L. T. RUNION; GREG STALEY; DICK NEAL; and WHISPERING WOOD NO. 5, A PARTNERSHIP v. STATE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY; MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; INDIANA INSURANCE COMPANY; and TRI-CITY INSURANCE SERVICE, INC. ROBIN RAMEY, as Mother and Next Friend, Guardian and Custodian of the minor ESTATE OF ROBERT RAMEY, by and through MARGO GRUBBS; JAMES STRICKLEY; JAN MUDD; v. STATE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY; MOTORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; TRI-CITY INSURANCE SERVICE, INC.; INDIANA INSURANCE COMPANY; and GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY
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RENDERED:
September 7, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000154-MR
L. T. RUNION; GREG STALEY;
DICK NEAL; and WHISPERING
WOOD NO. 5, A PARTNERSHIP
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00488
STATE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY;
MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
INDIANA INSURANCE COMPANY; and
TRI-CITY INSURANCE SERVICE, INC.
and
NO.
2000-CA-000477-MR
ROBIN RAMEY, as Mother and Next Friend,
Guardian and Custodian of the minor
children, JENNA RAMEY and ELI RAMEY;
ESTATE OF ROBERT RAMEY, by and through
its duly appointed Administratrix,
MARGO GRUBBS; JAMES STRICKLEY; JAN MUDD;
and JILL MUDD
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00488
STATE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY;
MOTORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
TRI-CITY INSURANCE SERVICE, INC.;
INDIANA INSURANCE COMPANY; and
GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, JUDGE: This case arises from a fire that occurred in an
apartment building in Burlington, Kentucky.
Numerous plaintiffs
filed actions for property damage, personal injury, and wrongful
death against Whispering Wood No. 5, a partnership, and its
partners, L. T. Runion, Greg Staley, and Dick Neal.
The present
controversy concerns insurance coverage by Indiana Insurance
Company, State Automobile Insurance Company, and Motorists Mutual
Insurance Company, all of whom the trial court found had no
liability.
The appellants also made a third-party claim against
Tri-City Insurance Service, Inc., the agency through which the
State Auto and Motorists Mutual Insurance policies were procured,
alleging that Tri-City negligently failed to procure appropriate
insurance coverage.
On March 27, 1989, Runion, a California resident,
purchased the Meadowood Golf Course in Burlington and procured a
policy of insurance for the golf course from Motorist Mutual
through Tri-City, a local insurance agency.
Subsequently, Runion
purchased an additional tract in Burlington and together with
Staley and Neal, formed a partnership called Whispering Wood for
the purpose of constructing two apartment buildings on the
property.
Runion owned 51% of the partnership while Staley and
Neal each owned 24½%.
Upon Runion’s request in June of 1990, Tri-City
procured through State Auto a builder’s risk policy for the
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Whispering Wood Partnership.
Staley and Neal also had liability
insurance for the construction of the apartments in 1990-1991,
through a commercial general liability policy and an umbrella
policy, both issued by Indiana Insurance.
Following the completion of the apartments in the
summer of 1991, State Auto’s builder’s risk policy was replaced
with a comprehensive business liability policy, also issued by
State Auto through Tri-City.
In 1992, Runion purchased the
interest of Staley and Neal and became the sole owner of the
apartment buildings.
The State Auto policy was renewed each year
until Runion sold the buildings in February 1996, at which time
he canceled the State Auto policy.
On February 13, 1997, the
apartment building burned, and Staley, Neal, Runion and the
Whispering Wood partnership were sued by those injured.
LIABILITY OF INDIANA INSURANCE
The commercial package policy issued by Indiana
Insurance covered bodily injury and property damage occurring
during the policy period.
The excess policy issued to Staley and
Neal covered only personal injury and property damage “caused by
an occurrence” during the policy period.
There is no dispute
that the policy period for both policies was February 14, 1990,
to February 14, 1991.
The general commercial liability policy issued to
Staley and Neal provides in pertinent part:
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY.
I.
Insuring agreement.
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A. We will pay those sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of “bodily injury” or “property
damage” to which this insurance applies. No
other obligation or liability to pay sums or
perform acts or services is covered unless
explicitly provided for under SUPPLEMENTARY
PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B. This insurance
applies only to “bodily injury” and “property
damage” which occurs during the policy
period. The “bodily injury” or “property
damage” must be caused by an “occurrence.”
The “occurrence” must take place in the
“coverage territory.” We will have the right
and duty to defend any “suit” seeking those
damages.
The excess policy states:
“Personal injury” means (1) bodily injury,
sickness, disease, disability or shock,
including death at any time arising
therefrom, and if arising out of the
foregoing, mental anguish and mental injury;
(2) false arrest, false imprisonment,
wrongful eviction, wrongful entry, wrongful
detention or malicious prosecution; (3)
libel, slander, defamation of character,
humiliation or invasion of the rights of
privacy, unless arising out of the
advertising activities; and (4) racial or
religious discrimination (unless coverage is
prohibited by law) not committed by or at the
direction of the insured or any executive
officer, director or stockholder thereof, but
only with respect to the liability other than
fines and penalties imposed by law; caused by
an occurrence during the policy period.
Coverage is provided under either policy for the fire
that occurred in 1997, if the alleged negligent construction of
the apartment buildings can be characterized as an occurrence
during the policy period.
The language of both policies is clear
and unambiguous and is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning
under Kentucky law.1
1
“An insurance policy must be interpreted to
Washington National Insurance Company v. Burke, Ky., 258
(continued...)
-4-
its true character and purpose, and in the sense which the
insured had reason to suppose it was understood.”2
In James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company,3 the court interpreted the term
“occurrence” as more expansive than “accident” in that it can
include losses and damages arising over a period of time from
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions.4
And, we agree
with appellants’ analysis that an occurrence need not occur at a
single moment but can be gradual.
In those cases cited by
appellants, however, the damage to the property began to occur
while the policy was in effect.5
In this case, assuming the
appellants’ theory is correct, that the faulty wiring caused the
blaze, there was no damage to the property or any person until
the fire erupted six years after the expiration of the Indiana
Insurance policy.
“An event which qualifies as an occurrence
must either cause property damage or bodily injury during the
period of time the policy is in effect.”6
There must be some
damage caused by the wrongful act to trigger the policy coverage.
As noted by the court in Jenoff, Inc. v. New Hampshire Insurance
1
(...continued)
S.W.2d 709, 710 (1953).
2
Cheek v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Company, 277 Ky.
677, 126 S.W.2d 1084 (1939), quoting Continental Casualty Company
v. Linn, 266 Ky. 328, 10 S.W.2d 1079, 1082 (1928).
3
Ky., 814 S.W.2d 273 (1991).
4
Id. at 278.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 277.
-5-
Company,7 this is the general rule in the majority of
jurisdictions.
7
558 N.W.2d 260, 263 (fn2)(1997). Citing Kirkham, Michael
& Assoc., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 493 F.2d 475, 476 (8th
Cir. 1974)(applying South Dakota law, holding no coverage for
accident occurring after policy period but caused by negligent
design and supervision of water treatment plant during policy
because “it is the damage incurred by ‘accident’ that triggers
the policies’ coverage, not the preceding wrongful
acts.”)(citation omitted); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Warwick Dev. Co., Inc., 446 So.2d 1021, 1024 (Ala. 1984)(finding
that “as a general rule the time of an ‘occurrence’ of an
accident within the meaning of an indemnity policy is not the
time the wrongful act was committed but the time the complaining
party was actually damaged.”)(citation omitted); Tiedemann v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 164 Conn. 439, 324 A.2d 263, 266
(Conn. 1973)(stating that “accident” unambiguously means “the
event causing injury, not the cause of that event,” holding no
coverage for damages resulting from fire occurring after the
policy period but caused by negligent construction of chimney
during the policy period)(citation omitted); Wrecking Corp. of
Am., Virginia, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 574 A.2d 1348,
1349-50 (D.C. 1990)(holding no coverage for collapse of wall
after policy period caused by negligent demolition work during
policy period because “the prevailing rule is that ‘property
damage occurs’ at the time the damage is discovered or when it
has manifested itself.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. C.J. Gayfer’s &
Co., Inc., 366 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979)(applying general rule, holding no coverage for rain damages
suffered after policy had expired but caused by negligent
installation of drainage system during policy period); Millers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ed Bailey, Inc., 103 Idaho 377, 647 P.2d
1249, 1251-52 (Idaho 1982)(applying general rule, holding no
coverage for fire occurring after policy period but caused by
negligent installation of insulation during policy period);
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 101
Mich. App. 697, 300 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(adopting general rule, holding no coverage for explosion of boat
after policy period caused by negligent installation of gas line
during policy period); Yarrington v. Camarota, 138 N.J. super.
398, 351 A.2d 353, 355 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971)(applying
general rule, holding no coverage for fire damage occurring after
policy period but caused by negligent construction during policy
period); Dorchester Dev. Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d
380, 383 (Tex. App. 1987)(applying general rule, holding no
coverage for faulty construction where damage did not manifest
itself until after the policy period).
-6-
We find no error in the summary judgment entered in
favor of Indiana Insurance Company.8
LIABILITY OF STATE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
The State Automobile policies, like the Indiana
Insurance policy, contain similar language requiring that the
bodily injury or property damage occur, or be caused by an
occurrence, during the policy period.
There was no State Auto
policy in effect at the time of the fire.
In the interest of
avoiding redundancy, we will not again reiterate the applicable
law.
Simply stated, the 1997 fire was not an occurrence within
the meaning of the State Auto policies.
Appellants contend that they had a reasonable
expectation that any damage caused by the negligent construction
of the apartments, no matter at what time, was covered by the
State Auto policies.
We find it difficult to accept the argument
that experienced business persons could reasonably believe that
insurance coverage extended into perpetuity long after the
expiration of the policy.
Moreover, the reasonable expectation
doctrine is employed in those cases where the insurance contract
is ambiguous.9
There is no ambiguity in the language of the
State Auto policies.
Both the occurrence and the property damage
must occur within the policy period.
Finally, we can find no language in the State Auto
policies that would cover “completed operations.”
Although the
8
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991).
9
Swartz v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Co., Ky. App.,
949 S.W.2d 72 (1997).
-7-
definitions section defined the term, there is no coverage
provided in the policies issued.
The summary judgment as to State Auto is affirmed.
LIABILITY OF MOTORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE
On the date of the fire, Motorist Mutual had in effect
a policy of insurance providing coverage for the golf course
owned by Runion.
The apartment complex was not connected to the
operation of the golf course.
Runion and Meadowood Golf Course,
Inc., were not insured under the Motorists policy and summary
judgment was properly entered.
LIABILITY OF TRI-CITY INSURANCE SERVICE, INC.
Appellants contend that Tri-City had an affirmative
duty to advise Runion regarding his insurance needs including the
need to have insurance coverage after the sale of the apartment
complex.
As explained in Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Insurance
Company,10 absent an expressed or implied assumption of such a
duty, there is no affirmative duty on an insurance agent to
advise an insured:
The record, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the appellants, does not present
a genuine issue of material fact concerning
the existence of an affirmative duty on the
part of insurance agent, Vanover, to advise
the Mullinses about the availability of UIM
coverage, and added RB. . . .
Appellants’ negligence action requires:
(1) a duty on the part of the defendant; (2)
a breach of that duty; and (3) consequent
injury. [citation omitted]. Thus to find
potential liability to exist in the case at
10
Ky., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247-249 (1992).
-8-
bar, there must first exist an affirmative
duty of the appellees to advise the Mullinses
about the availability of UIM coverage. The
trial court and Court of Appeals held no such
duty exists. We agree. . . .
The question of duty presents an issue of
law. 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 20; Prosser
and Keeton on Torts, § 37 (5th ed. 1984).
When a court resolves a question of duty it
is essentially making a policy determination.
[citations omitted]. While Kentucky courts
have not ruled on the specific issue at bar,
other jurisdictions have generally found “no
affirmative duty to advise it assumed by mere
creation of an agency relationship.” Hardt
v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 880 (D.C. Wash
1961).
An insurance agent ordinarily only
assumes those duties found in an agency
relationship. Hardt, supra, at 880. An
agent owes his principal the obligation to
deal in good faith and to carry out the
principal’s instructions. See 29 A.L.R.2d
171. Other jurisdictions have found that,
generally, an insurer may assume a duty to
advise an insured when: (1) he expressly
undertakes to advise the insured; or (2) he
impliedly undertakes to advise the insured.
Trotter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
297 S.C. 465, 377 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1988).
The insured has the burden of proving that
the insurer assumed such a duty. Id.
An implied assumption of duty may be
present when: (1) the insured pays the
insurance agent consideration beyond a mere
payment of the premium, Id., citing Nowell v.
Dawn-Leavitt Agency, Inc., 127 Ariz. 48, 617
P.2d 1164 (1980); (2) there is a course of
dealing over an extended period of time which
would put an objectively reasonable insurance
agent on notice that his advice is being
sought and relied on, Trotter, supra, citing
Nowell, supra; or (3) the insured clearly
makes a request for advice. Trotter, supra,
citing Precision Castparts Corp. v. Johnson &
Higgins of Oregon, Inc., 44 Or. App. 739, 607
P.2d 763 (1980). . . .
We note that while appellants fail to
produce facts evidencing an express
assumption of duty to advise, such a duty may
-9-
be present if the company, or agent,
represents directly, or by advertising, that
it will assume responsibility to advise the
customer as to what is needed. See 2A C.J.S.
Agency, § 54.
Where, as here, there is no express assumption of the
duty to advise, the company or its agent must represent directly
or by advertising that it will assume the responsibility to
advise the customer as to what is needed.11
Runion had an ongoing business relationship with TriCity.
He testified that several times per year he met William
McCarty of Tri-City to discuss his insurance coverages and needs.
During those discussions, McCarty gave advice and recommendations
to Runion.
However, he did not pay an additional premium nor
make a specific request for advice.
While Runion and McCarty met
on occasion throughout the eight years McCarty acted as his
agent, there is no evidence that Tri-City assumed the additional
duty as an insurance advisor.
The summary judgment as to Tri-
City is affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgments are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
11
Id.
-10-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE STATE
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY:
Robert E. Blau
Carl Turner
Cold Spring, Kentucky
William B. Strubbe
Cincinnati, Ohio
Mark W. Howard
Edgewood, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE INDIANA
INSURANCE COMPANY:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS
L. T. RUNION, GREG STALEY,
DICK NEAL and WHISPERING WOODS
NO. 5:
Lawrence E. Barbiere
Cincinnati, Ohio
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MOTORIST
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY:
Mark W. Howard
Edgewood, Kentucky
Joseph W. Gelwicks
Michael P. Foley
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS
ROBIN RAMEY, ESTATE OF ROBERT
RAMEY, JAMES STRICKLEY, JAN
MUDD and JILL MUDD:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
INDIANA INSURANCE COMPANY:
Robert E. Blau
Cold Spring, Kentucky
Jay D. Patton
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
STATE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY:
William B. Strubbe
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY:
Michael P. Foley
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
TRI-CITY INSURANCE SERVICE,
INC.:
Candance J. Smith
Covington, Kentucky
-11-
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