STEVEN SABO, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ELIJAH JOSEPH SABO, DECEASED v. K.C.'S REC. ROOM, INC. AND GORDAN DAX WORKMAN
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 27, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000283-MR
STEVEN SABO, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF
ELIJAH JOSEPH SABO, DECEASED
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00549
v.
K.C.'S REC. ROOM, INC. AND
GORDAN DAX WORKMAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Steven Sabo, administrator of the estate of
Elijah Joseph Sabo, deceased (Sabo), brings this appeal from a
January 28, 2000, order of the McCracken Circuit Court.
We
reverse and remand.
On November 29, 1996, Elijah Joseph Sabo, a pedistrian,
was struck and killed by a vehicle driven by Gordan Dax Workman.
Workman was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
On the
night of the wreck, Workman had been consuming alcohol at K.C.'s
Rec. Room.
Workman's automobile liability insurance limits were
paid to Sabo's estate.
Sabo instituted the present action.
Therein, Sabo alleged that K.C.'s Rec. Room was negligent in
continuing to serve and provide intoxicating alcoholic beverages
to Workman on the night of the accident.
K.C.'s Rec. Room filed
a third-party complaint against Workman.
Upon motion for summary judgment, the circuit court
dismissed the action as time barred by operation of Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.140(b).
Thereunder, an action for
personal injuries must be brought within one year of injury.
Summary judgment was based upon the fact that the instant action
was not filed within the one-year period.
Sabo disagreed and
argued the applicable statute of limitations for injuries arising
from motor vehicle accidents is KRS 304.39-230(6).
Therein, the
legislature provided a two-year limitation period for bringing
tort actions arising from motor vehicle accidents.
310 to 304.39-350.
KRS 304.39-
This appeal follows.
Sabo contends the circuit court committed error by
entering the summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate
where there exist no material issue of fact and movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CR 56; Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Resolution of this appeal revolves around but an issue of law -the applicable statute of limitations.
Sabo argues that the circuit court erroneously applied
the statute of limitations found in KRS 413.140.
We agree.
are of the opinion the applicable statute of limitations is,
indeed, KRS 304.39-230(6).
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We
In Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832 (1984), it was
held that the two-year statute of limitations was applicable to a
situation similar to the case at hand.
In that case, the driver
of a motor vehicle was injured when his truck struck a cow.
The
driver filed suit against the owner of the cow alleging
negligence in permitting the animal to stray upon the highway.
In holding that the two-year statute of limitations applied, the
Supreme Court stated:
The appellee argues that the two-year
statute of limitations, KRS 304.39-230(6), is
applicable only with respect to actions for
tort liability against an owner, operator or
occupant of a motor vehicle, but we find no
such limiting language in the Act. The
Section at issue states as follows:
An action for tort liability not
abolished by KRS 304.39-060 may be
commenced not later than two (2)
years after the injury, or the
death, or the last basic or added
reparation payment made by any
reparation obligor, whichever
occurs later. KRS 304.39-230(6).
If the legislature intended this
Section to be limited to “an action for tort
liability against an owner, operator or user
of a motor vehicle,” we must assume that such
language would have been expressed in this
Section of the statute.
. . . .
Further, there are a number of
situations where the victim of an automobile
accident has multiple claims against
different classes of litigants. For
instance, from the same accident caused by a
brake failure, an automobile victim may have
claims against a motorist, a garage
repairman, and an automobile manufacturer.
There are obvious inconsistencies and
litigation problems that would be created if
we were to interpret MVRA to carve out a
different statute of limitations in the claim
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against the motorist than would apply against
the repairman or manufacturer.
. . . .
The purview of the Act is motor vehicle
accident victims. In Gray [Floyd v. Gray,
Ky., 657 S.W.2d 936 (1983)] we decided that
strictly speaking the wife of a victim was
not, herself, an accident victim, and not
within the class whom the Act was designed to
protect. By the same reasoning, here the
plaintiff is the victim of the motor vehicle
accident and is within the class whom the Act
is designed to protect, regardless of whether
the tortfeasor is a motorist or a
nonmotorist.
We are also bolstered in our opinion by the holding in
Worldwide Equipment, Inc. v. Mullins, Ky. App., 11 S.W.3d 50, 59
(1999):
Moreover, the one-year statute of
limitations applicable to personal injury or
wrongful death, KRS 413.140(1)(a), operates
as a general statute of limitations.
[Footnote omitted.] It does not make
mention of motor vehicle accidents.
Conversely, KRS 304.39-230(6) is a special
statute of limitations, which is part and
parcel of an assimilated and extensive
statutory scheme (the MVRA), addressing the
rights and liabilities of persons involved
in motor vehicle accidents. Troxell v.
Trammell, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 525, 528 (1987).
Our rules of statutory construction are
that a special statute preempts a
general statute, that a later statute
is given effect over an earlier
statute, and that because statutes of
limitation are in derogation of a
presumptively valid claim, a longer
period of limitations should prevail
where two statutes are arguably
applicable. Thus the statutory
language in KRS 304.39-230(6) applies
rather than the statutory language in
KRS 413.140(1)(a) in the present
situation where the cause of action is
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both a motor vehicle accident and a
[wrongful death] claim.
In sum, we hold the circuit court erred as a matter of
law in determining that the instant action was time barred by KRS
413.140(b).
We perceive the applicable statute of limitations to
be KRS 304.39-230(6), which provides for a two-year period.
We
thus conclude summary judgment was improperly entered.
Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for proceeding
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, K.C.'S
REC. ROOM, INC.:
Rodger W. Lofton
Paducah, Kentucky
Tod D. Megibow
Paducah, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, GORDAN DAX
WORKMAN:
Van F. Sims
Paducah, Kentucky
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