RAYMOND DAVID WATSON v. CLIFF GILL
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RENDERED:
September 28, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002994-MR
RAYMOND DAVID WATSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00257
v.
CLIFF GILL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING, IN PART, REVERSING, IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE.
This is an appeal by Raymond David Watson from an
order of the McCracken Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
Appellee, Cliff Gill, the McCracken County Jailer.
In his
lawsuit against Gill, Watson alleges that Gill refused to provide
him with his prescription medication and refused to place him on
a renal failure diet as prescribed by his physician.
Because
there are genuine issues of material fact and it would not be
impossible for Watson to prevail at trial, Gill is not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
remand.
We accordingly reverse and
On November 30, 1993, Watson was arrested, charged with
murder and incarcerated in the McCracken County Jail where he
remained until transferred to the Eastern Kentucky Correctional
Complex on October 14, 1994.
On March 20, 1995, Watson filed a
lawsuit against Gill, alleging that during his incarceration in
the McCracken County Jail, he was not given his prescribed
medication and was not placed on a renal failure diet as ordered
by his physician.
It is undisputed that Watson suffered from
kidney disease during the time of his incarceration at the
McCracken County jail and required prescription medication and
the special diet.
On July 11, 1996, Gill filed a motion for summary
judgment.
Without notice of the motion to Watson, on July 19,
1996, the trial court granted Gill’s motion for summary judgment.
Watson subsequently appealed to this Court.
On December 4, 1998,
this Court rendered an opinion reversing summary judgment on the
basis that CR 56.03 had not been complied with (Watson v. Gill,
1996-CA-002717-MR).
Following remand, on July 9, 1999, Watson filed a
motion requesting that the trial judge recuse himself from the
case, which was denied by order dated July 22, 1999.
On October
12, 1999, Gill renewed his motion for summary judgment; on
November 8, 1999, the trial court entered an order granting
summary judgment.
This appeal followed.
Watson contends that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material
fact regarding his claims against Gill.
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In order to qualify for summary judgment, the movant
must “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."
CR 56.03.
On appeal, the standard of review of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
no genuine issue existed as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The
record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment, and all doubts are to
be resolved in his favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Summary judgment
should only be used when, as a matter of law, it appears that it
would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant.
Id. at 483 (citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683
S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
A party opposing a properly supported motion
for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion without presenting
at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d
at 482.
Throughout this case, Watson has prosecuted his case
pro se.
From his pleadings, Watson’s legal theory is not
entirely clear.
However, based upon the fact that a jail inmate,
Watson, is alleging that a jailer, Gill, deliberately denied him
access to prescribed medication and refused to provide him with a
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renal failure diet, we construe Watson’s cause of action as a
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part,
that a person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation or custom of any state, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any person to the deprivation of any federally
protected right, privilege or immunity is civilly liable to the
injured party.
Watson, in substance, alleges that Gill was
responsible for denying him adequate medical care and, while
acting under color of state law, violated his federally protected
right to humane treatment and reasonable medical care while he
was in Gill’s care and custody.
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the government has an obligation to provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.
Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103; 97 S.Ct. 285, 290; 50 L.Ed.2d 251, 259
(1976).
Government officials violate the Eighth Amendment and
the due process clause if they exhibit deliberate indifference to
the serious medical needs of a prisoner and inflict unnecessary
suffering on a prisoner by failing to treat his medical needs.
Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Massachusetts, 923 F.2d 203,
208 (1st Cir. 1990).
At trial, to prevail on his § 1983 claim,
Watson would have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Gill violated a constitutionally protected liberty interest of
Watson’s and that he did so in a manner which evidenced
1
The panel in Case 1996-CA-002717-MR likewise construed
Watson’s lawsuit as a 42 USC § 1983 lawsuit.
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deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights.
Watson
could not prevail simply by proving that Gill merely committed
negligent acts which resulted in injury.
Rivas v. Freeman, 940
F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th Cir. 1991).
As we must view the record in the light most favorable
to Watson, we must accept his claims, which are supported by
numerous affidavits from fellow jail inmates, that while
incarcerated in the McCracken County Jail Watson was denied
prescription medication and was not provided with a renal failure
diet.
Gill denies these allegations; therefore, there is a
factual dispute in the case.
Gill contends that the jail records
conclusively establish that Watson signed for his medication and
that Watson’s allegations are false.
However, Watson contends
that he was required to sign for the medication prior to being
issued the medication, and though he did sign the sheets, he did
not, in fact, receive the proper prescription medications.
Similarly, while Gill filed an affidavit stating that following
his receipt of the proper medical directive Watson was placed on
a renal failure diet, Watson disputes this.
Again, Watson
produced numerous witness affidavits disputing that Watson had
been placed on a renal failure diet.
In summary, there are
genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Gill withheld
prescription medications and refused to place Watson on a renal
failure diet, and the trial court erred in determining that there
were not.
Gill contends that alleged violations occurring prior
to March 20, 1994, are barred by the statute of limitations.
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However, we addressed this issue in the prior appeal in this
case.
In our December 4, 1998 opinion, we addressed the statute
of limitations issue as follows:
Because Watson's claim is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, Gill
argues, regardless of the factual accuracy of
his claim, summary judgment was appropriate.
Gill maintains that an action based on 42 USC
§1983, which Watson's claim appears to be,
must be brought within one year of the date
of the injury. Collard v. Board of Nursing,
896 F.2d 179, 189 (6th Cir. 1990). Watson's
complaint alleges specific instances when he
was deprived medical attention, the most
recent being on March 7, 1994. With deference
to the lack of artistry of its drafter, the
complaint also alleges that he was deprived
medical attention until the date of his
transfer to the Eastern Correctional Complex
in October 1994. We are not persuaded, that
given the opportunity, it would be impossible
for Watson to present evidence that the
failure to provide medical care was in the
nature of a continuing wrong which continued
until his transfer to the Eastern
Correctional Complex. Neel v. Rehberg, 577
F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1978).
In summary, Gill is not entitled to summary judgment
upon the theory that Watson’s claim is time barred by the statute
of limitations.
Blackburn v. Murphy, 244 Ky. 370; 50 S.W.2d 957,
959-960 (1932).
Gill contends, however, that if summary judgment was
not proper under the foregoing theories, he nevertheless is
entitled to summary judgment on the basis that he is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate the clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
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should have known.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815; 102
S.Ct. 2727, 2736; 73 L.Ed. 396 (1982).
In Siegert v. Gilley, 500
U.S. 226, 231-33; 111 S.Ct. 1789; 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991), the
Supreme Court clarified the appropriate framework for reviewing
claims of qualified immunity.
Under this framework, a court must
first determine whether the plaintiff "has asserted a violation
of a constitutional right at all."
Id. at 232.
If the court
determines that the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a
constitutional right, the court must then determine whether that
right was clearly established so that a reasonable official in
the defendant’s situation would have understood that his conduct
violated that right.
Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1489,
1490 (10th Cir. 1994).
As previously noted, the government has a
constitutional obligation to provide medical care to jail
inmates.
Estelle v. Gamble, supra.
Watson’s pleadings assert a
violation of this constitutional right.
Moreover, the
constitutional right at the time of Watson’s incarceration was a
clearly established right (Estelle v. Gamble was rendered in
1976).
Further, a reasonable official in Gill’s situation, a
county jailer, should have understood that withholding
prescription medications from an inmate and refusing to place an
inmate on a diet as prescribed by a physician were constitutional
violations of the inmate’s rights under Estelle.
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In light of the
allegations in this lawsuit, Gill is not entitled to qualified
immunity.2
Finally, Watson contends that the trial judge abused
his discretion when he failed to recuse himself from the case.
Specifically, Watson contends that the trial judge should recuse
himself because Watson has a sincere belief that the trial judge,
due to his prior rulings, harbors personal bias and prejudice
towards him; because the trial judge presided over his bond
hearing on the murder charge for which he is incarcerated;
because the trial judge has expressed opinions concerning the
merits of the proceedings; because Watson’s murder victim, his
father-in-law, had bragged about attending dogfights and chicken
fights with McCracken County judges; because the trial judge
improperly dismissed the case in 1996; because a close
relationship exists between the trial judge and Gill; and because
the murder victim’s son works for McCracken County and Watson’s
ex-wife has told him that the son has “clout within the system”
because he “know[s] all of the judges personally.”
KRS3 26A.015(2)(e) requires a judge to disqualify
himself "[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, . . . or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of
2
Gill also attempts to argue that he is entitled to
qualified immunity because the dispute here involves a
ministerial function; however, by definition, the deliberate
withholding of medical care is not a “ministerial act.” For
qualified immunity purposes, a duty is “ministerial” only where
the statute or regulation leaves no room for discretion. Sellers
v. Baer, 28 F.3d 895, 902 (8th Cir. 1994). If, as alleged, Gill
withheld medical care, clearly he was not doing so pursuant to a
statute or regulation.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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the proceeding."
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
SCR4 4.300, contains a similar provision. The burden of proof
required to demonstrate that recusal of a trial judge is mandated
is an onerous one.
The moving party must be able to show that
the trial judge is prejudiced to such a degree that the judge
cannot be impartial.
Johnson v. Ducobu, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 509, 511
(1953); Brand v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 939 S.W.2d 358, 359
(1997).
In order to successfully seek recusal of a judge, a
showing of facts must be made "of a character calculated
seriously to impair the judge's impartiality and sway his
judgment."
(1961);
Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 759, 760
Miller v. Commonwealth, Ky., 925 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1995).
The mere fact that the trial judge has indicated or stated his
belief in the guilt of the defendant is not enough to disqualify
the judge.
(1924).
Nelson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 202 Ky. 1, 258 S.W. 674
There must be a showing of bias, prejudice against, or
hostility towards the defendant.
904, 243 S.W. 27 (1922);
Stamp v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky.,
White v. Commonwealth, Ky., 310 S.W.2d
277, 278 (1958).
Watson has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
that the trial judge was prejudiced to such a degree that he was
incapable of being impartial.
Watson’s complaints consist
largely, if not entirely, of speculation, conjecture, and
hearsay.
A mere belief that the trial judge will not afford a
fair and impartial trial on the merits or that the judge will not
rule fairly and impartially is not sufficient grounds to require
4
Supreme Court Rule.
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recusal.
Webb v. Commonwealth, Ky., 904 S.W.2d 226-230 (1995).
The trial judge was in the best position to determine whether
questions raised regarding his impartiality were reasonable.
see no reason to second-guess his decision.
We
Jacobs v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 947 S.W.2d 416-417 (1997).
Therefore, we
affirm the trial judge’s decision to not recuse himself from this
case.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed, in part, reversed, in part
and remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Raymond David Watson, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Charles S. Foster
Mayfield, Kentucky
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