JAMES STOKES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 7, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002573-MR
JAMES STOKES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00612
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, HUDDLESTON, and MILLER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by James Stokes from an order of
the Warren Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to RCr1 11.42 and CR2 60.02.
Because Stokes’s
motion on its face states grounds for relief which are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would
entitle him to relief, we vacate in part and remand for an
evidentiary hearing.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
On September 23, 1998, Stokes was indicted for one
count of first-degree sexual abuse (KRS 510.110); four counts of
second-degree sexual abuse (KRS 510.120); and of being a seconddegree persistent felony offender (KRS 532.080).
The charges
stemmed from an allegation that in April 1998, Stokes subjected
two girls under the age of fourteen and one girl under the age of
twelve to sexual contact.
On February 15, 1999, Stokes entered a
plea of guilty to one count of first-degree sexual abuse and to
four counts of second-degree sexual abuse in exchange for a
recommended sentence of five years.
As part of the plea
agreement, the second-degree persistent felony charge was
dismissed.
On April 19, 1999, the trial court sentenced Stokes
in accordance with the plea agreement.
On October 26, 1999, Stokes filed a motion to vacate
his sentence and conviction on the first-degree sexual abuse
charge.
On January 5, 2000, he filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in this Court seeking to require the trial court to rule
on his motion.
We subsequently granted that petition. See Case
No. 2000-CA-000004.
On July 31, 2000, an attorney for the
Department of Public Advocacy entered an appearance on his
behalf, and on August 15, 2000, Stokes filed a supplement to his
post-conviction motion.
concerning the motion.
On August 23, 2000, a hearing was held
On October 3, 2000, the trial court
entered an order denying Stokes’s motion for post-conviction
relief.
This appeal followed.
Stokes contends that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel when trial counsel permitted him to plead guilty to
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first-degree sexual abuse even though the victim was twelve years
of age at the time of the offense.3
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, the movant must satisfy a two-part test by showing:
(1)
that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the
deficiency resulted in actual prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Unless the movant makes both showings, he
cannot prevail on his claim.
S.Ct. at 2064.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104
The movant bears the burden of proof of showing
that he was not adequately represented by trial counsel.
Jordan
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878, 879 (1969).
When an appellant challenges a guilty plea based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show: (1) that counsel
committed serious errors outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90
S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); and (2) that the
deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the
plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pled
guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203
(1985).
The burden of proof is upon the appellant to demonstrate
that both prongs of Strickland have been met.
Osborne v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 860, 863 (1998).
3
KRS 510.110 provides that a conviction for first-degree sexual abuse must involve a
victim who is under twelve years of age.
-3-
The mere fact that counsel advises or permits a
defendant to enter a plea of guilty does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.
657 S.W.2d 234, 237 (1983).
Beecham v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
In determining whether counsel was
ineffective, a reviewing court must be highly deferential in
scrutinizing counsel's performance, and the tendency and
temptation to second guess should be avoided.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311 (1998).
Harper v.
We must look to the
particular facts of the case and determine whether the acts or
omissions at issue were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.
Id.
In determining whether the appellant
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, "[o]ur review is confined
to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would
invalidate the conviction."
Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
992 S.W.2d 860, 864 (1998) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967)).
Count One of the indictment (September 23, 1998)
alleged “[t]hat during the month of April, 1998, in Warren
County, Kentucky, the above-named defendant committed the crime
of Sexual Abuse First Degree when he subjected [the victim], who
was less than 12 years of age to sexual contact.”
KRS 510.110
provides that:
(1) A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the
first degree when:
(a) He subjects another person to
sexual contact by forcible
compulsion; or
(b) He subjects another person to
sexual contact who is incapable of
consent because he:
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1. Is physically helpless; or
2. Is less than twelve (12)
years old.
The first-degree sexual abuse charge against Stokes was
based on the fact that the victim was less than twelve years of
age when the abuse occurred.
KRS 510.110(1)(b)(2).
However, it
is uncontested that the victim was born February 14, 1986; thus,
she was twelve years of age in April 1998.
Included in the
record is a letter (dated October 27, 1998) from Stokes to his
trial counsel, which includes the statement:
“I believe [the
victim] was already twelve in April 1998.”
Thus, the indictment charged Stokes with sexually
abusing a victim under the age of twelve when she was at least
twelve years of age on the date identified in the indictment.
Additionally, trial counsel had been advised specifically by the
defendant that he did not believe that the victim was under the
age of twelve in April 1998.
Therefore, we must conclude that
trial counsel provided deficient performance under the first
prong of Strickland by failing to investigate the merits of this
defense by electing instead to acquiesce in Stokes’s guilty plea.
Whether Stokes was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
deficient performance is unclear from the record.
In its order
of September 29, 2000, denying post-conviction relief, the trial
court stated as follows:
3. After the plea and sentencing, Defendant
alleges that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because the victim in
the sexual abuse first degree count of the
indictment was twelve years old during April
of 1998. The victim turned twelve six weeks
before that. The victim being twelve years
old is an element of sexual abuse first
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degree. However, evidence presented by the
Commonwealth at trial would likely show that
[the] victim was not sure of the date it
occurred and that the Defendant and victim
lived together when the victim was eleven.
. . . .
6. The Court finds no ineffective assistance
of counsel based on the victim’s age at the
time of indictment for the following reasons:
the victim was unsure of the exact date that
it occurred, the victim had only been twelve
six weeks prior to the date alleged on the
indictment, the Defendant and victim lived
together when the victim was eleven, had this
plea not occurred the Commonwealth would have
amended the indictment to allege a date when
the child was eleven, and had this plea not
been entered the Defendant would face the
possibility of a conviction as a persistent
felony offender second degree.
The statements and rationale of the court for denying
Stokes’s post-conviction motion substantially mirror the
arguments advanced by the Commonwealth at the hearing on August
23, 2000, and in its brief in this appeal.
However, no witnesses
were called at the August hearing, and there is no independent
evidentiary basis in the record to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the victim was unsure of when the abuse occurred.
Without some evidence as a foundation, we cannot affirm the trial
court’s finding that the Commonwealth may have amended the
original indictment to charge that the abuse had occurred prior
to February 14, 1998.
RCr 6.16 provides that “[t]he court may
permit an indictment . . . to be amended any time before verdict
or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and
if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.”
This
rule has been applied to the amending of the indictment to change
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the time in which the offense was alleged to have been committed.
Gilbert v Commonwealth, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 376 (1991).
In summary, the arguments of the Commonwealth and the
findings of the trial court are not supported by witness
testimony, police statements, investigative reports, or any other
evidentiary basis contained in the record.
The only basis for
the trial court’s findings are the unsubstantiated contentions of
the Commonwealth.
On its face, therefore, the record fails to
demonstrate that Stokes was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s
deficient performance.
Accordingly, we remand this matter for an
evidentiary hearing to determine if there is factual support for
the Commonwealth’s claim of entitlement to amend the indictment
to reflect that the abuse occurred prior to February 14, 1998.4
Upon remand, if indeed the evidentiary hearing should
disclose there was an adequate factual basis for the
Commonwealth’s claim that it could have amended the indictment to
charge the correct timing of the abuse, the trial court should
deny Stokes’s post-conviction motion as he would have suffered no
prejudice.
He would be in precisely the same position as when he
chose to plead guilty in February 1999 — with the reasonable
likelihood that he would elect to enter a guilty plea rather than
to proceed to trial.
On the other hand, should the trial court on remand
find no factual basis for the Commonwealth’s contention as to
amending the indictment, it should enter a judgment vacating
4
We note that the victim will not necessarily have to be
called in order to establish this critical element.
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Stokes’s conviction for first-degree sexual abuse.
Without
evidence that the abuse occurred prior to February 14, 1998,
Stokes will have been prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient
performance in acquiescing to a guilty plea to a Class D felony
in lieu of the misdemeanor that should have been charged.
Stokes additionally contends that his guilty plea
should be vacated because the trial court failed to order a
competency hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand
trial.
RCr 8.06 provides as follows:
[i]f upon arraignment or during the
proceedings there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant lacks the capacity
to appreciate the nature and consequences of
the proceedings against him or her, or to
participate rationally in his or her defense,
all proceedings shall be postponed until the
issue of incapacity is determined as provided
by KRS 504.100.
Criminal prosecution of a defendant who is incompetent to stand
trial is a violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct.
2572, 2574, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992).
When competency is placed in
issue, a hearing is required.
Once facts known to a trial court are
sufficient to place a defendant's competence
to stand trial in question, the trial court
must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
the question.
Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1182, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000);
Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815
(1966).
The competency hearing mandated by KRS 504.100 is
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Kentucky’s mechanism to implement and to safeguard this dueprocess right.
Mills, 996 S.W.2d at 486.
Our standard of review
is to determine whether a reasonable trial judge, having declined
to conduct an evidentiary hearing, should have entertained doubt
or experienced some reservation with respect to the defendant’s
competency to stand trial.
Id.
Under Kentucky law, the
competency to plead guilty and the competency to stand trial are
identical.
Littlefield v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 554 S.W.2d
872, 873 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 987, 98 S.Ct. 617, 54
L.Ed.2d 482 (1977).
The trial record includes a letter from the Director of
the Division of Mental Health of the Cabinet for Human Resources
(dated September 28, 1998), responding to a letter from the Clerk
of the Warren Circuit Court (dated September 24, 1998).
The
Clerk had requested that Stokes undergo examination as to his
mental condition and the existence of any mental illness or
retardation which might be relevant to his mens rea.
It appears
that a competency evaluation was never performed on Stokes.
However, the record clearly refutes Stokes’s contention
that reasonable grounds existed to cause trial counsel to
question his competency.
While Stokes does cite to various
letters which he wrote during the pendency of the case in which
he expressed suicidal thoughts, the letters also disclose that he
fully understood the nature of the proceedings against him and
that he was capable of assisting his attorney in preparing his
defense.
Moreover, the videotape of the hearing on the plea of
guilty reveals that Stokes acknowledged that he understood the
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charges against him, the rights that he was waiving by pleading
guilty, and the judge's statements.
Stokes has failed to
identify any objective evidence of incompetency, and we find no
basis for concluding that he is entitled to post-conviction
relief on his contention that the trial court failed to conduct a
competency hearing.
The judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William H. Eddy
Eddyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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