MICHAEL CRAIG v. GEORGE MILLION
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RENDERED:
October 5, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002463-MR
MICHAEL CRAIG
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-01085
v.
GEORGE MILLION
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, and TACKETT, Judges.
KNOPF, Judge:
Michael Craig appeals from an order of the
Franklin Circuit Court dismissing his petition for declaration of
rights because of a lack of venue.
Based on KRS 452.105, we
vacate and remand the case for transfer of the action to the
court with proper venue.
Craig is an inmate at the Eastern Kentucky Correctional
Complex (EKCC) in West Liberty, Morgan County, Kentucky.
In May
and June 2000, he was charged with and found guilty by the prison
Adjustment Committee of two violations of the Corrections
Policies and Procedures 15.2, Category IV-5 (smuggling of
contraband into, out of, or within the institution), involving
cigarette tobacco.
The Adjustment Committee imposed consecutive
penalties of 45 days disciplinary segregation and 60 days’
forfeiture of good time for each offense.
The prison warden
concurred with the decision of the Adjustment Committee on each
occasion.
On September 19, 2000, Craig filed a petition in the
Franklin Circuit Court for declaration of rights pursuant to KRS
418.040, challenging the disciplinary action.
The respondents
included the prison warden, the chairman of the Adjustment
Committee, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, and
John Damron, a staff attorney for the Department of Corrections.
More specifically, he alleged that the prison officials violated
his constitutional right to due process under the 14th Amendment
by not following certain procedures and finding him guilty
without sufficient evidence.
Craig maintained that the mandatory
language in the Corrections Policies and Procedures established
procedures that were required to be followed in order to satisfy
due process.
He alleged also that John Damron had improperly
advised prison officials that the prison policies and procedures
did not create due process rights.
Craig asked the circuit court
to invalidate the disciplinary penalties, award him monetary
damages, and issue an order and opinion declaring that the
Corrections Policies and Procedures create due process procedural
rights that must be strictly complied with by prison officials.1
1
Craig attached to his petition an April 2000 letter from
John Damron to an EKCC official expressing his opinion that the
(continued...)
-2-
On October 4, 2000, the Department of Corrections, on
behalf of the respondents, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
proper venue.
It stated that according to KRS 452.405(2),
actions against public officials for official acts must be
brought in the county where the cause of action arose.
The
Department of Corrections asserted that because all of the agency
actions occurred in Morgan County, venue in Franklin County was
improper.
On October 9, 2000, Craig mailed a response that was
officially filed by the clerk on October 10, 2000, in which he
asked the circuit court to deny the motion to dismiss or in the
alternative to transfer the case to the proper court.
He argued
that venue was proper in Franklin County because the petition
involved a complaint that Department of Corrections officials
incorrectly advised prison personnel concerning their duties
under the Corrections Policies and Procedures.
He also contended
that venue was proper because the prison policies and procedures
at the center of the action were promulgated from the Department
of Corrections office in Frankfort.
On October 9, 2000, the circuit court summarily
dismissed the petition for lack of proper venue.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Craig appears to admit that his petition was
filed in the wrong court but contends that the circuit court
1
(...continued)
Corrections Policies and Procedures do not create due process
rights.
-3-
should have transferred the case to the proper court.2
He also
asserts that as a pro se plaintiff, his pleadings should be
liberally construed.
First, we note that the circuit court correctly
concluded that proper venue did not reside in Franklin County.
KRS 452.405(2) provides that actions “[a]gainst a public officer
for an act done by him in virtue or under color of his office, or
for a neglect of official duty” shall be brought “in the county
where the cause of action, or some part thereof, arose.”
As the
court noted, all of the operative facts involving the CPP
violations and disciplinary hearing occurred in Morgan County
where the prison is located.
In Fisher v. State Board of
Elections, Ky., 847 S.W.2d 718 (1993), the court construed KRS
452.405(2) to place venue for suits challenging actions by
government officials in the county where the alleged injury or
harm to a particular individual occurs.
In Fisher, the pro se
plaintiff filed suit in Campbell County challenging the 1991
Reapportionment Act.
The court held that venue was proper in
Campbell County, rather than Franklin County, where the
legislature had enacted the statute.
The court stated,
“Appreciable harm arises only when the statue directly affects
the individual by denying him a right or imposing upon him an
obligation.”
Id. at 721.
In the case sub judice, Craig alleged that the actions
of the various corrections personnel violated his rights under
2
The Department of Corrections failed to file an
appellate brief so this Court has not been provided with a
response to Craig’s arguments on appeal.
-4-
both the prison policies and procedures and the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing due process of law.
Even though the
Corrections Policies and Procedures were promulgated in Franklin
County, the injury or harm to Craig occurred in Morgan County.
The fact that proper venue was in Morgan County,
however, does not resolve the matter.
The circuit court
apparently did not consider a recent statute dealing with the
transfer of civil cases because of improper venue that became
effective on July 14, 2000.
In 2000, the General Assembly
enacted KRS 452.105, which states:
In civil actions, when the judge of the
court in which the case was filed determines
that the court lacks venue to try the case
due to an improper venue, the judge, upon
motion of a party, shall transfer the case to
the court with the proper venue.
The mandatory language3 in this statute obligates the trial judge
to transfer a case upon request when there is a defect because of
venue.
In the current case, the Department of Corrections
filed its motion to dismiss for lack of venue on October 4, 2000.
The trial court granted the motion on October 9, 2000.
The
record indicates that Craig mailed his response on October 9, but
it was not received by the Franklin Circuit Clerk until the next
day, after the trial court had already entered its order granting
the motion to dismiss.
Although Craig failed to file a formal
3
See KRS 446.010(20)(word “shall” in statue is
mandatory). Cf. KRS 452.010(2)(giving court discretion for
change venue in civil action based on undue influence of party or
circumstances creating risk of unfair trial); Alexander v. S & M
Motors, Inc., Ky., 28 S.W.3d 303 (2000)(noting word “shall” in
statute is mandatory and “may” is permissive).
-5-
post-judgment motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment or
motion to transfer, he did request transfer of the case in his
response.
We believe that given his pro se status and the time
sequence involved, Craig’s response should have been treated as a
motion to transfer for purposes of KRS 452.105, and the trial
court should have transferred the case to the court with proper
venue in Morgan County.
We note that this statute is of very
recent origin and neither party specifically raised it before the
trial court.
Nevertheless, we feel Craig was entitled to have
his case transferred, rather than dismissed.4
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the
Franklin Circuit Court and remand the case with directions that
the court enter an order transferring the case to Morgan Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No Brief for Appellee
Michael Craig
West Liberty, Kentucky
4
Given our decision to vacate and remand the case, we
need not address the merits of Craig’s petition.
-6-
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