ROBERT LYNN YOUNG v. ALISA DEVINS YOUNG
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RENDERED:
November 2, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001471-MR
ROBERT LYNN YOUNG
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY GRIFFIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00909
v.
ALISA DEVINS YOUNG
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Robert Lynn Young ("Robert") appeals from a
decree of dissolution of marriage of the Daviess Circuit Court.
He contests the court's award of maintenance to his ex-wife,
Alisa Devins Young ("Alisa").
We affirm.
Robert and Alisa were married in 1978.
The marriage
produced three children, each of whom was a minor at the time of
the instant action.
On July 29, 1999, Alisa filed a petition in
Daviess Circuit Court seeking to dissolve the marriage.
Proof on the matter was heard by the Domestic
Commissioner on October 26, 1999.
After taking proof, on
November 3, 1999 the commissioner rendered his report which
included recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The report did not recommend an award of maintenance as neither
party had sought it.
Prior to the entry of the decree of dissolution, Robert
filed a petition in bankruptcy court seeking a Chapter 7
discharge of his debts.
The discharge was rendered on April 19,
2000.
After learning of the discharge, Alisa filed a motion
seeking maintenance.
As a basis for the motion, she argued that
the discharge had the dual effect of freeing Robert's finances
while placing the entire burden for the marital debts on her.
Robert claimed an inability to pay maintenance, even after filing
bankruptcy.
Upon considering the motion, the commissioner rendered
a recommendation on March 14, 2000, that Alisa was entitled to
maintenance from Robert in the amount of $200 per month for five
years, or until certain contingencies occurred (co-habitation,
remarriage, or death).
The matter then went before the circuit
court, which rendered a decree of dissolution of marriage on May
17, 2000.
The decree adopted the commissioner's recommendation
on maintenance.
This appeal followed.
Robert now argues that the circuit court erred in
awarding Alisa maintenance.
He contends that he is simply unable
to pay maintenance since his month living expenses of
approximately $1,340 exceed his monthly net income of $740.
He
further argues that if Alisa would file bankruptcy, she would be
able to provide for her reasonable needs and those of the
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parties' three children.
In sum, he maintains that the circuit
court did not properly apply the requirements of the maintenance
statute, KRS 403.200, and that as such the matter should be
reversed and remanded.
We have closely studied the record and the law, and
find no error.
KRS 403.200 provides as follows:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage or legal separation, or a proceeding
for maintenance following dissolution of a
marriage by a court which lacked personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the
court may grant a maintenance order for
either spouse only if it finds that the
spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including
marital property apportioned to him, to
provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that
the custodian not be required to seek
employment outside the home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such
amounts and for such periods of time as the
court deems just, and after considering all
relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, and his
ability to meet his needs independently,
including the extent to which a
provision for support of a child living
with the party includes a sum for that
party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to
find appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living
established during the marriage;
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(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and
emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from
whom maintenance is sought to meet
his needs while meeting those of
the spouse seeking maintenance.
Of these factors, Robert focuses on (2)(a), i.e.,
Alisa's financial resources, and (2)(f), i.e., Robert's ability
to meet his needs while paying maintenance.
With respect to
(2)(a), he notes that if Alisa would file bankruptcy, her
financial status would be improved.
He suggests that her refusal
to seek a discharge of her debts should bar her from seeking
maintenance from Robert.
Robert has not cited any case law or
statutory law in support of this assertion, and our own research
has uncovered none.
We find no rational basis for concluding
that a party requesting maintenance must seek a discharge of her
debts prior to moving for maintenance, and do not find Robert's
argument on this issue persuasive.
As to Robert's argument that he lacks the financial
means to pay maintenance, the record provides conflicting
evidence which could support either party depending on its
interpretation.
proceedings.
Such is often the case in dissolution
Robert claims a net monthly income of $740 per
month, whereas Alisa claims that his net monthly income is
$2,078.
Robert's calculation includes a deduction for repayment
of certain obligations including child support and repayment of a
401(k) loan, whereas Alisa's does not.
Our duty is not to
examine these financial calculations de novo, but rather to
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determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in making
the award.
Priddy v. Priddy, 504 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1974).
no such abuse.
We find
The trial judge rendered findings of fact on the
parties' finances, which included by reference the findings of
fact set forth in the commissioner's reports.
based on substantial evidence.
Those findings are
In applying the findings to law,
the circuit court reached a result which is in conformity with
KRS 403.200.
Nothing more is required.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decree of
dissolution of marriage of the Daviess Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary M. Gibbs
Henderson, KY
Diane Morris
Owensboro, KY
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