KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS AND KENTUCKY NATIONAL GUARD v. HON. ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE, FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT AND ROBERT A. JONES, CYNTHIA WHITE, LARRY WHITE, AND REGINALD P. YOUNGBLOOD
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 24, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000889-0A
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
AND KENTUCKY NATIONAL GUARD
v.
PETITIONERS
ORIGINAL ACTION
REGARDING FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
ACTION NOS. 99-CI-00311, 99-CI-00954,
99-CI-00956, and 99-CI-01093
HON. ROGER L. CRITTENDEN,
JUDGE, FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
RESPONDENT
AND
ROBERT A. JONES, CYNTHIA WHITE,
LARRY WHITE, AND REGINALD P.
YOUNGBLOOD
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
* * * * * * * * * * * *
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING CR 76.36 RELIEF
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Petitioners, Kentucky Department of Military
Affairs and Kentucky National Guard, have filed a petition for
writ of prohibition or mandamus pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P.(CR)
76.36.
Petitioners request that this Court direct the respondent
trial judge, Honorable Roger L. Crittenden, “to refrain from
compelling petitioners to stand trial on the discrimination and
retaliation claims against them” and to direct him to dismiss
those claims.
The real parties in interest, Robert A. Jones,
Cynthia White, Larry White, and Reginald Youngblood, have
responded to this petition.
Petitioners are defendants below to four consolidated
actions brought against them by the real parties in interest, who
are current or former members of the Kentucky National Guard,
pursuant to the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS)
344.010, et seq.
Petitioners moved the circuit court for summary
judgment, arguing that the actions raise a federal constitutional
question which is preempted from state regulation and is not
justiciable in a civilian court by virtue of application of the
Supremacy Clause and the Militia Clause of the United States
Constitution.
Franklin Circuit Court denied the motion.
Hence, this original action, which claims that the
circuit court is acting without jurisdiction and that petitioners
are entitled to dismissal based on, among other grounds, two
decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, i.e., Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed.2d 152 (1950)(where
the Supreme Court held that the federal government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for servicemen’s injuries
arising from activities incident to military duty), and Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586
(1983)(where the Supreme Court held that military personnel may
not maintain civil actions against their superior officers for
alleged constitutional violations). In this original action,
petitioners allege that they would suffer irreparable injury from
which they have no adequate remedy by appeal were the actions
allowed to proceed because they would “forever lose or forfeit
some of the protections of the Feres-Chappell doctrine, namely,
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the right not to stand trial before a civilian court and have a
civilian jury second-guess the decisions of respondents’ military
superiors.”
In its decision denying petitioners’ motion for summary
judgment, the trial court stated the issue before it was one of
first impression in Kentucky.
First, it determined that there is
nothing in KRS Chapter 344 that would exclude petitioners from
its provisions.
It then went on to distinguish this case from
Feres on the basis that, in the latter, the acts complained of
were negligent, not intentional.
The court noted that different
tests have been applied by various jurisdictions to decide the
justiciability of military-related actions filed in civil courts
and that the Sixth Circuit has adopted the “per se test”, i.e.,
whether the challenged activity is incident to military service.
The circuit court relied on
Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d
470 (6th Cir. 1999), a case which declines to apply the
provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act to members of the Kentucky
National Guard on the basis that the guardsmen remained within
state command when they engaged in the activities at issue
therein. The circuit court also found helpful a decision written
by then Circuit Judge Martin Johnstone finding that the National
Guard was subject to suit under KRS Chapter 344.
Therefore, the
court concluded, it had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
the actions pending before it.
In this original action, petitioners contend that
federal regulations make it clear that the federal antidiscrimination laws do not apply to National Guard personnel and,
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therefore, that “it should be evident that Congress does not want
KRS 344 to apply to the National Guard.”
They argue that,
regardless of the test they have used, all jurisdictions,
including the Sixth Circuit, which have reviewed the matter as it
pertains to discrimination claims between enlisted personnel and
their employer or superior officer have decided that federal law
has preempted this field from state regulation, thereby placing
this type of claim outside the ambit and jurisdiction of civilian
courts.
Consequently, they argue that
“[t]o the extent that the
General Assembly arguably intended to include the Kentucky
National Guard as an employer subject to the discrimination
provisions of KRS Chapter 344, the General Assembly has exceeded
its authority and this legislation is void pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause and the Militia Clause of the United States
Constitution.”
In response, the real parties in interest contend that
their claims have not been preempted by federal law because, as
members of the Kentucky National Guard, they remain state
officers until called into federal service.
Perpich v.
Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
They also rely on
Gilbert, supra, for the proposition that the status of a
guardsman is based upon which entity exercises control over the
individual when the alleged injuries occurred.
They reject
petitioners’ reliance on Feres and on Chappell because they
contend these cases may be distinguished from the specific matter
at issue in this case, which has yet to be addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
They argue that the provisions of KRS Chapter 344
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are neither preempted by the Supremacy Clause, nor the Militia
Clause, because the state statutory scheme does not conflict with
federal law and because the discrimination claimed by them has
nothing to do with military discipline.
A writ of prohibition or mandamus is an extraordinary
and discretionary remedy.
Generally, in a case where a
petitioner seeks relief on the ground that the trial court is
proceeding, or about to proceed, outside its jurisdiction, the
petitioner is required to make a preliminary showing that it has
no adequate remedy by appeal.
Ky., 613 S.W.2d 130 (1981).
See, e.g., Shumaker v. Paxton,
However, remedy by appeal is not
always the controlling consideration as “. . . it would be a most
inept ruling to deny the writ, require a trial on the merits, and
then on an appeal be forced to reverse the case on the very
question which is now before us.”
S.W.2d 775, 777 (1952).
Chamblee v. Rose, Ky., 249
In addition, although we recognize that
the circuit court was exercising its discretion when it denied
petitioners’ motion, we have determined that the question
presented to this court in this original action is one of law.
Therefore, this court is not restricted to the abuse of
discretion standard of review and may issue its opinion without
deferring to the trial court.
Southeastern United Medigroup,
Inc. v. Hughes, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 195, 199 (1997); Sisters of
Charity Health Systems, Inc. v. Raikes, Ky., 984 S.W.2d 464
(1998).
Based on our application of the foregoing standard, and
our review of the parties’ arguments, the partial record, and the
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law cited to us,
this petition is GRANTED and a writ of mandamus
shall issue.
We begin our analysis by noting that, at first blush,
the arguments made by the real parties in interest appear
reasonable.
Pursuant to KRS 36.010, the Kentucky Department of
Military Affairs is “attached to Office of Governor,” to whom it
reports regarding “the proper functioning of the Kentucky
National Guard, . . .”
Pursuant to KRS 36.020-040, the executive
head of the Department of Military Affairs is the adjutant
general, an appointee of the Governor.
Further, pursuant to KRS 35.390, a guardsman “who
believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, . . . may
complain to any superior officer who shall forward the complaint
to the Governor through the adjutant general;. . .” And, KRS
35.420 “presumes” the jurisdiction of military courts. Even
petitioners recognize that these two statutes do not clearly show
the full intent of the General Assembly as it pertains to the
jurisdiction of civilian courts over guardsmen’s discrimination
grievances.
We also note that both the Kentucky Department of
Military Affairs and the Kentucky National Guard are state
agencies.1
KRS 344.010(1) specifically includes within its
provisions “the state, any of its political or civil subdivisions
or agencies”.
See Department of Corrections v. Furr, Ky., 23
S.W.3d 615 (2000).
1
In fact, the real parties in interest point out they are
“enjoying the benefit” of representation by the Office of the
Kentucky Attorney General in this action.
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In addition, we have considered the argument made by
the guardsmen that, while the federal preemption doctrine often
applies to override state statutory provisions which conflict
with federal law, or would frustrate the uniformity intended by
the federal scheme, KRS Chapter 344 was modeled after federal
law, i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.
See Palmer v. International Association of
Machinists, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117, 119 (1994).
Further, we have
taken note of their argument that “discriminatory acts cannot be
condoned as discipline”.2
As previously stated, those are arguments that
initially appear well-taken. However, upon reaching the
completion of our review of the authorities currently available
in this complex and sensitive area of the law, we are compelled
to conclude that the issue presented to us for determination must
be analyzed within the confines of a different framework.
The Constitution of the United States, Article VI,
provides in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of
2
A similar point was made by a plaintiff in an action for
sexual harassment brought against her superior officers in the
United States Air Force. The plaintiff argued that the activities
she was challenging “simply cannot be viewed as acceptable in any
fashion [because they] do not implicate issues of judgment,
discretion or command. . . .” In rejecting that argument, the
reviewing court referred the plaintiff to the holding of United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 87 L. Ed. 38
(1985), and its emphasis on the “negative impact” such an action
would have on military discipline. Mackey v. United States, 226
F. 3d 773 (6th Cir. 2000). This case also clarifies that the
Feres doctrine applies to claims of intentional torts, not merely
to those of negligence.
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the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
The Constitution of the United States, Article I,
Section 8, clause 16, gives Congress the power:
To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to
the States respectively, the Appointment of
the Officers, and the Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress;...
The Constitution of Kentucky, Section 220, gives to the
Kentucky Legislature the power to maintain and regulate the
“Militia”.
However, Section 221 includes the following
directions:
The organization, equipment and discipline of
the militia shall conform as nearly as
practicable to the regulations for the
government of the armies of the United
States.
Language set forth in Perpich, supra, well defines the
status of a state National Guard.
The following quoted excerpts
are particularly instructive:
Since 1933, all persons who have enlisted in
a State National Guard unit have
simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard
of the United States. Id., at 345.
In a sense now, all of them now must keep
three hats in their closets -- a civilian
hat, a state militia hat, and an army hat —
only one of which is worn at any particular
time. When the state militia hat is being
worn, ‘drilling and other exercises’... are
performed pursuant to ‘the Authority of
training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress.’ Id., at
348.
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[The Militia Clause] merely recognizes the
supremacy of federal power in the area of
military affairs. Id., at 351.
...[T]he constitutional allocation of powers
in this realm [gives] rise to a presumption
that federal control over the Armed Forces
[is] exclusive. Id., at 353.
Also of significance is language found in Feres3 and in
Chappell, supra:
To whatever extent state law may apply to
govern the relations between soldiers or
others in the armed forces and persons
outside them or nonfederal governmental
agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents
and consequence of the relation between
persons in service and the Government are
fundamentally derived from federal sources
and governed by federal authority.
This Court . . . cannot escape attributing
some bearing upon it to enactments by
Congress which provide systems of simple,
certain, and uniform compensation for
injuries or death of those in armed services.
Feres, at 143-44.
Feres seems best explained by the ‘peculiar
and special relationship of the soldier to
his superiors, [and] the effects on the maintenance of such suits on discipline . . . .’
Chappell, at 299.
Likewise, we are guided by the holdings issued by the
Sixth Circuit in the reported cases cited by petitioners. Recent
language on the subject includes the following:
Consistent with the reasoning in Chappell,
courts of appeals have consistently refused
to extend statutory remedies available to
civilians to uniformed members of the armed
forces absent a clear direction from Congress
3
The Feres doctrine has been held to apply to suits brought
by members of the National Guard. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L. Ed. 2d 665
(1977).
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to do so. Thus, uniformed members of the
armed forces have no remedy under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Coffman v. State of Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59
(6th Cir. 1997).
Petitioners have provided the court with a copy of the
National Guard Military Discrimination Complaint System, issued
by the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. The regulation
sets forth a uniform mechanism for the processing of guardsmen’s
discrimination claims and clearly applies to the real parties in
interest. Further, it expressly provides that it implements Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified in 42 U.S.C. §
2000d, and not Title VII, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 from
which KRS Chapter 344 was modeled.
While the respondent judge relied on Gilbert, supra, we
have determined that this authority has no application to the
controversy before us.
The case merely decided that 18 U.S.C. §
1385 was not violated when Kentucky National Guardsmen
participated in a search and seizure operation while under state,
rather than federal, command.
As made clear by the Militia
Clause, and also exemplified in KRS Chapters 35 and 36, a variety
of functions related to military affairs is solely within the
jurisdiction of the particular state and its agencies.
Gilbert
clarifies the point we are making regarding the control which the
state may exercise over its military personnel when performing
certain activities that have been defined as being within the
realm of state regulation. However, Gilbert provides no guidance
regarding the issue before us because it does not deal with “the
effects of the maintenance of [discrimination] suits on
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discipline . . . .”
Chappell, supra at 299.
It is our conclusion that, although Congress has not
enacted statutes expressly preempting state regulation of
discrimination suits against military authorities,
the federal
scheme referred to in this Opinion strongly suggests that the
field has been impliedly preempted by federal law. Additional
support for this conclusion is found in the long line of U.S.
Supreme Court cases beginning with Feres and continuing with its
progeny on a consistent pattern of expansion of the Feres
doctrine.4 We shall borrow language authored by the Sixth Circuit
in order to emphasize this point:
Review of these Supreme Court precedents
makes it clear that in recent years the Court
has embarked on a course dedicated to
broadening the Feres doctrine to encompass,
at a minimum, all injuries suffered by
military personnel that are even remotely
related to the individual’s status as a
member of the military, without regard to the
location of the event, the status (military
or civilian) of the tortfeasor, or any nexus
between the injury-producing event and the
essential defense/combat purpose of the
military activity from which it arose.
Major v. United States, 835 F. 2d 641, 644
(1987)
It is clear that the question is not whether
discriminatory acts may or may not “be condoned as discipline”.
Rather, the question is whether the unique and delicate
relationship between uniformed personnel and their superiors
would be negatively affected if civilian courts, federal or
4
United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 87
L. Ed. 2d 38 (1985); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 107
S. Ct. 2063, 95 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1987); United States v. Stanley,
483 U.S. 669, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 97 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1987).
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state, were empowered with the jurisdiction to adjudicate
discrimination claims brought by servicemen, which would
necessarily involve testimony by the officers accused of
misconduct and would require the court to analyze military
decisions taken with regard to the controversy. As decided in
Chappell, civilian courts are “ill-equipped” to evaluate the
impact of such actions on military discipline and “must, at the
very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks
the court to tamper with the established relationship between
enlisted military personnel and their superior officers.” Id. at
300.
In addition, it seems obvious that the uniformity intended
by Congress for the compensation of injuries incurred by those in
the armed services would be greatly undermined were this
determination left to be made by civilian courts, acting within
their own separate and distinct spheres of empowerment and
applying conceivably incompatible statutory and regulatory
schemes.
We are of the opinion that such a scenario is not what
Congress wants. While this might seem harsh, it must be
remembered that the real parties in interest do have a remedy by
availing themselves of the provisions of the National Guard
Military Discrimination Complaint System, as discussed above.5
In accordance with the views expressed in this opinion
and order, the respondent trial court is hereby DIRECTED to issue
5
It is not clear whether the guardsmen in this case have
formally initiated the administrative grievance process. The
response asserts they “fully complied with the provisions of the
Kentucky National Guard’s internal complaint system. . . .” The
petition states they “rejected [the process] in favor of seeking
relief in Franklin Circuit Court.”
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an order dismissing the actions filed by the real parties in
interest for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
ENTERED:
August 24, 2001
/s/ David C. Buckingham
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
William B. Pettus
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS:
Barbara D. Bonar
Covington, Kentucky
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