BETTY RICHARDS; WILLARD HANSFORD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JACK DETHERIDGE, CHARLES MEADE, AND SAM CATRON, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE PULASKI COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS v. APPEAL FORM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE DANIEL J. VENTERS v. MARK HAMM
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 12, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
2001-CA-000215-MR
BETTY RICHARDS;
WILLARD HANSFORD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS PULASKI COUNTY CLERK AND MEMBER OF THE PULASKI
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
JACK DETHERIDGE, CHARLES MEADE, AND SAM CATRON, IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE PULASKI
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FORM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL J. VENTERS
ACTION NO 00-CI-01139
MARK HAMM
APPELLEE
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: This matter is before the court pursuant to
KRS1 120.175 on review of a decision of the Pulaski Circuit Court
voiding an election for a seat on the Pulaski County School
Board. The issue to be determined is whether the failure of the
county clerk to code the voter roster in one split precinct
necessarily constitutes fraud so as to invalidate the election.
The trial court concluded that it does, but we conclude that
under the facts in this case it does not.
remand.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Thus, we reverse and
At the November 2000 general election, Betty Richards
and Mark Hamm were opposing candidates for the Division II seat
on the Pulaski County Board of Education.
Division II includes
eight precincts, and seven of the precincts are completely
contained within Division II.
The Somerset precinct (No. 5-A) is
a split precinct in which only a minority of the voters are
eligible to vote in Division II.
After a re-canvass of the close election results,
Richards was credited with 1,459 votes and Hamm with 1,450 votes.
The trial court found that 187 votes were cast in the Somerset
precinct.
We have been unable to find in the record a statement
concerning how the votes of the Somerset precinct were divided
between the candidates.
Hamm, as the unsuccessful candidate, filed an election
contest in the Pulaski Circuit Court contending that the county
clerk’s failure to provide a coded list of eligible voters in the
split precinct as required by KRS 116.200(2) constituted fraud.
Hamm sought the removal of Richards from the board, the setting
aside of the results of the election, the voiding of the results
of the election in the Somerset precinct, and a declaration that
he had been the winner of the school board seat. Richards
responded that Hamm had failed to identify any vote affected by
the alleged fraud.
By motion to dismiss, Richards challenged Hamm’s right
to maintain the election contest based on his failure to allege
his innocence of any violation of the election laws. Richards
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also sought dismissal based on Hamm’s alleged ineligibility for
the office due to his financial interest in the relationship
between his company and the board of education.
Other named
defendants filed similar motions to dismiss and also moved to
dismiss on the ground that Hamm had failed to attempt to obtain a
summary order of the circuit court under KRS 117.055(6)(a) to
enforce the provisions of KRS 116.200.
On January 16, 2001, prior to trial of the contest, the
circuit court entered an order disposing of the motions to
dismiss. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss the
action based on Hamm’s failure to identify voters affected by the
failure to provide the required list.
Next, the circuit court
ruled that Hamm could not be declared the successful candidate
due to his failure to plead his own innocence of any violations
of the election laws. However, the court stated that Hamm was not
prevented from seeking to have the election itself declared void.
The circuit court further held that Hamm’s failure to
seek an order requiring that the coded list be produced before
the election was not a bar to his election contest.
The circuit
court also denied Richards’ efforts to have Hamm declared
ineligible for the office because of the contractual relationship
between his company and the board.
Finally, the circuit court
dismissed various defendants who would not be involved in the
granting of relief if Hamm were successful in having the election
voided.
After a trial before the bench, the circuit court
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entered a final judgment determining that the failure of the
county clerk to prepare a coded list of eligible voters as
required by KRS 116.200 constituted constructive fraud and raised
the possibility that ineligible voters had cast ballots in the
election. While finding neither deliberate misconduct nor any
effort to favor the successful candidate, the circuit court held
that the neglect of the county clerk required the voiding of the
election.
Richards and the members of the board of elections
appealed.
The only issues for resolution in this appeal are (1)
whether Richards was entitled to have Hamm’s contest dismissed
because Hamm was not eligible for the office due to the contract
between his company and the board, (2) whether Hamm’s contest
petition was defective in failing to lists voters affected by the
failure to produce the coded list, and (3) whether the failure to
produce the coded list rose to the level of constructive fraud so
that the entire election must be voided.
The central issue in this appeal is whether the county
clerk’s failure to comply with KRS 116.200 and provide a coded
list of eligible voters constitutes sufficient grounds in this
case for voiding the election. The applicable statute, enacted in
1994, provides:
(1) Each city and school district board shall
provide the clerk of the county in which the city or
school district is located with whatever information
the county clerk requires to maintain a roster of
voters who are eligible to vote in city and school
board elections. This information shall be provided to
the county clerk not later than sixty (60) days
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preceding the date of a primary election in each year
in which an election for city officers or school board
members shall be held in that county.
(2) Each county clerk shall code all registered
voters in that county in such a manner that precinct
election officers may determine their eligibility to
vote in city and school board elections.
KRS 116.200.
KRS 116.200 was enacted to provide precinct
election officers with a reliable tool to determine who is
eligible to vote in an election in which less than all the voters
of the precinct are so eligible.
The value of such a coded list
is demonstrated by the situation in the Somerset precinct.
The circuit court found that the current number of
registered voters in the precinct was 1,413. In 1996 (the date of
the board’s last reliable estimate), the number of those voters
eligible to vote in Division II was 225. The circuit court found
that the actual number would now be considerably higher based on
growth in the area.
There is no question concerning the county clerk’s
failure to produce the statutorily required list. The circuit
court stated, “[i]t appears to the Court that the county clerk,
although aware of the statute, simply neglected to apply it, and
instead conducted the election as it had always been done, long
before the 1994 changes.”
The question is whether this failure
justifies invalidating the election.
The courts have “no inherent power to hear and decide
election contests. To accomplish that purpose, the General
Assembly must act. This, it has done.”
S.W.2d 751, 752 (1978).
Wood v. Kirby, Ky., 566
KRS 120.165(4) sets out the limit of the
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court’s authority in resolving an election contest:
(4) If it appears from an inspection of the whole
record that there has been such fraud, intimidation,
bribery or violence in the conduct of the election that
neither contestant nor contestee can be judged to have
been fairly elected, the Circuit Court, or an appellate
court, on appeal, may adjudge that there has been no
election. In that event the office shall be deemed
vacant, with the same legal effect as if the person
elected had refused to qualify. If one of the parties
is adjudged by the court to be elected to the office,
he shall, on production of a copy of the final
judgment, be permitted to qualify or be commissioned.
Further, when courts do hear election contests, “it is the policy
of the law to sustain elections where the proof is doubtful and
to uphold the validity of an election if it can reasonably be
done.”
Hale v. Goble, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 33, 34 (1961).
Many years ago, Kentucky courts set the burden of proof
in election contest cases and the extent of proof necessary to
sustain the burden of proof.
In Skain v. Milward, 138 Ky. 200,
127 S.W. 773 (1910), the court held:
The burden of proof is on the contestant to
show such fraud, intimidation, bribery, or
violence in the conduct of the election that
neither the contestant nor contestee can be
adjudged to have been fairly elected. These
things are not presumed, but it must be
affirmatively shown, not only that they
existed, but that they affected the result to
such an extent that it cannot be reasonably
determined who was elected. (Citations
omitted.)
Id. at 777.
In the case sub judice, any impact on the vote totals
is purely speculative.
Hamm did not prove that any voter or
voters were improperly denied the right to vote in this election.
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Further, Hamm did not prove that any voter or voters improperly
voted in the election. The most that can be said is that the
statutory failure opened up the possibility of such behavior.
The circuit court correctly noted that a majority of the voters
in the Somerset precinct live outside the school district and
were not eligible to vote in the contested election. However,
there is no support in the record for the circuit court’s followup statement: “It is very probable, given the fact that no coded
list was prepared, that some of them [the ineligible voters]
mistakenly or intentionally voted in the school board race.”
Only one of the precinct election officers, Norma
Durham, testified. She testified that both she and the other
election officers had served previously in numerous elections.
Her testimony indicated that eligibility to vote in the school
board race was a frequent topic of conversation in the polling
place on election day.
Most voters indicated a knowledge of
their eligibility, and the election officers locked the machine
appropriately for each voter.
Ms. Durham’s deposition testimony
summed up the election officers’ response to voters uncertain of
their eligibility as follows:
I asked them where they lived and, the best
of our ability, you know, the best we knew
about the lines, we would advise them or
discuss with them where -- and, if they still
didn’t understand, they were asked, Do you
pay city school taxes, county school taxes,
and that helped clarify. Another thing that
I asked them — being a retired teacher, I
guess I was a little more aware of the school
situation, as far as where do the children on
your street or in your community, you know,
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where do they attend school. If you don’t
have children, where do your neighbors attend
school, city or county? That would tell you
if you were living within those boundaries.
That clarified a lot — for a lot of people,
and, some, I even asked, What school bus runs
in front of your house, city or county?2
Without the list, the precinct officers were deprived of a
valuable tool for expediting the verification of voter
eligibility.
However, the precinct officers were aware of the
problem of conducting the election in a split precinct and were
attentive to their duties. There is no showing that a single
voter was improperly deprived of the right to vote or exercised
that right improperly.
The county clerk’s failure to provide a properly coded
list does raise the possibility that an improper vote was cast.
However, Hamm showed no more than the possibility, and that is
not an adequate basis for invalidating an election under the
statutory standard. Skain, supra.
That is what distinguishes this case from Wood v.
Kirby, supra, where a defective machine failed to account for 251
votes in an election decided by 177 votes.
The apparent winner
could not claim any of the missing votes since the counter had
appeared to record his votes appropriately.
The missing votes
made the result achieved doubtful and justified voiding the
election. But in Drennan v. Roberts, 234 Ky. 574, 28 S.W.2d 735
(1930), the appellate court reversed a judgment invalidating an
2
Ms. Durham’s trial testimony was consistent with her deposition testimony but, due to
the interspersing of questions, is less succinct.
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election decided by nine votes. In a split precinct, the election
officers were supplied with just enough ballots to supply the
number of voters eligible to vote in a certain race. Ballots were
apparently given to ineligible voters resulting in ballots not
being available to eligible voters. The court found the proof was
not sufficient to show that a sufficient number of voters were
deprived of their votes to change the result.
Id. at 737.
As
the court stated, “[i]t is the policy of the law to sustain
elections where the proof is doubtful.”
Id.
We cannot condone the failure of the county clerk to
prepare the coded list as directed by statute.
But, there was no
showing in this case that the integrity of the election was
compromised by the casting of improper ballots or the denial of
the ballot in sufficient numbers to alter the result of the
election. In short, we conclude that Hamm did not meet his burden
of proof under KRS 120.165(4).
See Skain, supra.
Since we have determined that the failure to produce
the coded lists did not justify the voiding of the election, we
do not need to address the issue of the failure to identify
voters casting ineligible votes or voters being improperly being
deprived of their vote.
Likewise, we need not address the issue
of Hamm’s business relationship with the board.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this
matter is remanded for entry of a judgment upholding the
election.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
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SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT BETTY
RICHARDS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE HAMM:
R. Scott Madden
Manchester, Ky.
David Austin Tapp
Somerset, Ky.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
DETHERIDGE, MEADE, CATHRON,
AND HANSFORD:
Jeffery Scott Lawless
Somerset, Ky.
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