D.R.T., A CHILD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY M.R., A JUVENILE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 27, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000127-DG
D.R.T., A CHILD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-XX-00001
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2001-CA-000145-DG
M.R., A JUVENILE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-XX-00018
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUDGEL, and KNOPF, Judges.
GUDGEL, JUDGE:
These cases are before us on discretionary review
from orders entered by the Taylor and Marion Circuit Courts.
In
each case, the circuit court affirmed the juvenile court’s order
directing that a person who turned eighteen years of age after
having committed a public offense could subsequently, during a
juvenile dispositional hearing, be sentenced to serve time in an
adult detention facility.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we
are constrained to reverse and remand for resentencing.
In Appeal No. 2001-CA-000127-DG, eleven days before his
eighteenth birthday D.R.T. pled guilty to a public offense during
the juvenile session of the Taylor District Court.
A
dispositional hearing was conducted after his eighteenth
birthday, and D.R.T. was ordered to serve ninety days in an adult
detention facility.
The court ordered all but five days of that
sentence to be probated for twenty-four months, and the court
also imposed certain terms of probation.
D.R.T. subsequently was
ordered to serve several additional days in an adult detention
facility due to the violation of his probation.
The circuit
court affirmed the district court's orders, and this court
granted discretionary review.
In Appeal No. 2001-CA-000145-DG, a juvenile public
offense charge was filed against M.R. in the Marion District
Court.
At the subsequent dispositional hearing which was
conducted two days after he turned eighteen, M.R. was ordered to
serve sixty days in detention, with twenty days to be served in
an adult detention facility and the remaining days to be probated
for a period of twenty-four months.
Once again, the circuit
court affirmed the juvenile court's orders, and we granted
discretionary review.
D.R.T. and M.R. both contend on appeal that the
juvenile court lacked authority to order their confinement in
adult detention facilities, as they turned eighteen years of age
between the dates they committed public offenses and the dates
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upon which the juvenile courts conducted dispositional hearings.
We agree.
KRS 635.060 sets out the options available to a
juvenile court at a dispositional hearing regarding a public
offense, including (1) restitution or reparation, (2) probation,
home incarceration, or supervision, (3) commitment to the custody
or guardianship of the Department of Juvenile Justice or another
suitable child-caring facility or person, and (4) confinement in
an approved juvenile detention program or facility.
A juvenile
court may order any combination of such dispositions.
KRS
635.060(6).
In Jefferson County Department for Human Services v.
Carter, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 59 (1990), the supreme court carefully
considered the application of KRS 635.060 to a situation where a
juvenile court judge ordered an eighteen-year-old person to be
detained in a secure juvenile facility for a public offense
committed before he turned eighteen.
In finding that a person
over the age of eighteen may not be confined in a juvenile
detention facility, the court stated:
The Unified Juvenile Code distinguishes
between a child and a person who is before
the juvenile court for committing a public
offense prior to age 18.
The only options the juvenile court has
in disposing of the case of an adult who is
properly before the juvenile court are found
in §§ (2) and (3) of K.R.S. 635.060. These
two subsections contain specific language
permitting the juvenile court to continue
past the age of 18 the probation, supervision
or commitment to CHR of a "person" who is
placed on probation or supervision or is
committed to CHR after reaching the age of 17
years 6 months. Such language is not
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contained in § (4) under which an adult was
confined in a secured juvenile facility. The
current legislation limits the juvenile court
to only two options when disposing of a case
involving an individual who is beyond 18
years of age. K.R.S. 635.060(2), (3).
. . . K.R.S. 640.020 directs that a
youthful offender who has not met bond or
other pretrial release be housed according to
his age, that is, if the youthful offender is
under 18, he is to be housed in a secured
juvenile detention facility. If over 18, he
shall be lodged as an adult. These statutes
clearly establish a statutory system
providing that secure confinement facilities
for juveniles are separate and apart from
adult facilities.
The district court acting in its
juvenile session is limited to the powers
provided to it by the legislature. K.R.S.
610.010. The legislature did not grant the
juvenile court the dispositional options of
placing an individual beyond the age of 18 in
a secure juvenile facility. Only a child 16
years of age but not over 18 may be confined
in a secured juvenile detention facility as
the disposition of his case.
Traditionally, juvenile matters have
been treated differently than adult offenses.
The state is considered to be acting as
parens patriae rather than as a prosecuting
authority. It has been a principle theory of
juvenile law that an individual should not be
stigmatized with a criminal record for acts
committed during minority. By providing
young people with treatment oriented
facilities rather than simple punishment,
antisocial behavior can be modified and the
offenders will develop as law abiding
citizens. However, such treatment does limit
the constitutional rights that are
traditionally provided for adult offenders.
Juvenile offenders are not afforded all the
constitutional rights that adult offenders
receive. They are afforded only the right to
fair treatment. The Kentucky juvenile
justice system reflects this philosophy.
Under the system, one of the rights of the
child involved in the system is not to be
held in an adult jail.
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K.R.S. Chapter 640 defines youthful
offenders as those juveniles who are
transferred to circuit court for further
proceedings after a preliminary hearing in
juvenile court to determine if the individual
meets the standards of K.R.S. 635.020 and
K.R.S. 640.010(2)(b). If the juvenile court
finds that an individual should be proceeded
against as a "youthful offender" the case is
transferred to circuit court where all of the
constitutional rights guaranteed to adults
come into play. (Citations omitted.)
795 S.W.2d at 60-61.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. W.E.B., Ky., 985
S.W.2d 344 (1998), the supreme court had occasion to examine the
detention of a seventeen-year-old public offender who pled guilty
to four offenses.
The Commonwealth requested a certification of
the law after the juvenile court amended its original disposition
to order that the child's four ninety-day periods of detention
should run concurrently, rather than consecutively as was
originally ordered.
In resolving the dispute, the supreme court
reiterated that authorized dispositions of public offenses
adjudicated in district court are limited to combinations of the
options set forth in KRS 635.060, and that "the Unified Juvenile
Code specifically contemplates that the consequences of
committing an offense will be greater for youthful offenders than
for public offenders . . . ."
985 S.W.2d at 345.
Here, it is undisputed that the juvenile court judge
who presided over the two cases before us correctly determined
that neither D.R.T. nor M.R. could be ordered confined in a
juvenile detention facility as a punishment since they were both
over eighteen years of age at the time of their dispositional
hearings.
See Carter, 795 S.W.2d 59.
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However, the juvenile
court then improperly ignored the statements in Carter, 795
S.W.2d at 60, that subsections (2) and (3) of KRS 635.060
"expressly envision situations beyond the 18th birthday" by
specifically using the word "person" in place of the word
"child," while the detention provisions set out in subsections
(4) and (5) specifically apply to a "child" of a particular age.
In other words, at the time of disposition the juvenile court was
limited to the two options listed in KRS 635.060 for a "person"
other than a "child."
See Carter, 795 S.W.2d at 61.
Given the
statements in Carter, it is clear that the only two authorized
dispositions for D.R.T. and M.R. were either placement "on
probation, home incarceration, or supervision" for a period not
to exceed one year, see KRS 635.060(2), or commitment or
placement pursuant to KRS 635.060(3) for "an indeterminate period
not to exceed one (1) year."
Sentencing them to adult detention
facilities was not within the parameters of either of these
authorized dispositions.
It follows, therefore, that the court
was without authority to order D.R.T. and M.R. confined in adult
detention facilities for public offenses which they committed
before they reached the age of eighteen.
Hence, the court’s
dispositional orders in both cases must be reversed and remanded
with directions to resentence D.R.T. and M.R. consistent with the
dictates of KRS 635.060(2) and (3).
In light of our conclusions to this point in the
opinion, we need not address the remaining contentions raised by
the parties on appeal.
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For the reasons stated, the circuit court's orders
affirming the district courts are reversed and remanded with
directions to remand these cases to the district courts with
directions to resentence D.R.T. and M.R. consistent with the
dictates of KRS 635.060(2) and (3).
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
D.R.T., A CHILD; and M.R.,
A JUVENILE:
BRIEF FOR COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY IN APPEAL NO.
2001-CA-000145-DG:
Suzanne A. Hopf
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY IN APPEAL NO.
2001-CA-000127-DG:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY:
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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