JOE DON PIGUE, Executor of the Estate of ELMA H. PIGUE; LYNDA NASON; BETTY SMITH; DOROTHY HAMPTON; MARY L. UNDERWOOD; KATHY VAUGHAN; DIANNA FORT; TERRI YOUNGER; v. CHRISTIAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; JAMES C. JURY, Superintendent; WANDA BONNIE LYNCH; Chairperson; DANIEL N. THOMAS, Vice-Chairman; GARY P. LESTER; JOHN R. NOWAK and BARRY D. CORNELIUS, Board Members
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RENDERED:
July 13, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000789-MR
JOE DON PIGUE, Executor of the
Estate of ELMA H. PIGUE; LYNDA
NASON; BETTY SMITH; DOROTHY
HAMPTON; MARY L. UNDERWOOD; KATHY
VAUGHAN; DIANNA FORT; TERRI YOUNGER;
and THEROLYN PARKER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN M. WHITE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01005
CHRISTIAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION;
JAMES C. JURY, Superintendent; WANDA
BONNIE LYNCH; Chairperson; DANIEL N.
THOMAS, Vice-Chairman; GARY P. LESTER;
JOHN R. NOWAK and BARRY D. CORNELIUS,
Board Members
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART;
REVERSING IN PART and REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, JUDGE: The appellants are teachers employed by the
Christian County Board of Education who allege that the Board’s
reduction of their extended employment days was in violation of
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 161.760.
They further allege
that the Board violated KRS 61.805 et seq., the open meetings
law.
The trial court held the reduction in extended employment
days was pursuant to a uniform plan and that there was no
violation of the open meetings law.
We affirm in part and
reverse and remand in part.
On March 25, 1999, the Board reduced the extended
employment days of forty-six teachers in the school district,
including the appellants.
Eight of the nine appellants are
library media specialists and one is a home economics teacher.
letter was sent to those who had their days reduced informing
A
them that the reduction was based on “budget allocations.”
Although not specifically stated in the letters, the reduction
was made to allow funding of an Alternative Learning Center.
This action was then filed by the teachers on October
4, 1999, and on October 8, 1999, the Board filed its answer,
interrogatories, and request for production of documents.
Pursuant to notice, appellants Pigue and Nason, were deposed on
November 16, 1999.
On November 23, 1999, Daniel Thomas, Vice-Chairman of
the Board, filed his motion for summary judgment stating there
was no evidence the open meetings law had been violated and that
he had no individual liability.1
The following day, the Board
filed its motion for summary judgment based on its position that
a reduction in the extended employment days was not a reduction
in salary, and therefore compliance with KRS 161.760 was
1
Although the Board members were sued in their official
capacity, the issue of immunity is not raised on appeal.
-2-
unnecessary.
The teachers then filed their motion for summary
judgment and the three motions were heard on December 8, 1999.
On the date of the hearing, the Board filed its
response to the teachers’ motion and for the first time asserted
that the reduction in extended employment days was pursuant to a
uniform plan.
The teachers’ request for time to conduct
discovery was denied.
The trial court then permitted
Superintendent Jury to testify that to his knowledge all teachers
other than agricultural teachers received reductions in extended
employment days.
The Board’s records, however, contradict Jury’s
statement and show that of the approximately six hundred
certified employees, only forty-six are mentioned in the plan to
receive reductions.
No administrator received a reduction of
days, nor did the middle school or high school guidance
counselors.
plan.2
Not all teachers, therefore, were included in the
Assistant Superintendent Clyde Wallace testified that
while not all teachers were included in the plan, all teachers of
similar class and responsibility were reduced.
KRS 161.760(1) provides in part:
The superintendent of schools shall give
notice not later than July 1 each year to
each teacher who holds a contract valid for
the succeeding school year, stating the best
estimate as to the salary to be paid the
teacher during the year. The salary shall
not be lower than the salary paid during the
preceding school year, unless the reduction
is a part of a uniform plan affecting all
teachers in the entire district, or unless
there is a reduction of responsibilities.
2
Administrators other than superintendents are teachers
under KRS 161.760. Estreicher v. Board of Education of Kenton
County, Ky., 950 S.W.2d 839 (1997).
-3-
The reduction in extended employment days is a reduction in
salary:
[A]lthough our statutes do not require a
school district to compensate its certified
personnel for extra services, once extra
compensation is paid, no reduction thereof
may be made except in the two situations
allowed by KRS 161.760(1). As the
appellants’ duties were not decreased and as
they were not provided notice of the
reduction in salary, the reductions were
validly made only if the administrative
salary schedule was a part of a uniform plan
affecting the entire district.3
The Board could reduce the teachers’ extended
employment days only if there was a uniform plan to be
implemented or the teachers received a corresponding reduction in
responsibilities:
The clear wording of the statute
mandates that reductions in salary which are
a part of “a uniform plan affecting all
teachers in the entire district” may be had
without the specific notice required in
subsection (3); this latter section is
designed to give notice only to those persons
who have suffered a reduction in
responsibility and corresponding reduction in
salary outside of an overall plan affecting
all teachers.4
In Preuss, supra, and White, supra, the legislative
meaning of a “uniform plan affecting all teachers in the entire
district” was the focus of the court.
A brief recitation of the
facts of each case is useful in understanding the court’s
analysis.
In Preuss, all administrators in the system were paid
3
Preuss v. Board of Education of Daviess County, Ky. App.,
667 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1984).
4
White v. Board of Education, Ky. App., 697 S.W.2d 161,
162 (1985).
-4-
a salary comprised of a base amount determined by a single salary
schedule and each received extended employment pay calculated by
multiplying the days worked in excess of the one-hundred-eightyfive-day school year.
Each received an additional sum for extra
services based on an index figure.
Under the Board’s new method
there was simply a bottom line salary based on experience and
responsibilities.
A challenge to the plan was made on the basis
that only administrators were encompassed by the plan.
Emphasizing that only administrators received payment for extra
services, the court held that teachers did not have to be
included for uniformity.
As explained by the court:
“ . . . If it is true that decrease of a
component of salary for extra service (which
only administrators are paid) is a decrease
in salary even though total salary increases
as Plaintiff has successfully argued, then it
must also follow that teachers don’t have to
be decreased in order to have uniformity.
Why not—because they perform no extra service
and are paid for none. If the reduction of
Plaintiff’s salary had been in the ‘base
salary’ component teachers would also have
had to be reduced in order for the plan to
have been uniform because teachers and
administrators of the same rank and
experience are paid the same base salary.
But that was not the case here. The
reduction decreased only a component of
salary paid to principals, hence in order to
be uniform it is necessary only that all
principals with the same education,
experience and other classifying factors
received the same pay throughout the entire
system. The Court is satisfied that was
done.”5
Subsequently, in White, supra, the court rejected the
notion that a “uniform plan” must affect all teachers in the
5
667 S.W.2d at 394.
-5-
entire district.
The number of extended employment days was no
longer based on the number of days worked, but on the number of
students under each teacher’s supervision.
Thus, although some
did have extended employment days reduced, others remained the
same.
The court concluded that if all teachers are included in
the plan even though not all are affected, uniformity is
obtained.
Essentially, we are called upon to
determine the legislative meaning of the
phrase “a uniform plan affecting all teachers
in the entire district.” We do not deem this
to mean that every teacher must suffer a like
impact from a plan, or indeed any impact at
all. Rather, we believe it to mean that a
plan encompassing every teacher is valid
notwithstanding that some teachers may be
situated outside the scope of impact.
Neither the authorities cited by the
appellant nor any authority to which we have
been directed requires the special notice of
the nature of that provided in KRS 161.760(3)
as a condition precedent to implementation of
a state-mandated plan encompassing all
teachers simply because some teachers are
affected more than others or perhaps some
teachers are not affected at all. Therefore,
we conclude—as did the trial court—that the
treatment of the appellant was in conformance
with all statutory requirements.6
Because of the swift resolution of this case at the
trial court level, there was minimal discovery conducted.
However, based on the Board’s records and because no evidence is
offered to the contrary, it is clear that the plan submitted does
not attempt to include every teacher.
In fact, only specific
teachers are targeted to receive the reductions.
Yet, the Board
insists that uniformity is achieved because all teachers of the
6
White, supra, at 162-163.
-6-
same responsibility in a like class had the same number of
extended employment days reduced.
We realize a school board must be permitted to adjust
its budget to meet the concerns and needs of the district.
The
legislature, however, has required that there be uniformity in
making such adjustments so that no teacher or class of teachers
is sacrificed.
The statute and White, supra, make clear that all
teachers must be encompassed by the plan even though not all are
affected by its implementation.
Such a requirement prevents the
arbitrary reduction of salaries of a targeted class of teachers
within a single district.
In this case, while the Board’s plan
may be the most expeditious way of obtaining funds for its
Alternative Learning Center, it is clear that the plan is not
uniform.
In the absence of a uniform plan, a reduction in salary
of a teacher must be accompanied by a reduction of
responsibility, and written notice stating the specific reason
for the reduction must be furnished to the teacher no later than
May 15.7
Because the trial court did not reach the issue of
whether the teachers received a reduction in responsibility or
the resulting issue of sufficiency of the notice, we do not
address these issues and therefore remand the case to the trial
court for further consideration.
It does appear, that should
either party request additional time for discovery, a reasonable
time should be permitted.
7
KRS 161.760(3).
-7-
We agree with the trial court that summary judgment was
appropriate as to the allegation that the Board violated the open
meetings law.
Based on the affidavits of several members of the
Board it appears there was no violation.
Appellants offered no
evidence to the contrary, and have failed to indicate to this
court what, if any, violation occurred.8
The judgment of the Christian Circuit Court is affirmed
in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
8
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991).
-8-
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Dennis J. Courtney
Murray, Kentucky
Ben S. Fletcher III
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
-9-
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