MICHAEL EDWARD DORSEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 30, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002103-MR
MICHAEL EDWARD DORSEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00051
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Michael Dorsey appeals the September 20, 2001,
order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion for postconviction relief.
Dorsey argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion filed pursuant to RCr1 11.42 without
conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On January 20, 2000, Dorsey was indicted for the
offenses of first-degree assault and of being a first-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO).
the events of November 20, 1999.
1
The assault charge arose from
According to the testimony of
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Scott Ragland, Dorsey’s wife came to his home that evening, upset
and alleging that Dorsey had beat her up.
Later, when Ragland
accompanied her home, Dorsey hit him on the head with a hammer,
causing serious physical injury to Ragland.
At trial, Dorsey
admitted striking Ragland but claimed that he had acted in self
defense.
He testified that he and Ragland had a disagreement
earlier that day over a drug deal and that he was afraid of
Ragland.
He contended that his fears were justified because
Ragland had previously struck him in the face and had threatened
to kill him if he (Dorsey) did not repay money which he borrowed
from Ragland’s girlfriend to buy drugs.
Additionally, he claimed
that Ragland was high on drugs.
The jury convicted Dorsey of second-degree assault.
He
then pled guilty to being a PFO and was sentenced to serve ten
years in prison.
Dorsey subsequently moved for a new trial.
He alleged
that while he was in jail after his trial, he learned the
identity of an individual who was involved in the drug
transaction on the day of the assault and who would corroborate
his account of the evening in question.
Specifically, he alleged
that the potential witness, Tim Head, would testify that Dorsey
had procured crack cocaine for himself, his wife, Ragland, and
Ragland’s girlfriend.
H would also testify that the group smoked
the cocaine that evening and that Dorsey and Ragland got into an
argument over the quantity of drugs purchased by Dorsey.
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial.
affirming that ruling, this Court reasoned as follows:
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In
The trial court denied the motion for new
trial, relying on Hollowell v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 492 S.W.2d 884 (1973), which held that
“in order for newly discovered evidence to
support a motion for a new trial, it must be
of such decisive value or force that it
would, with reasonable certainty, have
changed the verdict or that it probably would
change the result if a new trial be granted.”
Id. at 886. Evidence that merely denigrates
the victim is not sufficient to support
granting a motion for a new trial. Collins
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 569, 576
(1997). The affidavit presented by Dorsey in
support of his motion does not contain
evidence that would, with reasonable
certainly, change the verdict. For this
reason, the trial court’s denial of the
motion for a new trial is affirmed.
Dorsey v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., No. 2000-CA-001668-MR (rendered,
June 29, 2001).
Dorsey next filed a motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.
He moved for an evidentiary hearing and for the
appointment of counsel to assist him in the motion.
Dorsey
argued that trial counsel rendered deficient representation by
failing to interview his wife to determine whether she would
provide helpful testimony at trial and by failing to crossexamine either Ragland or Ragland’s girlfriend.
Dorsey’s
appellate counsel filed a supplemental motion alleging that trial
counsel erred by: (1) failing to call witnesses on Dorsey’s
behalf (specifically, his wife, Shannon Smith Dorsey, and Tim
Head), (2) failing to object to hearsay testimony relating to
uncharged criminal misconduct, and (3) failing to depose Ragland
prior to trial.
-3-
The trial court denied the motion without conducting a
hearing.
It found that counsel’s performance did not fall below
the required standard and that Dorsey’s complaints “clearly fall
within the area of trial strategy, which is within defense
counsel’s professional discretion.”
The trial court also
concluded that there was no “reasonable likelihood” that Dorsey’s
assertions of errors — even if established — would have had any
impact on the jury’s verdict.
This appeal followed.
The sole error raised in Dorsey’s appeal is that the
trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine why trial counsel neglected to call his wife and Tim
Head as witnesses at trial to corroborate his version of the
evening’s events.
He maintains that the record does not support
the court’s finding that counsel’s conduct the result of trial
strategy and suggests that the real reason may have been
counsel’s “inadequate preparation and investigation.”
He argues:
. . . [Dorsey] was entitled to have a hearing
to discover if defense counsel had a strategy
in not calling witnesses in support of
[Dorsey’s] defense theory and in direct
contradiction to the Commonwealth’s
assertions and if so, how he arrived at that
strategy. Did he conduct any investigation,
and if so, what? The answers to these
questions are not in the record. We know
none of this without a hearing. The trial
court is not permitted to guess at the
answers or fill in the blanks. In reality,
there is no way to know what counsel’s
strategy consisted of without holding an
evidentiary hearing.
The standards for ineffective assistance of counsel
were set forth in the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
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Under the
Strickland test, the court must consider whether the challenged
conduct was deficient and, if so, whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been
different.
Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.
Where a motion
for post-conviction relief has been denied without a hearing, we
must determine whether the issues raised in the motion are
refuted by the record or whether the allegations -- if true -would not be sufficient to invalidate the conviction.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
Stanford
Dorsey is correct
that a trial court “may not simply disbelieve factual allegations
in the absence of evidence in the record refuting them.”
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (2001).
Fraser
Where it is
alleged that trial counsel failed to call witnesses whose
testimony may have altered the outcome of the trial, an
evidentiary hearing generally is necessary in order to ascertain
the possible evidence the counsel failed to introduce and/or to
explain his conduct or strategy with respect to that evidence.
Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 338, 345 (2001); see also,
Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 175 (2001), overruling
Robbins v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 719 S.W.2d 742 (1986).
In Dorsey’s previous appeal, this court addressed the
potential testimony of Tim Head and held that his testimony would
not “with reasonable certainty” have changed the outcome of the
trial.
See infra at 2-3.
Thus, regardless of the reasons for
trial counsel’s failure to call Tim Head as a witness, it is the
law of the case as a result of that earlier appeal that there is
-5-
no reasonable probability that his testimony would have changed
the jury’s verdict.
See, Ellison v. Commonwealth, Ky., 994
S.W.2d 939, 940 (1999).
Consequently, the doctrine of res
judicata bars Dorsey from establishing the prejudice prong of the
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.
An
inmate may not re-litigate the same issues in RCr 11.42
proceedings which have been presented or which could reasonably
have been presented by direct appeal.
Gross v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983) and McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948
S.W.2d 415 (1997).
With respect to trial counsel’s failure to call
Dorsey’s wife to testify, the record does refute his claim of
ineffective assistance.
Attached to Dorsey’s motion for post-
conviction relief was a copy of a letter he had written to his
attorney before the trial in which he stated: “Another thing, my
wife is not going to testify.”
Thus, Dorsey admitted that he
intended to invoke the spousal privilege set forth in KRE2
504(a).
Contrary to Dorsey’s arguments of deficient
representation, his counsel was merely following his client’s
clear instructions not to consider Shannon Dorsey as a witness.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
2
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Amy E. Robinson
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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