JOHN C. FISHER v. KAREN K. WILLIAMS
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 7, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001318-MR
JOHN C. FISHER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN T. DAUGHADAY, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00372 & 98-CI-00151
KAREN K. WILLIAMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; BUCKINGHAM, and McANULTY, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: John C. Fisher appeals from a summary judgment
entered by the Marshall Circuit Court dismissing his counterclaim
against Karen K. Williams.
We affirm the summary judgment, but
for reasons different from those stated by the trial court.
On September 20, 1997, Fisher and Williams were
involved in an automobile accident on Interstate 24 in Marshall
County, Kentucky.
As a result of the accident, Fisher was
convicted of six counts of first-degree wanton endangerment.
Additionally, on May 12, 1998, Williams filed this civil suit for
damages against Fisher, alleging that his negligent operation of
his vehicle caused the accident.
On June 2, 1998, Fisher timely
filed his answer to Williams’ complaint.
On February 3, 2000, Fisher filed a motion to amend his
pleadings to include a counterclaim against Williams.
As a basis
for his counterclaim, Fisher alleged that Williams violated 42
USCS 1985(3) by depriving him of rights or privileges by acting
in a conspiracy to interfere with his use of the roadways, that
Williams’ outrageous actions resulted in emotional distress, and
that he was entitled to punitive damages for Williams’ outrageous
conduct.
The trial court entered an order on March 7, 2000,
granting Fisher’s motion to amend and add the counterclaim.
The
trial judge noted in the order that no objection was made by
Williams to Fisher’s motion.
On March 8, 2000, Williams filed a reply to Fisher’s
counterclaim.
In addition to other defenses, Williams asserted
that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
Williams made no mention of her later argument that
the claims were barred by CR1 13.01.
On March 13, 2000, Williams filed a motion for summary
judgment on Fisher’s counterclaim.
The motion was based
primarily on the argument that the counterclaim was barred by the
applicable one-year statute of limitations.
In his response to
Williams’ motion for summary judgment, Fisher argued that under
CR 15.03(1), the amendment related back to the date of the
original pleading.
That pleading was within the statute of
limitations.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-2-
At the hearing on Williams’ summary judgment motion,2
she apparently shifted the focus of her argument from the statute
of limitations to her argument that Fisher’s counterclaim was
barred under CR 13.01 because it was a compulsory counterclaim
that was not originally pled.
The court granted Fisher
additional time to supplement his response to Williams’ argument.
Fisher acknowledged in his supplemental response that his
counterclaim fell within the definition of a compulsory
counterclaim.
However, he argued that the counterclaim was not
barred under CR 13.01 and asserted that CR 13.06 specifically
allowed for omitted counterclaims.
Further, Fisher pointed out
that the effect of CR 15.01 and CR 15.03, taken in conjunction
with the court’s order granting his motion to amend, was to allow
the compulsory counterclaim which then related back to the date
of his first pleading.
The trial court rejected Fisher’s argument and entered
an order granting Williams’ motion for summary judgment on
Fisher’s counterclaim.
The court held that Fisher’s claims “were
compulsory counterclaims pursuant to CR 13.01 and should have
been asserted in his Answer filed June 1, 1998[.]” The order did
not mention CR 13.06.
This appeal by Fisher followed.
Regardless of whether Fisher’s arguments in this regard
have merit, we affirm the trial court’s judgment for different
reasons.
See Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Gray, Ky. App.,
814 S.W.2d 928 (1991), wherein we held that “we, as an appellate
court, may affirm the trial court for any reason sustainable by
2
The record does not contain a recording of this hearing.
-3-
the record.”
Id. at 930.
Also, see Cooksey Bros. Disp. Co. v.
Boyd County, Ky. App., 973 S.W.2d 64, 70 (1997), at n.3.
The U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim of private
conspiracy in violation of 42 USCS 1985(3) in Bray v. Alexandria
Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d
34 (1993).
In that case, the respondents had filed suit seeking
to enjoin the petitioners from conducting demonstrations at
abortion clinics in the Washington, D.C. area.
113 S.Ct. at 758.
Citing precedent, the Supreme Court held that in order to prove a
private conspiracy in violation of Section 1985(3), “a plaintiff
must show, inter alia, (1) that ‘some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay]
behind the conspirators’ actions.’”
Id.
Further, the Supreme
Court stated that the plaintiff must also show “(2) that the
conspiracy ‘aimed at interfering with rights’ that are ‘protected
against private, as well as official, encroachment[.]’”
Id.
In
discussing the second element, the Court agreed that interstate
travel is protected.
Id. at 763.
However, the Court determined
that “a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the
right of interstate travel[.]”
Id.
Applying Bray to the facts of this case, we conclude
that Fisher was unable to establish a claim under Section
1985(3).
First, his complaint failed to alleged any facts which
would establish racial or class-based discriminatory animus.
Second, his complaint also fails to allege facts sufficient to
establish the second element.
The alleged interference with his
right of travel on the highways consists of an alleged
-4-
interference with his use of the roads within the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.
As in the Bray case, an alleged interference with
intrastate travel does not amount to an interference with
interstate travel.
Furthermore, our review of the record does
not indicate that there is evidence which would support either
element to establish a valid claim under Section 1985(3).
Thus,
we conclude that Williams was entitled to summary judgment in her
favor.
Thus judgment of the Marshall Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Fisher, Pro Se
Paducah, Kentucky
John T. Soyars
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
-5-
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