MURVELLA HARRIS FERLAND, Heir, and CARLIN L. HARRIS, Heir v. DELORA KRAUS, Heir; DAVID KRAUS, Co-Executor; DELMAR H. FRALEY, Co-Executor; LIDOLA HARRIS WEBSTER, Heir; CARLOS HARRIS; TRINITY HARRIS; and NATHAN HARRIS
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RENDERED: MAY 9, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002405-MR
MURVELLA HARRIS FERLAND, Heir,
and CARLIN L. HARRIS, Heir
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00533
DELORA KRAUS, Heir; DAVID KRAUS,
Co-Executor; DELMAR H. FRALEY,
Co-Executor; LIDOLA HARRIS
WEBSTER, Heir; CARLOS HARRIS;
TRINITY HARRIS; and
NATHAN HARRIS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Murvella Harris Ferland and Carlin L. Harris,
children and heirs of Bascom Harris, appeal from an order of the
Floyd Circuit Court dismissing significant portions of their
complaint and amended complaint against the co-executors of
Bascom Harris’s estate and Delora Kraus, another child and heir
of Bascom Harris.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
Bascom Harris died on April 26, 2000.
his death, he was 82 years old.
At the time of
The five children that survived
Harris are Murvella Harris Ferland (appellant), Carlin L. Harris
(appellant), Rita Harris, Lidola Harris Webster, and Delora
Kraus (appellee).
One son of Bascom Harris, Wilven Bascom
Harris, predeceased Bascom Harris.
The children of Wilven
Bascom Harris are Carlos Harris, Trinity Harris, and Nathan
Harris.
Bascom Harris had been married twice.
children were born of the first marriage.
All six of his
Harris’s first
marriage ended in divorce, and his second wife predeceased him.
On May 25, 2000, Harris’s will was probated in the
Floyd District Court.
David Kraus, who was the husband of
Delora Kraus, and Delmar H. Fraley, Harris’s accountant, were
appointed co-executors of the estate.
In his will, Harris left
the farm, farm equipment, furniture, and furnishings to his
daughter, Delora Kraus.
He left tangible personal property to
all his children, and he left the residue in trust to the
children except for Delora Kraus.
A trust, which was funded by
certificates of deposit totaling approximately $530,000, was
established for the benefit of the children per stirpes other
than Delora Kraus.
A proposed final settlement of the estate
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was filed on May 9, 2001, and the settlement was approved and
confirmed by the Floyd District Court in an order entered on
June 14, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, three of Harris’s children (Murvella
Harris Ferland, Rita Harris, and Carlin L. Harris) filed a civil
complaint in the Floyd Circuit Court against Delora and David
Kraus and Delmar H. Fraley.
The complaint described the “NATURE
OF THE ACTION” as follows:
This is a civil action contesting the
Will and the Power of Attorney of Bascom
Harris due to the undue influences of
defendants on Testator when he was
incompetent; for an accounting of the
deceased’s assets and transactions; for an
accounting of the specific medication and
medical care provided to deceased prior to
his death; and for monetary damages.
The complaint alleged that on January 4, 2000, Delora Kraus took
Harris to a law firm and influenced him to execute a new will, a
living will, and a durable power of attorney.
named by Harris as his power of attorney.
Delora Kraus was
The complaint alleged
that Harris was incompetent and subjected to the undue influence
of Delora Kraus and Delmar H. Fraley at the time he executed the
documents.
The complaint further alleged that the Krauses were
medicating Harris with Oxycontin near the end of his life.
The complaint demanded that the will and power of
attorney be declared invalid due to lack of testamentary
capacity and undue influence, that the defendants give an
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accounting of all financial transactions between them and
Harris, that all important papers be produced, and that the
defendants give an accounting of all medications and medical
care provided to Harris prior to his death.
On July 19, 2001, the defendants/appellees filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint.
The main basis of the motion
was that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because no
adversary proceeding concerning the settlement of the estate had
been filed within 30 days of the order of the Floyd District
Court approving the final settlement.
To support the argument,
the appellees cited KRS1 395.617(2) which states that “[a]n
aggrieved party may, no later than thirty (30) days from the
entry of the order upon the proposed settlement, institute an
adversary proceeding in Circuit Court pursuant to KRS
24A.120(1)(b).”
KRS 24A.120(1)(b) gives the district courts
exclusive jurisdiction in “[m]atters involving probate, except
matters contested in an adversary proceeding.”
The statute
further provides that adversary proceedings “shall be filed in
Circuit Court in accordance with the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure and shall not be considered an appeal.”
Id.
Following the filing of the appellees’ motion to
dismiss, the appellants filed a motion to amend their complaint.
A 24-page amended complaint was attached to the motion.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Count I
of the amended complaint alleged that the will and power of
attorney were invalid.
Count II alleged wrongful acts by the
appellees and requested an accounting of financial transactions
as well as a “medical accounting.”
Count III alleged
mismanagement of the estate by the co-executors.
Finally, Count
IV alleged breach of fiduciary duties by the co-executors and by
Delora Kraus.
In an order entered on August 30, 2001, the Floyd
Circuit Court granted the appellants’ motion to amend their
complaint to the extent that the amended complaint related to a
will contest pursuant to KRS 394.240.
However, the court
dismissed all claims in the complaint and the amended complaint,
including the adversary proceeding claim under KRS 395.617(2),
except the will contest claim. Upon the trial court’s denial of
the appellants’ motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order,
this appeal followed.
The appellants argue that the circuit court erred in
dismissing all their claims with the exception of the will
contest.
Their main argument is that they filed an adversary
proceeding concerning the estate within 30 days from the entry
of the final settlement in the district court as required by KRS
395.617(2).
As we have noted, the settlement of the estate
became final by an order of the district court dated June 14,
2001.
Although the initial complaint was filed in the circuit
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court on June 20, 2001, that complaint did not contain
allegations amounting to an adversary proceeding challenging the
final settlement under KRS 395.617(2).2
Such adversary
proceeding challenging the final settlement was first mentioned
in the motion to file amended complaint which was filed on
August 14, 2001, 61 days after the district court order
approving the final settlement of the estate.
The appellants argue as follows:
The Appellants’ Motion To File Amended
Complaint was filed within the 30-day period
required by KRS 395.617 for an adversary
proceeding. Moreover, under CR 15.03 the
expanded claims in the Amended Complaint
relate back to the date of the original
Complaint filed on June 20, 2001.
There are two problems with this argument.
First, the
appellants’ motion to file an amended complaint was not filed
within the 30-day period required by KRS 395.617(2).
As we have
noted, the motion to file an amended complaint was filed 61 days
Second, CR3 15.03 is not
after the district court order.
applicable.
That rule provides in relevant part that
“[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
2
Three factors make it obvious that the original complaint did not
raise an adversary proceeding challenging the final settlement of the
estate. First, the statute, KRS 395.617(2), was not mentioned in the
complaint. Second, there was no specific attack on the final
settlement in the district court. Third, the co-executors were not
named in their official capacities as parties in the original
complaint.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading.”
CR 15.03(1).
The appellants have cited no authority
and made no specific argument to support their conclusion that
their cause of action under KRS 395.617(2) relates back to their
original complaint.
To the contrary, case law addressing the “relates
back” argument demonstrates it would not apply in this case.
The court in City of Ashland v. Brown’s Adm’x., 290 Ky. 740, 162
S.W.2d 552, 554 (1942), noted that “[w]here, however, the
amendment introduces a new cause of action or one which is
different and distinct from that originally set up, the new
pleading is deemed equivalent to the bringing of a new action,
and there is no relation back[.]”
(Citation omitted.) In that
case, the amended pleading was merely used to correct
deficiencies in a contract claim set out in the original
pleading.
Id. at 553.
The application of “relates back” was
addressed again in the more recent case of Perkins v. Rend, Ky.,
616 S.W.2d 495 (1981).
In that case the plaintiff, who had been
involved in a head-on collision with the defendant, originally
sought recovery for the wrongful death of her husband and for
the damages to her vehicle.
Id.
The plaintiff subsequently
sought to amend her complaint in order to recover for the
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injuries she sustained in the accident.
Id.
In allowing the
claim to relate back, the court noted that under CR 15.03, “the
important consideration is not whether the amended pleading
presents a new claim or defense, but whether the amendment
relates to the general factual situation which is the basis of
the original controversy.”
(Citation omitted.)
Id. at 496.
See also Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 908 (1967).
In the case sub judice, the facts and circumstances
raised in the original complaint surrounded the execution of the
will and power of attorney, the transactions made under the
power of attorney, and the medication and care provided to
Bascom Harris.
While the amended complaint attempted to correct
any deficiencies in these claims, it also added separate and
distinct claims concerning the facts and circumstances occurring
subsequent to Harris’s death.
In particular, the amended
complaint added claims challenging the final settlement entered
by the district court.
As the “relates back” argument fails, we
conclude that the appellants’ cause of action pursuant to KRS
395.617(2) was properly dismissed by the circuit court for
failure to file it within 30 days of the June 14, 2001, order of
the Floyd District Court approving the final settlement.
The portion of the appellants’ complaint and amended
complaint against the co-executors of the estate for
mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duty, and financial
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accounting were also properly dismissed by the circuit court.
Kentucky courts have held that these type of actions fall under
KRS 395.510(1) as actions for the settlement of estates.
See
Myers v. State Bank & Trust Co., Ky., 307 S.W.2d 933 (1957).
Because the settlement of this estate was already final and
because an adversary proceeding challenging the settlement under
KRS 395.617(2) was not filed in a timely manner, the appellants
were precluded from further pursuing their action against the
co-executors for mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duty, and
financial accounting.
The remaining cause of action alleged by the
appellants was against Delora Kraus as attorney-in-fact for
Bascum Harris.
The complaint alleged that the power of attorney
was invalid due to Harris’s incompetence and the undue influence
of Kraus.
Further, the amended complaint alleged that Kraus
breached her fiduciary duties in connection with serving as
Harris’s attorney-in-fact.
These causes of action against Kraus
are separate and distinct from actions concerning the settlement
of the estate.
Such causes of actions by heirs against a person
serving as attorney-in-fact were expressly allowed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Priestley v. Priestley, Ky., 949
S.W.2d 594 (1997), where the action was brought by the heirs
following the death of the person for whom the attorney-in-fact
had served.
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Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings concerning
the appellants’ will contest claim and the claim against Delora
Kraus as attorney-in-fact for Bascum Harris.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, DELORA
KRAUS:
Harry D. Williams
Paintsville, Kentucky
William G. Francis
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, DAVID
KRAUS and DELMAR H. FRALEY:
Christopher A. Dawson
Ashland, Kentucky
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