JEFFREY METCALFE v. GENERAL ELECTRIC; SPECIAL FUND; HONORABLE THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 6, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000942-WC
JEFFREY METCALFE
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-96004
GENERAL ELECTRIC; SPECIAL FUND;
HONORABLE THOMAS A. NANNEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is a petition for review from a judgment
of the Workers’ Compensation Board affirming a decision of the
Administrative Law Judge which found that the claimant’s
cumulative trauma injury manifested after the 1996 amendments
and, thus, reduced claimant’s award by 50% due to the effects of
the natural aging process and a pre-existing condition.
Upon
review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand.
Appellant, Jeffrey Metcalfe, was 38 years old at the
time of the hearing and has a 10th grade education and his GED.
He began working for General Electric Company on June 12, 1996 as
a refrigerator door hanger, which required that he lift heavy
doors with his arms above shoulder level and push heavy carts
containing the doors.
Metcalfe testified that he first began
experiencing pain in his neck on September 12, 1996 and reported
it to his team leader at the time.
Additionally, he talked with
his union steward, Gary Waldridge, in the fall of 1996 about the
job and the pain he was having.
Waldridge testified that
sometime in the fall of 1996 (prior to January 1997), Metcalfe
complained to him of problems with the door-hanging job and the
pain resulting from those activities.
Waldridge further
testified that Metcalfe filed a grievance, but nothing was
written up by him or was reported to the company other than the
grievance filing.
In his deposition, Metcalfe testified that he did not
miss any work due to his pain until February of 1997.
However,
in the hearing, he testified that he missed some days between
September of 1996 and February of 1997.
Metcalfe first sought
treatment for his pain on February 1, 1997 when he was examined
by his family physician, Dr. Yancey.
Dr. Yancey took him off
work, ordered an MRI, and referred Metcalfe to Dr. Hodes, an
orthopedic surgeon.
On February 3, 1997, Metcalfe first
presented to the General Electric Medical Department with pain in
his shoulders radiating into his neck and head.
The General
Electric nurse noted that Metcalfe had pain for 6-7 months while
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performing his job.
The nurse also reported that Metcalfe stated
February 3, 1997 was “so far the only day lost to pain.”
Metcalfe was first seen by Dr. Hodes on February 14,
1997, and he diagnosed Metcalfe with cervical spondylosis with
spinal compression at C6-7.
He attempted to treat him with pain
medication and anti-inflammatories and restricted Metcalfe from
work until March 17, 1997.
1, 1997 to May 5, 1997.
Hodes.
Metcalfe was off work from February
In May 1998, Metcalfe returned to Dr.
Dr. Hodes took Metcalfe off work again and on June 15,
1998, performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C67.
As a result of the surgery, Metcalfe was off work from
June 15, 1998 to August 24, 1998 when he was released to work by
Dr. Hodes with restrictions.
Metcalfe continues to work at
General Electric at the present time.
It must be noted that Metcalfe was involved in a motor
vehicle accident in 1977 or 1978, which resulted in a period of
unconsciousness.
assaulted in 1986.
He also sustained a head injury when he was
He sustained yet another head injury in 1989
when he fell off of a chair while working for a construction
company.
Dr. Hodes assessed a 7% impairment, which he
represented was in accordance with the AMA Guidelines.
According
to Dr. Hodes, there had been a permanent aggravation of a preexisting condition and one-half of the 7% impairment was due to
the natural aging process.
Dr. John Nehil examined Metcalfe and
assigned a 12% impairment to the body as a whole.
He opined that
Metcalfe’s condition was related to repetitive trauma.
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Dr.
Martyn Goldman found evidence of degenerative disc disease at C67 and believed it could have been aggravated by Metcalfe’s work
activities but was not caused by it.
Finally, Dr. Robert Keisler
also found evidence of degenerative disc disease at C6-7 and
assigned a 6% impairment to the body as a whole.
He was of the
opinion that Metcalfe’s work at General Electric could have
caused a temporary aggravation of his neck symptoms but did not
result in any permanent aggravation of his neck problems.
He
also indicated that there was evidence of a probable old trauma.
Dr. Keisler attributed all of the impairment to the pre-existing
degenerative changes with superimposed aging process.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) relied primarily
on the testimony of Dr. Hodes, finding that Metcalfe had
sustained a work-related cumulative trauma.
He assessed a 7%
impairment, but found that only 3½% of the impairment was
attributable to work activities, the other 3½% being the result
of a pre-existing degenerative cervical condition and the natural
aging process.
As to manifestation of the injury, the ALJ found
that pursuant to Randall Co. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d
687 (1989), the disability manifestation date was February of
1997 and, therefore, the 1996 amendments applied.
Special Fund was dismissed.
Hence, the
From the judgment of the Worker’s
Compensation Board (“Board”) affirming the ALJ, this petition for
review followed.
Metcalfe first argues that the ALJ erred in determining
that the injury manifested in February 1997.
Metcalfe asserts
that under the facts and law, his injury manifested on
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September 12, 1996.
Specifically, Metcalfe maintains that Alcan
Foil Products v. Huff, Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999) is applicable and
that the ALJ misapplied the law in relying on Pendland.
In Pendland, 770 S.W.2d at 688, this Court held that
“where the injury is the result of many mini-traumas, the date
for giving notice and the date for clocking a statute of
limitations begins when the disabling reality of the injuries
becomes manifest.”
In that case, the worker first began
experiencing pain in her hand six months before she quit work and
gradually worsened until she could no longer work.
The Court
agreed with the ALJ that the disabling reality of the injury
became manifest on the worker’s last day of work, not when she
first began experiencing pain.
In Alcan, the workers suffered gradual hearing loss due
to their jobs for years and became aware of their hearing loss as
an occupational disability more than two years prior to filing
their claim, although they continued to work during this time.
The Court held that the “manifestation of disability” under
Pendland occurs when the worker discovers that a work-related
injury has been sustained, not when the worker is first
occupationally disabled.
Alcan, 2 S.W.3d at 101.
The Court held
that the workers’ claims were barred because they were aware of
their work-related injuries more than two years before filing
their claims.
Id. at 102.
With each of these claimants, the
court noted that their conditions had not worsened in the two
years before their claims were filed.
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Metcalfe argues that under Alcan, the date of
manifestation should be September 12, 1996 because that is when
he first began having pain and, thus, discovered his injury.
General Electric argues that according to Pendland, his injury
manifested on February 1, 1997 because that was the first date he
missed work as a result of the injury.
We note that Alcan
specifically recognized that a period of limitations will not be
tolled because the worker continues to work, even though he is
aware of his occupational disability.
Id. at 101.
We further
note that the Pendland Court specifically allowed that “a date
earlier than the last work day may be proven to be applicable in
some situations, such as by a period of temporary or partial
disability.”
Pendland, 770 S.W.2d at 688.
However, Metcalfe did
not suffer a period of temporary or partial disability in
September of 1996.
Rather the evidence was undisputed that
Metcalfe’s pain started in September of 1996 and gradually
worsened until he had to quit work in February of 1997.
Simply
because he began having pain does not mean he was aware of a
work-related injury at that time, especially given his previous
injuries.
Accordingly, we believe the facts are more akin to
Pendland.
We believe that Alcan is distinguishable on the facts
because the Court’s ruling turned on the fact that the workers’
conditions had not worsened in the last two years.
Essentially,
the claimants were aware of their injuries and said injuries had
peaked more than two years prior to the filing of the claim.
It
is noteworthy that the Court in Alcan did not state exactly when
the claimants’ injuries did manifest.
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Moreover, the Court in
Alcan did not overrule Pendland; rather, it attempted to follow
and reconcile its decision with Pendland.
Accordingly, we
believe the ALJ’s reliance on Pendland was not in error.
Nor can we say that the ALJ erred in his finding of
fact incident to the above ruling, that Metcalfe did not miss any
work as a result of his injury until February of 1997.
The ALJ,
as fact finder, has the sole authority to judge the weight,
credibility, substance, and inference to be drawn from the
evidence.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d
418 (1985).
The ALJ chose to believe Metcalfe’s testimony in his
deposition wherein he stated that he did not miss work due to his
injury until February of 1997, and that was his prerogative.
See
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15 (1977).
Given our ruling that the 1996 amendments were
applicable in this case, Metcalfe’s argument that the Special
Fund was improperly dismissed is moot.
Metcalfe next argues that the ALJ’s reliance on Dr.
Hodes’s assessed impairment was improper because the impairment
rating could not have been made pursuant to the AMA Guidelines.
The doctor testified that his impairment ratings were
in accordance with the AMA Guidelines.
This presents an
interesting question, but we believe the Board’s analysis was
correct when it said:
[N]either we, the ALJ nor the parties may
offer our interpretation of the AMA
Guidelines as indicating an inappropriate use
of those guidelines. This is particularly
true in assessing the amount of impairment.
We would agree with Metcalfe to the extent
that it is obvious Dr. Hodes did not use the
DRE Model, since they are in multiples of
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five. However, while the DRE Model is to be
used in most spine-related injuries, there
are exceptions. The AMA Guidelines emphasize
that they are to be used and interpreted by
physicians in conjunction with the
physician’s experience and examination. The
percentage of impairment assessed pursuant to
the Guidelines is an issue relating to the
weight and credibility to be afforded to a
physician’s testimony. Weight and
credibility are for the ALJ and are solely
within his discretion. Smyzer vs. B.F.
Goodrich Chemical Co., Ky., 474 SW2d 367
(1971). While there was evidence to the
contrary, there was no specific challenge to
the assessment made by Dr. Hodes.
Finally, Metcalfe complains that the reduction of 50%
of his award due to the effects of the natural aging process was
in error.
After this case was submitted, our Supreme Court
decided the cases of McNutt Construction v. Scott, Ky., 40 S.W.3d
854 (2001) and Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Guffey,
Ky., 42 S.W.3d 618 (2001), which held that the disability which
results from the arousal of a prior, dormant condition by a workrelated injury remains compensable under the 1996 act.
In
McNutt, 40 S.W.3d 859, n. 1, the Court recognized that cumulative
trauma under Haycraft v. Corhart Refractories Co., Ky., 544
S.W.2d 222, 225 (1976), still constituted an injury under the new
law of 1996.
Therefore, it appears that the ALJ should have
considered whether the disability caused by the natural aging
process was the result of an arousal of a prior dormant condition
into disabling reality by a work-related injury.
If so, the
claimant’s entire disability remains compensable under the 1996
act.
Therefore, the opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s findings is
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affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further
consideration.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, GENERAL
ELECTRIC:
Tamara Todd Cotton
Louisville, Kentucky
Judson F. Devlin
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
David R. Allen
Frankfort, Kentucky
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