JAMES NICK HARRISON v. DOUG SAPP; GARY BLACKBURN; B. BLACKWELL; DANNY BOTTOM; McELORY BURDENTTE; RAYMOND CANTERBERRY; BILL CASE; ANTHONY CLARK; JOHN DOE; GAYL DOLES; NANCY DOOM; KENNETH EHISHIDE; RON FLETCHER; CHARLES HOWELL; CARL JONES; LONNIE MATLOCK; JAMES MITCHELL; JAMES MORGAN; JUDITH MORRIS; PHILIP PARKER; DUKE PETTIT; JAMES POTTER; CHARLES RADER; CHARLIE RAMEY; ALAN SIMS; ROGER SOWDER; JOE STUART; CLARK TAYLOR; JULIE THOMAS; JOHN THOMPSON; PATTI TREAT; SERGEANT WESTERFIELD; CAROL T. WILLIAMS; AND ED WILLIAMS
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 30, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001666-MR
JAMES NICK HARRISON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00187
v.
DOUG SAPP; GARY BLACKBURN; B. BLACKWELL;
DANNY BOTTOM; McELORY BURDENTTE;
RAYMOND CANTERBERRY; BILL CASE; ANTHONY
CLARK; JOHN DOE; GAYL DOLES; NANCY DOOM;
KENNETH EHISHIDE; RON FLETCHER; CHARLES
HOWELL; CARL JONES; LONNIE MATLOCK; JAMES
MITCHELL; JAMES MORGAN; JUDITH MORRIS;
PHILIP PARKER; DUKE PETTIT; JAMES POTTER;
CHARLES RADER; CHARLIE RAMEY; ALAN SIMS;
ROGER SOWDER; JOE STUART; CLARK TAYLOR;
JULIE THOMAS; JOHN THOMPSON; PATTI TREAT;
SERGEANT WESTERFIELD; CAROL T. WILLIAMS;
AND ED WILLIAMS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
James Nick Harrison has appealed, pro se, from
an order entered by the Lyon Circuit Court on August 14, 2000,
which dismissed his civil complaint which alleged violations of
his federal and state constitutional rights in connection with a
prison disciplinary action.
Having concluded that a large
portion of the claims contained in the amended complaint should
have been transferred to the court with the proper venue based on
KRS1 452.105, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with
directions.
Harrison was an inmate at the Kentucky State
Penitentiary (KSP) in Eddyville, Lyon County, Kentucky, on
October 26, 1996, when he failed to return to his prison cell at
the time for lockup and was charged with violating the
Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) 15.2, Category IV-7,
for failing to comply with lockup procedures.
Harrison admitted
that he was not inside his cell when the doors were closed for
final lockup, but he claimed that he did not have sufficient time
to return from the prison yard.
A disciplinary write-up report
was prepared, the report was investigated, and a hearing was held
before a three-member Adjustment Committee, at which several
inmates provided testimony.
The Adjustment Committee found him
guilty of the offense and assessed a penalty of 45 days
disciplinary segregation, suspended for 90 days.2
Harrison
challenged the disciplinary procedures in an appeal filed with
the prison warden, Philip Parker.
The warden concurred with the
Adjustment Committee’s decision and rejected Harrison’s
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Under prison policies, if an inmate is not found guilty of
violating a rule during the period of suspension, the penalty is
vacated but the violation remains on his record. See CPP 15.6.
-2-
procedural complaints.
The record indicates that Harrison did
not have to serve any time in disciplinary segregation.
In March 1998, Harrison was transferred to the
Northpoint Training Center in Boyle County.
Although the current
record fails to identify the circumstances or nature of the
charges, Harrison alleges that he was placed in segregation after
being charged and found guilty of several disciplinary violations
while at Northpoint.
In February 1999, he was transferred from
Northpoint back to the KSP.
On December 26, 1996, Harrison filed a civil complaint
pursuant to KRS Chapter 418 and 42 U.S.C.3 § 1983 against various
Department of Corrections employees in connection with the
October 1996 disciplinary action, alleging a violation of his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
In
addition to the KSP corrections officers directly involved in
reporting and investigating the charges, the warden, and the
members of the Adjustment Committee, Harrison named Doug Sapp,
the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, and Judith
Morris, a classification branch manager, whose offices were in
Frankfort.
Harrison claimed Sapp and Morris denied him a
meaningful appeal process by failing to update and/or correct the
prison regulations to allow him an adequate appeal process beyond
the level of warden and/or allowed him to be disciplined without
due process of law.
Attached to the complaint were the
disciplinary report forms involving the write-up, the
investigation, the Adjustment Committee hearing, Harrison’s
3
United States Code.
-3-
petition to the warden on appeal, and the Warden’s appeal
decision.
Shortly thereafter, Harrison filed an amended
complaint naming an additional 17 Corrections Department
employees in connection with the disciplinary actions against him
at Northpoint.
He also raised additional claims against Sapp for
failing to provide employment and preventing him from obtaining
privately furnished clothing.
On February 3, 2000, the Department of Corrections, on
behalf of the numerous defendants, filed an answer to the
complaint and amended complaint in which it raised various
defenses including, inter alia, improper venue and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
On February 25,
2000, the Department filed a motion to dismiss four defendants4
who were officials residing and working in Frankfort and 15 other
defendants5 who were employed at Northpoint.
Harrison filed a
response to the motion to dismiss these defendants.
On July 24,
2000, the trial court entered an order dismissing the 19
defendants named in the motion based upon a finding that Lyon
County was not the proper venue for a lawsuit against these
defendants.
On August 2, 2000, Harrison filed a motion to
reconsider that included a request for additional findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the venue issue.
In the motion,
he suggested transfer to another jurisdiction should the court
reject his argument on reconsideration.
4
Doug Sapp, Judith Morris, Clark Taylor, and Carol Williams.
5
Danny Bottom, McElroy Burdette, Raymond Canterbury, Bill
Case, Anthony Clark, Charles Howell, Carl Jones, Donnie Matlock,
James Mitchell, James Morgan, Charles Rader, Alan Sims, Roger
Sowder, John Thompson, and Sgt. Westerfield.
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On August 14, 2000, the trial court entered an order
dismissing the original complaint based on Sandin v. Conner.6
It
also found the action to be legally without merit or factually
frivolous under KRS 454.405(1) and suggested the Department
should take special note of KRS 197.045(5)(a), which authorizes
the Department to establish rules reducing inmates’ good-time
credits when a court dismisses and finds a lawsuit to be
malicious, harassing, or factually frivolous.
On August 21,
2000, Harrison filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
order dismissing.7
He maintained that the order failed to
address any claims raised in the amended complaint and that the
complaint and amended complaint were adequate to state a cause of
action for arbitrary and retaliatory action by the Corrections
officials.
Harrison also filed a motion for additional findings
of fact pursuant to CR 52.02 and a motion seeking recusal of the
trial judge based on an appearance of possible bias.8
The trial
judge did not recuse himself and the Supreme Court of Kentucky
entered an order denying Harrison’s request to disqualify the
trial judge.
On June 28, 2001, the trial court denied the CR
59.05 motion to amend and the CR 52.02 motion for additional
findings of fact.
This appeal followed.
Harrison contends the trial court erred in dismissing
the 19 defendants for improper venue.
He states that although
the actions involving these defendants occurred outside Lyon
6
515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
7
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05.
8
See KRS 26A.015 and KRS 26A.020; SCR 4.300 Canon 2; and
Nichols v. Commonwealth, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 263 (1992).
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County, venue was proper in Franklin, Boyle and Lyon Counties
because he alleged a single continuing process of harassment and
retaliation.
KRS 452.405(2) provides that actions “[a]gainst a
public officer for an act done by him in virtue or under color of
his office, or for a neglect of official duty” shall be brought
“in the county where the cause of action, or some part thereof,
arose.”
In Fischer v. State Board of Elections,9 the Supreme
Court stated that for purposes of this statute, “a cause of
action generally arises at the place where the act creating the
right to bring an action occurred.”10
In Fischer, the Supreme
Court held that the proper venue for the action in that case
challenging the constitutionality of the 1991 Reapportionment Act
was the county of residence of the plaintiff rather than Franklin
County where the statute was enacted.
The Supreme Court
determined that any injury to the plaintiff did not occur until
the statute was applied to him.
The Supreme Court stated,
“[a]ppreciable harm arises only when the statute directly affects
the individual by denying him a right or imposing upon him an
obligation.”11
Despite Harrison’s attempt to characterize much of his
lawsuit as a single process by joining all of the actions of the
defendants under an allegation of conspiracy and retaliation, we
conclude that the trial court properly viewed the numerous claims
9
Ky., 847 S.W.2d 718 (1993).
10
Id. at 720.
11
Id. at 721.
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as containing discrete acts with the attendant harm occurring in
different locales.
Harrison has alleged no facts in his
complaints to support his claim of a conspiracy by these numerous
defendants.
The complaints concerning the disciplinary actions
and actions by the prison employees at the two prisons involved
alleged harm to Harrison at those locations, so the proper venue
for alleged civil rights violations occurring at Northpoint was
in Boyle County.
Similarly, venue for the claims against the
four defendants residing and working in Franklin County is where
the alleged harm caused by their actions or omissions occurred,
that being either Lyon County or Boyle County.
Contrary to the
Department’s position, the proper venue as to the claims against
these defendants was not in Franklin County.
As in Fischer,12
any appreciable harm to Harrison did not arise until the actions
taken by Sapp, Morris, Taylor and Williams in Franklin County
denied him a right or imposed an obligation upon him at his place
of residence.
While we agree with the trial court’s ruling that Lyon
County was the proper venue only for those claims arising in that
county, we hold that the trial court erred by not transferring
the claims that arose in Boyle County to the Boyle Circuit Court.
In 2000, the General Assembly enacted KRS 452.105, which
provides:
In civil actions, when the judge of the
court in which the case was filed determines
that the court lacks venue to try the case
due to an improper venue, the judge, upon
motion of a party, shall transfer the case to
the court with the proper venue.
12
Supra at 721.
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In the case sub judice, the trial court dismissed the
19 defendants it found were named in claims involving improper
venue.
Harrison specifically requested the trial court to
transfer any claims it held could not be brought in Lyon County
The mandatory language13 in this
because of improper venue.
statute creates an obligation on the trial judge to transfer a
case upon request when there is a defect because of venue.14
Consequently, this case must be remanded to the Lyon Circuit
Court for entry of an order transferring those claims that arose
in Boyle County to the Boyle Circuit Court.
Harrison also claims the trial court erred by
dismissing his complaint and amended complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
He asserts that
he stated a cause of action for violations of the prison
regulations affecting both his procedural and substantive due
process rights.
Much of Harrison’s appellate brief deals with
claims raised in his amended complaint.
As discussed above,
venue for most of those claims lies in Boyle County, so the Lyon
Circuit Court properly did not consider them in its order
dismissing the action.
As to the claims in the original
complaint involving the disciplinary action at KSP, Harrison’s
arguments are without merit.
13
See KRS 446.010(29)(word “shall” in statute is mandatory);
and Alexander v. S & M Motors, Inc., Ky., 28 S.W.3d 303
(2000)(noting word “shall” in statute is mandatory and “may” is
permissive).
14
The trial court’s failure to apply this statute is perhaps
understandable given the fact that it became effective (July 14,
2000) shortly before the court entered its order (July 24, 2000)
dismissing the defendants.
-8-
Initially, we note that while the trial court dismissed
the action for failure to state a claim, when parties file
exhibits in support of their positions, as was done here, we are
required to treat the request for dismissal and the circuit court
order dismissing as a summary judgment.15
As this Court
indicated in Smith,16 declaratory judgment suits involving inmate
disciplinary actions invoke the circuit court’s authority as a
body reviewing an administrative agency action.
Under these
circumstances, the Smith Court recognized a modified standard for
summary judgment.
“[W]e believe summary judgment for the
Corrections Department is proper if and only if the inmate’s
petition and any supporting materials, construed in light of the
entire agency record . . . does not raise specific, genuine
issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption of
agency propriety, and the Department is entitled to judgment as
matter of law.”17
In Wolff v. McDonnell,18 the Supreme Court held that
prison inmates may not be deprived of earned statutory good-time
without a meaningful opportunity to challenge the deprivation.
The Supreme Court held that although inmates are not entitled to
the full panoply of procedural safeguards, the due process clause
protects an inmate’s state-created liberty interest in good-time
credits, and therefore an inmate is entitled to minimum
15
See Smith v. O’Dea, Ky.App., 939 S.W.2d 353, 356 (1997);
and CR 12.02.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 356.
18
418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
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requirements of procedural due process including:
(1) advance
written notice of disciplinary charges; (2) the opportunity to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals; (3) a written
statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
disciplinary action; and (4) an impartial decision-making
tribunal.19
While Wolff outlines certain minimal procedures
required by due process, in Superintendent v. Hill,20 the Supreme
Court set out the substantive quantum of evidence required to
support a decision in a prison disciplinary proceeding.
Given
the deference that necessarily applies to judicial review of
prison disciplinary situations, the Supreme Court held that in
situations involving prison disciplinary proceedings, due process
requires a somewhat lesser standard of proof and that a
disciplinary committee’s decision to impose sanctions for
violations of prison rules must be supported by merely “some
evidence in the record.”21
In applying this modicum of evidence,
the Supreme Court indicated that courts should refrain from
second-guessing the prison officials’ administrative decision.
Ascertaining whether this standard is
satisfied does not require examination of the
entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the
evidence. Instead the relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in the record
that could support the conclusion reached by
19
Id. at 563-67. See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
465 n.3, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868 n.3, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).
20
472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).
21
Id. at 454.
-10-
the disciplinary board. . . . The
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause does not require courts to set
aside decisions of prison administrators that
have some basis in fact. Revocation of good
time credits is not comparable to a criminal
conviction, and neither the amount of
evidence necessary to support such a
conviction, nor any other standard greater
than some evidence applies in this context22
[citations omitted].
In the case sub judice, Harrison challenges the KSP
disciplinary action based on several alleged procedural flaws
including a failure of the corrections officer to verify the
report, an inadequate statement of the evidence relied upon for
the finding of guilt by the Adjustment Committee, a denial of an
appeal process beyond the level of the warden, and an inadequate
investigation of the report.
A review of the disciplinary forms
indicates that the charges were initiated by two corrections
officers responsible for the lock-up, Harrison was interviewed as
part of the investigation, he received a copy of the write-up
report and the hearing report, he was provided a legal aide to
assist him and accompany him at the hearing, and several
witnesses testified at the disciplinary hearing.
The hearing
report stated the Adjustment Committee relied upon the evidence
of the corrections officers.
An inmate has no constitutional
right to an internal appeal beyond the level of the warden.
Thus, the procedural steps taken were adequate and we discern no
internal policy issues that rose to the level of a constitutional
violation.
22
Id. at 455-56. See also Stanford v. Parker, Ky.App., 949
S.W.2d 616, 617 (1996).
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Additionally, there was sufficient evidence to support
the Adjustment Committee’s finding.
The two corrections officers
responsible for the lock-up provided evidence of the violation.
Moreover, Harrison admitted that he had failed to return to his
cell when the doors were closed.
The trial court dismissed the complaint under Sandin
based on the absence of a liberty interest.
In Sandin, the
Supreme Court adjusted the prior approach that focused
exclusively on the language of prison regulations for determining
whether state law or regulations created a due process liberty
interest.
The Supreme Court indicated that in order to establish
a protected, state-created liberty interest, an inmate must
demonstrate two elements: (1) the presence of state statutory or
regulatory language creating “specific substantive predicates”
intended to circumscribe the discretion of prison officials; and
(2) the imposition of “atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”23
Sandin dealt primarily with the latter element in relation to
disciplinary segregation and the Supreme Court discussed three
important factors in assessing atypical and significant hardship:
(1) the effect of the segregation on the length of prison
confinement under the original sentence; (2) the extent to which
the conditions of the segregation differ from other routine
23
Sandin, supra at 484. See also Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62
F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995)(inmate must prove both existence
of mandatory language in regulation and atypical and significant
hardships).
-12-
prison conditions; and (3) the duration of the segregation
imposed.24
In the case sub judice, Harrison was assessed a penalty
of 45 days segregation, but he apparently did not actually serve
any time in segregation because the penalty was suspended for 90
days and he did not commit any other rule violations during that
period of suspension.
Although the violation stayed on his
prison record, there is no evidence it affected the length of his
confinement under the original sentence.
The trial court
correctly held that Harrison has not shown the existence of a
liberty interest with respect to the KSP disciplinary action.
However, Harrison contends that in addition to his due
process claims, he alleged constitutional violations based on
retaliation that were ignored by the trial court.
In Thaddeus-X
v. Blatter,25 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized two
categories of retaliation claims where government action is
motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual
for exercise of a constitutional right26 — general retaliation
claims brought under the substantive due process theory of the
14th Amendment and retaliation for the plaintiff’s exercise of
specific constitutional provisions.
retaliation claim are as follows:
The basic elements of a
(1) a plaintiff engaged in
conduct protected by the Constitution or statute; (2) adverse
24
See, e.g. Sandin, supra at 486-87; Wright v. Coughlin, 132
F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1998); and Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,
448 (9th Cir. 2000).
25
26
175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 386-87.
414 (6th Cir. 2000).
See also Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410,
-13-
action taken by the government officer against the plaintiff
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated,
at least in part, because of the protected activity.27
The third
element involves a series of shifting burdens in order to
establish a causal connection between the protected conduct and
the adverse action.
Once the plaintiff establishes that his
protected conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm
suffered by an adverse action, the defendant may prevail on
summary judgment if he can show that he would have taken the same
action in the absence of the protected activity.28
A prisoner
must set forth specific, non-conclusory facts of a causal
connection sufficient to allow an inference of a causal
connection between the protected conduct and the adverse
action.29
The government officials’ adverse action itself need
not violate the Constitution or involve a protected liberty
interest.30
However, some courts have held that a prisoner has
27
Thaddeus-X, supra at 394; Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d
1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001). Otherwise protected activity,
however, does not constitute “protected conduct” for a
retaliation claim if it involves a frivolous claim or violates a
legitimate prison regulation. See Herron, supra at 415; and
Campbell, supra at 1037.
28
Thaddeus-X, supra at 399; Campbell, supra; Rauser v. Horn,
241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).
29
Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492-93 (2d Cir. 2001);
Thaddeus-X, supra at 399. Facts relevant to creating an inference
of intent to retaliate include the temporal proximity of the
events, disparate treatment, prior disciplinary record, and
statements by the decisionmaker. Id.; Campbell, supra at 1038;
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1995).
30
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220 (3d Cir.
2000)(holding retaliation claim not precluded by failure to
(continued...)
-14-
no claim for retaliation based on disciplinary punishment for a
rule violation that is supported by “some evidence.”31
Harrison’s complaint does not clearly state the
protected conduct supporting his retaliation claim.
He suggests
the appellees have retaliated against him for raising grievances
about his own treatment and assisting other inmates.
While an
inmate does have a First Amendment right to file grievances
against prison officials on his own behalf, he does not have an
independent right to help other prisoners with their legal
claims.32
With respect to the Lyon County defendants, the
adverse action in Harrison’s retaliation claim involves the 1996
disciplinary action.
Given our earlier conclusion that this
action was supported by “some evidence” including his admission
of guilt, Harrison has not stated a cognizable claim for
retaliation.
Additionally, since Harrison did not actually serve
any of the penalty time in segregation, he has not shown that the
collateral ramifications from the existence of the violation on
his prison record rose to the level of an “adverse action” such
as to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
First Amendment right.
Finally, his complaint fails to set forth
facts showing a retaliatory motivational intent.
Therefore, the
30
(...continued)
satisfy requirements of Sandin); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802
(9th Cir 1995); and Bobcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir.
1996).
31
See Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 1994);
Earnest v. Courtney, 64 F.3d 365 (8th Cir. 1995); and Cowans v.
Warren, 150 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1998).
32
Campbell, supra at 1037 (citing Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d
157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996)); Herron, supra at 415. See also Shaw
v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 149 L.Ed.2d 420 (2001).
-15-
trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to the Lyon
County appellees on Harrison’s claim of retaliation based on the
October 1996 disciplinary action.
Harrison also challenges the trial court’s failure to
enter additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and the
trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself from the case.
Additional factual findings and conclusions of law were not
necessary because this case has been decided based on issues of
law, which this Court reviews de novo under the summary judgment
standard.33
Furthermore, we have carefully considered Harrison’s
arguments supporting his request for recusal of the trial judge
and find them inadequate.34
Finally, Harrison erroneously asserts that the trial
court directed prison officials to take disciplinary action
against him for filing his lawsuit.
The August 2000 order merely
directed the parties’ attention to KRS 197.045(5)(a), which
authorizes prison authorities to assess penalties against inmates
for filing civil lawsuits found to be frivolous by a court.
The
trial court did not order the authorities to penalize Harrison
and it did not exceed its authority.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and vacate
in part the order of the Lyon Circuit Court, and remand this
matter to the Lyon Circuit Court with directions to enter an
33
See CR 52.01 (findings of fact and conclusions of law not
necessary on decisions under Rules 12 and 56).
34
See Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787,
(2001)(burden of proof required for recusal of trial judge is an
onerous one), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1921, 152
L.Ed.2d 829 (2002).
-16-
order transferring those claims arising outside Lyon County to
the appropriate circuit court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
James Nick Harrison, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
John T. Damron
Frankfort, Kentucky
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