ROBERT L. ROLAND v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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October 11, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001041-MR
ROBERT L. ROLAND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00608
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Robert L. Roland has appealed from a judgment of
conviction and sentence of seven years’ imprisonment entered by
the Kenton Circuit Court on April 13, 2000, which convicted him
of rape in the second degree.1
Having concluded that none of the
issues raised by Roland on appeal constitutes harmful error, if
any error, we affirm.
On December 10, 1999, a Kenton County grand jury
returned an indictment against Roland for the offense of rape in
the second degree.
On February 29 and March 1, 2000, a jury
trial was held and Roland was convicted as charged.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes 510.050.
On April 13,
2000, he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.
This appeal
followed.
In September 1998, the victim, W.E.2, whose date of
birth is June 17, 1986, was living with her mother, K.E., her
younger brother, and an older sister, C.E., who was 18.
At the
time of the alleged eight instances of sexual intercourse, the
family was living in Covington, Kentucky.
During the time W.E.
was having sexual intercourse with Roland, she spent a
significant amount of time with her 19-year-old cousin, B.E.
W.E. testified that she stayed with her cousin on many weekends
and at one point was basically living with her.
W.E. testified that she met Roland on May 2, 1998, when
she was standing outside her home with her sister, C.E.
Roland,
whose date of birth is June 19, 1972, approached the girls and
began to have a conversation with them.
walked off, Roland asked W.E. her age.
At some point after C.E.
W.E. testified that she
told Roland that she was 17 years old although she was actually
only 11 years old and that he told her he was 20 years old
although he was actually 25 years old.
W.E. next saw Roland approximately a week later on the
street near her home.
W.E. testified that this was the time she
acquired Roland’s pager number and that after that encounter she
began to page him.
W.E. testified that she subsequently met
2
While the Commonwealth has referred to the minor victim by
her full name, in an effort to protect her privacy we will refer
to her and her family members by their initials.
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Roland outside Joe’s Bar and Club 55 in Newport, but that they
did not show any affection toward each other because they were in
public.
W.E. testified that she first had sexual intercourse
with Roland sometime during the middle of September 1998.
At
that time, W.E. was 12 years old and Roland was 26 years old.
W.E. had skipped school and was at the home of a friend, when she
paged Roland.
Roland went to W.E.’s friend’s house; and after
the friend left the house, W.E. and Roland had sexual intercourse
with each other for the first time.
W.E. testified that when
they had sexual intercourse, she took off her pants and panties
and Roland only pulled down his pants.
She testified that she
kept her shirt on during the sexual intercourse and that he did
not touch her breasts or say anything sexual to her.
The second time W.E and Roland had sexual intercourse
occurred two or three months later at her cousin’s house.
W.E.
paged Roland, he came over, and they had sexual intercourse
upstairs in the cousin’s son’s bedroom.
The third time they had
sexual intercourse was approximately one month later in a car
parked on Greenup Street after W.E. had paged Roland.
Roland
climbed on top of W.E. while she sat in the reclined passenger
seat.
The fourth time they had sexual intercourse was
approximately one or two months later.
aunt’s residence and paged Roland.
This time W.E. was at her
Roland picked her up and took
her to a secluded location behind Lookout Bowl in a different
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vehicle, and once again he got on top of her in the passenger
seat and had sexual intercourse with her.
Approximately two months later, W.E. paged Roland from
her cousin’s house, he came over, picked her up, and took her to
the Lookout Motel.
They checked into room 23, where they had
sexual intercourse in bed.
After they had sex, Roland went to a
nearby Hardee’s restaurant and picked up some food.
testified that Roland ate but that she did not.
W.E.
She further
testified that they smoked a marijuana joint together and then
had sexual intercourse again.
She testified that they watched
some television and then had sexual intercourse for the third
time that day.
W.E. testified that the first time that they had
sex in the motel room was the only time during any of their
encounters that Roland took off all of his clothing.
She
testified that she kept her shirt on during each of the
encounters.
The eighth and final time that they had sexual
intercourse took place approximately two months later in Roland’s
car which was parked in a secluded spot at Lookout Bowl.
W.E. testified that she did not use any birth control
during any of the eight times that they had sexual intercourse
because Roland had told her that he had taken action to prevent
him from producing children.
After W.E. began to feel sick to
her stomach, her mother took her to the hospital.
W.E. was
diagnosed with having the sexually transmitted diseases of
chlamydia and gonorrhea.
At first W.E. would not tell her mother
who she had had sex with, but after she was told by a worker from
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Child Protective Services that her mother would go to jail if she
refused to provide the name of her sex partner, W.E. relented and
told them about Roland.
W.E.’s cousin testified and corroborated a portion of
W.E.’s testimony.
The cousin testified that W.E. often stayed
with her during the relevant time period and that she had seen
Roland drop W.E. off at her home.
She also said that she had
answered the telephone when Roland had called for W.E. and that
W.E. referred to him as her “dude.”
The cousin also testified
that W.E. had told her that she and Roland had had sex in a car
and in a motel room.
The cousin further testified that W.E. told
her about having sexual intercourse with Roland before the police
began investigating the case.
Detective Ray Haley worked for the Covington City
Police Department’s domestic abuse response team during this time
period. His job involved working with juvenile crime victims.
After being assigned to this case, Det. Haley videotaped an
interview between W.E. and a professional forensic interviewer.
Det. Haley testified that he videotaped the interview from a
separate room and that the purpose of the interview was to
identify the perpetrator of the alleged abuse without using
leading questions.
Det. Haley testified that W.E.’s story was
consistent in the two interviews she gave prior to trial and in
her trial testimony.
Moreover, he stated that W.E.’s story was
given validity when he took W.E. to the locations where the acts
of sexual intercourse allegedly occurred.
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W.E. was able to
identify the motel and show the detective the room where she and
Roland had allegedly had sex.
She had originally told Det. Haley
that they had had sex in room 22, but after arriving at the motel
she said that she was positive it was room 23 because of the way
the door opened.
Det. Haley had already discovered, but had not
informed W.E., that the motel’s records showed that Roland had
checked into room 23 during the relevant time period.
Roland’s primary defense at trial was that W.E. had a
serious crush on him and that he had no interest in a little
girl.
He testified that she was always trying to talk to him but
that he had no interest in her.
He also testified that he had no
sexually transmitted diseases and thus that he could not have
been the person who had infected W.E.
Furthermore, since W.E.
had failed to mention Roland’s distinguishing physical
characteristic of severe scarring during her testimony, Roland
showed the jury his back and upper buttocks which revealed
several keloidal scars.
Roland admitted that he had checked into
room 23 at the Lookout Motel, but he claimed to have done so with
a woman he had met at a gas station.
However, this other women
did not testify and Roland did not introduce any other evidence
to establish her existence.
The case sub judice turned to a large extent on the
credibility of Roland and the victim.
Roland’s testimony
primarily consisted of a strong denial that he had had sexual
intercourse with W.E.
In addition to W.E.’s testimony, the
Commonwealth’s proof included testimony from some of W.E.’s
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relatives which was consistent with W.E.’s testimony.
But
perhaps the most important evidence was the testimony from Det.
Haley which raised the question of how W.E. could have known
which motel room Roland had checked into, if she had not been
with him; and the hard to explain fact that W.E. had acquired
Roland’s pager number.
Apparently, Roland was not able to
sufficiently answer some of these questions to the satisfaction
of the jury.
As we turn to the arguments made by Roland in his
brief, we agree with the Commonwealth that many of his arguments
are difficult to understand.
Roland attempts to raise several
issues concerning voir dire.
He first claims that he was denied
his constitutional right to a fair trial and an impartial jury
because there were no African-Americans serving on the jury
panel.
However, he has failed to indicate in his brief where any
issue concerning voir dire was preserved for appeal; and from our
review of the record, we conclude that none of them was properly
preserved for our review.3
In fact, not only was this issue not
objected to at trial, but Roland’s counsel stated during voir
dire that he felt that Roland could get a fair trial from an “all
white jury.”
The questions asked by Roland’s counsel during voir
dire either resolved any concern that he may have had related to
there being no African-Americans on the jury, or it was counsel’s
trial strategy to try to gain favor with the jury by expressing
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(v).
-7-
confidence in their ability to give Roland a fair trial.
In any
event, he accepted the jury.
Roland next claims that he was denied his right to a
fair trial because several members of his jury had sat on another
jury during the same term of court.4
The case that some of the
jurors apparently served on had the same prosecutor and also
involved a sex crime.
Once again, this issue was not preserved
for appellate review and apparently did not cause defense counsel
any concern.
Nonetheless, we will briefly address the issue, by
quoting from our Supreme Court’s opinion in Spanski v.
Commonwealth:5
As his second argument on appeal,
appellant claims that several prospective
jurors who had sat on several cases in the
same term were disqualified because of this
previous service. He cites KRS
29A.080(2)(g): “(2) A prospective juror is
disqualified to serve on a jury if he: . . .
(g) Has served on a jury within the past
twelve (12) months.” There is no merit to
this argument. KRS 29A.080 is part of a
statutory scheme to provide grand and petit
jurors for a term of court. KRS 29A.010 et
seq. The disqualification statute relates to
the prospective jurors’ ability to be on a
jury panel. To hold otherwise would mean
that a juror could only serve on one case per
term and obviously this was not the intent of
the legislation.
4
Although Roland makes this claim, he is unable to state
with any specificity who the jurors were and how many had
previously served on another case.
5
Ky., 610 S.W.2d 290, 292 (1980).
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Roland next claims that the Commonwealth’s Attorney
attempted to prejudice the jury against him by using his
familiarity with the jury panel.
In his brief, Roland states:
The [C]ommonwealth’s [A]ttorney
established a prejudicial familiarity with
this jury based on his prior trial, being
both of sexual issues and concluded to him
(sic). He initially asked during “voir dire”
who knew him and who had served on a jury
with him [citation to the record omitted].
The defendant-appellant’s position is
without objection, the trial court has a duty
to this defendant-appellant to protect the
Constitutional Right of the defendant to a
fair and impartial jury.
This jury has a clear predisposition to
the acceptance of [the] Commonwealth’s
Attorney and his subsequent arguments,
presumably if they rendered a guilty verdict;
in the prior jury trial meeting and
acquientancship (sic). If the prior contact
was adverse to either party, that aspect was
not demonstrated, by the conduct of the
jurors, who were excused of cause [citation
to the record omitted].
This argument is simply without merit.
Although the citations to
the record are clearly incorrect, we have reviewed the entire
voir dire.
At the beginning of voir dire, the Commonwealth’s
Attorney noted that he saw some familiar faces and he apologized
in advanced if his questions seemed repetitive to those who had
previously heard them.
We find nothing objectionable in his
conduct.
Roland also claims that it was error for a juror who
had a “passing acquaintance with Det. Ray Haley” to have been
seated.
Once again, this claim was not preserved for appellate
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review, and additionally, the citation to the record where the
error allegedly occured was incorrect.
We have reviewed the
record and could not find where a juror stated that he had a
“passing acquaintance” with Det. Haley.
In any event, unless it
was established that the relationship would prevent the juror
from deciding the case fairly because of his inability to give
equal weight to Det. Haley’s testimony, the juror would not have
been dismissed for cause.
Thus, we find no error.
Next, Roland relies on Commonwealth v. Callahan,6 for
his claim that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s
explanation of the law to the jury panel during voir dire.
Yet
again, this error was not preserved for appellate review; and
additionally, Callahan is clearly not on point.
In Callahan, the
defense attorney attempted to define reasonable doubt.
The
Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a trial court must prohibit
counsel from making any attempt to define reasonable doubt at any
point during the trial.
Once again, Roland sends us on a “wild
goose chase” with citations to the record that have nothing to do
with his argument.
However, as we have stated previously, we
have reviewed the entire voir dire, and we did not see any
conduct which violated Callahan.
Next, Roland claims that the trial court erred by
allowing the Commonwealth’s Attorney to make improper racial
remarks during his opening statement and during his examination
6
Ky., 675 S.W.2d 391 (1984).
-10-
of witnesses.
This alleged error was also not preserved on
appellate review.
Generally, with little or unhelpful citations
to the record, Roland has argued that the Commonwealth’s Attorney
made a point to make race an issue at trial for the improper
purpose of stirring the emotions of the juror.
We have reviewed the record and disagree with Roland’s
characterizations of the Commonwealth’s use of race.
It is true
that the Commonwealth’s Attorney asked W.E.’s older sister, C.E.,
if her boyfriend was a black man, and she answered in the
affirmative.
While this question was limited and not expanded
upon, the obvious implication was that W.E. was perhaps trying to
emulate her older sister by dating Roland.
Roland also argues that the prosecutor used raciallymotivated tactics during his cross-examination by asking him if
the woman he claimed to have had sexual intercourse with in room
23 of the Lookout Motel was a white woman.
However, this
question was asked in conjunction with several other questions
concerning the identity and whereabouts of this woman, who the
Commonwealth has referred to as the “mystery woman.”
It is clear
from our review of the record that the Commonwealth was merely
attacking Roland’s credibility on this issue.
In its closing
argument, the Commonwealth did not place any emphasis on the fact
that Roland was black and the alleged woman from the gas station
was white.
Rather, the prosecutor argued that the woman was not
present to testify at trial, and that Roland’s explanation was
not believable.
Thus, we reject Roland’s argument that the
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Commonwealth attempted to inappropriately comment on race
throughout the trial in an attempt to prejudice the jury.
We
hold that when the fact of race was raised at trial that it was
properly raised because it was relevant to the Commonwealth’s
case.
The final issue raised on appeal is whether the trial
court erred by denying Roland’s motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal.
When a trial court considers a motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal, it must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.7
“If
the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a
directed verdict should not be given.”8
In reviewing the trial
court’s decision, an appellate court should not disturb the trial
court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
unless it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt.9
With this standard in mind, we will review the evidence presented
in support of the charge of rape in the second degree.
Roland argues that the evidence at trial was
insufficient for any reasonable juror to find that he had had
sexual intercourse with W.E.
At trial and in his brief, Roland
points to what he claims to be three critical facts in his favor.
7
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
8
Id.
9
Id.; Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983).
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First, he argues that no witness could corroborate W.E.’s
testimony.
Although no witness actually saw the two of them
having sex, W.E.’s story was supported by her sister and her
cousin since both testified that they knew Roland and they had
seen him with W.E.
W.E.’s cousin further testified that W.E.
often talked about her relationship with Roland, that she had
answered the telephone when Roland had called for W.E., and that
she had seen Roland drop W.E. off at her house.
The second fact that Roland emphasizes is W.E.’s
failure to mention that Roland’s back and buttocks are covered
with extensive surgical scars.
We conclude that a reasonable
juror could have found that W.E. had a limited opportunity to
view the scars.
The testimony at trial was that Roland was fully
nude in the presence of W.E. only one time and it was for only a
very brief period of time.
Also, on all eight occasions that
W.E. claimed to have had sexual intercourse with Roland, she
stated that he was on top of her.
Finally, Roland argues that no reasonable juror could have
found that he had had sexual intercourse with W.E. because she
had contracted two sexually transmitted diseases and that he did
not have either disease.
Although Roland testified that he did
not have a venereal disease, the jury was left to make a judgment
as to his credibility versus W.E.’s credibilty.
We cannot say
that it would have been unreasonable for the jury to believe
W.E.’s claim that she had acquired the sexually transmitted
diseases from Roland and that Roland was not being truthful about
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having the diseases.
As we discussed previously, there were two
unexplained factual matters which clearly supported W.E.’s
version of the events:
she knew Roland’s pager number and she
also knew that he had checked into room 23 in the Lookout Motel
during the relevant time period.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Darrell A. Cox
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
William A. Al’Uqdah
Cincinatti, Ohio
J. Gary Bale
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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