PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHAEL A. STORTZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF RACHEL M. STORTZ, A MINOR; AND PEGGY STORTZ, RACHEL M. STORTZ, A MINOR
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RENDERED: AUGUST 9, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001919-MR
PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00076
MICHAEL A. STORTZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF RACHEL
M. STORTZ, A MINOR; AND PEGGY STORTZ,
AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF
RACHEL M. STORTZ, A MINOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, Judge:
Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive)
appeals from the findings of fact, conclusions of law and summary
judgment for Michael and Peggy Stortz entered by the Bracken
Circuit Court that required it to provide basic reparations
benefits on a motorcycle insurance policy issued to Michael
Stortz and denied its motion for summary judgment.
After
reviewing the record, the arguments of counsel and the applicable
law, we reverse and remand.
In conjunction with his purchase of a motorcycle,
Michael Stortz consulted with Sarah Carl at the Carol Moran
Independent Insurance Agency in March 1999, about procuring motor
vehicle insurance coverage.
During their conversation, Stortz
told Carl that he wanted a “good policy” and “full coverage” and
wanted to make sure he had coverage for passengers because he
sometimes took his children for rides.
Carl allegedly responded
that “it should not be a problem,” but they did not have a
specific discussion about basic reparations benefits, which often
is also referred to as PIP, personal injury protection,
benefits.1
Carl accepted Stortz’s application for a motorcycle
insurance policy issued by Progressive2 that included bodily
injury liability, property damage liability, stacked uninsured
and stacked underinsured coverage, and pedestrian personal injury
protection, but no personal injury protection coverage for the
insured.3
Sometime after March 1999, Carol Moran became aware,
contrary to her previous belief, that PIP coverage was not
automatically included in the motorcycle insurance policies
issued by Progressive, but rather was an optional item.
In early
June 1999, Moran mailed letters to all of her clients with
Progressive motorcycle policies informing them of this situation
1
See Stevenson v. Anthem Cas. Ins. Group, Ky., 15 S.W.3d
720, 723 (1999)(discussing automobile insurance liability
terminology).
2
The policy actually was issued by Progressive Northern
Insurance Company, an affiliate of Progressive Insurance Company.
3
The cost for the policy was $61.92.
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and asking them to contact the agency about whether they wished
to add PIP coverage.
The agency did not receive a response from
Michael Stortz to the letter, and he maintains that he never
received it.
On September 5, 1999, Michael Stortz was driving on a
rural highway with his daughter Rachel, when a dog ran onto the
highway causing him to lose control of the motorcycle.
Both
occupants were injured with Michael sustaining the more severe
injuries and approximately $30,000 in medical expenses, while
Rachel had $2,600 in medical expenses.
When Michael notified
Progressive of the accident, the insurer denied his claim based
on an absence of PIP coverage under the policy.
In July 2000, Stortz filed a petition for declaration
of rights action pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
Chapter 418 seeking a judgment declaring that the motorcycle
insurance policy provided PIP coverage.
Subsequently, the
parties took the depositions of Michael Stortz, Sarah Carl and
Carol Moran.
In March 2001, Progressive filed a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
(CR) 56 arguing that PIP benefits were optional and neither it,
nor its agents had breached a duty owed to Stortz.
Stortz filed
a response to the motion and its own motion for summary judgment
against Progressive.
Stortz asserted that Carl had misled him to
believe he had PIP coverage and effectively failed to offer him
the option to purchase PIP coverage.
On June 28, 2001, the trial court entered findings of
fact, conclusions of law and summary judgment in favor of the
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Stortzes, and denied Progressive’s summary judgment motion.
The
court held that Carl had a duty to advise Michael Stortz of the
optional nature of PIP coverage, had effectively failed to offer
it, and had misrepresented the existence of that coverage under
his policy.
The court ordered Progressive to provide the
Stortzes $10,000 in basic reparations benefits for both Michael
and Rachel under the motorcycle insurance policy.
Progressive
filed a CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend or vacate stating summary
judgment was premature because it needed more time for discovery
on the issue of whether Michael Stortz received the June 1999
letter from Moran on the availability of PIP coverage.
court summarily denied the motion.
The trial
This appeal followed.
Progressive contends that the trial court erred in
granting the Stortzes summary judgment.
The standard of review
on appeal when a trial court grants a motion for summary judgment
is whether the trial court correctly found there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Palmer v. International Ass’n of
Machinists, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1994); Stewart v.
University of Louisville, Ky. App., 65 S.W.3d 536, 540 (2001); CR
56.03.
The movant bears the initial burden of convincing the
court by evidence of record that no genuine issue of fact is in
dispute, and then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary
judgment to present “at least some affirmative evidence showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 482 (1991).
See also City of Florence v. Chipman,
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Ky., 38 S.W.3d 387, 390 (2001); Lucchese v. Sparks-Malone, Ky.
App., 44 S.W.3d 816, 817 (2001).
The court must view the record
in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all doubts
in his favor.
Lipsteuer v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Ky., 37
S.W.3d 732, 736 (2000); Commonwealth, Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Neace, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 15, 19
(2000).
Summary judgment is not considered a substitute for a
trial, so the trial court must review the evidentiary record not
to decide any issue of fact, but to determine if any real factual
issue exists and the nonmovant cannot prevail under any
circumstances.
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480; Chipman, 38 S.W.3d
at 390; Barnette v. Hospital of Louisa, Inc., Ky. App., 64 S.W.3d
828, 829 (2002).
An appellate court need not defer to the trial
court’s decision on summary judgment and will review the issue de
novo because only legal questions and no factual findings are
involved.
See Lewis v. B & R Corp., Ky. App., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436
(2001); Barnette, 64 S.W.3d at 829.
See generally Goldsmith v.
Allied Bldg. Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d 378, 380
(1992)(reviewing court need not give same deference to trial
court on summary judgment as on case tried by the court).
Progressive questions the trial court’s action on
several grounds.
Unlike the mandatory PIP coverage for
automobiles,4 the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act provides that
insurers must provide basic reparations benefit coverage as an
option for motorcycle liability insurance policies.
304.39.040(3) and (4).
4
See KRS
As such, Progressive asserts that it owed
See KRS 304.39-080(5)and KRS 304.39-100(1)(c).
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and breached no duty with respect to its conduct with Michael
Stortz.
Progressive relies heavily on Mullins v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., Ky., 839 S.W.2d 245 (1992), in which the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that insurance agents had no affirmative duty
to advise insureds on the availability and desirability of
purchasing underinsured motorists coverage because of its
optional nature.
It also cites Flowers v. Wells, Ky. App., 602
S.W.2d 179 (1980), wherein this Court held that an applicant’s
request for “full coverage” did not constitute a request for
optional coverage items such as underinsured motorist coverage,
which was involved in that case.
In making its decision, the trial court relied on PanAmerican Life Ins. Co. v. Roethke, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 128 (2000),
which was cited by the Stortzes.
In Roethke, the court held that
an insurance company could be held vicariously liable for the
actions of its agents acting within the scope of their authority.
The court noted statutory and case law expressing a need to
protect insureds from overreaching by insurance agents.
A careful review of the case law raises questions with
the positions of both parties and the trial court.
For instance,
while both Mullins and Flowers indicate that general requests for
a “good policy” or “full coverage” do not create a duty on an
insurance agent to advise insureds of optional coverage items,
more specific requests can raise such a duty.
In Mullins, the
court noted that the insured told the agent that she wanted “as
good a policy as I could get on liability and no fault,
everything I could get on it, because I couldn’t afford full
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coverage.”
839 S.W.2d at 246.
The court said, “[s]ince her
request was for less than full coverage, it precludes including
optional coverages such as UIM [underinsured motorist] and added
RB [reparation benefits], within its parameters, because we do
not find circumstances creating an express or implied assumption
of a duty to advise.”
839 S.W.2d at 249.
The court stated that
an implied assumption of duty may arise if, inter alia, the
insured clearly makes a request for advice.
Similarly, in
Flowers, the court said, “[w]e cannot conceive that a request for
‘full coverage’ would include all or even any optional coverages,
unless specifically requested.”
602 S.W.2d at 181 (emphasis
added).
The issue of the existence of a duty is a question of
law for the court subject to de novo review.
at 248.
Mullins, 839 S.W.2d
While perhaps a close question, we agree with the trial
court that Michael Stortz’s request created an implied assumption
of duty5 on Sarah Carl to advise him of the optional PIP
coverage.
Although his request for a “good policy” and “full
coverage” was not sufficient to create a duty, his request for
coverage for his passengers was specific enough to require Carl
to advise him of the availability and need for PIP coverage.
Having found an implied assumption of duty to advise
Michael Stortz of option PIP coverage, the next question is
whether Progressive breached that duty.
While the existence of
and standard of care associated with a duty are legal questions,
5
We agree with Progressive that no express assumption of
duty existed.
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the breach of a duty and causation are factual issues.
B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d at 438.
Lewis v.
A court may decide the issue of
causation as a matter of law only if there is no reasonable
question on the issue.
Id.
In the case sub judice, the evidence on breach of the
duty and causation is unclear and Progressive disputes liability
on both of these factual issues.
It is undisputed that Michael
Stortz and Carl did not specifically discuss the full aspects of
PIP coverage in part because Carl believed that PIP coverage was
included on a standard motorcycle policy.6
Nevertheless, she
testified in her deposition that she always went over the basic
coverages with clients before issuing a policy.
In addition,
Carl stated that she gave Michael Stortz a copy of the
application, which lists the coverages for his policy and
specifically indicates that it did not include PIP coverage.
The
declarations page of the full insurance policy received by the
Stortzes in late March 1999, several months prior to the
accident, did not list PIP benefits as part of the covered
items.7
Finally, Progressive disputed Michael Stortz’s assertion
that he did not receive a copy of the June 1999 letter sent by
the Moran Agency to its motorcycle policy holders fully
6
The trial court’s finding that PIP coverage was neither
offered nor available to Michael Stortz because Carl believed it
was already provided is clearly erroneous. The issue merely was
not specifically discussed.
7
We note the Kentucky Supreme Court has held in Grigsby v.
Mountain Valley Ins. Agency, Inc., Ky., 795 S.W.2d 372 (1990),
that failure of the insured to read and comprehend an insurance
policy is not a defense to an insurance agency’s negligence.
Grigsby involved a fire insurance policy.
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explaining the possible absence of PIP coverage.
Progressive
asked the trial court for additional time to conduct further
discovery on this issue and Stortz’s knowledge of PIP coverage
based on a prior motorcycle policy, but the trial court summarily
denied the motion.
Given the uncertainty of the evidence and disputed
nature of the factual issues surrounding the breach of duty and
causation, we believe the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Stortzes.
The reliance of the trial court and
the Stortzes on Roethke is unavailing and that case actually
supports our decision.
As Progressive points out, unlike this
appeal, Roethke involved affirmative misrepresentations by the
insurance agent, rather than omissions on optional coverages.8
The court in Roethke held that summary judgment was improper
because of the existence of factual questions concerning breach
of duty and causation concerning the insurance agent’s discussion
with the insured.9
In this appeal, there are genuine issues of
material fact in dispute that preclude summary judgment for the
Stortzes.
For the same reason, we reject Progressive’s claim
that it was entitled to summary judgment.
8
We disagree with Progressive’s argument that this fact
compels judgment in its favor. The Roethke court did not hold
that affirmative misrepresentations were required to constitute a
breach of duty and its decision is based on an express assumption
of a duty to advise, rather than an implied assumption.
9
The main issues in Roethke actually involved the existence
and scope of duty based on the scope of agency authority. The
court relied on the contract between the insurance company and
the insurance agency as creating a duty to advise and not
misrepresent the insurance policy. Progressive has not raised
the issue of the scope of agency authority based on any contract
between itself and the Moran Agency.
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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of
the Bracken Circuit Court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bradford P. Bollmann
Schiller, Osbourn & Barnes
Louisville, Kentucky
John F. Estill
Fox, Wood, Wood & Estill
Maysville, Kentucky
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