JAMES ROCKY WRIGHT v. LORETTA A. WOODEN
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RENDERED: November 21, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002295-MR
JAMES ROCKY WRIGHT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JUDA M. HELLMANN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-FC-001820
v.
LORETTA A. WOODEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND
VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, SCHRODER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
James Rocky Wright, pro se, has appealed from
an order of the Jefferson Family Court entered on August 29,
2001, which denied his request for visitation with his daughter,
Amber Marie Wooden.
Having concluded that the family court’s
order as to the child support is substantially correct, we
affirm on this issue.
Having further concluded that the family
court failed to comply with the statutory requirements contained
in KRS 403.320(1), we vacate the court’s order in respect to all
issues concerning James’s request for visitation.
James married Loretta Wooden in Jefferson County,
Kentucky on March 31, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, on April 12,
1994, the couple separated.
It was almost two years later, on
March 26, 1996, that Loretta filed a petition for dissolution of
the marriage in the Jefferson Family Court.
James and Loretta
entered into a settlement agreement and their marriage was
dissolved by the Jefferson Family Court on May 1, 1996.
As of
May 1, 1996, there were no children born of the marriage and
Loretta claimed she was not pregnant.1
On September 29, 1996, Loretta remarried and on
November 16, 1996, she gave birth to Amber Marie Wooden.
Loretta’s new husband, Alan Wooden, was listed as the father on
Amber’s birth certificate.
father.
In fact, James is Amber’s biological
According to James, Loretta informed him that he was
Amber’s father shortly before Amber was born.
James claims he
lost contact with Loretta and Amber until September 1998, at
which time he began visiting with Amber at the Wooden family
home.
Although Loretta and Alan permitted James to visit with
Amber, they requested that he refrain from informing Amber that
1
A dissolution hearing was held on April 30, 1996, at which time Loretta
informed the court that she was not pregnant. In addition, in her petition
for dissolution, which was filed on March 26, 1996, Loretta stated that she
was not pregnant.
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he is her father.
Consequently, Amber was told that James was a
“friend of the family.”
James maintains that he visited with
Amber on a regular basis until he was incarcerated on October 6,
1999.2
James has remained incarcerated since October 6, 1999,
and he is currently serving a 25-year sentence at the Lee
Adjustment Center in Beattyville, Kentucky.3
Apparently, Amber
is still unaware that James is her father.4
On March 19, 2001, James attempted to exercise his
parental rights by filing a pro se motion for declaratory
judgment, in which he requested, inter alia, an order granting
reasonable visitation with his daughter.5
This was James’s first
attempt at legally asserting his parental rights.
James’s
motion for declaratory judgment was returned due to the fact it
was not “properly submitted.”
Nevertheless, on May 31, 2001,
the Jefferson Family Court entered an order acknowledging, inter
alia, that James sought to establish his parental rights.
The
family court found that the allegations raised in James’s motion
2
Loretta contends the visits were more sporadic than regular.
3
The record is silent as to the nature of the offense or offenses James was
convicted of committing.
4
James has not seen Amber since his incarceration.
5
James further requested that Amber’s birth certificate be changed to reflect
that he is her father, and that her legal name be changed to Amber Marie
Wright. James also asked the court to assess his child support obligation,
but requested that his payments “be held in abeyance” until his release from
prison.
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for declaratory judgment were sufficient to justify a hearing,
which was held on August 27, 2001.
James and Loretta were both present at the hearing.
Loretta was represented by counsel and James proceeded pro se.
The family court began by noting that its primary
“responsibility [was] to determine whether visitation at a
prison is in [Amber’s] best interests.”
The family court then
proceeded to hear testimony from both parties.
Loretta conceded
that James is Amber’s father, however, she objected to his
request for visitation.
Loretta claimed Amber was
claustrophobic and unable to ride in a car for longer than 30
minutes at a time.6
Amber’s claustrophobia posed a problem due
to the fact Loretta and Amber resided in Louisville at the time
of the hearing.7
James agreed that it would be unreasonable to
require Amber to travel such a long distance given her
condition.
James explained that he hoped to be transferred to a
closer facility in the near future, and, that he would like to
visit Amber on a regular basis following his relocation.
At
this point, the family court judge stated that she was not
concerned with the distance issue.
The judge declared that she
was not willing to make a determination concerning visitation
until a recommendation from a professional was provided.
The
6
Loretta did not offer any medical evidence indicating that Amber suffered
from claustrophobia. Loretta further stated that she did not drive.
7
The distance between Louisville and Beattyville is approximately 150 miles.
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judge further noted that the visitation issue was moot since
James had agreed not to push the issue until he was transferred
to a facility closer to Loretta and Amber.
The judge then proceeded to question James concerning
his ability to pay child support.
James testified that he
earned $1.25 a day, seven days a week.
Consequently, the family
court set James’s child support obligation at $60.00 per month
effective April 4, 2001, payable upon his release from prison.8
As for James’s request that Amber’s last name be changed to
reflect that he is her father, the family court concluded that
it was in Amber’s best interests that her last name remain
Wooden for the time being.9
On August 29, 2001, the family court entered an order
denying James’s request for visitation.
The order reads, in
relevant part, as follows:
1. Amber shall have no visitation with her
father as long as he is in a prison three
and one half hours away. The child shall
have no visitation with the Father until
such time as the child therapist recommends
the same. The child therapist needs to be
consulted before Amber is told that Mr.
Wright is her biological Father.
2. Mr. Wright shall correspond with Amber
in writing and by telephone at his own
8
At the time of the hearing, James had not made any child support payments.
9
Loretta did not object to James’s request that Amber’s birth certificate be
changed to reflect that he is her father. Nevertheless, Loretta’s counsel
correctly pointed out that the family court lacked the authority to modify
Amber’s birth certificate. See KRS 213.046(10)(b).
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expense. Mr. Wright is to forward the cost
of long distance telephone calls prior to
making the same. The Court finds that it is
in the child’s best interest that she not
change her last name to Wright until such
time as the child’s therapist recommends the
same.
3. The Father shall pay child support in
the amount of $60.00 per month effective
April 4, 2001. While the Father is
incarcerated, child support shall accrue and
be payable upon his release from
incarceration.
This appeal followed.
We will first address James’s contention that the
family court incorrectly found that he earns $1.25 per hour in
its order.
As previously discussed, James testified at the
hearing that he earned $1.25 per day in prison.
The family
court’s order reads, in relevant part, as follows:
“The Father
testified that while in prison he earns $1.25 per hour.”
While
we agree with James that the family court erred in this respect,
it is evident that this error caused no prejudice to his
substantial rights.
The family court assessed James’s child
support obligation at $60.00 per month, which is the minimum
amount set by the child support guidelines.10
10
See KRS 403.212(4).
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Simply stated, the
error had no bearing on the outcome of the family court’s
decision.11
Accordingly, we affirm on the child support issue.
James’s primary argument on appeal is that the family
court erred by denying his request for visitation.12
“[T]his
Court will only reverse a trial court’s determinations as to
visitation if they constitute a manifest abuse of discretion, or
were clearly erroneous in light of the facts and circumstances
of the case.”13
An initial request for visitation is governed by
KRS 403.320(1), which reads, in relevant part, as follows:
A parent not granted custody of the
child is entitled to reasonable visitation
rights unless the court finds, after a
hearing, that visitation would endanger
seriously the child's physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health. Upon request of
either party, the court shall issue orders
which are specific as to the frequency,
timing, duration, conditions, and method of
scheduling visitation and which reflect the
development age of the child.14
In Hornback v. Hornback,15 this Court noted that a
“noncustodial parent has absolute entitlement to visitation
11
See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 61.01. “The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
12
Loretta did not file an appellate brief.
13
Drury v. Drury, Ky.App, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525 (2000).
14
“When visitation has already been denied, the standard for modification is
not serious endangerment; rather, the best interests of the child governs.”
McNeeley v. McNeeley, Ky.App., 45 S.W.3d 876, 878 (2001). James’s request
for visitation must be viewed as an initial request given the absence of any
previous orders granting or denying visitation.
15
Ky.App., 636 S.W.2d 24 (1982).
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[under KRS 403.320(1)] unless there is a finding of serious
endangerment to the child.”16
The family court in the case sub
judice never made such a finding.
Moreover, as previously
discussed, the family court noted that its primary concern was
“whether visitation at a prison is in [Amber’s] best interests.”
As this Court stated in Hornback, “[n]o ‘best interests’
standard is to be applied; denial of visitation is permitted
only if the child is seriously endangered.”17
Put differently,
“[t]he noncustodial parent is not required to show visitation is
in the child’s best interest” when proceeding under KRS
403.320(1).18
In Smith, supra, this Court was faced with a similar
issue.
Robert Smith was an inmate at the Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex where he was serving a life sentence for
murder, robbery, and kidnapping.19
Two months prior to his
incarceration, Robert fathered a child, Amanda, with his former
wife, Edna.
Edna took Amanda to visit Robert in prison for
several years after his incarceration.
In 1989 Robert filed a
petition for dissolution of his marriage to Edna, and in
November 1990, a decree of dissolution was entered.
16
Id. at 26.
17
Id.
18
Smith v. Smith, Ky.App., 869 S.W.2d 55 (1994).
19
Id.
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The decree
provided that all issues concerning visitation were “deferred”
due to Robert’s status as an inmate.
Shortly thereafter, Edna
stopped bringing Amanda to visit her father.20
Consequently,
Robert filed a pro se motion requesting visitation on weekends
and holidays with Amanda, who was 11-years old at the time.
The
trial court subsequently denied Robert’s request, reasoning that
it was inappropriate to consider his motion due to his status as
an inmate.21
The trial court did not hold a hearing prior to
denying Robert’s visitation request, and it failed to issue any
findings concerning whether Amanda would be endangered in any
manner by visiting her father in person.22
This Court reversed and noted that “[i]n this
jurisdiction the non-custodial parent cannot be denied
reasonable visitation with his or her child unless there has
been a finding that visitation will seriously endanger the
child.”23
The Court went on to note that “the statute [KRS
403.320(1)] has created the presumption that visitation is in
the child’s best interest[,]” and, that “[t]he burden of proving
that visitation would harm the child is on the one who would
20
Id.
21
Id. at 56.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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deny visitation.”24
In closing, the Court remarked that one’s
“status as an inmate in a penal institution alone does not make
visitation with his child inappropriate.”25
In light of this Court’s previous holdings in
Hornback, supra, and Smith, supra, and the unequivocal language
contained KRS 403.320(1), we conclude that the Jefferson Family
Court abused its discretion in the case sub judice.
As
previously discussed, the family court completely failed to make
any findings concerning whether Amber would be seriously
endangered by visiting her father in prison, and, the family
court erroneously applied the “best interests” standard to a
situation in which it was wholly inapplicable.26
Consequently,
we must vacate the family court’s order as it pertains to
James’s request for visitation.27
James further contends that the family court
incorrectly ordered that a child therapist should be consulted
before Amber is told that he is her father.
Given the lack of
adequate factual findings contained in the family court’s
24
Id.
25
Id. at 57.
26
Hornback, 636 S.W.2d at 26; Smith, 869 S.W.2d at 56.
27
We are unpersuaded that James waived his right to appeal the family court’s
ruling in respect to his request for visitation by agreeing not to push the
issue until he was transferred to a facility closer to Loretta and Amber. A
thorough review of the videotape of the visitation hearing indicates that
James simply intended to withdraw his request for visitation until he was in
a better position to accommodate his daughter’s precarious condition.
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analysis of the issues presented by James at the visitation
hearing, we conclude that the family court’s order must be
vacated on this issue as well.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the order of
Jefferson Family Court is affirmed as to the amount of child
support ordered and vacated in respect to all issues concerning
James’s request for visitation.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James R. Wright, Pro Se
Beattyville, Kentucky
No Brief Filed
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