MARK A. BOLTON v. AMY ELIZABETH BOLTON
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RENDERED: JULY 27, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000711-MR
MARK A. BOLTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN R. JAEGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00139
AMY ELIZABETH BOLTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM EMBERTON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Mark A. Bolton appeals from an order of the
Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion for an order requiring
the parties’ two children to attend a public school and denying
his motion to reconsider the court’s prior order granting his
former wife, Amy Elizabeth Bolton, a judgment for $5,500.00 for
one-half of the children’s tuition at a private Catholic school.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The parties were married in 1987 and separated in 1994.
During the marriage, the couple had two sons, Nicholas, who was
born in December 1989, and Benjamin, who was born in December
1991.
Mark filed for divorce in February 1994 and requested
joint custody of the children.
In November 1994, the parties
entered into a Settlement Agreement that called for joint custody
of the children with Amy having primary physical possession of
the children subject to visitation by Mark.
It also stated that
the parties anticipated the children would receive private
schooling, that they would discuss the economic feasibility of
continued private education annually, and that each party would
pay one-half of any private school tuition.
On November 15,
1994, the circuit court entered a decree of dissolution that
approved and incorporated by reference the parties’ Settlement
Agreement.
As each child reached the proper age, Amy enrolled them
in a Catholic private school.
In November 1995, Amy filed a
motion seeking a contempt order for Mark’s failure to pay his
share of the children’s school tuition.
In February 1996, an
Agreed Order was entered that acknowledged Mark owed $255.00 for
unreimbursed school tuition and required him to pay the
arrearage.
In November 1999, Amy filed a motion to compel Mark to
abide by the terms of the Settlement Agreement with reference to
the school tuition provision.
In an accompanying affidavit, Amy
alleged Mark had failed to make any tuition payments and was in
excess of $11,000.00 in arrears.
In November 1999, Mark filed a
motion to modify custody seeking to be designated the primary
residential custodian of the children during the school year with
Amy having physical possession of the children during the summer.
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He stated in an affidavit that he had purchased a new residence
under the belief that Amy had agreed to allow the children to
attend a public school.
On November 22, 1999, the circuit court conducted a
hearing on the motions.
Mark challenged Amy’s request for school
tuition reimbursement stating he had never agreed to send the
children to a private school.
Amy denied having agreed to send
the children to public school or to a modification of custody.
The court held that Mark was obligated to pay for part of the
private school tuition under the Settlement Agreement.
It orally
awarded Amy a judgment for $5,500.00 plus interest representing
one-half of the children’s past private school tuition.1
The
court reserved the issue of modification of child custody for
further proceedings.
On January 21, 2000, Mark filed a motion requesting,
inter alia, reconsideration of the November 1999 judgment
awarding Amy one-half of the children’s private school tuition
and seeking an order requiring the children to attend a
particular public school starting in August 2000.
On February
21, 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.
Mark testified that in conversations with Amy after the divorce,
he repeatedly objected to sending the children to a private
school because he could not afford the additional costs.
1
He
The certified record on appeal does not contain a
written order or judgment reflecting the trial court’s oral
rulings. However, Amy has included a court calendar reflecting
the rulings that has a circuit clerk stamp indicating it was
entered on November 23, 1999. It is unclear why the certified
record has this omission.
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stated that he believed any decision on schooling would be a
joint decision but that Amy enrolled the children in a private
school over his objection.
He admitted that the private school
the children had been attending was satisfactory, but he objected
to the added expense.
Amy testified that the children had been
attending the same private school for several years and that they
told her they did not want to transfer to a public school.
She
stated that the parties had agreed to raise the children in the
Catholic faith and that she preferred to have them attend a
Catholic school.
She admitted not having asked Mark to help pay
the school tuition for several years.
On February 22, 2000, the circuit court entered an
order denying Mark’s motion to reconsider the $5,500.00 judgment
for Amy for prior school tuition reimbursement and denying his
request for an order requiring the child be sent to a public
school.
The court stated that the Settlement Agreement indicated
the parties anticipated the children would attend private
schooling and it was in the best interest of the children for
them to continue in the school they were attending at least until
the completion of their elementary school education.
This appeal
followed.2
2
Amy argues the appeal should be dismissed because the
notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day time period. She
contends Mark’s January 21, 2000, motion to reconsider was
untimely because it was filed more than 10 days after the court’s
November 1999 order. See CR 59.05. She states the appeal
concerns the court’s November 23, 1999, order. However, CR 59.05
states a motion to alter or amend a judgment “shall be served not
later than 10 days after entry of the final judgment.” CR
73.02(1)(a) states that a notice of appeal “shall be filed within
30 days after the date of notation of service of the judgment . .
(continued...)
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Mark contends that the circuit court misinterpreted the
Settlement Agreement and erred in determining continued
attendance at their current private school was in the children’s
best interest.
He argues that under the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, the decision on private schooling was subject to the
financial abilities of and joint agreement by the parties.
Mark
points to Amy’s failure to seek reimbursement for the tuition for
several years as evidence that the parties’ intent under the
Agreement was to discuss the issue of private schooling and make
a joint decision based on the economic conditions.
He also notes
his repeated objections to private schooling.
We begin with the general principle that the trial
court has broad discretion in determining the best interest of
children in child custody situations.
See generally, Squires v.
Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765 (1993); Krug v. Krug, Ky., 854
S.W.2d 765 (1993).
A trial court has the authority to make all
orders “as are necessary to properly effectuate joint custody.”
Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 769.
When considering disputes between
the parents on issues concerning the children such as their
education, a trial court has discretion to resolve the dispute
within a joint custody situation based on the best interests of
the children.
See, e.g., Burchell v. Burchell, Ky. App., 684
2
(...continued)
. .” In this case, the November 23, 1999, order was never
entered into the record and correspondingly there was no notation
of service of the judgment on the docket sheet. As a result, the
November 23, 1999, order was not a final judgment triggering the
time limitations of CR 59.05 or CR 73.02(1)(a), and the appeal
was timely filed following the February 22, 2000, order and
judgment.
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S.W.2d 296 (1984); Jacobs v. Edelstein, Ky. App., 959 S.W.2d 781,
784 (1998)(noting now discarded Mennemeyer procedural requirement
did not restrict trial court’s authority to resolve disputes over
children’s education and religious upbringing).
With reference to the Settlement Agreement, amicable
agreements between divorcing couples are generally encouraged.
See KRS 403.180.
If a trial court does not find a separation
agreement unconscionable, it is binding on the court except for
matters concerning custody, support, or child visitation.
403.180(2).
KRS
The terms of an agreement incorporated in a divorce
decree are enforceable as a judgment and as a contract.
KRS
403.180(5).
Mark’s first issue concerns the judgment for
reimbursement of past school tuition, which depends on an
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.
there is evidence that public school is
Generally, unless
inadequate or the
special needs of the children render public school inadequate, a
parent is not obligated to pay for attendance at a private
school.
See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 81, 83-84
(1970).
However, a parent may be required to pay for private
school education under an agreement between the parents.
Cf.
Stevens v. Stevens, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 136 (1990)(holding father
contractually agreed to pay for child’s college education).
In the current case, the trial court referred to the
Settlement Agreement, which provides in relevant part as follows:
It is anticipated that the children will
receive private schooling. Currently, the
minor child, Nicholas, is enrolled in Latonia
Baptist Kindergarten. The parties shall
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discuss the economic feasibility of
continuing to enroll the children in private
schooling no later than July 1st of each
year. In the event that the children attend
private schooling, the Husband shall pay onehalf of the tuition for each child. The wife
shall pay the remaining one-half of the
tuition.
This provision does not attempt to authorize either parent as the
primary decision-maker on the children’s schooling, and as
asserted by Mark, a joint custody arrangement involves joint
decision-making on major issues affecting the children such as
education.3
See Burchell, supra;
S.W.2d 612 (1995).
Aton v. Aton, Ky. App., 911
Although the Settlement Agreement suggests
that economic conditions would be a factor in the schooling
decision, Mark misconstrues the court’s decision as ratifying a
unilateral decision by Amy without regard to the financial
conditions of the parties.
As the court noted, the Settlement Agreement set forth
an expectation or preference for private schooling, subject to
re-evaluation facilitated by consultation between the parties
concerning the economic feasibility of continued private
schooling.
While Mark proclaimed an inability to financially
afford the costs of private schooling, he provided little or no
evidence to support his position.
The children had been
attending the same private school for several years before Mark
raised this issue in court.
Mark does not dispute that the
Settlement Agreement explicitly requires him to pay one-half of
the tuition if the children attend private school.
3
But see KRS 403.330.
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Given the
preference in the Agreement, Mark bore the obligation to seek a
change in the status quo if he disagreed with the children’s
schooling.
Amy’s failure to seek immediate compensation or
reimbursement for the tuition costs did not release him from the
terms of the Agreement.
Mark has not shown that Amy’s inaction
led him to believe he was not responsible for a portion of the
tuition as evidenced by the fact that he continued to object to
the private schooling for financial reasons in discussions with
her.
Therefore, the court properly held that Mark was
responsible for one-half of the tuition costs and that Amy did
not violate the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
Mark’s second issue involves a claim that the trial
court’s order denying his request that the children be required
to attend public school violated his right to free exercise of
religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The trial court’s action
was based on its decision that continued private school education
at the school the children were attending was in their best
interests.
First, we note that Amy testified Mark agreed to have
the children raised in the Catholic faith.
Both children had
attended the same Catholic school from the beginning of their
first year of elementary education.
At the time of the hearing,
the older child had been at the school for approximately five
years.
As indicated earlier, the Settlement Agreement created an
expectation that the children would attend a private, presumably
faith-based, school.
Amy also testified that the children
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expressed a desire to remain at the school.
Mark testified that
the school the children were attending was a quality school and
they were happy there.
In order for them to attend the public
school suggested by Mark, his physical possession of the children
would have had to be increased substantially.
As Amy argued,
such a change would have dramatically altered the children’s
lives.
Mark did not present sufficient evidence to require such
an action.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
decision.
As for Mark’s constitutional argument, he has not cited
to the record where this argument was preserved and we have been
unable to find where he raised this issue before the trial court;
therefore, it was waived and not properly preserved for review.
See, e.g., Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, Ky., 770 S.W.2d
225, 228 (1989); Forrester v. Forrester, Ky. App., 979 S.W.2d
928, 931 (1998); Elwell v. Stone, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 46, 47
(1990); Hibbitts v. Cumberland Valley Nat’l Bank; Ky. App., 977
S.W.2d 252, 253 (1998); CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv).
Nevertheless, this argument is without merit.
Mark’s
objection to the children’s attendance at a private school was
based on financial grounds, not any deep religious concern.
The
Settlement Agreement states the parties “anticipated” the
children would attend a private school.
As the court noted in
Hoefers v. Jones, 288 N.J. Super. 590, 672 A.2d 1299 (1994), the
court’s authority to act in the best interest of the child under
its duty as parens patriae can sometimes prevail over a parent’s
constitutional rights.
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Religious and moral training have been
considered an important, positive growth
experience in advancing a child’s best
interests and general welfare by our courts;
but how practiced, how implemented, our
courts have held, are best left to the
appropriate parent or parents, in this case,
the plaintiff, mother. The children’s
attendance at King’s Christian School in no
way interferes with the defendant’s right to
believe, to practice a religion or not. In
reality, what defendant seeks, by withholding
financial support, is the right to
superimpose, to force his values on his
former wife and children. This he should not
be permitted to do.
Id. at 609-10, 672 A.2d at 1309-10 (citations omitted).
It is clear that the trial court considered the
parties’ Settlement Agreement, past practice, and the overriding
concern for the children’s best interest.
Allowing the children
to continue attendance at a private school or making him pay a
portion of the private school tuition does not constitute an
establishment of religion or unduly interfere with Mark’s
practice of religion in violation of the constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Kenton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
H. Henry Kramer
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
Dean A. Pisacano
Covington, Kentucky
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