FISHER EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. V. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY EAST AND WESTBROOK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.; and TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY V.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001774-MR
FISHER EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
V.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-004186
UNITED STATES FIDELITY &
GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2001-CA-001915-MR
EAST AND WESTBROOK CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.; and TRANSPORTATION
INSURANCE COMPANY
V.
APPELLANT
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-004186
FISHER EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING IN APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-001774-MR,
AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
IN APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-001915-MR
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUDGEL, and KNOPF, Judges.
GUDGEL, JUDGE:
These consolidated appeals stem from partial
summary judgments granted by the Jefferson Circuit Court in an
action arising out of a construction accident.
In Appeal No.
2001-CA-001915-MR, appellants East and Westbrook Construction
Company, Inc. (East and Westbrook) and Transportation Insurance
Company contend that the court erred by finding that a hold
harmless agreement between appellee Fisher Equipment Company,
Inc. (Fisher) and East and Westbrook was valid and enforceable.
In Appeal No. 2001-CA-001774-MR, Fisher contends that the court
erred by finding that coverage for the accident was excluded
under the contractor’s equipment policy issued to Fisher by
appellee United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company
(USF&G).
We disagree with Fisher’s contention in Appeal No.
2001-CA-001774-MR, but we agree that the partial summary judgment
in Appeal No. 2001-CA-001915-MR must be reversed.
Hence, we
affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
For the most part, the relevant facts in both appeals
are essentially undisputed.
In 1997, Whip Mix Company contracted
with Branscrum Construction to erect a warehouse addition in
Louisville.
Branscrum in turn subcontracted with East and
Westbrook to do the concrete construction for the project,
including the erection of the concrete panels which were to form
the walls of the building.
To assist in erecting the panels,
East and Westbrook contracted with Fisher for the latter to
provide a 140-ton hydraulic crane and the necessary personnel to
operate it.
Fisher obtained the necessary crane from Holloway &
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Son Construction Company, Inc. (Holloway), under an agreement
whereby Fisher agreed to operate, maintain, and insure the crane,
and to share with Holloway the income generated by its use.
Consistent with its duties under that agreement, Fisher obtained
a contractor’s equipment insurance policy from USF&G.
On October 31, 1997, East and Westbrook forwarded to
Fisher a written purchase order reciting the terms and conditions
of the parties’ contract, and Fisher delivered the requisite
crane to the job site.
On the work’s starting date of November
3, the on-site supervisor for East and Westbrook signed a hold
harmless agreement in favor of Fisher.
On November 4 the crane
tipped over while lifting a concrete panel, causing significant
damage to both the crane and the construction site.
for damages against Fisher followed.
An action
USF&G was added as a party
for the purpose of resolving the coverage issue after it denied
Fisher coverage for the loss.
In due course, the court granted
both Fisher and USF&G partial summary judgments dismissing the
claims against them.
These consolidated appeals followed.
First, in Appeal No. 2001-CA-001774-MR Fisher contends
that the court erred by granting USF&G a summary judgment as to
the coverage issue.
We disagree.
The proof shows that the crane tipped over because
Fisher’s employees overloaded the crane and attempted to lift
more weight than it could handle.
USF&G took the position that
the accident was due to the negligence of Fisher’s employees in
attempting to lift a load which exceeded the “manufacturer’s
rated capacity” for that particular load, with the result that
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coverage for the loss was excluded by the policy’s clause which
excluded coverage for any loss caused by or resulting from Fisher
“exceeding the manufacturer’s rated capacity” for the insured
crane.
Fisher, however, claimed that the exclusionary clause’s
use of the phrase “manufacturer’s rated capacity” was ambiguous
as being subject to two reasonable interpretations.
More
specifically, Fisher asserted that the phrase could be
interpreted as referring either to the crane’s total lifting
capacity as determined by the manufacturer, or to 85% of the
total lifting capacity as specified in the manufacturer’s lifting
capacity chart which was attached to the crane’s cab.
Fisher
argued that the policy’s allegedly ambiguous exclusionary clause
must be construed in favor of coverage, especially since USF&G
failed to define the phrase in its policy.
In resolving this coverage issue, the court determined
that the policy was unambiguous and that there was only one
reasonable interpretation of its use of the phrase
“manufacturer’s rated capacity.”
The court concluded that it was
not reasonable to interpret the phrase as meaning 100% of the
crane’s lifting capacity rather than 85% thereof as listed on the
chart in the crane’s cab, because such an interpretation would
require the crane’s operator to perform independent mathematical
calculations before each use of the crane, rather than using the
posted figures provided by the manufacturer.
The court therefore
found that the only reasonable interpretation of the phrase was
that coverage was excluded for any use of the crane which
involved the lifting of a load in excess of the specified 85%
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weight limit.
Since it was admitted that the load which caused
the crane to tip over exceeded that limit, the court adjudged
that there was no coverage under the policy for Fisher’s loss.
Fisher’s argument to this court totally ignores the
trial court’s reasoning for finding that the policy’s
exclusionary clause was not ambiguous.
Moreover, Fisher ignores
the affidavit of the manufacturer’s employee that the phrase
“manufacturer’s rated capacity” referred to 85% of the total
lifting capacity, as well as the testimony of its own employees
that the 85% capacity chart in the crane’s cab provided the rated
capacity for the crane and was “the bible” for such purposes.
Given the evidence in the record, it is clear that the trial
court did not err by finding that the phrase “manufacturer’s
rated capacity” must be deemed to refer to what the manufacturer
believed it meant, and not to the insured’s interpretation of the
phrase.
It follows, therefore, that the trial court did not
clearly err by finding that there was no policy coverage for
Fisher’s loss and that US&G was entitled to a summary judgment as
to the coverage issue.
In Appeal No. 2001-CA-001915-MR, appellants contend
that an issue of fact exists as to whether the hold harmless
agreement was supported by consideration, and as to whether the
agreement itself created an ambiguity regarding whether the
parties intended for Fisher to be indemnified against its own
negligence.
Hence, they urge that the court erred by granting
summary judgment as to Fisher’s right to enforce the agreement.
We agree.
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It is undisputed that on October 31, 1997, East and
Westbrook faxed a purchase order to Fisher for an operator,
oiler, and crane for tilt-up erection at an agreed price of
$3,128 per day, and Fisher delivered the crane to the job site.
It is also undisputed that on that date, Fisher was aware that it
would be required to set up the crane on the concrete slab, as
East and Westbrook could not get permission to use the preferred
adjacent ditch line.
Thus, as of October 31 there was a contract
between the parties which addressed all the issues essential to
the contract.
The fact that Fisher’s principal did not sign the
purchase order until after the accident is of no significance,
given the fact that Fisher moved the crane onto the job site on
October 31 and the purchase order expressly provided alternate
means for acceptance, including delivery of the materials to the
purchaser.
The terms and conditions of the purchase order,
rather than those of the hold harmless agreement subsequently
signed by East and Westbrook’s on-site supervisor, therefore are
controlling and the parties’ rights must be determined consistent
with that purchase order.
The parties agree that the purchase order permitted
written modification of its terms and conditions.
However, while
Fisher argues that the November 3 indemnity agreement validly
modified the existing purchase order, appellants assert that any
such modification was unenforceable as it was not supported by
any new consideration.
We need not resolve this issue, however,
because it is clear that genuine issues of material fact exist as
to whether the individuals who executed the November 3 hold
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harmless agreement were authorized to do so, and as to whether
the agreement was intended only to absolve Fisher from liability
if the crane’s weight cracked the concrete slab, rather than to
totally absolve Fisher from liability for other acts of
negligence.
Therefore, so much of the summary judgment as
dismisses the claim against Fisher must be reversed.
For the reasons stated, the partial summary judgment in
Appeal No. 2001-CA-001774-MR is affirmed, and the partial summary
judgment in Appeal No. 2001-CA-001915-MR is reversed and remanded
for further proceedings consistent with our views.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR FISHER EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, INC.:
BRIEF FOR EAST & WESTBROOK
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.;
and TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE
COMPANY:
Christopher R. Cashen
Catherine Stivers Purdy
Lexington, KY
James L. Fischer, Jr.
New Albany, IN
BRIEF FOR UNITED STATES
FIDELITY & GUARANTY
INSURANCE COMPANY:
Gerald R. Toner
Clay A. Edwards
Louisville, KY
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