RAMSEY ENTERPRISES, A KENTUCKY PARTNERSHIP; WILLIAM N. RAMSEY JR, CHILDREN'S TRUST, PARTNER; G. FRANK RAMSEY, TRUSTEE, PARTNER; THE G. FRANK RAMSEY CHILDREN'S TRUST, PARTNER; WILLIAM RAMSEY SR, TRUSTEE, PARTNER; SUSAN RAMSEY ALDRIDGE, PARTNER; G. FRANK RAMSEY, INDIVIDUALLY; AND WILLIAM N. RAMSEY JR, INDIVIDUALLY v. JOHNNIE LEMASTER SPORTS, INC., A KENTUCKY CORPORATION
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RENDERED:
November 21, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001624-MR
RAMSEY ENTERPRISES, A KENTUCKY PARTNERSHIP;
WILLIAM N. RAMSEY JR, CHILDREN'S TRUST, PARTNER;
G. FRANK RAMSEY, TRUSTEE, PARTNER;
THE G. FRANK RAMSEY CHILDREN’S TRUST, PARTNER;
WILLIAM RAMSEY SR, TRUSTEE, PARTNER;
SUSAN RAMSEY ALDRIDGE, PARTNER;
G. FRANK RAMSEY, INDIVIDUALLY;
AND WILLIAM N. RAMSEY JR, INDIVIDUALLY
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00647
v.
JOHNNIE LEMASTER SPORTS, INC.,
A KENTUCKY CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Ramsey Enterprises (“Ramsey”), appeals
from a judgment of the Pike Circuit Court entered upon a jury
verdict in favor of Appellee, Johnnie LeMaster Sports, Inc.
(“LeMaster”).
Ramsey owned a shopping center and leased space to
LeMaster to operate a retail sporting goods store.
The jury
determined that Ramsey had breached a restrictive covenant in the
lease by subsequently leasing property in the same shopping
center to another retail sporting goods store and awarded
$427,000.00 in damages.
On appeal, Ramsey contends that the trial court erred
in denying its motions for directed verdict, judgment
notwithstanding verdict and/or for a new trial because Ramsey did
not breach the lease, and/or the evidence was insufficient to
support the damages awarded.
Ramsey also argues that it is
entitled to a new trial because the trial court gave a “highly
erroneous” and misleading instruction on damages.
Finding no
error, we affirm.
The lease, between Ramsey and LeMaster, executed March
16, 1992, was for an initial term of three years with an
automatic extension for two additional terms of five years each.
The lease provides, in pertinent part:
The tenant [LeMaster] desires to lease from
the Landlord [Ramsey] certain property
located [at Weddington Square Shopping
Center] in Pikeville, Kentucky, for the
operation of a Retail Sporting Goods Store,
and the Landlord desires to lease such
property to the Tenant; NOW THEREFORE, in
consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements of the parties herein contained,
and for other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt of which are
hereby acknowledged by the parties hereto,
the parties agree as follows:
. . . .
25(j) Exclusivity. Tenant agrees that at all
times during the Term of this Lease, it will
not directly or indirectly, or through a
subsidiary or affiliate, operate any business
similar to the Retail Store within a radius
of five (5) miles of the Square. Landlord
agrees that during the term of this Lease
that Landlord shall not lease space in the
Weddington Square to another “Sporting Goods”
store that derives the majority of its sales
from the sale of sporting goods. Tenant
agrees and understands that there may be
Men’s or Ladies’ Clothing Stores in the
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Weddington Square that derive a portion of
their sales from sporting apparel and
footwear. (Emphasis added.)
In January 1998, Ramsey entered into a lease with another
business, Acton Enterprises, d/b/a Sports Sensation, for the
operation of a “FOOTWEAR AND APPEARL [sic] STORE.”
On May 12, 1998, LeMaster filed a complaint against
Ramsey in Pike Circuit Court alleging, inter alia, that Ramsey
had breached the lease by leasing space at Weddington Square to
Sports Sensation for the purpose of operating a business engaged
in the selling of sporting goods.
proceeded to trial.
On May 1, 2000, the case
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of
LeMaster awarding $427,000.00 in damages for violation of the
subject provision of the lease.
On May 8, 2000, the trial court
entered judgment on the jury verdict.
On May 17, 2000, Ramsey
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in
the alternative, for a new trial which was denied by order
entered June 30, 2000.
On July 5, 2000, Ramsey filed a notice of
appeal to this court.
On appeal, Ramsey first contends that the trial court
should have granted its motions for directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because “as a matter of
law” Ramsey did not breach the lease.
[The] purpose of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is the same as
that of [a] motion for directed verdict; when
either motion is made, the trial court must
consider [the] evidence in its strongest
light in favor of [the] nonmoving party and
must give that party the advantage of every
fair and reasonable intendment that the
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evidence can justify. Appellate court
considers the evidence in the same light
. . . .
Lovins v. Napier, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 921,922 (1991).
According to Ramsey, it is uncontroverted that Sports
Sensation sells primarily “sporting apparel and footwear.”
Ramsey maintains that “sporting apparel and footwear” should not
be construed as “sporting goods” erroneously relying upon Keyes
v. Carrick, Ky. App., 268 S.W.2d 397 (1954).
In Keyes, the lease had been assigned to a jewelry
store provided that “[l]essors will not rent to any person, firm
or corporation premises in the same building . . . during the
period of this lease for any purpose inimical to the purpose
herein granted lessees.”
Id. at 399.
(Emphasis added.)
Another
tenant subsequently opened a retail jewelry business in the same
building.
At issue was the construction of the term, “inimical.”
It would have been easy to insert in the
[first] lease a covenant whereby the lessor
agreed not to lease any other portion of the
premises for a jewelry store, or for a
business competitive to that of the lessee.
Certainly the word “inimical” does not
clearly mean or include “competitive,” and
applying the strict construction rule must be
construed as not preventing a competitive
business.
Id. at 402.
Here, the LeMaster lease does contain a covenant
whereby Ramsey agreed not to lease any other space in Weddington
Square to “another Sporting Goods store that derives the majority
of its sales from the sale of sporting goods.”
Kentucky courts
have consistently upheld the enforceability of a restrictive
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covenant in a lease, when it is limited as to territory and
duration.
Mendell v. Golden-Farley of Hopkinsville, Inc., Ky.
App., 573 S.W.2d 346, 348 (1978).
Ramsey also relies upon Pulliam v. Wiggins, Ky. App., 580
S.W.2d 228 (1978).
asked to decide.
Pulliam does not involve the issue we are
There, the lessee agreed to build a “drive-in
restaurant of the Frisch’s Big Boy type.”
A covenant in the
lease provided that the lessors agreed not to lease, assign, or
sell any other property for a similar type business.
The lessors
specifically reserved the right to have other restaurants with
inside service, provided that they were located in the shopping
square proper.
A dispute arose over subsequent plans to build a
free-standing Bonanza Restaurant.
The issue, in Pulliam, was
whether Bonanza was within the shopping center proper, not
whether Bonanza was a “similar-type” business to Frisch’s.
We agree with LeMaster that this case is more in accord with
Buckaway v. J-Town Center, Inc., Ky., 475 S.W.2d 642 (1972).
There, plaintiffs operated a beauty shop in a shopping center
owned by the defendant, J-Town Center, Inc.
The lease agreement
between the parties contained a covenant in which the lessor
agreed “not to lease any other property within the shopping
center for a beauty shop during the term of the lease.”
643.
Id. at
A dispute arose after J’town leased space to a beauty
school.
The Court distinguished Keyes, supra, and explained:
[T]he crucial question of whether the
operation of a “beauty school” is in
violation of the restriction against other
“beauty shops” in the shopping center. Under
the circumstances of this case we hold that
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it is. A strong argument could be made to
the contrary in view of the strict
construction position we have taken in the
past concerning covenants in restraint of
trade. Cf. Keyes v. Carrick, Ky., 268 S.W.2d
397 (1954). However, it is clear that the
purpose of the restrictive covenant in this
lease and the intention of the parties were
to prohibit competition with the beauty shop,
and the evidence is abundant that the beauty
school was in fact competing with the beauty
shop. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to
utilize a rule of construction and find that
there has been a breach of the restrictive
covenant in the lease.
Buckaway v. J-Town Center, Inc., supra, at 644.
In reviewing the evidence supporting a judgment entered
upon a jury verdict, our role is limited to determining whether
the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for directed
verdict:
All evidence which favors the prevailing
party must be taken as true and the reviewing
court is not at liberty to determine
credibility or the weight which should be
given to the evidence, these being functions
reserved to the trier of fact. Kentucky and
Indiana Terminal R. Co. v. Cantrell, 298 Ky.
743, 184 S.W.2d 111 (1944) and Cochran v.
Downing, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 228 (1952). The
prevailing party is entitled to all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from
the evidence. Upon completion of such an
evidentiary review, the appellate court must
determine whether the verdict rendered is
“‘palpably or flagrantly’ against the
evidence so as ‘to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.’” NCAA v. Hornung, Ky., 754
S.W.2d 855, 860 (1988). If the reviewing
court concludes that such is the case, it is
at liberty to reverse the judgment on the
grounds that the trial court erred in failing
to sustain the motion for directed verdict.
Otherwise, the judgment must be affirmed.
Lewis v. Bledsoe, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459,461-62 (1990).
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Here, evidence was presented that the majority of
Sports Sensation’s sales derive from sporting apparel and
footwear.
There was evidence that Sports Sensation sells the
same lines of apparel and footwear as LeMaster.
Thomas Doyle,
vice president of the National Sporting Goods Association
(“NSGA”), testified that such apparel and footwear are classified
as sporting goods by the NSGA.
There was evidence presented that
the intention of the parties was to prohibit competition with
LeMaster’s Weddington Square store.
We conclude, based upon our
review of the record, that the jury’s verdict is based upon
substantial evidence, and it was not reached as a result of
passion or prejudice.
The trial court did not err in denying
Ramsey’s motions for directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
Ramsey also contends that the trial court erred in
denying its motions for directed verdict, for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, for a new trial,
because the evidence was insufficient to support the damages
awarded.
Ramsey maintains that LeMaster’s evidence of lost
profits was “inherently flawed and highly misleading,” in part,
because LeMaster failed to include sales data for Weddington
Square for June and July 1999.
Ramsey attempts to persuade us
that, as a result of this error, the testimony of LeMaster’s
expert, Marc Ray, should have been disregarded.
CPA, was Ramsey’s expert.
John Petot, a
Petot explained that the omitted sales
data had been attributed to LeMaster’s other store in Paintsville
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in error.
Petot testified that this was apparently due to a
computer glitch.
Clearly, this information was brought to the
attention of the jury.
It was the jury’s prerogative to
determine the weight and credibility of the evidence.
LeMaster responds that Ray is a CPA, certified in
Accredited Business Valuation with substantial experience
performing lost profits analyses.
LeMaster notes that Petot did
not criticize Ray’s methodology, nor did Petot provide his own
estimate of damages sustained.
LeMaster contends — and we agree
— that if Ramsey believed Marc Ray’s opinion was based upon
faulty financial data, one would have expected an “attack” at
trial, but there was none.
We have reviewed the testimony of the two CPAs.
Ramsey
had every opportunity to cross-examine Ray and to expose the jury
to any inaccuracy in his testimony.
Ramsey also had the
opportunity to present his own expert’s estimate of damages.
Ramsey chose not to do so.
He cannot now be heard to complain
about the jury’s reliance upon Ray’s testimony.
Ramsey also complains that LeMaster “further
exacerbated” the unreliability of its damages proof by including
Ray’s figure of $150,000.00 for lost gross margin.
contends that these damages were speculative.
Ramsey
Ray testified,
based upon a “reasonable professional certainty,” that LeMaster
had sustained damages in the total amount of $670,000.00 as a
result of Sports Sensation’s opening a business next door.
Ray’s
opinion was based upon: (1) future projected loss of profits from
unrealized sales for the duration of the lease term in the amount
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of $520,000.00 and (2) lost gross margin or a decline in
profitability against the “sales we do have” (reduced profit on
the sales that were not lost) in the amount of $150,000.00.
Kentucky law holds that:
Loss of anticipated profits as an element of
recoverable damages for breach of contract is
fully recognized in Kentucky. Graves v.
Winer, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 193 (1961). Mere
uncertainty as to the amount will not
preclude recovery. Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Don Stohlman & Assoc., Inc., Ky., 436 S.W.2d
63 (1968). There must be presented, however,
sufficient evidence on which a reasonable
inference as to the amount of damage can be
based. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of
Damages, Sec. 28, 106-06 (1935). In proving
a claim of loss of profits of an established
business, the record of past profits is
usually the best available evidence.
Illinois Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. Harry Berry Inc., Ky., 578
S.W.2d 244, 245-46 (1979).
Ray reviewed and relied upon historical business data
in formulating his opinion — sales tax returns from 1992-1999,
annual financial statements from 1992-1998, monthly financial
statements by store, a breakdown of retail versus organizational
sales, an analysis of hard goods versus soft goods, as well as
the corporate tax returns.
Sufficient evidence was presented
from which a reasonable inference as to the amount of damage
could be based.
Moreover, as LeMaster notes, the point raised
about gross profit margin was not presented to the trial court in
the motion for directed verdict.
We find no error.
Ramsey also argues that the trial court should have
granted its motion for a new trial under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 59.01.
Ramsey again argues that LeMaster’s
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evidence of lost profits was flawed and contends that the
“maximum” damages the jury should have awarded was $286,694.01.
This figure represents Ramsey’s own “reconstructed” lost profits
analysis.
LeMaster notes that Ramsey did not present this
analysis at the trial court level.
less than its expert calculated.
evidentiary foundation.
The jury awarded LeMaster
The verdict has a substantial
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
Ramsey also claims entitlement to a new trial on ground
that the “highly erroneous and misleading damages instruction”
constituted reversible error.
Ramsey cites no authority but
contends that the instruction “undoubtedly influenced” the jury
to award a “grossly high sum.”
The argument is without merit.
The jury was instructed that it could award damages in a sum not
to exceed $670,000.
The instruction was consistent with
LeMaster’s proof; moreover, the jury awarded substantially less
than the instruction allowed.
There was no error.
The judgment of the Pike Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Herman W. Lester
Pikeville, Kentucky
Jim Vanover
Vanover, Hall & Bartley
Pikeville, Kentucky
John K. Bush
Christy A. Ames
Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
John K. Bush
Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald
Louisville, Kentucky
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