ROBERT DYE v. WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
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RENDERED: JUNE 6, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001320-MR
ROBERT DYE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-01379
v.
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
APPELLEE
NO. 2001-CA-001389-MR
AND
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-01379
v.
ROBERT DYE
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE.
This appeal and protective cross-appeal
involve an allegation of wrongful termination based on race and
disability.
A jury verdict found the termination was not based
on either race or disability and the employee’s claim was
dismissed.
On appeal, the appellant haphazardly presents
numerous allegations of error, none of which contain any merit.
Hence we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
The protective
cross-appeal now becomes moot and is also dismissed.
Appellant, Robert Dye (Dye), who is African-American,
was employed by appellee, Western Kentucky University (WKU),
from October 1988 until he was terminated on October 2, 1997.
Dye’s position at WKU was that of Building Services Attendant
(BSA).
Building Services Attendants perform various janitorial
functions in campus buildings.
WKU’s version of events is as follows.
In 1996, Dye
was assigned to the Pearce Ford Tower, a residence hall on WKU’s
campus.
On January 21, 1997, Dye approached a residence
assistant (RA), Dave Baskett, in the lobby of Pearce Ford Tower
where Baskett lived.
Dye was angry with Baskett because Baskett
had reported to Facilities Management that the showers on his
floor had not been cleaned in some time, and Dye told Baskett
that his (Dye’s) supervisor had “come down” on him (Dye) because
of Baskett’s complaint.
Dye told Baskett in a threatening way
that if Baskett complained in the future, that Dye would “come
down” on Baskett.
Baskett reported the threat, after which Dye
was reassigned to work in Keen Hall, another residence hall at
WKU.
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In March, 1997, WKU received another complaint
concerning Dye by another RA, Aaron High, who resided in Keen
Hall.
High alleged that, after complaining to Dye about a dirty
bathroom on his (High’s) floor, Dye got in the elevator with
High and was breathing loudly and glaring at High in a
threatening manner.
Following the complaint by High, the matter was
investigated by Mark Struss, WKU’s Director of Facilities
Management.
Based on his investigation, Struss recommended that
Dye be terminated, which was approved by Tony Glisson, the Human
Resources Director, as well as WKU’s General Counsel, Deborah
Wilkins.
Struss and Glisson subsequently met with Dye regarding
the matter, and agreed to give him one last chance.
Dye was
told that any further incidents would result in immediate
termination.
On September 25, 1997, Dye engaged in a confrontation
with another Building Services Attendant, Debra Logan.
Dye’s
supervisor, Vinny Vincent, separated the two and told them to
report to their work stations.
Following this incident,
Vincent’s supervisor, Terry Hovey, recommended to Struss that
Dye be fired because he presented a threat to students and other
employees.
Struss agreed, and this recommendation was reviewed
and approved by Glisson and Wilkins.
Struss on October 2, 1997.
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Dye was terminated by
Dye testified to a different version of events.
Dye
testified that in July of 1996, he presented to his supervisor,
Vinny Vincent, statements from his doctors showing that he had
high blood pressure and an irregular heartbeat, and asked to be
on light duty.
Dye also took the doctor’s statements to
Vincent’s supervisor, Tom Maachi (who was the assistant
superintendent of housing), and also talked to Maachi’s boss,
Mark Struss.
Dye contends that, after showing Vincent the
doctor’s statements, Vincent stated that a person in Dye’s
condition “don’t need to be working up there.”
Dye testified that Vincent sometimes made
disrespectful statements to him when Vincent came to him with
work instructions.
However, on cross-examination Dye testified
that Vincent had never used racially offensive language to his
face.
Another witness, Greg Fulks, testified at trial that
Vincent, when ranting to Fulks about Dye, had referred to Dye
with a racial slur.
This is the only witness who testified that
Vincent used a racial slur.
When asked what Vincent did to him
that was either a racial comment or was of a racial nature, Dye
explained that Vincent would have Dye do extra things that
others didn’t have to do.
For example, Vincent would have Dye
clean extra floors, would look at the showers Dye had already
cleaned and make him do it over, and tell him to sweep and mop
all the stairways in the dorm when it was too close to clock out
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time to finish the job.
“had it in for me.”
Dye testified that he felt like Vincent
Dye testified that prior to 1996 he was not
treated this way.
With regard to the January 1997 incident involving
Dave Baskett, Dye testified that on the Friday before the Martin
Luther King holiday, the BSA’s were asked to make sure the
floors were clean before they left for the holiday weekend.
When the BSA’s came back on the Tuesday following the King
holiday, all of the floors in Pearce Ford Tower had been
“trashed” by the students, and the BSA’s had to clean them up.
Dye testified that he and Baskett had been good friends during
the year.
After Vincent gave Dye the write-up slip resulting
from Baskett’s complaint, Dye went to talk to Baskett.
Dye
testified that he said to Baskett “when you turn stuff into
Vinny Vincent, he comes down on us,” and then he and Baskett
laughed, and then he (Dye) said “well then we have to come down
on y’all.”
Dye testified that he was not mad or upset at
Baskett, and that they were both laughing.
A few days later,
however, Dye got a discipline action report from Vincent that
said he had threatened Baskett.
Dye testified that although all of the floors in the
dorm had been trashed, he was the only BSA who was written up.
Dye subsequently went to talk to Howard Bailey about the
situation because he felt that racial discrimination was
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involved.
Bailey sent Dye to talk to Huda Melky, WKU’s Equal
Opportunity officer.
Dye told Melky that he felt his color had
something to do with the way he was treated by Vincent.
Melky
told him she had checked it out and that she did not see any
racial discrimination concerns. (Melky testified that Dye did
not mention racial discrimination when speaking to her.)
Dye
testified that he did not complain to anyone else at WKU about
the matter after talking to Melky, although he may have talked
to Tony Glisson about it once.
After the Dave Baskett incident, Dye was moved to Keen
Hall.
In March 1997, Aaron High, a Keen Hall RA, complained to
Dye about his floor not being cleaned, in particular, that there
were spots on the bathroom mirrors and floors.
Dye explained to
High that he could only clean once a day, and can’t keep spots
off the mirrors when the guys brush their teeth after he had
already cleaned in the morning, and that some spots on the floor
can’t be cleaned because they are under the wax.
agitated, told Dye he was lying, and yelled.
High then got
Dye backed away
from High, and told him “you ain’t got no sense” and left.
Dye
then went to complain to the assistant dorm director about the
way High had talked to him, who said that he would talk to High.
Dye testified that he and High rode down in the elevator
together, but that he wasn’t glaring at High or intentionally
breathing heavily or making High feel threatened.
-6-
With regard to the Debra Logan incident, Dye testified
that on September 25, 1997, he and Debra Logan, another BSA, got
into an argument concerning a petition some of the BSA’s were
involved with.
Dye testified that after the argument, he and
Logan worked things out and walked away together.
Dye testified
that Vincent told Dye as long as he and Debra had worked it out,
it was OK.
The next day, however, Vincent came and got Dye and
they went to a meeting with Mark Struss and Terry Hovey, and Dye
was told to leave campus.
Dye testified that he believed he was
intentionally terminated because of his illness and his race.
The jury was instructed on wrongful termination based
on race and wrongful termination based on disability.
On
March 13, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of WKU.
The trial order and judgment was entered March 28, 2001.
On
April 6, 2001, Dye filed a motion for judgment not withstanding
the verdict/motion for new trial/motion to alter, amend or
vacate the judgment, and on May 18, 2001, filed an amended
motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict/motion for new
trial/motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
An order
was entered denying the aforementioned motions on May 21, 2001.
Dye filed his notice of appeal on June 19, 2001.
WKU filed a
notice of cross-appeal on June 27, 2001.
Dye presents a number of arguments on appeal.
The
first is that attorney Deborah Wilkins should not have been
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allowed to testify and be at counsel table because Dye moved for
separation of witnesses.
Wilkins was general counsel for WKU
and her duties are those of in-house legal counsel.
All
recommendations for termination, including Dye’s, have to be
reviewed by her.
She approved Dye’s termination and explained
WKU’s policies concerning discrimination and termination.
CR 43.09 provides for separation of witnesses but
specifically does not apply to parties or attorneys.
Also,
under Allen v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 582, 9 S.W. 703
(1888), this rule does not apply to officers of the court; see
also, Webster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 508 S.W.2d 33 (1974).
Hence, we see no error.
Next, Dye contends that the court abused its
discretion when Huda Melky was allowed to testify because she
was not designated as an expert witness.
misunderstanding by Dye.
This is a
Melky was a fact witness who testified
that Dye met with her because he wanted to be transferred back
to Pearce Ford Tower following his transfer subsequent to the
“Baskett incident.”
Melky testified not as an expert but as to
the reason Dye gave her in requesting the transfer.
As to the
argument that Dye was not permitted to impeach this witness, it
was not preserved.
Excluded testimony must be preserved by
avowal, which was not done in this case.
Transit Authority of
River City v. Vinson, Ky. App., 703 S.W.2d 482 (1985).
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Dye next contends that he did not receive a jury of
his peers.
Specifically, Dye requested to exclude any juror
that was an employee of WKU or had an immediate family member
who was an employee of WKU, as WKU is the second largest
employer in Warren County, Kentucky.
A second part to his
request for a jury of his peers was that the jury include
“persons of color.”
The jury ultimately included six people who
were connected with WKU, and one African-American, who was also
one of the six connected with WKU.
Although Dye had filed a
motion to exclude any juror connected to WKU, he participated in
voir dire and used his strikes without objections for cause.
His failure to object failed to preserve, or waived, the error,
if any.
Payne v. Hall, Ky., 423 S.W.2d 530 (1968).
Dye next contends that it was an abuse of discretion
for the court to allow Terry Miles to testify at trial.
Dye had
filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Terry
Miles.
Dye alleges that Terry Miles was evasive at his
deposition and not cooperative, and that his trial testimony did
not match his deposition.
However, Dye’s designation of the
record specifically excludes Miles’ discovery deposition, and
the deposition was never introduced for impeachment purposes or
by avowal, therefore, this Court is unable to review the alleged
error.
It is the appellant’s responsibility to include that
part of the record needed to support his argument.
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CR 75.07(5);
Belk-Simpson Co. v. Hill, Ky., 288 S.W.2d 369 (1956); CR 43.10;
Freeman v. Oliver M. Elam, Jr. Co., Ky., 372 S.W.2d 796 (1963).
Dye next contends the court erred in admitting
attorney Stivers’ summary of allegedly Dye’s blood pressure
readings.
Prior to trial, Dye filed a motion in limine to
exclude a summary of Dye’s blood pressure readings which was
prepared by WKU’s counsel, Gregory N. Stivers.
The summary was
based on medical records of Dye’s prior physicians, Dr.’s Gott,
Pribble, Tapp, and Lovett, and introduced as an exhibit to the
testimony of Dr. John Nadeau.
Dr. Nadeau had examined Dye at
the request of the defense, and had reviewed the summary.
Notice of the intent to use the summary was given to Dye’s
counsel over two years prior to trial, in WKU’s supplemental
pretrial compliance filed on August 11, 1998, which stated that
WKU may introduce as an exhibit at trial “[a] chart of blood
pressure readings from the medical records of Dr. Fred Gott and
from the records of Drs. Tapp, Lovett and Pribble.”
Dr. Nadeau
testified by deposition at trial, wherein Dye’s counsel was
permitted to cross-examine Dr. Nadeau extensively.
KRE 1006
allows such summaries provided certain guidelines are followed.
We see no error.
Dye next contends that it was an abuse of discretion
to allow Vinny Vincent to testify live at trial.
Dye contends
that WKU prevented him from fully deposing Vincent by never
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making him available in person.
telephonically, however.
Dye was able to depose Vincent
WKU had no obligation to produce
Vincent because he was no longer employed by WKU.
attempt to hide a witness, employee or not.
Mills, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 448 (1968).
WKU cannot
See Thompson v.
The mere failure to do Dye’s
legwork is not grounds for striking a witness.
Again, we see no
error.
Dye next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the deposition of Aaron High to be
introduced at trial.
Dye filed a motion in limine to exclude
the deposition of Aaron High, because his counsel did not fully
depose High at the August 7, 1998 deposition.
While it is true
that Dye’s attorney got to the deposition 30 minutes late
because she got lost, and that direct examination was completed
without her present, the story does not end there.
Once Dye’s
attorney arrived, the entire direct examination was replayed for
her, and she was given the opportunity to, and did, crossexamine High.
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in admitting the deposition.
Dye next alleges two improper actions by WKU, the
first being that attorney Stivers’ was unbecoming of an officer
of the court, and the second being that an unnamed “vicepresident” of WKU intimidated a witness.
These issues were not
raised by Dye in the trial court and will not be considered by
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this Court on appeal.
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, Ky.,
770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (1989).
Dye next contends that the trial court improperly
denied his motion for a mistrial in six instances.
1.
Dye moved for a mistrial when Mark Struss
testified about why Dye was fired.
Dye contends this
information was hearsay and not admissible, and that the letter
Struss was referring to, a memo dated March 12, 1997, was based
on hearsay and prejudicial information.
We disagree.
Struss gave WKU’s reasons for firing Dye.
Mark
Mark Struss, as
Director of Facilities Management, investigated the complaint by
Aaron High.
The March 12, 1997 memo had been introduced earlier
at trial as defendant’s exhibit number 9 without objection.
It
was a memo from Mark E. Struss, Director of Facilities
Management, to Tony Glisson, Director of Human Resources, and
Deborah Wilkins, University Counsel, reporting on his
investigation and recommending that Robert Dye be terminated.
The memo contains statements allegedly made by Tony Glisson,
Howard Bailey, and Huda Melky.
number one at trial.
number nine.
thirteen.
Tony Glisson was defense witness
Howard Bailey was plaintiff’s witness
Huda Melky testified as defense witness number
Mark Struss was defense witness number two.
The RA
at Pearce Ford Tower mentioned in the memo was Dave Baskett, who
testified as defense witness number eight.
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Pam Reno supposedly
contributed some information for the memo and her deposition was
read as defense witness number nine.
Aaron High was the other
RA mentioned in the memo as a source of information and his
video deposition was admitted as defense witness number ten.
Deborah Wilkins, one of the individuals receiving the memo,
testified as defense witness number fourteen.
The other two
individuals mentioned in the memo, Kaye Smith and Byron Lightsy,
corroborated statements made by the above.
All of the
statements contained in the memo were subject to crossexamination at trial.
Therefore, even if Dye had objected to
the introduction of the memo, all of the persons mentioned in
the memo, with the exception of Smith and Lightsy, testified in
open court (either in person or by deposition) and were subject
to cross-examination.
CR 46; Division of Parks v. Hines, Ky.,
316 S.W.2d 60 (1958); KRE 801.
No error occurred.
2. Dye contends the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting evidence of an incident wherein a white BSA, Kim
Gibson, had been disciplined similar to Dye.
This evidence,
produced on the third day of trial, was discovered when a former
WKU employee, Tom Maachi, was permitted to review WKU’s files
during the trial.
Dye contends that this evidence caused his
claim of different treatment to be partially discredited.
Dye
contends that had he known about this evidence prior to trial,
he would have tried a different strategy, and that the trial
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court’s permitting this evidence to be sprung upon him midway
through the trial was an abuse of discretion, and violated his
right to due process.
Unless Dye can show he requested the
information before trial and was not given such during
discovery, he cannot complain when the defense puts on proof of
a defense.
No such allegations were made and therefore, there
was no error.
3.
Dye contends that the court should have granted a
mistrial after the defense attorney asked a defense witness,
Mark Struss, to read a document that was found the day of his
testimony.
information.
Dye contends he should have had more warning of this
Dye not only gives no authority for this statement
but no reason why the court erred, or authority for why the
defense should not have been allowed to use said document.
We
have no issue to review.
4.
Dye moved for a mistrial when the defense attorney
moved to admit the medical records of Dr. Alan Pribble into the
record.
Dye contends the exhibit is hearsay and does not meet
the business record exception to the hearsay rule.
Specifically, Dye contends that the records were not certified;
no one from Dr. Pribble’s office was present to establish it as
a business record; and Dr. Pribble was not present to testify.
Contrary to Dye’s assertion, our review of the record indicates
the records of Dr. Pribble were, in fact, certified, and were
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introduced as medical records as defendant’s exhibit 23 (rather
than as defendant’s exhibit 15, as stated in appellant’s brief.)
We see no error.
5.
Terry Hovey testified to employee evaluations
found during the third day of trial and Dye again moved for a
mistrial regarding Kim Gibson’s evaluation.
Again, we need to
know the grounds for the error as Dye gives us no reason or
authority for why this evidence should not have been introduced.
6.
The last request for a mistrial was after Pam
Reno’s deposition was read into evidence.
Dye alleges the
deposition contained hearsay without exceptions.
Pam Reno was
the Assistant Director for Facilities University Housing, and
had prepared a January 29, 1997, memo to Sal Trobiano, Auxiliary
Services Manager, recommending that Robert Dye be transferred
based on her investigation of “the recent incident at the desk.”
The alleged statements in the memo by the “two student staff
members,” “a couple of female residents,” and “some people” are
hearsay.
However, the error in its admission is harmless
considering the wealth of other evidence concerning this same
incident, and the fact that the recommended termination was
cancelled and Dye was later terminated for another reason.
Therefore, there was no need for a mistrial.
“[A] mistrial is
an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there is a
fundamental defect in the proceedings which will result in a
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manifest injustice.”
Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., Ky., 929
S.W.2d 734, 738 (1996).
Dye finally contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing WKU to admit into the record by avowal
domestic violence petitions.
Again, we perceive no error but a
misunderstanding by counsel as to the nature of avowal
testimony.
Avowal testimony is that preserved into the record
by authority of CR 43.10 for purposes of appeal.
It is not
introduced to be considered by the jury.
Because we are affirming on appeal, the protective
cross-appeal becomes moot.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Warren Circuit Court.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Nancy Oliver Roberts
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Greg N. Stivers
Scott D. Laufenberg
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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