DONALD RUCKER v. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WILLIAM C. SEABOLD, WARDEN, LT. SEARCY, SGTR. THOMAS CTO MULLER, COMMITTEE
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 20, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000740-MR
DONALD RUCKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 2001-CI-00556
v.
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
WILLIAM C. SEABOLD, WARDEN,
LT. SEARCY, SGTR. THOMAS
CTO MULLER, COMMITTEE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Donald Rucker appeals from an order of the
Oldham Circuit Court dismissing his petition for declaration of
rights.
We affirm.
Rucker was an inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory
in LaGrange.
Prison officials found Rucker to be in violation of
Corrections’ regulations by being in possession of stolen
property on July 30, 2001.
According to the testimony of
Corrections’ Officer John Fulcher, a shakedown was conducted in
the inmate copy office, and two cans of spray paint, twenty-one
cassette tapes, and laminating material for identification cards
were found.
Rucker had been assigned to the copy office and was
the only person allowed to work therein.
He was the only person,
other than staff, to have access to the office.
Rucker was found
guilty of being in possession of stolen property and was punished
by being made to spend eighteen days in segregation.1
On September 14, 2001, Rucker filed a petition for
declaration of rights in the Oldham Circuit Court.
Therein, he
alleged errors in the prison disciplinary proceeding against him.
He requested the circuit court to enter an order expunging the
disciplinary report and the findings of the Adjustment Committee
from his institutional record.
In an order entered on March 11, 2002, the circuit
court dismissed Rucker’s petition.
The court reasoned as
follows: “The Court is persuaded by the legal arguments contained
in Respondents’ memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss
and incorporates herein by reference.”
From that order, Rucker
appeals.
Rucker understands that if he is to obtain any relief,
he must show due process violations and that he has been deprived
of a protected liberty or property interest through government
action.
He does not argue that the eighteen days he spent in
segregation deprived him of a protected liberty interest.
Rather, he asserts that he was deprived of a protected liberty
interest as a result of having been convicted since he is now
1
Rucker initially received greater punishment in the form
of additional days in segregation and loss of statutory good time
credit, but his punishment was reduced to only eighteen days in
segregation by the warden on appeal.
-2-
denied five days of meritorious good time credit toward his
sentence.
KRS2 197.045(3) states that an inmate may be allowed a
deduction from his sentence of five days per month “for
performing exceptionally meritorious service or performing duties
of outstanding importance in connection with institutional
operations and programs.”
Such credit may be awarded in the
discretion of the Corrections’ commissioner.
Rucker argues that,
since he has been convicted of violating a rule under a major
category of offenses, he will not receive five days meritorious
good time for the month the conviction occurred.
Thus, he
maintains that he will be required to spend more time in prison
and that a protected liberty interest was involved.
We agree
with Corrections that there is no protected liberty interest in
the receipt of awards of meritorious good time since such awards
are entirely discretionary.
See Anderson v. Parker, Ky. App.,
964 S.W.2d 809, 810 (1997).
Rucker’s second argument is that he did not receive due
process because he was convicted of possession of stolen property
even though no evidence was presented to prove the items were
stolen.
The question is whether “some evidence” appears in the
record to support the findings of the Adjustment Committee.
Smith v. O’Dea, Ky. App., S.W.2d 353, 358 (1997).
As in the
O’Dea case, the fact finder may make reasonable inferences from
the evidence given.
Id. at 357.
Under the circumstances in the
case sub judice, the Adjustment Committee could reasonably have
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
inferred that Rucker was in possession of stolen property.
Although Rucker maintains that there was no evidence that the
items were stolen, the items were found in a restricted area in
which they did not belong.
Rucker was the only inmate with
access to the inmate copy office, and staff personnel were
unaware of how the items came to be in the office.
We conclude
that there was “some evidence” that the items were stolen and
that Rucker had possession of them.
Rucker’s third argument was that he was denied due
process because he was not allowed to cross examine Corrections
Officer Janice Markum.
Officer Markum was Rucker’s accuser, and
Rucker states that Corrections’ policy and procedure required the
Adjustment Committee to grant his request to cross examine her.
He states that, had he been granted his request to cross examine
Officer Markum, “pertinent facts crucial to his defense would
have surfaced lending to appellant’s assertion he was not
responsible for the items discovered in the copy room.”
Furthermore, he asserts that Corrections’ policy and procedure
state that if the Adjustment Committee denies an inmate the
opportunity to confront and cross examine his accuser,
justification for the denial must be made in writing.
He notes
that no justification for denying his right to cross examine
Officer Markum was made in writing.
Corrections acknowledges that the Adjustment Committee
did not state in writing its justification for denying Rucker the
right to cross examine Officer Markum.
However, Corrections’
policy and procedure authorize the denial of witnesses when their
-4-
testimony would be irrelevant, cumulative, unnecessary, or would
constitute a threat to security.
Corrections argues that the
violation of policy was “a technical violation” in light of the
fact that Officer Fulcher, who was involved in the incident,
appeared and testified.
Further, Corrections argues the relief
requested by Rucker is not warranted since he was not deprived of
a constitutionally protected interest.
Although Rucker argues that Office Markum would have
presented additional testimony favorable to him, we are
unpersuaded that would be the case.
We agree with Corrections
that any violation in the policy would not have been prejudicial
to Rucker since Officer Fulcher testified and since Officer
Markum’s report was consistent with this testimony and adverse to
Rucker’s position.
Regardless, since Rucker was not deprived of
a protected liberty or property interest by being denied five
days of meritorious good time credit, the trial court properly
refused to rule in Rucker’s favor on his petition.
The order of the Oldham Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald Rucker, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Rebecca Baylous
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky
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