MICHAEL J. FOLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000063-MR
MICHAEL J. FOLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00051
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Michael J. Foley has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence entered by the Mason Circuit Court on
December 12, 2001, which convicted him of rape in the first
degree1 and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment.
Having
concluded that there was no reversible error and that Foley was
not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal, we affirm.
Foley and his wife, Sherri, resided in an apartment
above Jason and Maria Meadows.
1
On or about February 19, 2001,
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.040.
Foley’s wife asked him to go downstairs to the Meadowses’
apartment and to borrow some movies.2
Upon Foley’s arrival,
Maria was preparing to leave the apartment to deliver a baseball
cap to her husband at work.
After Maria left, Foley was alone
in the apartment with C.M.
Maria and C.M. are sisters and C.M.
had been staying with the Meadowses for two and one-half months.
C.M. was 24-years-old, developmentally delayed, and sexually
inexperienced.3
She had graduated from high school under a
special education curriculum.
At his jury trial, Foley claimed that he began talking
to C.M. and “asked her if she wanted to fool around and she said
yes.”
Foley testified that he believed C.M. “pushed [her
panties] down with her pants.”
Foley admitted that he pushed
his pants down to his knees and knelt in front of C.M., but he
claimed that he was wearing a pair of Nike basketball shorts and
a pair of boxer shorts underneath his pants, and that he never
removed his penis from these undergarments.
Once C.M.’s pants
were down, Foley licked his fingers and inserted them into her
vagina.
After C.M. informed Foley that she was a virgin, Foley
2
The record is unclear as to whether this incident occurred late Sunday
night, February 18, or early Monday morning, February 19. However, as the
record indicates that Foley was arrested on February 19, 2001, that will be
the date of the incident for our purposes.
3
Detective Andy Muse, a police officer investigating the alleged attack,
commented that C.M. possessed the mentality of a ten-year-old. While
Detective Muse is apparently not an expert on this subject, this testimony is
not an issue on appeal. The record also reflects that C.M. has a hearing
disability.
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“told her to relax and [that he] would be gentle.”
Foley
testified that he pushed his fingers in and out of C.M. “a time
or two.”
Foley conceded that he intended to have sexual
intercourse with C.M., but he contended that the entire incident
was consensual.
Sherri Foley testified that she went downstairs to the
Meadowses’ apartment to determine what Foley was doing because
he had been gone approximately five minutes.
Outside the
apartment door, Sherri overheard Foley tell C.M. to “just lay
back and relax.”
Sherri became angry, abruptly kicked in the
apartment door, and saw C.M. in the recliner.4
Sherri testified
that Foley was on the floor in front of C.M. and that C.M. was
“laid back [in the recliner] chilling with it.”
Although his
pants were down to his knees, Sherri testified that Foley’s Nike
basketball shorts were still up.
As soon as Sherri opened the door, both Foley and C.M.
began dressing hastily.
Sherri testified that she “just walked
in and ruined their plans.” Sherri left the apartment, but
returned shortly and confronted C.M.5
Sherri testified that she
banged on the apartment door a couple of times and observed C.M.
peer through the blinds.
Sherri told C.M. that if she did not
open the door within three seconds she was going to break it in.
4
Although Sherri was unsure as to whether C.M. was completely naked, Sherri
did observe that C.M. was not wearing pants or panties.
5
Foley had left the Meadowses’ apartment.
-3-
After C.M. unlocked the door, Sherri pushed it open and shoved
C.M. across the room.
Sherri’s shove knocked C.M. into the next
room where she landed on her back and C.M. began to cry.
Sherri
instructed C.M. to get up; and after she did, Sherri knocked her
down again.
As C.M. lay upon the floor crying, Sherri “thanked
her for ruining [her] marriage and called her a few choice
words[.]”
Sherri testified that C.M. then told her that Foley
“forced himself upon [her].”
C.M. testified at trial regarding her family
background, age, and mental and physical characteristics.
C.M.
testified that she attended special education classes in both
middle school and high school.
C.M. graduated from high school
in 1996, but she was not employed because she was on disability.6
C.M. admitted that she does not have a very good memory.
C.M.
testified that she first saw Foley on the Saturday night before
the incident occurred when he stopped in the Meadowses’
apartment to use the telephone.7
C.M. alleged that on the night of the incident Foley
had approached her and “asked [her] if [she] wanted to do it
[but] she said ‘no’ because [she] was scared.”
that she shook her head, indicating “no.”
6
C.M. testified
She testified that
C.M. testified that she graduated “[b]ack in 1996, I think.”
7
However, during cross-examination, C.M. testified that she had in fact met
Foley on other occasions before that Saturday night.
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even though she shook her head, Foley unfastened her pants.
C.M. testified that she “was trying to keep [Foley] from getting
too close,” by zipping and buttoning her pants back up as he
tried to unbutton them.
Although C.M. acknowledged that she
never verbally told Foley “no,” she did shake her head and tell
him that she was scared.
C.M. testified that Foley next
scrunched me down in the chair, got on his
knees, pulled down his pants, and he pulled
it out [and] he was sticking it halfway in.
It didn’t go all the way in. He took it out
and he licked his finger and touched me down
there, and then he put it back in. And, his
wife, Sherri Foley, come down and hollered
his name. He hurried up and got his pants
and ran out the door. Before my leg –- my
leg –- one of my legs was out of my pants
leg, and my underwear was the same way.
After she hollered out his name, like I said
he got his pants and he ran out –- he ran
out the door after –- then, I put that leg
back in my underwear and my pants on.
C.M. explained that she then closed and locked the
apartment door.
C.M. testified that she experienced pain as a
result of Foley’s insertion of his penis halfway into her
vagina.
C.M. further testified that she told Foley that she
“didn’t want to do it,” and that she “took both [her] hands and
tried to push him away from [her] and he just kept at it.”
Although C.M. did not remember whether Foley had his pants on or
off, or whether they were pulled down, or whether his underwear
was pulled down, she testified that all she knew was that his
pants were undone and his penis was exposed.
-5-
After Maria
returned from her husband’s workplace, she found C.M. crying and
shaking.
C.M. told Maria what happened and Maria called Jason
at work.
C.M. was then taken to a regional medical center for
an examination.
Bonnie Jett, a social worker at the regional medical
center, described C.M. as having “childlike manners in the
emergency room,” that she “was very scared,” and that she “would
cover her eyes as a child would to kind of block out what was
happening to her.”
Kay Foreman, a registered nurse at the
regional medical center and a sexual assault examiner, examined
C.M. after the incident.
Foreman testified that C.M. had
bruising on various parts of her body, a good bit of bleeding on
the pelvic examination, a torn hymen, a tear below her vagina,
bruising on both sides of her vagina, and bruising inside her
vagina.
Foreman also testified that C.M.’s injuries were
consistent with vaginal penetration.
A few hours after the incident, C.M. gave the
following handwritten statement to the police:
Michael Foley came into my sister’s
apartment, but first he knocked on the door.
My sister went to answer the door to see who
it was. Then he came in here and asked to
borrow some movies. Then my sister went to
where her husband works at. Then he waited
until she left. Then he came over and he
put the movies down and he pulled my pants
down and got on his knees and pulled my
pants down to try to stick his thing in me
and I tried to push him away from me and he
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was trying to finger me, but also asked me
if I wanted to do it and I told him no.
Then his wife came in and Sherri seen him on
his knees and yelled his name and got mad
and walked out. Then a minute later Sherri
came knocking on the door, so I went to see
who it was and she came in and pushed me in
the dirt room. Then started crying a minute
or two later.
During cross-examination, C.M. admitted that she was
not looking at what was occurring during the incident.
In
addition, the following exchange transpired between Foley’s
counsel and C.M.:
Q. So, from the time you first wrote your
statement that was just your memory to the
time that you gave all these other
statements, your story kind of –- your story
changed a lot in there due to the questions
[the police and regional medical center
employees] asked you, right?
A.
Well, not too much, but a little bit.
Q. Some details got added and some things
disappeared and all that sort of thing,
right?
A.
Yes.
Foley was arrested and charged with rape in the first
degree and sexual abuse in the first degree.8
On March 16, 2001,
the grand jury indicted Foley on one count of rape in the first
degree for engaging in sexual intercourse with C.M. by forcible
compulsion and one count of sexual abuse in the first degree for
8
The first-degree rape charge concerned C.M.’s allegations. The first-degree
sexual abuse charge concerned an allegation made by Maria Meadows that, on a
date prior to C.M.’s alleged rape, Foley grabbed her (Maria’s) breast.
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subjecting Maria Meadows to sexual contact by forcible
compulsion.
Foley pled not guilty and a jury trial was held on
October 16, 2001.
Foley was convicted of rape in the first
degree and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.9
This appeal
followed.
Foley claims the trial court erred to his substantial
prejudice by denying him his Sixth Amendment right to be present
at every stage of the proceedings because the trial court
allowed the jury to take C.M.’s police statement back to the
jury room while it deliberated.
Foley alleges that, albeit
perhaps inadvertently, the trial court permitted the jury to
take C.M.’s handwritten police statement back to the jury room,
despite his objection and the trial court’s ruling that the
statement would not be made available to the jury during
deliberations.
Foley concedes that the record does not disclose
whether the jury had access to C.M.’s handwritten statement
during its deliberations.
However, he speculates that the jury
9
An amended judgment was entered on December 17, 2001, which provided as
follows:
This matter coming on to be heard on the
Court’s review of its judgment dated December 7, 2001
and ENTERED on December 12, 2001, and the Court
having made oral findings that the victim suffered
serious physical injury, IT IS ORDERED that the
written judgment is amended to reflect the Court’s
oral finding that the victim suffered serious
physical injury.
-8-
did have access to C.M.’s statements during its deliberations
due to the trial court’s inadvertence.
support Foley’s contention.
The record does not
The record reveals that after the
jury returned its verdict Foley failed to make any objection
based on his claim that it had improperly obtained C.M.’s
handwritten statement during its deliberations.
“[RCr] 9.22
requires a party to render a timely and appropriate objection in
order to preserve an issue for review.”10
Not only was there no
evidence in the record to support an irregularity, but no
objection was raised.11
This issue is meritless.
Foley next claims that the trial court erred to his
substantial prejudice by denying him due process of law because
it denied his motion for a continuance after the Commonwealth in
violation of RCr 7.26 produced a written witness statement less
than 48 hours before the start of the trial.
As previously
mentioned, C.M. gave a handwritten statement to the police after
the incident.
C.M.’s handwritten statement was dated February
19, 2001, and was given at 1:25 a.m.
However, C.M. gave a
second statement to the police on February 19, 2001, at 2:36
a.m., one hour and eleven minutes after she provided her first
handwritten statement.
This second statement was an audiotaped
interview between Detective Andy Muse and C.M. approximately
10
Collett v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 686 S.W.2d 822, 823 (1984); see Blanton
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 407, 410 (1968).
11
Bowman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 814, 817 (1956).
-9-
five minutes in length.
The interview was transcribed and both
the transcript and audiotape were provided to Foley’s counsel on
October 15, 2001, one day before the trial began.
On the morning of the trial, October 16, 2001, Foley’s
counsel made a motion for a continuance.
Foley’s counsel
requested a continuance due to the Commonwealth’s alleged
failure to provide her with any and all of C.M.’s mental health
records and its failure to provide her with the transcript of
C.M.’s second police statement.
Foley’s counsel insisted that
material differences existed between C.M.’s first handwritten
statement and the interview conducted an hour and eleven minutes
later.
Foley’s counsel argued that
listening to [the audiotape] and reviewing
the transcript, it [was] [her] opinion that
the defense [had] not been able to
adequately investigate [the] case [ ] –- as
that tape provided extra information that
would need to be investigated. It also
provided extra information that the defense
would have used. It provides part of the
minimal showing for a –- for the request for
medical records and mental health records.
Foley’s counsel further claimed that the
inconsistencies between C.M.’s statements would have possibly
required a hearing as to C.M.’s competency on both mental
grounds and her memory and perception of the alleged crime.
Foley’s counsel claimed that a reading of the interview
transcript of
C.M.’s second statement reveals that Detective
-10-
Muse asked C.M. very leading questions, which in turn raised
questions of C.M.’s competency.
The trial court denied the
motion.
RCr 7.26(1) provides:
Except for good cause shown, not later than
forty-eight (48) hours prior to the trial,
the attorney for the Commonwealth shall
produce all statements of any witness in the
form of a document or recording in its
possession which relates to the subject
matter of the witness’s testimony and which
(a) has been signed or initialed by the
witness or (b) is or purports to be a
substantially verbatim statement made by the
witness. Such statement shall be made
available for examination and use by the
defendant.
“This rule was enacted for the purpose of allowing defense
counsel a reasonable opportunity to inspect any such previous
statements, before the witness is called, to enable counsel an
opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness concerning any
contradictory statements made by [her].”12
C.M.’s second statement clearly fell within the
purview of RCr 7.26, and the Commonwealth failed to comply with
RCr 7.26.13
Although Detective Muse interviewed C.M. on February
12
Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 805 S.W.2d 144, 148 (1990) (citing Wright
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 635 (1982); and Commonwealth v. Jackson,
Ky., 281 S.W.2d 891 (1955)).
13
The Commonwealth contended in its brief that “[c]ontrary to [Foley’s]
argument, the defense counsel moved for a continuance based upon her request
for more victim medical records (mental health records) and moved for a
competency hearing based upon the taped statement.” However, the trial
transcript reflects that Foley’s request for a continuance was based upon the
taped statement and the affect, if any, its timely production would have had
-11-
19, 2001, the Commonwealth alleged that it only became aware of
the audiotape on October 15, 2001.
“Regardless of whether the
Commonwealth’s Attorney was personally aware of the statement,
the Commonwealth was obliged to produce this statement under RCr
7.26(1).”14
Furthermore, the Commonwealth may not retort that it
was unaware of C.M.’s statement “if the statement was taken by
the investigating officer in charge of the case.”15
“In such
circumstances the knowledge of the detective is the knowledge of
the Commonwealth.”16
“However, even if the forty-eight hour rule is
violated, automatic reversal is not required.”17
“Some prejudice
must be found, or the error, if any, is harmless.”18
In order to
justify reversal, Foley must demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by the Commonwealth’s violation of RCr 7.26.
Foley was
prejudiced “if as a result of the error, he was denied access to
upon C.M.’s competency to testify as a witness. Furthermore, the trial court
specifically denied Foley’s motion for a continuance based upon the failure
of this argument that material differences existed between C.M.’s two
statements. The trial court stated: “This Court has reviewed the tape and
the witness statement and finds there is no material difference and [Foley’s]
motion for a continuance is overruled, and [Foley’s] renewed motion for the
Commonwealth to provide medical and mental health records of [C.M.] is also
overruled.”
14
Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1993).
15
Id. at 912.
16
Id.
17
Gosser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 897, 905 (2000) (citing McRay v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 675 S.W.2d 397, 400 (1984)).
18
Gosser, supra at 905 (citing McRay, 675 S.W.2d at 400).
-12-
See also RCr 9.24.
information which, had he possessed it, would have enabled him
to contradict or impeach the witness or established some other
fact which might reasonably have altered the verdict.”19
“RCr
9.24 provides however that errors which do not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.”20
“Under the harmless
error doctrine, if upon consideration of the whole case it does
not appear that there is a substantial possibility that the
result would have been any different, the error will be held
non-prejudicial.”21
Foley alleges that a comparison of C.M.’s
two statements indicate that her “second statement was the
product of leading questions and suggestion.”
Foley complains
that once he received C.M.’s audiotaped interview, his counsel
“noticed that C.M.’s account had become richer in detail,
coaching was suspected, and leading questions had been
employed.”
C.M.’s handwritten statement, previously reproduced
verbatim, was her first statement to the police.
C.M. wrote
that Foley pulled her pants down, got on his knees, tried to
insert his penis into her vagina, she tried to push him away
from her, he tried to insert his finger(s) into her vagina, and
19
Haynes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1983) (citing Maynard v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 567, 570 (1973)).
20
Id. at 950 (citing Maynard, supra at 570).
21
Gosser, supra at 903 (citing Abernathy 439 S.W.2d at 952).
-13-
he asked her if she wanted to have sex and she said no.
The
transcript of C.M.’s second police statement evidences that she
told Detective Muse that Foley asked her if she wanted to have
sex, his pants were down and his penis was exposed, he pulled
down her pants and underwear, she told him a couple of times
that she did not want to have sex, he attempted to insert his
penis into her vagina, she experienced pain, and after Sherri
opened the apartment door Foley pulled up his pants and
underwear.
Foley’s counsel conceded that the Commonwealth’s
transcript of C.M.’s interview was “relatively accurate” to the
audio recording.22
To reiterate, the trial court denied Foley’s motion
for a continuance because it found that no material difference
existed between C.M.’s two statements.
We conclude that even
thought the Commonwealth failed to comply with CR 7.26 by not
providing Foley with C.M.’s second police statement, the failure
was “not prejudicial since the [statement] would not have
established some other fact which might reasonably have altered
the verdict.”23
Although C.M.’s second statement was not
furnished to Foley until one day before trial, his counsel
nevertheless used it to fully and effectively cross-examine
22
The audiotape of C.M.’s interview is not part of the record on appeal.
23
Haynes, 657 S.W.2d at 950.
-14-
C.M.24
Therefore, the jury was aware of any discrepancies
between the two statements.
Further, the trial court correctly
ruled that there were no material differences between the two
statements.
From our review of both statements, we have not
discovered any disparity that would have altered the verdict.
C.M. provided strikingly similar accounts of the incident in
both of her statements.
The Commonwealth’s failure to comply
with RCr 7.26 was non-prejudicial because there is no
substantial possibility that the result would have been any
different.25
The Commonwealth’s failure “to comply with RCr 7.26
does not constitute reversible error.”26
Foley also claims that the trial court erred to his
substantial prejudice by denying him due process of law because
it denied his motion for a competency hearing after it was
disclosed that C.M. made her allegations of rape during an
interview in which leading questions were used and that C.M. had
graduated from a special education program.
Foley alleges that
the trial court’s denial of his request for a competency hearing
was violative of “his due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Sections 2, 3, 10, and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution[.]”
24
Hicks, 805 S.W.2d at 149.
25
Gosser, 31 S.W.3d at 903.
26
Hicks, 805 S.W.2d at 149.
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On the morning of the trial and before it began,
Foley’s counsel moved the trial court to reconsider providing
her with any and all of C.M.’s mental health records.
After the
trial court observed that Foley’s motion was untimely, the trial
court considered her motion for a continuance premised upon the
same argument.
The Commonwealth replied that it had provided
Foley with all information it possessed about C.M.’s mental
health months earlier, including the fact that C.M. graduated
from a special education high school.
Furthermore, the
Commonwealth’s Attorney asserted that
I am not aware of any mental health records.
I am not aware of whether [C.M.] has been
seen by a state facility or a private
facility or any other type of facility
whatsoever. All I know is that she is
apparently, in somebody’s opinion, slow and
has had special education classes.
Foley’s counsel responded that
[a]s far as the statement goes, due to the
inconsistencies and the fact that it was in
interview form, this changes –- this changes
things greatly in the sense that the defense
would have moved to have possibly a hearing
on the competency of [C.M.] prior to that,
not necessarily competency, just on mental
grounds, but also competency in the form of
memory and perception based on other people
being involved and the statements given by
the victim. If you look at the transcript,
it is a very leading interview.
-16-
The trial court denied Foley’s motion for the Commonwealth to
provide C.M.’s medical and mental health records and his motion
for a competency hearing for C.M.
KRE 601 provides as follows:
(a) General. Every person is competent to
be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by statute.
(b) Minimal qualifications. A person is
disqualified to testify as a witness if the
trial court determines that he:
(1) Lacked the capacity to perceive
accurately the matters about which he
proposes to testify;
(2) Lacks the capacity to recollect facts;
(3) Lacks the capacity to express himself so as
to be understood, either directly or through an
interpreter; or
(4) Lacks the capacity to understand the
obligation of a witness to tell the truth.
Foley argues that C.M. lacked the capacity to
recollect facts27 because she “testified about an event that was
shaped by the influence of a police detective, a nurse, a social
worker, and the Commonwealth Attorney, [and] not from her own
memory as she readily admitted at trial.”
Foley also claims
that the alleged inconsistencies between C.M.’s statements
demonstrate her incompetence to testify.
27
KRE 601(b)(2).
-17-
Consequently, Foley
asserts that a competency hearing was required to evaluate
whether C.M. was capable of testifying at trial.
“KRE 601 recognizes a presumption of competency and
permits disqualification of a witness only upon proof of
incompetency.”28
Furthermore, the commentary to KRE 601 explains
as follows:
This provision serves to establish a
minimum standard of testimonial competency
for witnesses. It is designed to empower
the trial judge to exclude the testimony of
a witness who is so mentally incapacitated
or so mentally immature that no testimony of
probative worth could be expected from the
witness. It should be applied grudgingly,
only against the “incapable” witness and
never against the “incredible” witness,
since the triers of fact are particularly
adept at judging credibility.29
The record supports the trial court’s allowing C.M. to
testify at trial.
C.M. promptly reported the sexual assault and
her handwritten statement was lucid.
Her second statement
reveals that she fully and coherently answered Detective Muse’s
questions.
Her two statements were consistent and sensible.
Moreover, the trial transcript of her testimony reveals that she
understood the facts and comprehended what had happened to her.
C.M. admitted on cross-examination that she did not have a very
good memory; however, “[t]hough she could not recollect all of
28
Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 885, 891 (2000).
29
Id. at 891 (citing Commentary to KRE 601, Evidence Rules Study Committee,
Final Draft (1989)).
-18-
the specific details surrounding her [attack] by [Foley], that
affected only the credibility of her testimony, not her
competency to testify.”30
It was within the trial court’s sound
discretion to determine whether a competency hearing was
required.
C.M. was presumed competent to testify and Foley has
failed to produce any evidence of her incompetency.
There was
no error.
Foley’s final claim is that the trial court erred to
his substantial prejudice by denying him due process of law
because it denied his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
on the charge of rape in the first degree even though the
evidence was so incredible that no rational trier of fact could
have found guilt and the Commonwealth failed to prove penile,
rather than digital, penetration.
Foley argues that although
C.M. testified that his penis was inserted halfway into her
vagina, she was not looking when this allegedly occurred; as
C.M. had no sexual experience, she would have been unable to
differentiate between a finger and a penis; Kay Foreman, C.M.’s
examining nurse, was unable to determine whether C.M.’s
penetration was caused by a finger, penis, or foreign object;
Foreman did not know whether C.M.’s penetration and injuries
were consistent with more than one finger; Sherri observed that
Foley’s Nike shorts were still up even though is pants were
30
Price, 31 S.W.3d at 891.
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pulled down; C.M. did not allege that she had been raped until
after Sherri attacked her; and that the jury requested the
results of the rape kit.31
C.M. testified as follows:
she knew that Foley
inserted his penis, rather than his finger, into her vagina;
Foley’s insertion of his penis “felt different” than when he
inserted his finger(s); and it felt strange and uncomfortable.
Additionally, Foreman testified that C.M.’s injuries, which
included bruising and abrasions, were not consistent with the
use of a finger, her injuries were consistent with the insertion
of something wide, and her penetration was consistent with a
penis.
As a reviewing court, our duty is not to reevaluate
the proof; rather, this Court’s “only function is to consider
the decision of the trial judge in light of the proof
presented.”32
The standard for a directed verdict is as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should be given. For the purpose of ruling
on the motion, the trial court must assume
31
The trial court refused to provide the jury with the results of the rape
kit because it was never introduced as evidence. Additionally, Foley’s
counsel agreed with the trial court’s decision. As such, this is irrelevant.
32
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
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that the evidence for the Commonwealth is
true, but reserving to the jury questions as
to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.33
Foley was obviously not entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal because, under the evidence as a whole, it was not
clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt.34
The
Commonwealth “produced evidence that was considerably more than
a mere scintilla and the case was properly presented to the jury
for determination.”35
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Mason
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Richard Hoffman
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
33
Id. at 187.
34
Id. at 187.
35
Id. at 188.
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