CARDONNA CULLER v. JARED D. DESPAIN
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RENDERED: JULY 27, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000420-MR
CARDONNA CULLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-01056
v.
JARED D. DESPAIN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Cardonna Culler (“Culler”), appeals
from an order of the Christian Circuit Court denying her motion
for a new trial.
The sole issue on appeal is whether Culler was
entitled to a new trial on damages where the jury awarded her
medical expenses, but nothing for pain and suffering.
We affirm.
Culler was involved in a motor vehicle accident with
Appellee, Jared Despain (“Despain”), on December 16, 1996.
The
case was tried in Christian Circuit Court on January 6 and 7,
2000.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court
granted a directed verdict on liability in Culler’s favor.
The
jury returned a verdict on damages, awarding the requested
medicals of $4,338.16, but nothing for pain and suffering.
On January 14, 2000, Culler filed a motion for a new
trial on the ground that the damages were inadequate, stating:
Attached hereto . . . is Miller v. Swift, 46
K.L.S. 141 which outlines the duties of a
trial court to determine whether an award is
inadequate depends upon the underlying
evidence [sic]. The evidence in the present
case was overwhelming that plaintiff suffered
some amount of pain and suffering and as such
the jury’s verdict clearly disregarded the
evidence and it should be set aside granting
plaintiff a new trial in this action.
By order entered February 9, 2000, the trial court
denied the motion for a new trial.
On appeal, Culler relies upon
Prater v. Coleman, Ky. App., 955 S.W.2d 193 (1997) for the
proposition that an award of zero damages for mental and physical
pain and suffering is inadequate “as a matter of law” where the
jury has made an award for medical expenses.
Culler contends
that we have “almost an identical situation here.”
In response, Despain contends that the trial judge’s
action, in denying the motion for a new trial, is not “clearly
erroneous.”
Despain argues that the trial judge, in the case sub
judice, was in a better position to review the jury’s action.
Despain points out that his medical treatment consisted solely of
conservative chiropractic care, and there was “no significant
evidence” of pain and suffering.
1
Culler did not file a reply.
Miller v. Swift, Ky., S.W.3d 599 (2001), released for
publication April 26, 2001.
-2-
Prater involved a similar factual situation.
The court
held that the jury’s failure to award damages for past pain and
suffering was improper, where the jury had awarded medical
expenses; however, our Supreme Court, in Swift, supra determined
that Prater was based upon a misinterpretation of the law.
In
Swift, the plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering,
claiming that the accident had resulted in enhanced pain, in
addition to that she had suffered prior to the accident due to a
variety of maladies.
The Supreme Court explained:
[The plaintiff] . . . argues that the trial
court abused its discretion and erred as a
matter of law when it denied her motion for a
new trial because the jury's failure to award
her any amount of money for pain and
suffering was contrary to the evidence and
inconsistent with its award of more than
$5000 for medical expenses and lost wages
. . . .
[The plaintiff’s ]. . . argument presupposes
legal inconsistency when a jury awards
damages for medical expenses and lost wages,
but awards no damages to compensate the
plaintiff for pain and suffering. The law in
Kentucky, however, does not require a jury to
award damages for pain and suffering in every
case in which it awards medical expenses. In
Cooper v. Fultz,[Ky.], 812, S.W.2d 497 [1991]
this Court, faced with a jury verdict similar
to the one now before us, remanded the case
for the trial court to determine the adequacy
of a jury’s award, and plainly avoided
holding such a verdict inconsistent or
inadequate as a matter of law:
. . . .
In Cooper, this Court rejected the contention
that a jury's pain and suffering award was
automatically inadequate as a matter of law
when a jury intentionally indicated no pain
and suffering award but awarded damages for
medical expenses or lost wages. Instead, the
Cooper Court remanded the matter for the
-3-
trial court to determine whether, based upon
the evidence submitted at trial, the jury's
pain and suffering award was adequate.
It appears that some confusion has resulted
from Prater v. Coleman, . . . where a threejudge panel of the Court of Appeals
misconstrued the Cooper holding and remanded
a similar case for a new trial. In the case
now before us, however, we believe the
majority of the en banc panel correctly
interpreted Cooper. We now overrule Prater
v. Coleman to the extent it holds that a "0"
award of pain and suffering damages,
regardless of the evidence, is inadequate as
a matter of law when accompanied by awards
for medical expenses and lost wages.
Swift, Id. 2001 Ky. Lexis, at 7-10, (Emphasis
added.)
Here, the proper standard of review is whether the
trial court’s action was “clearly erroneous.”
Accordingly, if
the jury's verdict of zero damages for pain and suffering is
supported by the evidence, the trial court was not clearly
erroneous in denying Culler’s motion for a new trial.
Ky. Lexis, at 6.
Id. 2001
Culler has not shown that the jury’s verdict of
“Zero” damages for pain and suffering lacks a substantial
evidentiary foundation.
In fact, Culler has not provided any
reference whatsoever to the record regarding evidence of pain and
suffering.
We decline to search for it.
Ky. App., 849 S.W.2d 571 (1993).
Robbins v. Robbins,
The trial court’s order denying
the motion for new trial is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth R. Haggard
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Robert L. Fears
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
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