JEANNETTE STEWART v. UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
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RENDERED:
JULY 6, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001726-MR
JEANNETTE STEWART
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN W. POTTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-003029
v.
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
Judge.1
BUCKINGHAM and COMBS, Judges, and MARY COREY, Special
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Jeannette Stewart appeals from a summary
judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of the
University of Louisville.
We affirm.
After a career in teaching and counseling, Stewart
entered the graduate program in psychology at the University of
Louisville at the age of forty-four.
She was a recipient of a
Regent’s Fellowship that provided full tuition remission and a
renewable yearly stipend of approximately $11,000.
1
She was
Senior Status Judge Mary Corey sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution.
required to submit annual reports describing her progress and was
not allowed to accept employment without obtaining permission
from the university.
Stewart received regular checks from the
university while she was a fellow, and the university withheld
all state and federal taxes, including FICA and medicare taxes,
from the checks.
She also received four checks for $50 each late
in 1992 from the Bingham Child Guidance Clinic of the University
of Louisville.
The psychology department at the university provided
written instructions to graduate students setting forth the
required progress for a student to complete the graduate program,
including requirements relating to a student’s thesis.
On
December 22, 1992, the chairperson of the department wrote
Stewart a letter indicating that she had made “little progress”
toward her thesis proposal.
On May 24, 1993, following the
spring semester of Stewart’s second year, the chairperson of the
department again wrote a letter to Stewart.
He advised Stewart
that since she did not have her thesis proposal approved, she was
not eligible for financial support through the department for the
next year.
On May 17, 1994, following the end of Stewart’s third
year, the acting chairperson of the department wrote Stewart a
letter reminding her that she must have her thesis completed and
approved by a committee by July 1, 1994, “or your fellowship will
be rescinded.”
When Stewart did not meet this requirement, they
rescinded her fellowship.
However, she remained a part of the
psychology department’s graduate clinical program.
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On March 15, 1995, Stewart faced a “Discovery Hearing”
to review her progress on her thesis.
On the following day, she
was sent a letter from an associate professor of the department
advising her that the clinical faculty had recommended that she
be dismissed from the graduate clinical program.
After Stewart
was dismissed from the program and thereafter unsuccessfully
filed a grievance, she filed a complaint against the university
in the Jefferson Circuit Court.
In her lawsuit against the university, Stewart alleged
sex and age discrimination in violation of KRS2 Chapter 344,
violation of KRS 61.102, failure to provide adequate supervision
in violation of KRS 319.082(1)(l), discrimination and violation
of the university handbook, illegal retaliation, and outrageous
conduct.
By an opinion and order entered on February 9, 2000,
the trial court granted the university’s summary judgment motion.
The court held that Stewart had no cause of action for
discrimination under KRS Chapter 344 because she was not an
employee of the university and the statute is limited to the
employer-employee relationship.
The court further stated that
even if Stewart were an employee, its ruling would “probably” be
the same.
When the trial court denied Stewart’s motion to
reconsider, this appeal followed.
Kentucky statutory law makes it unlawful for an
employer “[t]o fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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employment, because of the individual’s race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age forty (40) and over . . . .”
344.040(1).
An “employee” is defined for purposes of KRS Chapter
344 as “an individual employed by an employer . . . .”
344.030(5).
KRS
KRS 61.102(1) provides that:
No employer shall subject to reprisal, or
directly or indirectly use, or threaten to
use, any official authority or influence, in
any manner whatsoever, which tends to
discourage, restrain, depress, dissuade,
deter, prevent, interfere with, coerce, or
discriminate against any employee who in good
faith reports, discloses, divulges, or
otherwise brings to the attention of the
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Commission, the
Attorney General, the Auditor of Public
Accounts, the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its
members or employees, the Legislative
Research Commission or any of its committees,
members or employees, the judiciary or any
member or employee of the judiciary, any law
enforcement agency or its employees, or any
other appropriate body or authority, any
facts or information relative to an actual or
suspected violation of any law, statute,
executive order, administrative regulation,
mandate, rule, or ordinance of the United
States, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any
of its political subdivisions, or any facts
or information relative to actual or
suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse
of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety. No
employer shall require any employee to give
notice prior to making such a report,
disclosure, or divulgence.
An “employee” is defined for purposes of KRS 61.102 as:
[A] person in the service of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, or any of its political
subdivisions, who is under contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, where
the Commonwealth, or any of its political
subdivisions, has the power or right to
control and direct the material details of
work performance[.]
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KRS
KRS 61.101(1).
The first issue is whether the trial court properly
awarded the university summary judgment on Stewart’s claims under
KRS Chapter 344 and KRS Chapter 61.
Because both statutes relate
to prohibited actions by an employer against an employee, the
specific issue is whether or not the court properly held as a
matter of law that Stewart was not an employee of the university.
As the trial court noted, “there is surprising lack of authority
addressing whether a Fellowship/Scholarship student is an
“‘employee’ of the university that student attends.”
KRS Chapter 344 was modeled after Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b).
Palmer v. International Ass’n of Machinists, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117,
119 (1994).
In fact, the Kentucky discrimination statute is
virtually identical to Title VII.
Mills v. Gibson Greetings,
Inc., 872 F.Supp. 366, 371 (E.D.Ky. 1994).
Thus, Kentucky courts
generally follow federal law in interpreting the Kentucky
discrimination statute.
Id.
Stewart maintains that her stipend supplied by the
university constituted an employment relationship because she was
required to perform duties above those expected of unassisted
students.
She further contends that the treatment of her stipend
as wages for tax purposes by the university bolsters her alleged
employment status.
In Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319 (9th Cir.
1996), the federal court stated as follows:
Scholarship sponsors often exercise a certain
degree of control over the students who
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receive their scholarships, including
terminating the scholarship if the student’s
grades fall below a designated level or if
the student acts in derogation of other
scholarship terms. However, imposition of
scholarship conditions is far from the
direction and supervision found in the
traditional employment setting.
Id. at 326.
In determining whether an individual will be deemed
an “employee” for Title VII purposes, “one must examine the
economic realities underlying the relationship between the
individual and the so-called principal in an effort to determine
whether that individual is likely to be susceptible to the
discriminatory practices which the act was designed to
eliminate.”
Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir.
1983).
Applying these principles to the case sub judice, we
conclude that the mere fact the university imposed conditions on
Stewart’s fellowship which required her to perform more duties
than those expected of other students did not create an employeremployee relationship.
Further, although the treatment of her
stipend as wages for tax purposes was relevant, it was not
dispositive of the issue.
Also, although Stewart may have
developed a therapist-patient relationship with one clinic
patient, it is clear that nearly all of her duties and activities
were in connection with her academic work rather than providing a
service to the university.
In short, we conclude that the
economic realities of the relationship between Stewart and the
university did not point to an employer-employee relationship.
Thus, the trial court did not err in determining as a matter of
law that Stewart was not an employee of the university.
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Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed her claims under
KRS Chapter 344 and KRS Chapter 61.
Stewart’s second argument is that the trial court’s
summary judgment should be vacated or reversed because it did not
consider her amended complaint claims of negligent supervision in
violation of KRS 319.082 (1)(l), violation of handbook, illegal
retaliation, and outrageous conduct.
Our standard of review on
appeal of a summary judgment is “whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”
781 (1996).
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779,
The ruling of the trial court is given no deference
since factual findings are not at issue.
Id., citing Goldsmith
v. Allied Bldg. Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d 378, 381
(1992).
Therefore, merely because the trial court did not
specifically address all of Stewart’s claims does not require
this court to vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the
trial court.
Rather, we will review the claims and determine
whether the trial court properly awarded summary judgment.
Stewart asserts in her third argument that the
university is not entitled to assert the defense of sovereign
immunity as to her claims under KRS Chapter 344 and KRS Chapter
61.
See Department of Corrections v. Furr, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 615
(2000).
Thus, we presume she concedes that the university may
assert the defense of sovereign immunity as to her remaining
claims.
In fact, the university argues in its brief that it has
sovereign immunity as to those claims, and Stewart does not
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maintain otherwise.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court acted
properly in dismissing the remaining claims even though it did
not specifically address them in its opinion and order.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Philip C. Kimball
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas M. Williams
J. Gregory Cornett
Louisville, Kentucky
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