ROGER GILLILAND v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 22, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002405-MR
ROGER GILLILAND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES R. DANIELS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 86-CR-00088
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Roger Gilliland brings this appeal from a
September 9, 1999 order of the McCracken Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
In May 1986, Gilliland pled guilty to first degree rape
and first degree sexual abuse.
twenty years’ imprisonment.
He was sentenced to a total of
Shortly before Gilliland’s scheduled
release from prison, in 1999, the court entered an Order Of Sex
Offender Risk Determination pursuant to the Sex Offender
Registration Act, codified as Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
17.500 et seq.
The court conducted a hearing on August 27, 1999,
during which arguments were heard from both Gilliland and the
Commonwealth.
The court also considered the testimony of at
least one victim, and a Risk Assessment offered by a state
certified psychologist (KRS 17.554).
On September 9, 1999, the
court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in an Order
of Sex Offender Risk Determination.
Therein, the court concluded
that Gilliland was a “moderate risk” sex offender.
This appeal
followed.
By order entered September 26, 2000, the Court of
Appeals placed the above-styled appeal in “abeyance” pending
disposition in the Kentucky Supreme Court of Hyatt v.
Commonwealth, 2000-SC-0676-DG; Hall v. Commonwealth, 2000-SC0820-DG; and Commonwealth v. Sims, 2000-SC-1076-DG and 2000-SC0961-DG.
The Supreme Court handed down a decision in the
aforementioned appeals on February 21, 2002 in Hyatt v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 72 S.W.3d 566 (2002).
The Court of Appeals
subsequently entered an order directing appellant to show cause
why this appeal should not be “summarily affirmed under the
authority” of Hyatt.
Appellant responded that the constitutional
issues were disposed of by Hyatt, but that an issue remained
concerning interpretation of the Act.
We therefore summarily
affirm upon the constitutional issues and address the remaining
issue upon the merits.
Gilliland maintains the circuit court erred by
determining him to be a moderate risk sex offender.
Our standard
of review is whether the circuit court’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Yates v. Wilson, Ky.,
339 S.W.2d 458 (1960).
On August 27, 1999, sex offender risk
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assessment was controlled by KRS 17.570, which read in pertinent
part:
(1) Upon conviction of a “sex crime” as
defined in KRS 17.500 and within sixty (60)
calendar days prior to the discharge,
release, or parole of a sex offender, the
sentencing court shall order a sex offender
risk assessment by a certified provider . . .
. . . .
(3) In making the determination of
risk, the sentencing court shall review the
recommendations of the certified provider
along with any statement by a victim or
victims and any materials submitted by the
sex offender.
(4) The court shall conduct a hearing
in accordance with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and shall allow the sex offender to
appear and be heard.
. . . .
(6) The sentencing court shall issue
findings of fact and conclusions of law and
enter an order designating the level of risk.
In the case sub judice, the circuit court considered
the Sex Offender Risk Assessment.
Utilizing multiple assessment
instruments, the state certified provider concluded that
Gilliland was “overall . . . a moderate risk” for re-offending.
There was also testimony from at least one victim.
We believe
the above evidence alone constitutes substantial evidence
supporting the court’s finding that Gilliland was a moderate risk
sex offender.
Simply put, we cannot say the circuit court’s
findings were clearly erroneous.
As such, we are of the opinion
the circuit court did not err in determining Gilliland was a
moderate risk sex offender under KRS 17.570.
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For the foregoing reasons, the order of the McCracken
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Franklin P. Jewell
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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