DONALD J. SLEETS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 27, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002989-MR
DONALD J. SLEETS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-000961
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
COMBS, MILLER, and PAISLEY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Donald J. Sleets appeals from an order of the
Jefferson County Circuit Court which found him to be a moderate
risk sex offender.
We affirm.
Sleets was indicted for first-degree sodomy.
On
December 5, 1991, he entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill
and was sentenced on March 23, 1992, to thirteen-years’
imprisonment.
On September 28, 1999, the trial court ordered
Sleets to undergo a sex offender risk assessment pursuant to KRS1
17.570.
The hearing took place on November 24, 1999.
On
November 30, 1999, the trial court entered an Order of Sex
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Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Offender Risk Determination, classifying Sleets as a moderate
risk offender.
Sleets filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
By Order
of this Court, entered September 26, 2000, the case was held in
abeyance, pending the final disposition in the Kentucky Supreme
Court of three cases involving issues of interpretation and/or
constitutionality of KRS 17.500 et. seq., Sexual Offender
Registration.
Following the resolution of these cases, this court
entered an order to show cause why the appeal should not be
summarily affirmed based on the holdings of those cases.
Sleets
responded that -- with one exception — all issues raised in his
appeal had been disposed of expressly by rendition of the Supreme
Court opinions, Hyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 72 S.W.3d 566 (2002),
and Martinez v. Commonwealth, Ky., 72 S.W.3d 581 (2002).
The one remaining issue is what burden of proof is to
be applied in a risk assessment hearing.
Sleets argues that the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden provided for in KRS 500.079
must apply.
He bases his argument on the premise that the
assessment process is a continuation of the criminal prosecution.
Sleets admits that this issue was resolved in Hyatt by inference,
and we agree.
In Hyatt, the argument was made that the Commonwealth
was required to prove risk classification by clear and convincing
evidence.
While the statute sets out specific guidelines for the
trial judge to follow, the Supreme Court does not specify a
standard-of-proof element.
Hyatt 72 S.W.3d at 575. The Court did
not impose a standard but rather limited its review as to whether
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the trial court followed the guidelines set out in the statute.
In Hyatt, the Court held that the Sex Offender Registration
Statutes are regulatory rather than punitive in nature and
purpose.
Id. at 573.
The Court also held that the risk
assessment did not constitute a re-opening of the criminal
conviction.
However, it was necessarily premised on a criminal
conviction since the risk assessment could not arise without the
prior sex offense conviction.
Id. at 578.
In addressing a separation of powers argument, the
court stated:
"It is within the power of the legislature to
determine what unit of government is best suited to perform
certain civil responsibilities."
Id. at 579.
Based on the
preceding analysis, we believe that Hyatt indicates that the risk
assessment hearing is a proceeding not requiring the higher
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court was
required to follow the specific guidelines of the statute in
making a determination of risk.
Sleets makes no argument that it
failed to do so in his case -- nor can we find any error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel T. Goyette
J. David Niehaus
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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