been Mr. Bult picking up the phone and
calling and – and vice versa.
As we have already observed, the evidence reveals that
the Bults received all the benefits to which they were entitled
under their automobile insurance policy by various payments made
between January and May of 1998.
While Moriarty was slow, he
nonetheless secured payment of the various coverages in the
order in which they were demanded by the Bults.
USAA did not
deny a single claim; nor did it deny the limits of coverage in
the Bults’ policy.
In essence, the Bults’ claim of bad faith
narrows down to a delay in their receipt of those payments.
USAA correctly relies on Motorists Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Glass, supra, 996 S.W.2d at 452, which holds that:
mere delay in payment does not amount to
outrageous conduct absent some affirmative
act of harassment or deception. In other
words, there must be proof or evidence
supporting a reasonable inference that the
purpose of the delay was to extort a more
favorable settlement or to deceive the
insured with respect to the applicable
coverage. (Emphasis added.)
Clearly there was some delay9 in making the payments
after demand was made.
as follows:
USAA offered explanations for the delays
the number of claims that Moriarty had to process;
9
The Bults could have invoked the provisions of KRS 304.12-235, which would
have provided 12% interest on the value of the final settlement as well as
reimbursement for a reasonable attorney’s fee for failure to pay a claim to
an insured within thirty days of notice and proof of claim. The Bults
instead elected to pursue a claim pursuant to KRS 304.12-230, the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act, involving the much higher burden of proof
that we have analyzed at some length.
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the confusion created by the health insurance carrier; the
necessity of obtaining a legal opinion on the issue of what is
contemplated by “survivor’s economic loss”; and with respect to
the UIM claim, the multiple tiers of company officials that
Moriarty had to consult in order to obtain authority to issue
the $300,000 draft.
Our search of the record reveals no
evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the
delay that the Bults encountered was designed to either “extort
a more favorable settlement” from them or to conceal the amount
of their coverage.
On the contrary, a fair measure of the delay
is attributable to their own conduct.
The Bults did not dispute
that they made no effort to submit the documentation that
Moriarty requested or to contact anyone at USAA.
In summary, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the Bults and drawing all inferences in their
favor, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence of bad
faith to permit the jury to consider the issue.
Accordingly,
the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed, and
this matter is remanded with directions that the complaint
against USAA be dismissed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Wayne J. Carroll
J. Scott Sweeney
Louisville, Kentucky
Lee E. Sitlinger
Curt L. Sitlinger
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Wayne J. Carroll
Louisville, Kentucky
Lee Sitlinger
Louisville, Kentucky
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