UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND v. GWENDOLYN WILLIAMS; KED TRUCKING, INC.; J. LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD and KED TRUCKING, INC. v. GWENDOLYN WILLIAMS; UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND; J. LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JUNE 8, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000167-WC
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-99-01502
GWENDOLYN WILLIAMS;
KED TRUCKING, INC.;
J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
AND:
NO. 2001-CA-000288-WC
KED TRUCKING, INC.
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-99-01502
GWENDOLYN WILLIAMS;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND;
J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
AND:
NO. 2001-CA-000314-WC
GWENDOLYN WILLIAMS
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-99-01502
KED TRUCKING, INC.;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND;
J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Uninsured Employers' Fund asks us to review an
opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) rendered
January 10, 2001.
Appellees, KED Trucking, Inc. and Gwendolyn
Williams, file cross-petitions for review.
We reverse and remand
Petition No. 2001-CA-000167-WC and Cross-Petition No. 2001-CA000288-WC, and affirm Cross-Petition No. 2001-CA-000314-WC.
On May 17, 1999, Gwendolyn Williams hired on with KED
Trucking, Inc. as an over-the-road truck driver.
KED Trucking
did not provide workers' compensation coverage for its employees.
Instead, it provided an accident and health policy.
Williams was
advised of this arrangement and executed Form 4 which rejected
workers' compensation coverage in favor of the health and
accident protection.
-2-
During the week of June 25, 1999, Williams was hauling
a load of aluminum coil.
The coil shifted in transit and
rendered the tie-downs and booming mechanisms so fast that they
were difficult to free upon her destination.
Using a crowbar and
hammer, she was required to use considerable physical force in
loosening the rigging.
She claims that she injured her wrist in
doing so, resulting in carpel tunnel syndrome.
She made a claim
under KED Trucking's health and accident policy.
Although she
was hired in on May 17, 1999, and filled out an application for
the health and accident policy on May 19, 1999, the health and
accident carrier refused to honor her claim.
The carrier claimed
that the insurance did not become effective until August 12,
1999, which, of course, was after the date of her alleged injury.
Williams thereafter filed her workers' compensation claim
implicating the Uninsured Employers' Fund as KED Trucking was an
uninsured employer.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.760.
Williams' claim came on for hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
On August 18, 2000, the ALJ
rendered an Opinion and Order holding that the health and
accident carrier's refusal to cover Williams was of no relevance,
and that she had voluntarily rejected the act in accordance with
her right to do so under KRS 342.395(1).
The ALJ perforce
ordered that her claim for workers' compensation be denied.
On appeal to the Board, the Board remanded to the ALJ
for a determination as to whether the representations made by KED
Trucking concerning Williams' rejection of compensation coverage
in favor of health and accident coverage was sufficient to estop
-3-
KED Trucking from denying compensation coverage.
These petitions
ensue.
We shall first address an issue raised by Williams.
She claims that the Uninsured Employers' Fund's petition is
premature inasmuch as the Board's order remanding to the ALJ was
interlocutory.
We decline to accept this contention on the
authority of Davis v. Island Creek Coal Company, Ky., 969 S.W.2d
712 (1998).
We, therefore, decide the petitions on the merits.
KRS 342.395(1) provides, in relevant part:
Where an employer is subject to this chapter,
then every employee of that employer, as a
part of his contract of hiring or who may be
employed at the time of the acceptance of the
provisions of this chapter by the employer,
shall be deemed to have accepted all the
provisions of this chapter and shall be bound
thereby unless he shall have filed, prior to
the injury or incurrence of occupational
disease, written notice to the contrary with
the employer; . . . [B]efore an employee's
written notice of rejection shall be
considered effective, the employer shall file
the employee's notice of rejection with the
Department of Workers' Claims. The
commissioner of that department shall not
give affect to any rejection of this chapter
not voluntarily made by the employee.
(Emphasis added.)
The question presented is whether Williams made a valid
rejection of the Act.
The ALJ was of the opinion she did.
He
specifically found that Williams voluntarily and with full
understanding of the effect of her action rejected coverage.
He
further found that there was no evidence that KED Trucking, Inc.
required her to reject coverage as a condition of obtaining
employment or a condition to remain employed.
-4-
The ALJ further
found that the refusal of the health and accident carrier to
honor Williams' claim was not relevant.
On appeal to the Board, the matter was remanded.
The
Board stated as follows:
In the instant case, if Williams is to
prevail, it will not be because she
involuntarily rejected the Act, but because
pre-employment representations made by KED
were so misleading as to prevent Ked [sic]
from now relying on her rejection to defeat
potential benefits under the Act.
Ever mindful of the ALJ's authority as
the fact-finder, we hesitate to emphasize
those facts which we, as an appellate body,
might view as persuasive. We would simply
note that this case clearly lends itself to
an estoppel analysis and we REMAND this
matter to the ALJ for additional findings
consistent with the views expressed in this
opinion.
We are asked to review this matter from two
perspectives.
First, may the Board consider matters of estoppel
which were not raised before the ALJ?
Secondly, assuming matters
of estoppel may be considered by the Board, does the record
support a finding of estoppel?
We answer both in the negative.
The general rule is that estoppel is an equitable
remedy that must be pled in order to be available.
The rule
applies whether estoppel is asserted as a defense or whether it
is asserted as part of the cause of action or to preclude a
defense.1
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver ยงยง 162-164 (2000).
This general rule has long been recognized in this jurisdiction.
See Stansbury v. Smith, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 571 (1968), Bean v.
1
Estoppel as a defense is required to be affirmatively pled
under Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.03.
-5-
Bevins, 287 S.W.2d 627 (1956), J.R. Watkins Co. v. Jordan, 249
Ky. 432, 60 S.W.2d 984 (1933),
Bracket v. Modern Botherhood of
America, 154 Ky. 340, 157 S.W. 690 (1913).
In view of the foregoing authorities, we are of the
opinion the Board erred in remanding this matter to the ALJ for
consideration of estoppel.
estoppel as rather moot.
In any event, we view the question of
Our examination of the record convinces
us that the principles necessary for estoppel as enunciated in
Gray v. Jackson Purchase Production Credit Association, Ky. App.,
691 S.W.2d 904 (1985), are not present.
We think that the ALJ
correctly found that the rejection of workers' compensation was
not based upon any job repercussion as was the case in Watts v.
Newberg, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 59 (1996), nor can it be based upon any
lack of understanding as was the case in Karst Robbins Machine
Shop, Inc. v. Caudill, Ky., 779 S.W.2d 207 (1989).
The facts
established indicate that Williams was a person not only familiar
with the workers' compensation law by virtue of prior claims, but
clearly understood the difference between accident and health
insurance and the benefits to be derived from workers'
compensation protection.
The record simply does not form a basis
for concluding that Williams' employer misled her in any way.
There are, indeed, many reasons why alternative
insurance coverage may fail.
The coverage may not be timely, the
premiums may lapse, or the insurer may become insolvent.
In any
event, we think it inappropriate that one should have the
unqualified privilege of opting-out of workers' compensation and
later opting back in when alternate insurance fails.
-6-
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Board is
affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS' FUND:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT, KED TRUCKING, INC.:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
W. Russell Duty
Owensboro, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT, GWENDOLYN WILLIAMS:
Michael A. Richardson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Charles B. West
Henderson, Kentucky
-7-
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