JAMES C. CODELL, III, SECRETARY OF THE TRANSPORTATION CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR THOMAS C. BOYSEN, (NOW WILMER C. CODY), SECRETARY OF KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; AND KENTUCKY STATE BOARD FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (NOW THE KENTUCKY BOARD OF EDUCATION) v. D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR
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RENDERED:
June 22, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002895-MR
JAMES C. CODELL, III, SECRETARY
OF THE TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00056
D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND
FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR
AND
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-002897-MR
THOMAS C. BOYSEN, (NOW WILMER C.
CODY), SECRETARY OF KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; AND
KENTUCKY STATE BOARD FOR
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION (NOW THE KENTUCKY
BOARD OF EDUCATION)
v.
APPELLANT
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00056
D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND
FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR
AND
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-003069-MR
CALLOWAY COUNTY, KENTUCKY;
JAMES C. CODELL, III, SECRETARY
OF THE TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; AND
THOMAS C. BOYSEN (NOW WILMER C.
CODY), SECRETARY OF THE KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
AND THE KENTUCKY STATE BOARD FOR
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
(NOW THE KENTUCKY BOARD OF EDUCATION)
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00056
D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND
FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR
AND
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-003176-MR
JAMES C. CODELL, III, SECRETARY
OF THE TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00056
D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND
FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR
AND
NO.
APPELLEE
1998-CA-003177-MR
D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND
FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FAUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00056
-2-
JAMES C. CODELL, III, SECRETARY
OF THE TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
THOMAS C. BOYSEN (NOW WILMER C.
CODY), SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY; THE KENTUCKY STATE
BOARD FOR ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION (NOW THE
KENTUCKY BOARD OF EDUCATION); AND
THE CALLOWAY COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
AND
CROSS-APPELLEES
NO. 1998-CA-003178-MR
THOMAS C. BOYSEN, (NOW WILMER C.
CODY), SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; AND
KENTUCKY STATE BOARD FOR
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION (NOW THE KENTUCKY
BOARD OF EDUCATION)
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00056
D.F., A NATURAL PARENT AND
FRIEND OF M.F., A MINOR
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DYCHE, McANULTY AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This is an appeal from the trial court’s
determination that KRS 159.051, the “No Pass-No Drive” law, is
unconstitutional and violates federal law.
reverse in part.
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We affirm in part and
This action challenging the statute was originally
filed by a minor and her parents and was later certified as a
class action by the Calloway Circuit Court.
The issues raised
are purely questions of law concerning the constitutionality of
the statute, and the facts are not pertinent to the appeal.
Suffice it to say the action is taken on behalf of minors who
were adversely affected by the “No Pass-No Drive” law, which
operates to suspend the driver’s license of any 16 or 17-year-old
student who drops out of school or is deemed academically
deficient.
KRS 159.051(1)-(4).
Specifically, the statute
provides as follows:
(1) When a student age sixteen (16) or
seventeen (17) drops out of school or is
declared to be academically deficient, the
school administrator or his designee shall
notify the superintendent of schools of the
district in which the student is a resident
or is enrolled. The reports shall be made at
the end of each semester but may be made
earlier in the semester for accumulated
absences. A student shall be deemed to have
dropped out of school when he has nine (9) or
more unexcused absences in the preceding
semester. Any absences due to suspension
shall be unexcused absences. A student shall
be deemed to be academically deficient when
he has not received passing grades in at
least four (4) courses, or the equivalent of
four (4) courses, in the preceding semester.
The local school board shall adopt a policy
to reflect a similar standard for academic
deficiency for students in alternative,
special education, or part-time programs.
(2) Within ten (10) days after receiving the
notification, the superintendent shall report
the student’s name and Social Security number
to the Transportation Cabinet. As soon as
possible thereafter, the cabinet shall notify
the student that his operator’s license,
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permit, or privilege to operate a motor
vehicle has been revoked or denied and shall
inform the student of his right to a hearing
before the District Court of appropriate
venue to show cause as to the reasons his
driver’s license should be reinstated. Within
fifteen (15) days after this notice is sent,
the custodial parent, legal guardian, or next
friend of the student may request an ex parte
hearing before the District Court. The
student shall not be charged District Court
filing fees. The notification shall inform
the student that he is not required to have
legal counsel. Revocation under this
subsection shall not be permitted unless the
local school district shall operate an
alternative education program approved by the
Department of Education designed to meet the
learning needs of students who are unable to
succeed in the regular program.
(3) In order for the student to have his
license reinstated, the court shall be
satisfied that the license is needed to meet
family obligations or family economic
considerations which if unsatisfied would
create an undue hardship or that the student
is the only licensed driver in the household
or the student is not considered a dropout or
academically deficient pursuant to this
section. If the student satisfies the court,
the court shall notify the cabinet to
reinstate the student’s license at no cost.
The student, if aggrieved by a decision of
the court issued pursuant to this section,
may appeal the decision within thirty (30)
days to the Circuit Court of appropriate
venue. A student who is being schooled at
home shall be considered to be enrolled in
school.
(4) A student who has had his license
revoked under the provisions of this section
may reapply for his driver’s license as early
as the end of the semester during which he
enrolls in school and successfully completes
the educational requirements. A student may
also reapply for his driver’s license at the
end of a summer school semester which results
in the student having passed at least four
(4) courses, or the equivalent of four (4)
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courses, during the successive spring and
summer semesters, and the courses meet the
educational requirements for graduation. He
shall provide proof issued by his school
within the preceding sixty (60) days that he
is enrolled and is not academically
deficient.
The class action challenged the statute on seven
different grounds.
The trial court found for the
plaintiff/appellee on five of those issues but found for the
defendants/appellants on the remaining two.
The plaintiff filed
a cross-appeal regarding the trial court’s decision on those two
issues.
We will address each issue separately.
First, we must discuss the standard of review we will
apply to this case. It appears from the record that the trial
court made its decision based on dispositive motions for summary
judgment and accompanying memoranda of law.
There was no bench
trial, therefore we are not guided by Hilliard v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Mideast, Inc., Ky. App., 690 S.W.2d 773 (1985), as the
appellees would have us believe.
Rather, the trial court granted
summary judgment and, therefore, our standard of review is
"whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Scifres v. Kraft,
Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
I. Whether the trial court
properly concluded that KRS 159.051 does not
deny meaningful judicial review in violation
of the state and federal constitutions.
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Appellee contends the judicial review provided for in
KRS 159.051 is insufficient, and therefore, in violation of the
Kentucky and U.S. Constitutions.
We cannot agree.
If a student is found to be in violation of the
statute, a notice is sent suspending the student’s license and
immediately informing the student of his/her right to a hearing
regarding the suspension.
The student then has 15 days from the
time the notice is sent to request an ex parte hearing before the
District Court.
KRS 159.051 (2).
This hearing is not held
solely for the purpose of determining whether the student has
dropped out of school or is considered academically deficient —
it also allows the student to show why his/her license should not
be suspended, such as existing obligations that if not met would
create an undue hardship on the student’s family.
The student is
also given the chance to correct any clerical errors such as
incorrectly recorded grades, or to prove the student is still
enrolled in school.
If the student is dissatisfied with the
outcome of this hearing, he/she may appeal it to the circuit
court within 30 days.
KRS 159.051(3).
The circuit court determined these procedures were
sufficient so as not to violate Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution or the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. We are in accord with the
circuit court’s decision.
Appellee contends that under the statute, judicial
review is not meaningful because the court will not affirmatively
-7-
examine the background behind a student’s grades or attendance
record.
argument.
However, we find this to be a wholly inappropriate
The district court is in no position to second-guess
the professional assessments of teachers who deal with the
students in question on a daily basis.
If a student feels he/she
has received a failing mark that is without merit or an incorrect
unexcused absence, it is an issue for the student to discuss with
his/her teacher.
resolve.
It is certainly not a matter for the court to
Therefore, we agree with the circuit court that the
judicial review should be limited to whether a clerical error was
made on the student’s record.
In sum, we believe the circuit
court did not err in concluding KRS 159.051 provides meaningful
judicial review.
II. Whether the trial court
properly concluded that KRS 159.051 does not
violate procedural due process.
The Appellee also asserts on appeal that KRS 159.051
violates a student’s rights to procedural due process by
suspending his/her driver’s license without a pre-suspension
hearing.
We disagree, and affirm the decision of the circuit
court.
In support of its determination that KRS 159.051 does
not violate procedural due process, the circuit court pointed to
a variety of other situations in which a driver’s license may be
legitimately suspended before a hearing is held.
We also submit
a test set out in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S. Ct. 1723, 52
-8-
L. Ed. 2d 172 (1977), which gives us a standard for determining
whether due process has been violated.
In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed an
Illinois statute which provided for the immediate suspension of
drivers’ licenses for repeated convictions of traffic offenses.
The statute allowed an administrative hearing after the
suspension of the license.
In analyzing the law, the Dixon Court
looked to three factors:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id. (Citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L.Ed.2nd
18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976).)
Applying this test, the circuit court determined the
statute did not violate the procedural due process requirement.
We agree.
The interest affected here is a legitimately regulated
privilege, not a fundamental right.
As well, it is an interest
that may be restored immediately once it is found to create an
undue hardship on the student as provided by law.
An erroneous
deprivation, though certainly possible, is not probable.
Reports
to the Cabinet are not mandated to be made until the end of the
semester; the reports may be made sooner only if the student has
dropped out or accumulated the required number of unexcused
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absences.
This gives a student plenty of time to work with
school officials to have grades corrected or unexcused absences
resolved before a reporting is due.
Finally, there would
certainly be unreasonable fiscal and administrative burdens
placed on the government if this court were to require presuspension hearings for each and every student found to be in
violation of the law.
Therefore, we agree with the circuit court
that the Appellees’ right to procedural due process has not been
violated, and find no error.
III. Whether the trial court
properly found that the Transportation
Cabinet violated KRS Chapter 13A in issuing
its Memorandum.
This argument concerns a Transportation Cabinet
(“Cabinet”) decision requiring parents to consent to the release
of information from their student’s educational records before
the 16 or 17-year-old may obtain a learner’s permit and,
eventually, a driver’s license.
The Appellees allege this
infringes on the student’s privacy rights under the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA).
The parental consent requirement was not provided by
the legislature but by the Cabinet in a memorandum issued in
March of 1997.
In this memorandum, the Cabinet directs circuit
court clerks to use a new version of a form called TC94-30.
This
form requires parents to assume joint liability for damages
caused by their young driver, but most importantly, it also
includes language requiring the parent to “consent to the receipt
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and release of information as set forth in KRS 159.051 as it
regards No Pass/No Drive.”
A parent or legal guardian must sign
this form before their student can be issued a driver’s license
or permit.
The circuit court determined the Cabinet violated KRS
13A by effectively legislating through memorandum.
KRS 13A.130
states, in pertinent part:
(1) An administrative body shall not by
internal policy, memorandum, or other form of
action:
(a) Modify a statute or administrative
regulation;
(b) Expand upon or limit a statute or
administrative regulation; and
(c) Except as authorized by the Constitution
of the United States, the Constitution of
Kentucky or a statute, expand or limit a
right guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States, the Constitution of Kentucky,
a statute, or an administrative regulation.
The question becomes whether the Cabinet’s memorandum
modified, expanded or limited KRS 159.051 or a right guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution, Kentucky Constitution, statute or
regulation.
We believe it does not.
The trial court noted the new form was not created
until after the litigation challenging KRS 159.051 had commenced,
concluding that the Cabinet added the parental consent provision
regarding the release of educational information in order to
allow for the enforcement of KRS 159.051 under FERPA.
-11-
While the
trial court may be correct, it does not necessarily follow that
the Cabinet is not permitted to act in this regard.
The Cabinet is authorized to enforce KRS 159.051 as it
relates to KRS 186.440, 186.450 and 186.470, all of which concern
persons under the age of eighteen who apply for or possess an
instruction permit or driver’s license.
See KRS 186.400.
Moreover, KRS 186.440 specifically references KRS 159.051.
We believe the memorandum does not modify or expand KRS
159.051 by requiring a parent to consent to the release of
educational information.
This information is already available
to be released under the statute.
As we have noted, the Cabinet
is charged with enforcement of KRS 159.051 as it intertwines with
KRS 186.440 and other operator’s license statutes.
The
memorandum simply furthers the ability to carry out the
directives set out by the General Assembly.
Whether or not the
statute violates federal law is another matter which is addressed
below.
Accordingly, we believe the trial court erred in
concluding that the Cabinet violated KRS 13A.130 by issuing the
memorandum and changing the form signed by a parent before his or
her minor child may receive a driver’s license or permit.
We
therefore reverse on this issue.
IV. Whether the trial court
properly determined that KRS 159.051 violates
federal law.
The trial court also determined that KRS 159.051
violates a student’s right to privacy under the federal Family
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Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and violates the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
In
considering the FERPA violation, the court relied heavily on a
letter from the Director of the Family Policy Compliance Office
of the U.S. Department of Education, the federal department which
oversees compliance with FERPA.
While the letter concluded KRS
159.051 did indeed violate FERPA, Appellants responded that
reliance on this letter was inappropriate because the Department
of Education did not consider the statute within the context of
the 1996 amendment to 601 KAR 13.070 and because the trial court
attached improper significance to the letter.
As to both
arguments, we must disagree and affirm the circuit court’s
decision.
A brief overview of FERPA is helpful at this point.
In
part, FERPA provides that no federal funds shall be given to any
educational agency that permits the release of a student’s
educational records or personally identifiable information, other
than directory information, without the written consent of
his/her parents.
20 U.S.C. §1232g(b)(1).
“Education records”
are defined as:
[T]hose records, files, documents and other
materials which (I) contain information
directly related to a student; and (II) are
maintained by an educational agency or
institution, or by a person acting for such
agency or institution.
20 U.S.C. §1232g(a)(4).
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There are thirteen exceptions to the general rule
against nonconsensual disclosure.
However, the parties do not
assert that any of these apply.
Appellants’ claim addresses the amended regulations
used by the Cabinet to implement KRS 159.051.
The General
Assembly authorized the Cabinet to promulgate administrative
regulations to enforce drivers’ licensing laws.
KRS 186.400(1).
Accordingly, the Cabinet created 601 KAR 13.070 to aid in
enforcing the “No Pass-No Drive” statute.
The original version
of this regulation required transmission of a student’s directory
information to the Cabinet, such as his/her name and address,
along with a certification that the student had dropped out of
school or was academically deficient.
Later, 601 KAR 13.070 was
amended to require only that the school district superintendent
give notice to the Cabinet if the student “is not in compliance
with KRS 159.051," thereby omitting the specific reason behind
the student’s noncompliance.
A review of the Department of Education letter
indicates the Compliance Office relied solely on the language of
KRS 159.051 in concluding that it violates FERPA.
There is no
reference to the amended regulation, and time would preclude such
a reference in any event — correspondence between the parties
began in 1995, yet the amendment would not take effect until
1996.
We cannot predict how the decision of the Family Policy
Compliance Office might have changed had it considered this later
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amendment.
What we do know is that according to the letter, the
Family Policy Office believes KRS 159.051 violates FERPA on its
face “because the provision requires the disclosure of personally
identifiable information from an education record.”
Although this decision may have changed in light of the
amendment, for the purposes of this case, we must turn to whether
this letter and its finding are entitled to substantial weight.
The trial court determined the letter should be
afforded substantial weight, relying on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 81 L.Ed.2d
694, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).
In Chevron, the Supreme Court was
asked to review an agency’s interpretation of a statute.
The
Court held that an agency’s interpretation of a statutory scheme
it is entrusted to administer should carry considerable weight.
Id. at 467 U.S. 844.
Appellants argue the circuit court was not charged with
interpreting the FERPA statute, and thus Chevron deference is
inappropriate.
However, under Chevron, whether the circuit court
is asked to interpret the statute is meaningless; the
interpretation the court is concerned with is that of the agency
itself.
So we turn to the Compliance Office’s responsibilities
under FERPA to determine whether this ruling qualifies as an
interpretation.
The Family Policy Compliance Office was created to
investigate alleged FERPA violations.
20 U.S.C. §1232g(g).
Congress has given this Office the power to review complaints,
-15-
solicit written responses from accused agencies, and finally, to
submit written notice of its findings to the offending agency or
institution, complete with specific steps that institution can
take to come into compliance.
99.66(c)(1).
34 C.F.R. 99.65(a)(2), 99.66(b),
Using this authority, the Compliance Office
reviewed the Kentucky statute and interpreted it to be violative
of FERPA.
We view the Compliance Office’s ruling on the Calloway
County School District’s noncompliance under FERPA as an
interpretation of that agency’s rules, and thus we believe the
circuit court was correct in relying on the letter to hold that
KRS 159.051 violates the provisions of FERPA.
Appellants also claim there was no adversarial
proceeding or fair opportunity for them to be involved in the
Compliance Office’s decision.
However, both the Appellees and
Appellants were allowed to submit written justifications for
their views, and the complaining Appellees were even allowed
another response before the Compliance Office released its
findings.
Under 34 C.F.R. 99.66(a), the Compliance Office has
the power to permit further written or oral arguments or
information, but just because the Compliance Office did not
exercise this power does not mean the findings should be
invalidated.
The circuit court had access to the Compliance
Office’s determination on this issue and was certainly
encouraged, under Chevron, to accord considerable weight to that
determination.
We find no error in this regard and therefore
affirm on this issue.
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Although we have determined KRS 159.051 violates FERPA,
that does not strike the “No Pass-No Drive” law from the books.
FERPA does not ban disclosures of education records; it simply
directs that funds will not be available to any educational
agency which has such a policy.
As such, the Cabinet could
explore ways to apply the “No Pass-No Drive” law without
violating federal law.
It is also important to note that FERPA
concerns only nonconsensual disclosure.
In other words, once a
parent has consented to the disclosure of such information, the
policy may be continued without sacrificing the entitlement to
federal funds.
As previously noted, all Kentuckians under 18
years of age must fill out Form TC94-30 to obtain a license or
instruction permit, and that form requires parental consent to
the release of education records to comply with KRS 159.051.
Therefore, KRS 159.051 currently works outside of the boundaries
of FERPA.
The only remaining problem is that KRS 159.051
provides for the disclosure of information regardless of whether
the student has actually applied for an instruction permit,
thereby consenting to the release of the information.
V. Whether the trial court properly
concluded that KRS 159.051 punishes children
with academic problems without regard to
their learning or other disabilities.
The trial court also determined the “No Pass-No Drive”
statute violates federal and state law by discriminating against
students with educational disabilities.
We disagree, based on
the clear language of the statute, and therefore, reverse.
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KRS 159.051 expressly provides that “[r]evocation under
this subsection shall not be permitted unless the local school
district shall operate an alternative education program approved
by the Department of Education designed to meet the learning
needs of students who are unable to succeed in the regular
program.”
KRS 159.051(2).
The statute clearly provides for the
same students Appellees claim are disadvantaged by the law.
The alternative schools’ requirement seeks to apply the
law only in areas where students with learning disabilities have
options in regards to their education.
Were the law to apply to
districts without such options, we could conclude there was a
discriminatory effect, because all students would be held to the
same standard regardless of their abilities in the classroom.
This law protects students with special needs by guaranteeing
they will not be expected to meet a standard that may be
unattainable for them based on their natural abilities. It is
therefore clear that KRS 159.051 does not discriminate against
students with special needs, and thus, we reverse on this issue.
VI. Whether the trial court
properly concluded that KRS 159.051 violates
the substantive due process rights of those
to whom it applies.
Appellees claim KRS 159.051 violates their substantive
due process rights under the U.S. Constitution because there is
no reasonable relationship between the law and its purpose or
objective.
The trial court applied a rational basis test and
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determined that KRS 159.051 did violate substantive due process.
However, we do not agree.
In beginning our analysis, we note that to determine
whether an act of the General Assembly is unconstitutional, a
court dealing with such a challenge must "necessarily begin with
the strong presumption in favor of constitutionality and should
so hold if possible."
Brooks v. Island Creek Coal Co., Ky. App.,
678 S.W.2d 791, 792 (1984).
Also, previous Kentucky case law
tells us “[a] statutory classification in the area of social
welfare is not unconstitutionally arbitrary if it has a
legitimate objective and it is rationally related to that
objective.”
Estridge v. Stovall, Ky. App., 704 S.W.2d 653, 655
(1985), citing Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S. Ct. 254,
30 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1971).
Further, “the constitutional
protections of due process or equal protection are offended ‘only
if the resultant classifications or deprivations of liberty rest
on grounds wholly irrelevant to a reasonable state objective.’
Kentucky Association of Chiropractors, Inc., v. Jefferson County
Medical Society, Ky., 549 S.W.2d 817 (1977).”
Id.
In the case at bar, the trial court reasoned there was
no rational connection between the purposes of KRS 159.051 and
the operation of a motor vehicle, and as such, the statute
violated due process.
The court reached this conclusion based on
the following: a case from Illinois, People v. Linder, 127 Ill.2d
174, 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989), and a discussion about whether KRS
159.051 had been effective in reducing the drop-out rate.
-19-
We
find that reliance on an Illinois case and evidence of the
statute’s effectiveness was wholly inappropriate in determining
whether KRS 159.051 violates due process.
In People v. Linder, supra, the Illinois Supreme Court
reviewed a law which revoked drivers’ licenses of sex offenders.
The court determined that law was enacted to protect the public
interest in safe and legal operation and ownership of motor
vehicles.
The court then held the statute did not bear a
reasonable relationship to that objective because under the
statute, licenses could be revoked for crimes not involving a
motor vehicle.
Id. at 832-833.
In the case sub judice, the statute in question is
certainly not aimed at protecting the public highways.
Rather,
KRS 159.051 is an education-related law enacted to encourage 16
and 17-year-olds to stay in school and get good grades.
This is
unquestionably a legitimate objective under Estridge v. Stovall,
supra, as the Commonwealth has a strong interest in ensuring its
citizens are educated.
The question the trial court should have determined,
then, is whether KRS 159.051 bears a rational relationship to the
objective of encouraging students to stay in school and get
passing grades.
We believe that it does.
As we noted before,
virtually every teen-ager looks forward to the privilege of
getting a driver’s license.
It is a milestone on the way to
adulthood bringing teens a certain amount of freedom and a great
deal of responsibility.
The threat of losing this much-20-
anticipated privilege becomes a real incentive to stay in school
and achieve passing grades.
In this regard, the statute is
rationally related to its objective.
As to discussions regarding the statistics behind KRS
159.051, we fail to see how the law’s effectiveness or lack
thereof has any bearing on whether the law violates substantive
due process.
It is not within the purview of the court to
evaluate whether the law works properly.
As the Kentucky Supreme
Court has stated, rational basis review “is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness or logic of [the]
legislative choices.”
700, 703 (1998).
Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky., 969 S.W.2d
The rational relationship test should have been
the basis of the court’s analysis, not the success of the law
itself.
Having passed that rational relationship hurdle, we
therefore conclude the statute does not violate due process.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision.
VII. Whether the trial court
properly determined that KRS 159.051 violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the State and
Federal Constitutions.
The Calloway County Circuit Court also determined that
KRS 159.051 violates the Equal Protection Clause of our Federal
and State Constitutions.
That determination was made because the
statute applies only to a particular class of persons — 16 and
17-year-old students attending school in districts with
alternative school programs — while similarly situated students
are not affected by the law.
-21-
Before we can decide on the merits of this claim, we
must determine what type of review to apply to the facts.
Here,
the class of drivers under eighteen does not constitute a
“suspect class” under the law.
722 S.W.2d 602 (1987).
Praete v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
And, as previously discussed, a driver’s
license is not a fundamental right but a legitimately regulated
privilege.
Commonwealth v. Steiber, supra.
Because this claim
does not involve a suspect class or interfere with a fundamental
right, rational basis review will be applied.
Roberts v.
Mooneyhan, Ky. App., 902 S.W.2d 842, 844 (1995).
The rational basis standard requires that the
legislation “bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
end."
Chapman v. Gorman, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 232, 239 (1992).
Statutes that create differences in similar classes of people
“will be held invalid when these classifications are totally
unrelated to the state’s purpose in their enactment, and when
there is no other conceivable purpose for their continued
viability.”
Id. at 240.
In other words, "the proper test to be
applied under the equal protection clause and the cited sections
of the Kentucky Constitution is whether there is a rational basis
for the different treatment."
S.W.2d 522, 523 (1989).
Hooks v. Smith, Ky. App., 781
Applying this standard, we find KRS
159.051 to be constitutional.
It is true that applying the law only to students in
districts with alternative school programs treats those students
differently from students to whom the law does not apply.
-22-
Sometimes, as the Appellee pointed out, even two students living
within the same county may be treated differently under the law.
However, just because the students are treated differently does
not mean the law is unconstitutional.
In Kentucky and in the U.S., our courts show great
deference to the laws handed down by our legislatures.
The
Kentucky Supreme Court has said, “Our General Assembly, under the
Equal Protection Clause, has great latitude to enact legislation
that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently.”
Chapman, 839 S.W.2d at 239.
In 1995, this court said, “In
reviewing statutes enacted by the General Assembly we indulge in
the presumption that they are constitutionally valid.”
902 S.W.2d 842.
Roberts,
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized such
a legislative deference, remarking:
Defining the class of persons subject to a
regulatory requirement — much like
classifying governmental beneficiaries —
“inevitably requires that some persons who
have an almost equally strong claim to
favored treatment be placed on different
sides of the line, and the fact [that] the
line might have been drawn differently at
some points is a matter for legislative,
rather than judicial, consideration.”
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 315-6, 113 S.Ct. 2096,
2102, 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 61 U.S.L.W. 4526.
The purpose of KRS 159.051 is clearly to encourage
students to pass their courses and stay in school.
Appellants
have advanced several reasons for applying the law only in
certain districts, not the least of which is to avoid
-23-
discrimination against students who may not be able to succeed in
traditional education programs.
Appellee has repeatedly tried to paint alternative
schools as institution-like repositories for cast-offs and
discipline problems, but this is simply not true in every case.
Obviously, a rule such as this would be discriminatory in a
district where all students, regardless of their learning
abilities, were held to the same academic standards based on the
same curriculum.
By allowing the law only to apply in those
districts with options for differently-abled students — and then
applying the same law to those students based on their own
abilities — it seeks not to disadvantage any certain class of
students but to level an inherently uneven playing field.
This
classification is reasonably related to the purpose of the law
because the state has an interest in encouraging students to stay
in school and pass their courses, without discriminating against
students whose abilities may preclude them from doing so in a
standard high school atmosphere.
Based on this reason, and the
deference accorded to legislative actions, we find KRS 159.051
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Kentucky and
U.S. Constitutions.
The circuit court also decided that KRS 159.051
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was aimed solely
at 16 and 17-year-olds as opposed to any other high school age
group.
Again, we disagree.
The legislature is attempting to tie
the privilege of driving with academic accomplishment.
-24-
Since
students younger than 16 are not allowed to obtain drivers’
licenses under KRS 186.440, it would be impossible to achieve the
desired objective.
Using the rational basis test, we find it is
not only constitutional but imperative that KRS 159.051 apply to
16 and 17-year-olds instead of 14 and 15-year-olds.
This
classification is completely related to a legitimate state end,
and therefore, constitutional under the Kentucky and U.S.
Constitutions.
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the circuit
court.
Interestingly, the circuit court also determined that
KRS 159.051 infringed on the fundamental education rights of the
students in this Commonwealth, citing Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc., Ky. 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989).
We fail to see how a
law encouraging students to stay in school and make good grades
could infringe upon one’s educational rights, so therefore, we
are forced to summarily reject this finding.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that KRS 159.051,
known as the “No Pass-No Drive” statute, provides meaningful
judicial review, complies with procedural due process
requirements, does not violate substantive due process
requirements, and does not violate equal protection.
We further
hold that the Transportation Cabinet did not violate KRS Chapter
13A by issuing a memorandum changing the language on the form to
apply for an instruction permit.
-25-
Most importantly, however, we do find that KRS 159.051
violates FERPA. The attendant consequences rest not with this
court, but with the appropriate agencies of the Executive Branch.
The judgment of the Calloway Circuit Court is hereby
vacated and the matter remanded for entry of judgment consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mary R. Harville
Reed Weitkamp Schell & Vice
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Max W. Parker
Murray, KY
Robert V. Bullock
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael A. Owsley
Regina A. Jackson
English, Lucas, Priest &
Owsley
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Richard W. Jones
Hurt & Jones
Murray, Kentucky
-26-
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