ROSS STEPHENSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001937-MR
ROSS STEPHENSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-01053
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Ross Stephenson appeals from orders of the
Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion for relief pursuant to
RCr 11.42.
Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we
affirm.
On October 29, 1996, appellant was indicted by the
Fayette County Grand Jury on one count of capital murder, one
count of first-degree assault, and one count of first-degree
burglary.
The indictment arose from events occurring on
August 17, 1996, in which appellant shot and seriously injured
Scott Thompson, and shot and killed Earl Griffin.
Prior to
trial, the Fayette Circuit Court ruled that the case was to
proceed as a non-capital murder case.
A jury trial commenced on
December 1, 1997.
Testimony at trial included that of Thompson and
appellant.
Thompson testified, by video deposition, that on the
night at issue, he, Griffin, and another man, Al Dailey, were at
Griffin’s residence.
Appellant showed up later, and they were
all drinking beer and liquor.
Although Dailey claimed Thompson
gave him a ride home, Thompson didn’t remember doing so.
According to Thompson, at some point appellant left Griffin’s
residence and returned less than an hour later.
When appellant
came back, he stood behind Thompson, and when Thompson turned
around, appellant shot him.
Thompson heard two more shots, and
saw appellant leave.
Appellant testified to a different version of events,
summarized as follows.
Appellant testified that he was eighteen
years old at the time of the shootings, and that his mother had
taken him out of school after the seventh grade because a lot of
the kids made fun of him for being overweight.
According to
appellant, on the night at issue he had drunk a lot of beer and
smoked some marijuana, and that at about 2:30 in the morning he
decided to go over to Griffin’s to see what he was doing and
maybe buy some marijuana from him.
Appellant testified that he
had his gun in his jacket pocket, and that he had taken the gun
with him so that in case the subject of guns came up he could
show it to Griffin and Griffin would think he was cooler than he
actually was.
When he arrived at Griffin’s residence, Griffin,
Thompson, and Dailey were there drinking beer and whiskey.
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Appellant joined the men in drinking and smoking pot, and
everybody was drunk and high.
and loud.
Thompson and Griffin were rowdy
Thompson left to take Dailey home, during which time
appellant and Griffin watched TV and talked, and then Thompson
returned to Griffin’s.
loud and hollering.
When Thompson came back, he was drunk and
Thompson handed a whisky bottle to appellant
and told him to take a drink.
Appellant took a little sip, and
Thompson called him a “pussy” and told him to take a real drink.
Appellant tried to take a bigger drink, and then Thompson took
the bottle away from him and called him a “fat pussy.”
and Griffin started laughing at him.
Thompson
Appellant felt sick and
went to the bathroom to throw up and heard Thompson and Griffin
laughing.
Appellant decided to go home.
As he headed for the
door, Thompson jumped up, grabbed his arm, and shouted “where are
you going, fat boy, we’re not done drinking yet” and then said
“let me show you something” and looked at Griffin.
shouted, “No rules,” a couple of times.
Griffin then
Thompson then whirled
around and hit appellant in the jaw with his elbow.
Appellant
testified that the next thing he knew his ears were ringing from
a gunshot and that he had his gun in his hand.
to look at Griffin.
He turned around
Appellant testified that Griffin was
hollering something and started to come after him, and without
realizing what he was doing, he shot Griffin.
Appellant
testified that he shot Griffin because he was scared, wanted to
get away, and was afraid of what Griffin would do if he got hold
of him.
Appellant testified that he never meant to shoot or kill
anyone.
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The jury found appellant guilty of first-degree
manslaughter of Griffin and of first-degree assault of Thompson.
Appellant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment on each
count, with the sentences to run consecutively for a total of
forty years.
Appellant’s convictions were affirmed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Case No. 98-SC-0020-MR.
On May 30, 2000, appellant, pro se, filed a motion to
vacate or set aside judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On
February 7, 2001, appointed counsel filed a supplemental
memorandum.
On July 16, 2001, the trial court denied appellant’s
motion without a hearing.
On July 25, 2001, appellant filed a
motion to vacate the July 16, 2001 order.
On August 13, 2001,
the trial court denied appellant’s motion to vacate, in which
order the court further stated that more specific findings were
not necessary.
Appellant appeals from the July 16, 2001, and
August 13, 2001 orders.
On appeal, appellant contends that 1) the trial court
erred by overruling his RCr 11.42 motion without a hearing, 2) he
was denied due process by the trial court’s failure to inquire
whether he voluntarily and intelligently consented to defense
counsel’s arguments admitting guilt to the alleged crimes, and 3)
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by counsel’s
reliance on a multiple theory defense, which included conflicting
defenses.
We first address appellant’s argument regarding the
trial court’s failure to inquire whether he voluntarily consented
to defense counsel’s arguments admitting guilt to the crimes.
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Appellant argues that statements made by counsel in his opening
and closing arguments were admissions of guilt, and therefore, as
with a guilty plea, the trial court was required to query
appellant to ensure the admissions were made with his voluntary
and intelligent consent.
The statements with which appellant takes issue include
counsel’s remarks that he was not going to ask the jury to find
appellant not guilty of everything, that the evidence would not
excuse what appellant did that night, and that he would not ask
them to let appellant walk out a free man, as well as counsel’s
admissions that appellant was guilty of assault under extreme
emotional disturbance for the shooting of Thompson, and that
appellant was guilty of the misperceived need for self-defense
with regard to the shooting of Griffin.
We believe that the case of Meadows v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 550 S.W.2d 511 (1977), is dispositive of appellant’s
argument.
In Meadows, the appellant, on trial for murder,
similarly argued that statements made by his counsel in his
closing argument amounted to a plea of guilty, and therefore that
his conviction should be set aside under the principles of Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274
(1969), because there had been no hearing to determine whether he
had voluntarily and intelligently acquiesced to counsel’s
statements.
Id. at 512.
The Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
We think, however, that this particular
approach to the jury by counsel, seeking more
to save his client’s life than his liberty,
was not a plea, but a ploy. It entreated the
jury to find Meadows not guilty of the most
serious offense covered by instructions, even
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if the price of its so doing were to find him
guilty under one of the other instructions.
A lawyer’s role in trying a case is much like
that of a military commander on the field of
battle. His decisions to advance, retreat or
stand fast cannot always be plotted in
advance or be laid before headquarters before
taken. The action of trial counsel in this
particular instance may have amounted to a
tactical retreat, but certainly it did not
surrender the cause. We therefore need not
pass on the question whether the Boykin
principle would apply to a de facto guilty
plea made, for example, in the form of a
lawyer’s admitting his client’s guilt and
pitching his case on the mercy of the jury.
Id.
In the present case, we similarly conclude that counsel’s
statements “[were] not a plea, but a ploy.”
Id.
As in Meadows,
it is clear that counsel’s statements were a strategic attempt to
avoid conviction of the most serious offenses, murder as to
Griffin and first-degree assault as to Thompson, by conceding to
the jury that appellant was guilty of lesser offenses.
Id.
In
fact, on appeal, appellant agrees that “[i]t seems likely that
defense counsel’s actions were chosen in an effort to avoid a
conviction for murder.”
Accordingly, we conclude that counsel’s
statements did not constitute a “de facto guilty plea,” id., and,
per Meadows, under these circumstances no inquiry by the trial
court was required.
We next address appellant’s argument regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant contends that,
rather than developing one theory of the case, counsel presented
several, and conflicting, defenses - extreme emotional
disturbance, intoxication, and self defense - and that this
failure to rationally select a defense, or protect a chosen
defense, constituted ineffective assistance.
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In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing that
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency
resulted in actual prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984).
The burden is on the movant to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel's assistance was constitutionally
sufficient.
Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878 (1969).
There is a presumption that the challenged actions of counsel
might be considered sound trial strategy.
at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
Strickland, 466 U.S.
Whether an attorney has rendered
ineffective assistance is an issue of fact to be determined by
the trial court, and its findings will not be set aside unless
they are clearly erroneous.
Ivey v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 655
S.W.2d 506, 509 (1983).
Our review of the record indicates that defense
counsel’s strategy, in light of appellant’s admission to the
shootings, was to portray appellant as a peaceful young man who
never meant to hurt anyone, but who, as a result of his
intoxication and sensitivity to teasing, overreacted when he was
taunted and frightened by Thompson and Griffin.
Counsel was
defending appellant against charges concerning both Griffin and
Thompson, each of whom appellant himself advanced a different
explanation for shooting.
Further, the defenses asserted by
counsel, extreme emotional disturbance, a misperceived need for
self-defense, and intoxication were consistent with the testimony
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given by appellant himself as well as other evidence presented at
trial.
Effective assistance of counsel does not deny counsel
the freedom of discretion in determining the means of presenting
his client's case.
642 (1978).
Hibbs v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 570 S.W.2d
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that
appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel’s
actions were other than sound trial strategy.
Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in rejecting appellant’s claim of
ineffective assistance.
Finally, as the issues raised by appellant are
resolvable from the record, no evidentiary hearing was required.
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 803 S.W.2d 573, 576 (1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 844, 112 S. Ct. 140, 116 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1991).
For the aforementioned reasons, the orders of the
Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Marguerite Neil Thomas
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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