PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC. v. MARY CARBONE; HON. DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000629-WC
PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-95-14724
v.
MARY CARBONE; HON. DONNA H. TERRY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The employer appeals an award of 30 percent
permanent partial disability in this workers’ compensation case.
The appellee, Mary Carbone (“Carbone”), developed post-traumatic
stress syndrome following a motor vehicle accident (“MVA”) in
which she was injured.
The employer contends that the
psychiatric condition did not arise out of a physical injury and
is not compensable under KRS 342.0011(1).
the Board.
We disagree and affirm
Carbone and her husband drove for Paschall Truck Lines,
Inc.
On April 9, 1995, they were involved in a MVA during a
blinding sandstorm.
Carbone testified:
Well, we came into a sand storm, and the
visibility was next to nothing. I hit a
tractor-trailer in front of me, and from that
impact, the entire cab busted loose off its
frame . . . . I had gotten pinned behind the
– the dashboard. My knees were up against
the dashboard. And I had my seatbelt on, and
this part of my body. . . that wasn’t held,
you know, went forward.
We had gotten hit four times from behind. . .
And everytime we got hit, it was . . . it was
back and. . . forth and then, you know, the
same thing which got repeated.
My wrist . . . I have trouble with my wrist
occasionally.
. . .
Right wrist, yeah, whenever – ‘cause when I
had the steering wheel, it - - the first
impact, it went up against the windshield,. .
. . My shoulder . . . and my knees. Both my
knees. I have trouble with my knees now.
. . .
And down into the right shoulder blade, you
know, into the back.
Carbone was told there were 52 vehicles in the pile up.
Nine people were under their trailer -– all fatalities.
were other fatalities as well.
There
Carbone was taken by ambulance to
the hospital where she was treated for multiple contusions and
abrasions and admitted overnight. Carbone followed up with her
family physician, Dr. Mintz, for her physical injuries.
Carbone
explained that during the second week of seeing him, Dr. Mintz
“could see that I was upset about the accident, and he told me
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that he wanted me to see somebody to talk about it.
And that was
Dr. Priori.”
Dr. Priori performed a psychiatric assessment on May
23, 1995.
Carbone was seen “because of the development of
emotional symptoms following the involvement in a catastrophic
traffic accident. . . .”
Carbone was injured in the accident.
Dr. Priori diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder.
Dr. Erskine, the employer’s evaluating psychiatrist,
noted that Carbone had been “formerly intact.”
He stated that
“[w]ith respect to the causal relationship between the patient’s
complaints and her auto injury, I feel that it was established
that there was a causal antecedent series of events, (stemming
from her auto accident of 4/9/95) responsible for the patient’s
The version of KRS 342.0011(1)1 in effect on the date
condition.
of injury provides:
(1) "Injury" means any work-related harmful
change in the human organism, arising out of
and in the course of employment, . . . .
"Injury" when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall include an
occupational disease, but shall not include a
psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related
change in the human organism, unless it is a
direct result of a physical injury.
The ALJ determined Carbone’s psychological condition
arising from the April 9, 1995 accident was compensable and
awarded 30 percent occupational disability.
1
The employer
Effective 12-12-96, KRS 342.0011(1) was amended. The amended
version provides: “Injury means any work-related traumatic
event or series of traumatic events, including cumulative
trauma, arising out of and in the course of employment which
is the proximate cause producing a harmful change in the
human organism evidenced by objective medical findings.”
The
remainder of the statute is unchanged.
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appealed to the Board which affirmed.
The Board concluded that
the “phrase, ‘physical injury’ as used in the . . . [statute],
means a physical incident resulting in a work-related harmful
change in the human organism including a psychiatric disorder in
the event it is directly attributable to a physical event.”
In its statement of material facts, appellant states
that Carbone “did not sustain permanent physical injury as a
result of the April 9, 1995 accident.”
Appellant proceeds to
argue that Carbone’s psychiatric condition cannot be considered
compensable, under KRS 342.0011(1), because “[t]here was no
‘physical injury.’”
Either appellant has grossly misstated the
facts or has confused the concept of injury with occupational
disability.
KRS 342.0011(1) does not require that a physical
injury result in permanent occupational disability, before a
psychiatric condition can be considered compensable.
“[T]he
definition of "injury" contained in KRS 342.0011(1) refers to any
work-related harmful change in the human organism, and does not
consider whether the change is occupationally disabling.”
Alcan
Foil Prods., v. Huff, Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96, 101 (1999).
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Sexton, 242
Ky. 266, 46 S.W.2d 87 (1932), a meat market employee contracted
tularaemia.
He became ill three days after dressing and skinning
a shipment of rabbits.
The employee did not cut himself while
working; however, he had an abrasion on his finger from splitting
kindling at home.
At issue was whether he had sustained a
compensable injury. Section 4880 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act provided that an “injury . . . shall not include diseases
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except where the disease is the natural and direct result of a
traumatic injury by accident.”
Id. at 88, (Emphasis added).
In determining that the employee had sustained a
compensable injury, the court explained:
In this case, appellee’s injuries may be
traced directly to his coming in contact with
meats laden with tularaemia germs. The time,
the place, and the cause of the injury are
determinable with reasonable certainty. As
an immediate result of the contact, symptoms
peculiar to the disease manifested
themselves.
. . .
This court . . . has consistently held that,
where the language of the Compensation Act is
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, it should
be liberally construed in favor of the
employee, thus giving effect to its humane
purposes.
Id., at 89-90.
This Court must follow the legislative directive that
“[a]ll statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a
view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the
legislature, . . . .”
KRS 446.080(1).
We agree with Carbone
that the legislature intended to exclude only “mental/mental”
claims from coverage, and not claims such as this where there is
a physical injury.
To conclude otherwise would produce an absurd
result, at odds with the humane purposes of the Workers’
Compensation Act.
Myopic exactitude in the construction of
statutes would produce many an unfortunate
and unintended result. An interpretation that
would produce an effect manifestly
inconsistent with sound public policy is to
be avoided unless it is utterly clear that
the legislature actually so intended. The
more unwise and unsound the result of a
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literal construction appears to be, the more
specifically must such an intention be
expressed in the statute in order for the
courts to be justified in construing it
literally. This is merely a corollary of the
rule that the courts will not give a strict
literal construction to a statute if it would
lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion.
[citation omitted].
Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1963).
Here, we have an employee who was injured in a
catastrophic MVA in the course and scope of her employment and
developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result.
As the ALJ
stated, the “instant situation is clearly not a mental/mental
case in which a claimant developed psychological complaints as
the result of perceived stress or other nonphysical cause.”
There was no evidence that Carbone’s complaints were incident to
anything but her employment.
psychiatric treatment.
Carbone had no prior history of
Both Dr. Prior and Dr. Erskine diagnosed
post-traumatic stress disorder arising from the April 9, 1995
incident.
We affirm the Board’s Opinion that Carbone’s condition
was compensable.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, MARY
CARBONE:
R. Christian Hutson
Paducah, Kentucky
Thomas A. Dockter
Bardstown, Kentucky
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