COURTNEY L. GOULD v. DWAINA L. BURKHARDT
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RENDERED:
April 27, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003130-MR
COURTNEY L. GOULD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TRIMBLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HON. DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-D-00034
v.
DWAINA L. BURKHARDT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, KNOPF and MILLER, Judges.
KNOPF, Judge:
Courtney Gould appeals from a domestic violence
order issued by the Trimble Circuit Court on November 5, 1999,
ordering him to avoid telephone and physical contact with Dwaina
Burkhardt other than reasonable contact for pick-up and delivery
of the parties’ child for purposes of visitation.
Having
concluded that the circuit court did not err, we affirm.
The parties engaged in a extramarital relationship that
resulted in the birth of a son in January 1998.
Shortly
thereafter, they separated and Courtney filed a complaint in
March 1998 in Henry Circuit Court concerning paternity, child
custody, child support, and property matters.
On March 13, 1998,
the circuit court held a hearing on a domestic violence petition
filed by Dwaina alleging physical and domestic abuse by Courtney.
On March 23, 1998, the circuit court issued an order with factual
findings that, inter alia, awarded the parties joint custody of
their son with Dwaina as primary residential custodian, granted
Courtney visitation, and imposed a domestic violence order (DVO).
Under the DVO, Courtney was required to avoid contact with Dwaina
except for purposes of facilitating visitation.
Although the
court initially set a 90 day period for the DVO, Dwaina
voluntarily agreed to termination of the DVO after 30 days.
Nevertheless, the parties continued to experience
acrimonious relations that led to Dwaina filing another DVO
petition on October 1, 1999, in Trimble District Court.
In the
petition, she alleged that Courtney was harassing her, that he
filed a false report with the Department of Social Services
alleging she had struck and injured the parties’ child, and that
she was afraid for herself and the child.
The district court
issued an emergency protective order (EPO) the same day
temporarily suspending child visitation.
On October 19, 1999, a
trial commissioner held a hearing and reinstituted partial
visitation.
On November 2, 1999, the district court held a
another hearing on the petition.
The district court ordered
continuation of the EPO and suspended all visitation pending a
hearing in circuit court.
On November 5, 1999, the circuit court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the petition.
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Dwaina’s attorney argued
that Courtney had engaged in a pattern of harassing and
threatening activity for the past two years.
Dwaina testified
that she had obtained an EPO in the past based on physical abuse,
that there was a pending assault case against Courtney, and that
she continued to have problems with Courtney dealing with
exchange of their child for visitation.
She stated that over the
previous few months, Courtney had called her repeatedly on her
cellular phone up to 15 times a day.
She also recalled one
incident where he indicated that he was following her on the
highway while speaking with her on the cell phone.
Dwaina stated
that Courtney had filed a false report with the Cabinet for
Families and Children accusing her of hitting their child in the
face and causing his nose to bleed.
Counsel offered a report of
the investigation into Courtney’s allegation finding that the
complaint was unsubstantiated.1
He also offered notes from a
family physician disputing Courtney’s claim that the child had
suffered an injury to its nose.
Dwaina also stated that Courtney
had left a voice-mail message at her place of employment that was
distributed to several of her co-workers accusing her of having
struck and injured the parties’ child.
She said Courtney had
told her that he would kill anyone that tried to take the child
away from him, and that if anything happened to her then “the
child would be all his.”
Dwaina testified that she feared for
her own safety and her son’s safety.
1
She indicated that she
The Cabinet filed a criminal complaint in district court
charging Courtney with filing a false report.
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believed Courtney could possibly hurt their son and blame it on
her in order to obtain custody or greater control over the child.
Courtney testified that Dwaina had lied about his
conduct in order to keep him from seeing his son.
He stated that
she was exaggerating the number of times he telephoned her and
that she had lied about his past activity.
He stated that most
of his telephone calls were merely responses to telephone calls
from Dwaina.
He said that he was not intentionally following her
but he sometimes saw her on the road because they traveled the
same area.
Courtney repeated his accusation that Dwaina had hit
their son and described the incident.
He disputed the
physician’s statements and the Cabinet investigator’s report
concerning his complaint about Dwaina striking their child.
He
indicated that he had not intended to distribute the voice-mail
message about his accusation to others at Dwaina’s workplace.
Following the testimony and the arguments of counsel,
the circuit court found that the statutory requirements had been
met and issued a DVO ordering Courtney to avoid cellular
telephone contact with Dwaina, to withdraw immediately in any
accidental public meeting, and to remain at least 250 feet away
from Dwaina and her family except for reasonable contact for
pick-up and delivery of their child.
This appeal followed.
Courtney challenges the DVO on two grounds involving
subject matter jurisdiction and sufficiency of the evidence.
First, he contends that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction to issue the DVO.
He cites KRS 403.725(1), which
provides for filing of verified domestic violence petitions in
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the district court in the county where the petitioner lives.
He
acknowledges that under KRS 403.725(4), a circuit court in which
a marriage dissolution or child custody action is pending has
jurisdiction to issue a protective order, but he maintains that
no such action was pending in Trimble Circuit Court.
Thus, he
concludes that only the Trimble District Court had subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a DVO in this case.
We disagree.
As Dwaina points out, KRS 403.735(3)(c) allows for
joint jurisdiction by district and circuit courts pursuant to a
local protocol reviewed and approved by the Kentucky Supreme
Court.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has approved a Domestic
Violence protocol for the 12th District and Circuit Courts in
Henry, Oldham, and Trimble Counties.
Section IV of the protocol
dealing with removal of domestic violence cases to the circuit
court provides in relevant part as follows:
B.
If the parties to a domestic violence
case have pending within this Circuit a
dissolution or child custody action, the
District Judge presiding at the EPO hearing
shall remove the case to Circuit Court upon
the request of either party. The presiding
District Judge may remove the case sua sponte
if, in his or her opinion, the domestic
violence matter presents issues so
intertwined with the Circuit Court action as
to require a Circuit Judge’s order for final
resolution. (Emphasis added.)
At the beginning of the November 1999 hearing before
the circuit court judge, the attorneys indicated that the
district court had transferred the case to the circuit court
because there was a pending child custody action involving these
parties in Henry Circuit Court.
We note that at the time, Judge
Fritz was the only circuit court judge in the 12th circuit and
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had presided over the circuit court action in Henry County.
While it is unclear whether the district court transferred the
case to the circuit court upon the request of a party or sua
sponte, we believe the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the
matter and issue a DVO in this case pursuant to KRS 403.735(c)
and the 12th Circuit local protocol.
Courtney’s second issue concerns the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the DVO.
Under KRS 403.750(1), a court may
issue a DVO “if it finds from a preponderance of the evidence
that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse have occurred
and may again occur. . . .”
KRS 403.720(1) defines “domestic
violence and abuse” as “physical injury, serious physical injury,
sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent
physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or
assault between family members. . . .”
In discussing the
preponderance of evidence standard of proof in KRS 403.750(1),
the Supreme Court stated:
It merely requires that the evidence
believed by the fact-finder be sufficient
that the defendant [petitioner] was more
likely than not to have been a victim of
domestic violence.
It has long been held that the trier of
fact has the right to believe the evidence
presented by one litigant in preference to
another. The trier of fact may believe any
witness in whole or in part. The trier of
fact may take into consideration all the
circumstances of the case, including the
credibility of the witnesses.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 276, 278
(1996)(citations omitted).
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In the current case, the circuit court thoroughly
analyzed the requirements of the statute in finding that Dwaina
had established by a preponderance of the evidence that acts of
domestic violence and abuse had occurred and may occur in the
future.
It felt that Courtney’s acts had created an atmosphere
of veiled intimidation and that he had exhibited an intense
desire to control the situation involving his visitation with the
child.
The court relied primarily on the two incidents involving
Courtney’s cellular phone call to Dwaina indicating that he was
watching or following her on the roadway and his leaving a
message at Dwaina’s workplace accusing her of striking her child.
Viewing the evidence as a whole, we believe there was
sufficient evidence to support the issuance of a DVO.
The two
incidents emphasized by the circuit court indicate Courtney’s
attempt to intimidate Dwaina and threaten her status as primary
residential custodian of their child.
Although the court relied
primarily on these two incidents, other evidence indicated that
Courtney had repeatedly called Dwaina on the telephone, had
assaulted her in the past, had stated he would do anything to
prevent anyone from taking the child from him, and had filed a
false report accusing Dwaina of child abuse.
The circuit court
judge had issued an earlier DVO in the paternity/custody action
and was familiar with the acrimonious relationship of the
parties.
Dwaina testified that she feared physical harm to
herself or to her child from Courtney’s desire for and possible
attempt to gain control over the child.
As indicated earlier,
the circuit court is free to weigh the evidence and determine the
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credibility of the witnesses.
Especially in the area of domestic
violence, trial courts must be given flexibility and discretion
in dealing with difficult issues in order to prevent possible
injury.
The DVO restricted contact between the parties but
allowed Courtney to continue the previously established
visitation schedule.
We believe the evidence supported the
issuance of a DVO and the limited restrictions imposed by the
court.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
circuit court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Grant M. Helman
Smith & Helman
Louisville, Kentucky
Armand I. Judah
Louisville, Kentucky
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