AMANDA BUTLER v. POLLEY NEACE
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RENDERED: May 30, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000277-MR
AMANDA BUTLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-01055
v.
POLLEY NEACE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
Amanda Butler appeals from an adverse jury
verdict and judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court entered on
November 16, 2001.
Butler filed suit for damages for injuries
she sustained when the automobile she was driving was struck by
a vehicle operated by the appellee, Polley Neace.
Butler
contends that the trial court erred to her substantial prejudice
by failing to instruct the jury on her claim for future pain and
suffering and by failing to declare a mistrial based on her
allegations of juror misconduct.
As we disagree with those
contentions, we affirm.
On November 6, 1998, Butler and Neace were traveling
in separate vehicles on U.S. 27 in Campbell County, Kentucky.
Neace=s vehicle collided with Butler=s, and Butler sustained
personal injury.
Butler filed this personal injury action
against Neace on September 11, 2000.
When trial began on
October 29, 2001, Neace stipulated as to liability.
Following
the close of evidence and a short period of deliberation, the
jury found unanimously that Butler had not incurred more than
$1,000.00 in reasonably necessary medical expenses nor had she
sustained a permanent bodily injury as required by the Ano fault@
provision of KRS Chapter 304.
considered.
Consequently, damages were not
The trial court entered judgment on November 16,
2001.
On November 26, 2001, nearly a month following trial,
Butler filed a motion for relief based on juror misconduct and
on the trial court=s failure to include a jury instruction
related to the damages recoverable for future pain and
suffering.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of Sherrie
Butler, the appellant=s mother and a trial witness.
In the affidavit, Sherrie indicated that on October
29, 2001, she had engaged in a short conversation with a woman
(later identified as Linda Schlosser) in a courthouse hallway.
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Sherrie averred that the conversation was initiated by Schlosser
and that it occurred before the trial began -- although it is
not clear whether it occurred before or after voir dire and the
swearing of the jury.
Sherrie=s affidavit set forth the
following recitals:
4) I told her [Schlosser] I was there for
my daughter=s trial, that my daughter was in
a car wreck and the insurance company now
pay (sic) her for the injuries.
5) Ms. Schlosser made a comment to the
effect that sounds like an insurance
company.
6) At that point, there was no further
conversation.
7) I reported this to my daughter=s attorney
Randy A. Byrd on November 1, 2001.
Linda Schlosser served as the foreperson of the jury that
returned the defense verdict.
The appellant=s attorney did not
report the exchange to the court at any time prior to filing the
motion for relief.
The appellee responded with Schlosser=s affidavit.1
Schlosser admitted that she had engaged in a short conversation
with Sherrie Butler during which Butler:
1
Butler argues briefly that Schlosser=s affidavit is used for an
improper purpose here. Citing Ritze v. Williams, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 613
(1970), she explains that juror=s affidavits cannot ordinarily be used
to impeach a verdict. As Neace points out in her brief, Schlosser=s
affidavit was offered to the trial court in an effort to support the
verdict rather than to impeach it.
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told me that her daughter was involved in
the trial. I had absolutely no further
conversation with Sherrie Butler. Her
boyfriend or husband started talking to her
and I did not say anything else to her at
any time.
The trial court considered the motion, the arguments
of counsel, and the contents of the affidavits.
In an order
entered January 2, 2002, the court denied Butler=s request for
relief.
This appeal followed.
The appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to declare a mistrial based upon juror
misconduct.
Depending upon the timing of the conversation, the
appellant argues that Schlosser either failed to disclose to the
court that she had contact with trial witnesses contrary to the
court=s admonition or that she failed to respond forthrightly to
questions posed during voir dire.
We are not persuaded that the
encounter between Schlosser and Sherrie Butler necessitated a
mistrial -- regardless of its timing.
To obtain a new trial because of juror
mendacity, “a party must first demonstrate
that a juror failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire, and then
further show that a correct response would
have provided a valid basis for a challenge
for cause.@
Adkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 779, (2003), citing
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556,
104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984).
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The appellant has
failed to meet the Adkins standard for declaration of a mistrial
so as to warrant a new trial.
During voir dire, defense counsel explained to
prospective jurors that Sherrie Butler, the plaintiff=s mother,
and Tom McLafferty, Sherrie=s boyfriend, would provide testimony.
He asked A[d]oes anyone know Sherrie Butler or Tom McLafferty?@
There was no response from the panel.
It is not clear that
Schlosser failed to answer this question honestly given her
brief encounter with Sherrie Butler and Tom McLafferty.
Nevertheless, even if we were to accept that Schlosser had
failed to answer the question forthrightly, there is still no
evidence to indicate that a more complete answer would have
provided the basis for a challenge for cause.
Even if defense
counsel=s allegation could be proven, Schlosser=s brief encounter
with Butler and McLafferty as described by Sherrie’s affidavit
would not have required her removal for cause.
supra.
See Adkins,
The trial court did not err by failing to grant a
mistrial or to order a new trial on this ground.
Next, we shall consider whether Schlosser=s failure to
disclose to the court her contact with the witnesses following
the court=s admonition required the court to declare a mistrial.
The appellant correctly observes that if a juror sees or hears
anything improper, that juror is under an obligation -- as
admonished specifically by the court -- to report that alleged
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misconduct to the trial court as soon as possible.
The
appellant contends that Schlosser=s failure to inform the court
that she had gained extra-judicial information during a
conversation with Sherrie Butler deprived the plaintiff of a
fair trial.
We do not presume that a juror=s exposure to any and
all extra-judicial information automatically renders a trial
fundamentally unfair.
(1996).
Gould v. Charlton, Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734
The trial court is vested with wide discretion to
analyze and to determine the prejudicial effect of juror
misconduct -- including the impact of receiving extra-judicial
information.
Gould, supra, citing Byrd v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
825 S.W.2d 272 (1992).
Our review of the nature and content of the extrajudicial information identified in this case reveals no
indication that Schlosser was rendered unqualified to serve
further as a member of the jury.
Furthermore, there is no claim
or suspicion that the other jurors were influenced or were even
aware of the extra-judicial information.
If we wholly accept
the appellant=s description of the encounter between Schlosser
and Sherrie Butler, we cannot conclude that the exchange had any
improper impact on the trial.2
2
The appellant complains that the trial court erred by failing to
interrogate Schlosser in an effort to determine whether her encounter
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A mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted
to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings
which will result in a manifest injustice.
There has been no
showing of a manifest injustice in this case.
The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by concluding that a mistrial was
not required.3
Finally, the appellant argues that the trial court
erred by failing to instruct the jury with respect to damages
recoverable for future pain and suffering.
is harmless in light of the defense verdict.
That alleged error
The jury was
properly instructed to address a threshold issue before
considering any element of damages.
The jury decided that the
plaintiff=s reasonably necessary medical expenses had not
exceeded $1,000.00; it also found that she had not sustained
permanent bodily injury as a result of the collision.
Those two
findings completed and terminated any further considerations.
No other damages were recoverable.
Consequently, arguments with
respect to an alleged error in an additional damages instruction
with Sherrie Butler required a mistrial. We disagree. The affidavits
of the parties provided the trial court with adequate information as
to the nature and content of the conversation at issue.
3
The appellant also contends that Schlosser=s failure to disclose
that she had overheard a conversation between Sherri Butler and Tom
McLafferty required a mistrial. However, there is absolutely no
evidence in the record to support the claim that Schlosser may have
overheard any conversation between Sherri Butler and Tom McLaffery.
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were foreclosed by operation of the verdict.
Levi v.
Gonzenbach, Ky. App., 33 S.W.2d 657 (1930).
The judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Randy A. Byrd
Cincinnati, Ohio
Jeffrey A. Stepner
Covington, Kentucky
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