WALTER CALLIHAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND WALTER CALLIHAN, INC. v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
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RENDERED: MAY 2, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
NO.
2002-CA-000347-MR
AND
2002-CA-000502-MR
WALTER CALLIHAN, INDIVIDUALLY
AND WALTER CALLIHAN, INC.
APPELLANTS
APPEALS FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00563
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, PAISLEY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Walter Callihan and Walter Callihan, Inc.
appeal from two orders of the Greenup Circuit Court, one
granting summary judgment in favor of CSX Transportation, Inc.
(CSXT) for trespass and an injunction barring Callihan from
entering on real property owned by CSXT, and the second
dismissing Callihan’s pro se complaint against CSXT and various
entities not a party to this action.
We affirm.
The parties have a long and litigious history owing to
Callihan’s insistence, despite numerous adverse decisions by the
courts of this Commonwealth, on operating a fruit stand on
property owned by CSXT.
In 1981, CSXT’s predecessor in
interest, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, filed an
action for forcible detainer against Callihan in the Greenup
District Court.
A trial was ultimately held and the trial court
entered an order on June 20, 1985, which contained findings that
CSXT owned the real property in question and that Callihan had
committed an unlawful forcible entry.
In addition, the trial
court ordered Callihan to vacate the property.
Callihan did quit the property at some point after the
entry of the June 1985 order.
Subsequently, on November 12,
1993, Callihan filed Articles of Incorporation for a whollyowned corporation, Walter Callihan, Inc., of which he was the
sole shareholder, director, officer, and registered agent.
In
January 1995, Callihan again entered onto the CSXT property and
began operating a fruit stand under the name of Walter Callihan,
Inc.
On June 5, 1996, CSXT filed a motion for a warrant of
restitution and to enforce the District Court’s June 1985 order.
A hearing was held, and the trial court entered a new
order on February 14, 1997, finding that the June 1985 order was
subject to a fifteen year statute of limitations, pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statute 413.090, and that CSXT had acted within
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the prescribed statute of limitations in seeking to enforce the
June 1985 judgment against Callihan.
In addition, the trial
court’s order found that the parties agreed that the only issue
remaining before the court was whether CSXT had waived its right
to enforce the June 1985 judgment by way of laches,
acquiescence, estoppel, waiver or other means.
The court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain equitable
defenses which should have been brought before a Circuit Court;
however, the District Court went on to state that Callihan could
not avail himself of any of these defenses because he admitted
to being in contempt of the June 1985 order.
Finally, the
District Court once again ordered Callihan to vacate the
property.
Callihan appealed the February 1997 order to the
Greenup Circuit Court which affirmed it and remanded the case to
the District Court for further proceedings.
The Kentucky Court
of Appeals subsequently denied Callihan’s request for
discretionary review by an order issued on August 19, 1997.
Subsequently, the District Court entered an order sustaining
CSXT’s motion for a warrant of restitution on November 17, 1997.
Callihan refused to vacate the property, even after being served
with the warrant of restitution, and the District Court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce its order.
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In 1996, while CSXT was seeking a warrant of
restitution ordering Callihan to vacate the property, Callihan
filed a pro se action to quiet title in both the Greenup
District and Circuit Courts naming CSXT and Walter Callihan,
Inc. as defendants.
CSXT’s motions for dismissal of both
actions were granted by the respective trial courts.
The
Greenup Circuit Court dismissed the 1996 quiet title action with
prejudice and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
December 2, 1999, CSXT filed the present action
seeking judgment against Callihan and Walter Callihan, Inc. for
trespass and an injunction barring them from entering,
occupying, operating a business on, or being present in any way
on the property without CSXT’s permission.
CSXT filed a motion
for summary judgment accompanied by an affidavit establishing
ownership of the property and a memorandum of law supporting its
motion.
Callihan filed a response and a defective complaint
against CSXT and various entities which are not parties to this
action.
The Circuit Court granted CSXT’s motion for summary
judgment, entered an injunction against Callihan and Walter
Callihan, Inc., and dismissed Callihan’s complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be grounded.
followed.
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This appeal
In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment,
the moving party must demonstrate that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
Steelvest v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
CSXT included
a sworn affidavit from James Spradlin, a duly authorized officer
and employee of the corporation, with its motion for summary
judgment.
Spradlin’s affidavit outlined the history of
litigation between CSXT and Callihan, including several adverse
decisions by the courts of this Commonwealth determining that
CSXT, not Callihan, owned the property in question.
In
addition, CSXT submitted certified copies of three deeds showing
the transfer of the property from Alva May to Chesapeake and
Ohio, CSXT’s predecessor in interest and copies of the various
court orders finding that CSXT owned the property and ordering
Callihan to vacate it.
Finally, CSXT attached a copy of a
letter to Callihan drafted by its counsel on September 10, 1999,
requesting that he once again vacate the property.
Once CSXT met the initial burden of showing that there
were no genuine issues of material fact, Callihan was obliged to
present “at least some affirmative evidence showing that there
is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
Id. at 482.
Furthermore, in meeting this burden, Callihan had “the
obligation to present affirmative evidence and not rest on his
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‘mere allegations.’”
Swatzell v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 500 (1999).
Callihan represented himself in this action and his response to
CSXT’s motion for summary judgment asserted that the statute of
limitations had expired, that Walter Callihan, Inc. was the
proper party defendant in this action, and that Walter Callihan,
Inc. has had continuous possession of the property since 1981
when, according to Callihan, the property was deeded to Walter
Callihan, Inc.1
Chesapeake and Ohio filed the successful lawsuit
to establish ownership of the property in question in 1981.
The
Greenup District Court found, in its June 1985 order, that CSXT
(which acquired Chesapeake and Ohio’s interest due to a merger)
owned the property in question.
When CSXT sought a warrant of
restitution in 1996, the court further found that Walter
Callihan, individually, was the proper party defendant and that
the June 1985 order was subject to a fifteen year statute of
limitations.
Furthermore, Callihan filed quiet title actions in
both the Greenup District and Circuit Courts in 1996 which were
decided in favor of CSXT.
Clearly, all of Callihan’s defenses
in the present action involve claims which have already been
resolved adversely to his interests by the courts of this
Commonwealth.
Consequently, the trial court correctly
1
Although, Callihan argues that Walter Callihan, Inc. received a general
warranty deed to the property in question in 1981, the Greenup District Court
made a finding that the entity of Walter Callihan, Inc. was created on
November 12,1993.
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determined that Callihan was barred from relitigating his claims
by the doctrine of res judicata.
We now turn our attention towards Callihan’s pro se
attempt to file a complaint against CSXT, its current counsel
and her law firm, the attorney who represented Chesapeake and
Ohio in the 1981 action, and the trial judge in both his
official and individual capacities.
The trial court found that
the claim was procedurally improper and failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be grounded.
Callihan’s complaint was
filed without leave of the trial court and fails to state any
actionable allegations against CSXT.
He does make specific
claims of wrongdoing against the other named defendants;
however, they are not parties to the action at hand and Callihan
did not seek to join any of them.
Therefore, the trial court
acted properly in dismissing Callihan’s complaint pursuant to
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(f) for failure to state a
claim.
For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the Greenup
Circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Walter Callihan, Pro Se
Argillite, Kentucky
Janet Smith Holbrook
Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty,
Porter & Copen
Ashland, Kentucky
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