DAN E. WILSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
October 5, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED PUBLISHED BY KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT: June 5, 2002
(2001-SC-000899-D)
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001697-MR
DAN E. WILSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00977
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, BARBER, and TACKETT, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Dan E. Wilson (Wilson) appeals from a sentence of
July 11, 2000, revoking his probation and sentencing him to two
years to run consecutively with any other felony sentence which
he was currently serving.
We affirm.
On July 6, 1994, Wilson pleaded guilty to Burglary,
Second Degree, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 511.030; Unlawful
Transaction with a Minor, Second Degree, KRS 530.065; and
Unlawful Use of a Motor Vehicle, KRS 514.100, in Breckinridge
Circuit Court.
He was sentenced to seven (7) years to serve.
On
January 13, 1995, the parole board released Wilson on parole.
On
December 11, 1995, the board revoked his parole, returning him to
prison.
Wilson was subsequently incarcerated at Blackburn
Correctional Complex (Blackburn) in Fayette County, Kentucky.
On
June 3, 1997, Wilson escaped from Blackburn.
He turned himself
in to the Breckinridge County Sheriff’s Office within days of the
escape.
On November 11, 1997, Wilson pleaded guilty to Escape,
Second Degree, KRS 520.030.
The Fayette Circuit Court sentenced
him to two years to serve for the escape charge but probated the
service of his sentence for five years to run consecutively with
any other felony sentence that Wilson was currently serving.
On November 10, 1998, the parole board again released
Wilson on parole with respect to the original seven-year
Breckinridge sentence.
At that point, Wilson’s five-year
probationary period with respect to the Fayette sentence began.
On February 23, 2000, the parole board revoked Wilson’s parole
with respect to the Breckinridge sentence, and he returned to
prison to serve the balance of the seven years.
On June 30,
Wilson, pro se, moved the Fayette Circuit Court to revoke his
probation on the escape charge and to run its two-year sentence
concurrently with the seven-year Breckinridge County sentence.
He argued that the Fayette sentence had to run concurrently with
the Breckinridge sentence because more than ninety days had
passed since the Department of Corrections (Corrections) had
become aware of the grounds for revocation of probation for
escape.
Wilson contended that KRS 533.040(3) requires that a
revocation hearing be held within ninety days from the time that
Corrections becomes aware of the grounds for revocation in order
for his reinstated sentence to run consecutively with any other
felony sentence.
He argued that Corrections became aware that he
-2-
had violated his probation no later than February 23, 2000, when
his parole was revoked.
If the hearing is held beyond the ninety
days, Wilson contends that KRS 533.040(3) mandates that the
sentences run concurrently.
On July 11, 2000, the Fayette
Circuit Court revoked Wilson’s probation and sentenced him to
serve two years consecutively to any other previous felony
sentence that he was required to serve.
This appeal followed.
Wilson presents one assignment of error for our review:
whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when upon
probation revocation, it sentenced him to serve his more recent
sentence consecutively with the prior felony sentence.
is a question of law, our review is de novo.
As this
See, Floyd County
Board of Education, et al. v. Ratliff, et al., Ky., 955 S.W.2d
921 (1997) and Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Garland, Ky., 805
S.W.2d 116 (1991).
Wilson contends that after his probation had been
revoked, the circuit court was prohibited from running his twoyear sentence consecutively with the balance of the seven-year
sentence that he was then serving pursuant to KRS 533.040(3),
which reads as follows:
A sentence of probation or conditional
discharge shall run concurrently with any
federal or state jail, prison, or parole term
for another offense to which the defendant is
or becomes subject during the period, unless
the sentence of probation or conditional
discharge is revoked. The revocation shall
take place prior to parole under or
expiration of the sentence of imprisonment or
within ninety (90) days after the grounds for
revocation come to the attention of the
Department of Corrections, whichever occurs
first. (Emphasis added.)
-3-
Wilson relies on Sutherland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 910 S.W.2d 235
(1995), in which the defendant’s probation was revoked more than
ninety days after Corrections had become aware of the violation.
Sutherland argued that since the hearing occurred outside the
ninety days, the trial court was wholly prohibited from revoking
his probation at all.
Id.
The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed,
upholding the revocation of probation but directing that it run
concurrently rather than consecutively with the previous sentence
because of the failure of Corrections to act within ninety days:
"any revocation of probation (which occurs outside of the 90-day
period) is to be run concurrently with any other offense."
Id.
at 237.
The Commonwealth maintains that the circuit court acted
appropriately, citing KRS 532.110(4) as the pertinent statute
governing the facts of this case:
Notwithstanding any provision in this section
to the contrary, if a person is convicted of
an offense that is committed while he is
imprisoned in a penal or reformatory
institution . . . the sentence imposed for
that offense may be added to the portion of
the term which remained unserved at the time
of the commission of the offense. The
sentence imposed upon any person convicted of
an escape or attempted escape offense shall
run consecutively with any other sentence
which the defendant must serve. (Emphasis
added.)
Our task is to resolve the conflict between KRS
533.040(3) (dealing with the 90-day probation revocation period)
and KRS 532.110(4) (the escape statute mandating consecutive
sentencing).
An analogous conflict occurred in Gaither v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 963 S.W.2d 621 (1997).
-4-
Gaither was charged
with several felonies in one indictment and with escape in a
separate indictment.
Because of the consecutive sentencing for
escape mandated by KRS 532.110(4), his aggregate sentence
totalled 40 years, exceeding the maximum length of the longest
extended term that would have been authorized by statute.
532.110(1)(c) specifically forbids such a situation.
KRS
The Gaither
court resolved the conflict in favor of the more specific
statute, holding that KRS 532.110(4) mandating consecutive
sentencing for escape should prevail.
We hold that KRS 532.110(4) creates a specific
exception to KRS 533.040(3) where the two come into conflict and
that the more specific statutory language pertaining to escape
must pre-empt the more general statute dealing with the 90-day
period in which to bring a probation revocation hearing.
The
court did not err in ordering Wilson’s sentence for escape to run
consecutively as to his previous sentence.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.