KENTEC COAL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 10, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000699-MR
KENTEC COAL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS C. COMBS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Kentec Coal (Kentec) appeals from a judgment of
the Perry Circuit Court that affirmed the final order of the
Secretary of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet (Resources Cabinet) finding Kentec in violation of the
Surface Coal Mining Act, Chapter 350, and several administrative
rules involving land reclamation.
After reviewing the record,
the applicable law, and the arguments of counsel, we affirm.
Kentec obtained a permit to conduct strip mining
operations on approximately 107 acres in Perry and Leslie
Counties.
Under the mining permit, Kentec was required to return
some of the realty to its prior use as forest land.
The permit
included a revegetation plan under which Kentec proposed planting
grass seed during the first growing season after backfilling and
grading the area, then planting 200 white pines per acre, 250
scotch pines per acre, and 200 black alders per acre between
February 5 - April 15, and September 15 - November 15.
The
permit provided, “After the completion of one growing season,
additional fertilizer will be applied if sufficient vegetative
growth is not obtained.
If a low germination rate is evident of
a tree species, then seedlings will be planted at the next
favorable planting time.
The area will be considered
successfully revegetated when sufficient ground cover is obtained
which effectively controls erosion and has a tree species
representative of the postmining land use plan.”
The permit also was subject to the terms and conditions
of the Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (KPDES),
which establish effluent limitations and monitoring requirements
as issued by the Division of Water for surface mining operations.
Under the terms of the KPDES permit, Kentec was required to
monitor all of its sediment structures and submit water samples
and discharge reports on a quarterly basis to the Department for
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement.
activities ceased in 1992.
Kentec’s mining
Kentec submitted a report indicating
it had backfilled, limed, put down grass seed, and mulched in
November 1994.
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On February 27, 1997, two Environmental Control
Supervisors with the Department for Surface Mining, Joe Duff and
David Harvey, conducted a regular inspection of the Kentec site.
Following the inspection, they issued several notices of
noncompliance with the postmining land use requirements in the
permit in violation of Chapter 405 of the Kentucky Administrative
Regulations (KAR) including:
(1) 405 KAR 16:200 (revegetation) -
failure to plant trees as required by the permit plan; (2) 405
KAR 16:210 (postmining land use plan) - failure to plant trees to
achieve the approved postmining land use; (3) 405 KAR 16:100 and
401 KAR 5:065 (impoundments) - failure to submit fourth quarter
1996 dam maintenance reports and annual certifications for all
sediment ponds; (4) 405 KAR 5:065 (KPDES) - failure to comply
with KPDES requirements to submit fourth quarter 1996 water
monitoring reports; and (5) 405 KAR 16:110 (water monitoring) failure to submit fourth quarter 1996 water monitoring reports.
The inspectors ordered abatement of the violations by March 27,
1997, which was subsequently extended.
The violations of 405 KAR
16:110, 401 KAR 5:065, and 405 KAR 16:100 were abated as of
May 28, 1997.1
On March 24, 1997, Kentec filed a petition for review
with the Resources Cabinet challenging the notices of
noncompliance.
During a prehearing conference, the parties
agreed to merge the revegetation violations of 405 KAR 16:200 and
405 KAR 16:210 into a single violation and the water report
1
Kentec also filed a request to revise the permit to change
the approved postmining land use in September 1997.
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violations of 405 KAR 16:110 and 401 KAR 5:065 into a single
violation.
On October 16, 1997, a hearing officer conducted an
evidentiary hearing at which the Resources Cabinet called Joe
Duff as a witness and offered several documents.
no witnesses.
Kentec called
Duff testified that although there was some ground
cover vegetation, he saw only a few stray tree seedlings during
the inspection that appeared to be from natural growth and no
organized plantings as proposed in the permit plan.
He also
testified that the required water monitoring and impoundment
reports had not been filed as of the date of the inspection.
Duff stated that Kentec had sought a Phase I bond release that
had been granted in May 1995.
He stated that under the permit
revegetation plan, Kentec should have performed tree seeding in
September 1995, February 1996, September 1996, and February 1997.
The planting report for the Phase I bond release indicated that
in November 1994, Kentec had applied lime, fertilizer, grass
seed, legumes, and mulch, but no tree seeds or seedlings.
Duff
testified that the trees needed to be planted early enough to
prevent their being crowded out by the ground cover.
Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued a
report that contained findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations.
The hearing officer found that Kentec had
committed three violations by failing to comply with 405 KAR
16:100, 405 KAR 16:110/401 KAR 5:065, and 405 KAR 16:200/405 KAR
16:210.
He noted that under 405 KAR 7:092 Section 7(9), the
Resources Cabinet had the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case supporting the notice of noncompliance, but the
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ultimate burden of persuasion rested with Kentec.
He stated that
Kentec had offered no evidence to rebut the evidence of the
Resources Cabinet showing the violations, and that the inspector
acted within his discretion in concluding that Kentec had not
properly completed its permit vegetation plan or complied with
the postmining land use.
Kentec filed exceptions to the hearing
officer’s report.
On December 18, 1997, the Secretary of the Resources
Cabinet entered a final order adopting the hearing officer’s
report and finding that Kentec had committed the three violations
of noncompliance.
Kentec appealed to the circuit court.
On
February 21, 2000, the circuit court found that the Resources
Cabinet’s order was supported by substantial evidence and
affirmed the Secretary’s final order.
This appeal followed.
Kentec challenges the action of the Resources Cabinet
on procedural and substantive grounds.
It contends that the
administrative hearing violated its constitutional rights and
that the hearing officer misconstrued the applicable regulations.
First, Kentec asserts that the administrative proceeding was
invalid because the hearing officer utilized an impermissible
burden of proof.
405 KAR 7:092 Section 7(9) provides:
Burden of Proof. In review of notices of
noncompliance and orders for remedial
measures or orders for cessation and
immediate compliance or the modification,
vacation, or termination thereof under this
section, the cabinet shall have the burden of
going forward to establish a prima facie case
as to the propriety of the notice, order, or
modification, vacation, or termination
thereof. The ultimate burden of persuasion
shall rest with the petitioner.
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Kentec argues that placing a slight burden on the
Resources Cabinet and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
party challenging the noncompliance imposes an inappropriate
burden of proof standard in violation of due process and equal
protection.
It notes that KRS 350.130(5) provides that each
provision of KRS 350.130, which deals with issuance and
enforcement of notices of noncompliance, “shall be interpreted
and applied consistently with due process of law.”
Kentec
maintains that the Resources Cabinet exceeded its authority in
promulgating 405 KAR 7:092 Section 7(9) by placing the ultimate
burden of persuasion for establishing noncompliance with the
regulations on the permit holder rather than the Resources
Cabinet.
Kentec asserts that an enforcement agency should not be
allowed to use unfair, advantageous regulations, which lessen the
Resources Cabinet’s burden when trying to punish by way of a
civil penalty, any more than the criminal justice system should
have laws that require the accused to disprove his guilt.
First, we believe Kentec’s analogy of this
noncompliance proceeding with a criminal prosecution is inapt.
This situation involves an administrative proceeding creating
civil sanctions, not a criminal prosecution with potential jail
sanctions.
Constitutional protections required for criminal
prosecutions do not necessarily apply to proceedings involving
civil sanctions.
See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.
93, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997) (Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy); Commonwealth v. Lawson Mardon Flexible
Packaging Inc., Ky. App., 10 S.W.3d 488 (2000) (same).
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While
administrative hearings must be conducted in a fair and impartial
manner, they need not possess the formality of judicial
proceedings.
See Perkins v. Stewart, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 48, 51
(1990) (administrative agencies not bound by technical rules of
evidence governing jury trials); KRE 1101(a) (Evidence rules
apply to all courts of the Commonwealth).
Administrative
regulations and procedures are based on and limited by statutory
authority.
See Flying J. Travel Plaza v. Commonwealth,
Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways, Ky., 928 S.W.2d
344 (1996).
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Lavine
v. Milne, 424 U.S. 581, 96 S. Ct. 1010, 47 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1976),
burdens of proof established under criminal jurisprudence
generally do not apply in the context of administrative
proceedings.
Where the burden of proof lies on a given
issue is, of course, rarely without
consequence and frequently may be dispositive
to the outcome of the litigation or
application. . . . Outside the criminal law
area, where special concerns attend, the
locus of the burden of persuasion is normally
not an issue of federal constitutional
moment.
424 U.S. at 585, 96 S. Ct. at 1016.
See also Concrete Pipe and
Products of California Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 626, 113 S. Ct.
2264, 2281, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1993).
In the case sub judice, Chapter 350 clearly places the
burden for reclamation of surface mined areas on the coal mine
operator as part of the mining permit.
See, e.g., KRS 350.064,
KRS 350.085, KRS 350.090, KRS 350.093, KRS 350.095, KRS 350.100.
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The General Assembly also gave the Resources Cabinet broad
authority to enforce the act.
KRS 350.020 states the legislative
policy and intent.
The General Assembly finds that the
Commonwealth is the leading producer of coal
and that the production of coal in Kentucky
contributes significantly to the nation’s
energy needs. The General Assembly further
finds that unregulated surface coal mining
operations cause soil erosion, damage from
rolling stones and overburden, landslides,
stream pollution, the accumulation of
stagnant water and the seepage of
contaminated water, increase the likelihood
of floods, destroy the value of land for
agricultural purposes, destroy aesthetic
values, counteract efforts for the
conservation of soil, water and other natural
resources, destroy or impair the property
rights of citizens, create fire hazards, and
in general create hazards dangerous to life
and property, so as to constitute an imminent
and inordinate peril to the welfare of the
Commonwealth. The General Assembly further
finds that lands that have been subjected to
surface coal mining operations and have not
been reclaimed and rehabilitated in
accordance with modern standards constitute
the aforementioned perils to the welfare of
the Commonwealth. The General Assembly
further finds that there are wide variations
in the circumstances and conditions
surrounding and arising out of surface coal
mining operations due primarily to difference
in topographical and geological conditions,
and by reason thereof it is necessary, in
order to provide the most effective,
beneficial and equitable solution to the
problem, that a broad discretion be vested in
the authority designated to administer and
enforce the regulatory provisions enacted by
the General Assembly. The General Assembly
further finds that governmental
responsibility for regulating surface coal
mining operations rests with state government
and hereby directs the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet to take all
actions necessary to preserve and exercise
the Commonwealth’s authority[.] . . .
Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter
to provide such regulation and control of
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surface coal mining operations as to minimize
or prevent injurious effects on the people
and resources of the Commonwealth. To that
end, the cabinet is directed to rigidly
enforce this chapter and to adopt whatever
administrative regulations are found
necessary to accomplish the purpose of this
chapter.
See also KRS 350.028; KRS 350.465.
The Resources Cabinet also
has broad authority to promulgate rules and regulations, to
conduct investigations or inspections necessary to ensure
compliance with Chapter 350, to adopt procedures with respect to
filing reports, and to order the suspension of any permit for
failure to comply with the statutory or regulatory provisions.
KRS 350.050.
See also KRS 13A.100.
KRS 350.0301 provides for certain procedures in
connection with administrative hearings challenging agency
action, including noncompliance citations.
It requires a hearing
before a duly qualified hearing officer, a written report and
recommended order, representation by counsel, and the opportunity
to offer testimony evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
350.0301(5) states in part:
KRS
“The cabinet shall promulgate
administrative regulations, pursuant to the provisions set forth
in this chapter, establishing formal and informal hearing
procedures . . . before an impartial hearing officer who is
independent of any prosecutorial functions of the cabinet.”
The
Resources Cabinet’s regulations accordingly provide for notice of
noncompliance or cessation order, 405 KAR 12:020, Section 5; the
right to discovery, 400 KAR 1:040; representation by counsel with
the opportunity to make oral or written argument, offer
testimony, and cross-examine witnesses, 405 KAR 7:091, Section 3;
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and a written report by a hearing officer, 405 KAR 7:091, Section
5.
These procedures provide sufficient due process protections.
Kentec also claims that placing the burden of
persuasion on it rather than the Resources Cabinet violated equal
protection.
This argument is predicated on the fact that in
administrative hearings under Chapter 350 where the Resources
Cabinet initiates an administrative complaint, and under Chapter
13B, the regulations place the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the Resources Cabinet.
Kentec contends this different treatment
has no rational basis.
Generally, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires equal treatment by the state of
persons similarly situated.
See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d
313 (1985); Weiand v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement
Systems, Ky., 25 S.W.3d 88, 92 (2000).
Where an equal protection
challenge does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental
right, a statute or government action is valid if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Id.;
Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 700, 702 (1998); Yeoman
v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 459, 469
(1998).
Under the rational basis test, a classification
resulting in differential treatment is valid if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.
Howard, 969 S.W.2d at 703
(citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed.
2d 257 (1993)).
The Equal Protection Clause does not require a
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state to provide the exact same procedure in all administrative
proceedings.
See Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369, 50 S. Ct.
299, 302, 74 L. Ed. 904 (1930); Kelly v. Warminster Township
Board of Supervisors, 512 F. Supp. 658, 669 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111 (3d
Cir. 1988).
In the present case, 405 KAR 7:092, Section 7(9)
requires the Resources Cabinet to establish a prima facie case of
noncompliance, then shifts the burden of persuasion on the
permittee.
As indicated earlier, reclamation is an obligation
imposed on coal operators for the health and welfare of society.
The reclamation plan is developed by the permittee and submitted
for approval by the Resources Cabinet.
Information concerning
the permittee’s actions in carrying out the
reclamation/revegetation plan and any problems excusing
compliance is more particularly within the knowledge of the
permittee.
These factors provide sufficient rational basis for
putting the burden of persuasion on the coal miner.
Therefore,
we opine that 405 KAR 7:092, Section 7(9), which assigns the
initial burden of establishing the existence of a violation on
the Cabinet but places the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
permittee, passes the rational basis test.
Kentec’s citation to
and reliance on KRS 13B.090(7) is misplaced because
administrative hearings under Chapter 350 are specifically
exempted from Chapter 13B.
KRS 13B.020(3)(f)(l).
Kentec also contends that the hearing officer
improperly construed sections 405 KAR 16:200 and 405 KAR 16:210
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in finding that it had not satisfied its obligation to restore
the land use to forest.
405 KAR 16:200 requires each permittee
to establish an effective, permanent vegetative cover meeting the
requirements of the regulation and the approved postmining land
use.
405 KAR 16:200 Section 1.
See also KRS 350.435.
405 KAR
16:210 generally requires that strip mined areas be returned to
conditions capable of supporting the uses which existed prior to
any mining.
Kentec argues that the noncompliance citation was
improper because 405 KAR 16:210 does not specify a firm deadline
for achieving the postmining land use, but rather merely states
that “prior to the final release of performance bond, affected
areas shall be restored in a timely manner.”
Kentec also asserts
that the revegetation planting plan in the permit sets forth the
seasonal times for planting trees in a given year and provided
that “forest land shall be achieved, after mining and reclamation
are completed. . . .”
Because it had not applied for final
release of its performance bond, Kentec argues the revegetation
noncompliance citation was premature.
It also notes that an
adequate ground cover had been established.
The hearing officer rejected Kentec’s arguments based
on the fact that Kentec completed backfilling and grading in
November 1994 but had conducted no organized tree planting prior
to issuance of the noncompliance citation in February 1997.
He
indicated that the inspector properly exercised his discretion in
finding that Kentec had failed to comply with its planting plan
and properly revegetate the area in a timely manner to achieve
the postmining forest land use.
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First, we note that the violations of 405 KAR 16:200
and 405 KAR 16:210 were merged and treated as a single entity, so
a violation of either would support a finding of noncompliance.
Nevertheless, we believe the hearing officer correctly found a
violation of both regulations.
KRS 350.090(1) requires a mining permittee to submit a
reclamation plan for approval by the Resources Cabinet.
KRS
350.093(1) provides that time and distance limits requiring
backfilling, grading, and planting “be kept current, so that all
reclamation efforts proceed in an environmentally sound manner
and as contemporaneously as practical under regulations
promulgated by the cabinet.”
(emphasis added).
Similarly, KRS
350.100(1) imposes a duty on the permittee to commence
reclamation of the area “as contemporaneously as practicable
after the beginning of operations on that area in accordance with
plans previously approved by the cabinet.”
KRS 350.100(2)
permits the Resources Cabinet to delay planting if it appears
necessary due to environmental conditions.
405 KAR 16:200,
Section 3 states:
Timing. Seeding and planting of disturbed
areas with permanent species shall be
conducted no later than during the first
normal period for favorable planting
conditions after final preparation. The
normal period for favorable planting shall be
that planting time generally accepted
locally, or as approved by the cabinet in the
permit, for the type of plant materials
selected. (emphasis added).
As stated earlier, Kentec’s revegetation plan called
for planting three species of trees from February 15 to April 15
and/or September 15 to November 15, with grass seeding during the
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first growing season after backfilling and grading.
The plan
suggests that tree planting would occur promptly when it states
“after the completion of one growing season additional fertilizer
will be applied if sufficient vegetative growth is not obtained.
If a low germination rate is evident of a tree species, then
seedlings will be planted at the next favorable planting time.
The area will be considered successfully revegetated when
sufficient ground cover is obtained which effectively controls
erosion and has a tree species count representative of the
postmining land use plan.”
Kentec completed backfilling,
regrading, and grass seeding in November 1994, but had conducted
no tree planting as of February 1997.
Its reliance on the
existence of groundcover alone is misplaced because the
revegetation plan and regulations clearly contemplated the
establishment of forest land.
Thus, Kentec was properly cited
for a violation of 405 KAR 16:200.
Similarly, while 405 KAR 16:210 speaks in terms of
release of the performance bond, it likewise requires reasonably
prompt action by stating the affected areas shall be restored in
a timely manner prior to release of the bond.
generally occurs in three stages or phases.
405 KAR 10:040.
Bond release
See KRS 350.093(4);
A permit is eligible for Phase I bond release
when the permittee has completed backfilling, regrading, topsoil
replacement, and drainage control, including soil preparation,
initial seeding, and mulching in accordance with the approved
reclamation plan.
405 KAR 10:040 Section 2(4)(a).
Phase II bond
release is available when revegetation has been established in
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accordance with the approved reclamation plan and the standards
for success of revegetation as stated in 405 KAR Chapter 16.
KAR 10:040 Section 2(4)(b).
405
“At Phase II bond release, each tree
or shrub counted shall be alive and healthy and shall have been
in place for not less than one (1) growing season.
At Phase III
bond release, each tree or shrub counted shall be alive and
healthy and shall have been in place for not less than two (2)
growing seasons.”
405 KAR 16:200 Section 6(3)(a).
“At Phase III
bond release, at least eighty (80) percent of the trees and
shrubs used to determine success shall have been in place for
three (3) years or more.”
405 KAR 16:200, Section 6(3)(e).
A
permit is not eligible for Phase III bond release until “the
permittee has successfully completed all surface coal mining and
reclamation operations in accordance with the approved
reclamation plan, such that the land is capable of supporting the
[approved] postmining land use. . . .”
405 KAR 10:040 Section
2(c).
The regulations require planting and successful
establishment of trees prior to the various stages of bond
release, along with ultimate restoration to postmining land use
in a timely manner.
Kentec’s argument that it may delay even
initial planting of trees necessary to restore forest land use
based solely on a milestone of final release of the performance
bond ignores the purpose and intent of the statute to reclaim
strip-mined land in a timely manner.
The citation of Kentec for
violation of 405 KAR 16:200 and 405 KAR 16:210 was neither
arbitrary, nor improper.
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Finally, Kentec admits it failed to file the water
monitoring reports and pond certifications on time in violation
of 405 KAR 16:110 and 401 KAR 5:065.
It contends, however, that
these violations were “administrative” in nature, involving mere
“paper work” rather than threats to the environment.
It asserts
that there was no evidence that the water quality was substandard
or the ponds defective.
“Thus, Kentec’s ‘sin’ was slight
tardiness in reporting.”
First, we note that reporting is a very important
component of the regulatory scheme.
Kentec’s argument goes to
mitigation rather than the existence of a violation.
The
proceeding in this case did not involve assessment of penalties
and therefore the hearing officer properly discounted this
argument.
Neither the inspector nor the Resources Cabinet is
required to totally ignore so-called “correctable” violations.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Perry Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jennifer Cable Smock
Frankfort, Kentucky
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