BETTY HAMBY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000180-MR
BETTY HAMBY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-002257
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE: Appellant Betty Hamby (Hamby) was arrested and
charged with trafficking in a controlled substance.
The Appellee
Commonwealth of Kentucky (Commonwealth) charged that Hamby ran a
“crack house” at 5413 Ilex Avenue in Louisville.
Hamby denied
the assertion, and stated that she did not reside at that
address, but merely visited her mother there on occasion.
Detective Mark Watson, the witness for the Commonwealth,
testified at trial that he had kept the house under surveillance
on June 11, and that Hamby had been opening the door to the
residence and admitted persons for short visits.
Hamby denied
the Commonwealth’s assertion, and stated that she was not at the
house on the date that the Commonwealth had the residence under
surveillance.
The jury was instructed as to the charge of trafficking
in a controlled substance, pursuant to KRS 218A.1412, and the
lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance,
under KRS 218A.500.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on the
trafficking charge, but no verdict on the paraphernalia charge.
The parties then reached an agreement in which Hamby waived jury
sentencing and agreed to a sentence of seven years to serve, or
ten years probated. Hamby was sentenced to ten years, probated
for five years.
Hamby asserts that she was forced to use peremptory
challenges to remove jurors who should have been stricken for
cause.
Hamby was granted nine peremptory challenges, and used
all of them during jury selection.
Five jurors provided
responses to voir dire indicating that they might draw an adverse
inference from the defendant’s failure to testify at trial.
Juror Number 7 stated that he would believe a defendant was
holding something back if she didn’t testify.
Juror Number 57
stated that he would think a non-testifying defendant was guilty.
Juror Number 43 agreed with that statement.
Juror Number 66 said
that if the defendant did not testify, she would think that the
defendant was guilty.
Juror Number 105 stated that she thinks
that a defendant who was not guilty would want to testify and say
something on her behalf.
Jurors No. 138 and 99 agreed with this
statement by Juror Number 105.
Juror Number 138 also stated that
if the defendant did not testify and he heard evidence against
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her, he would think she was guilty.
The discussion between
counsel and the prospective jurors went as follows:
Juror 57: If she didn’t testify I would think
that she was guilty.
Counsel: You would think that she was guilty?
Juror 57: I would think so.
Counsel: Anyone else?
Juror 43: I feel the same way.
Counsel: So if the defendant testified you
would think she was holding something back?
Juror 43: If she didn’t testify.
Counsel: If she did not testify, yes.
would you think she was guilty if she
testified?
And
Juror 43: It would enter my mind.
Counsel: Okay, now that’s two different
things. It would enter your mind, but would
you think if she didn’t testify that she was
probably guilty?
Juror 43: Yes.
The discussion between counsel and Juror Number 105 also showed
that the prospective juror was inclined to ignore the required
presumption of innocence:
Juror 105: I believe that if she plead not
guilty I believe that she would want
to say something in her behalf.
Counsel: So if you think that if she was
pleading not guilty and that she didn’t
want to testify you would think that she
would want to testify? You would think
that if she didn’t testify that she was
hiding something? Or are you thinking that
maybe she is guilty if she didn’t want to
testify?
Juror 105: Yes.
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Following voir dire, defense counsel made a motion to
strike all five prospective jurors who had indicated that the
defendant’s failure to testify would affect their decision in the
case.
One of the jurors, Number 138, was struck for cause by the
trial court, who found that the juror had indicated he would
ignore the presumption of innocence if the defendant did not
testify.
The Commonwealth avers on appeal that Juror Number 43
was not qualified to sit, but argues that Juror Number 138, who
was stricken for cause by the trial court, may have been
qualified to sit.
No cross-appeal was filed by the Commonwealth.
The trial court denied the motion to strike for cause
regarding the other four jurors, Numbers 43, 66, 105 and 7.
Commonwealth struck Juror Number 66.
The
Hamby used one peremptory
challenge to strike Jurors Numbers 43, and 105.
The remaining
potentially biased juror, Number 7, sat on the jury in this case.
Hamby argues that the trial court erred in failing to remove
Jurors No. 43 and 105 for cause.
The Commonwealth agrees that
Juror Number 43 was not qualified, and states that “Clearly the
circuit court would have struck Juror 43 if Hamby had correctly
stated Juror 43 was the juror who could not honor the defendant’s
presumption of innocence.”
Juror Number 43 should have been stricken for cause,
and was not properly qualified to serve on the jury panel.
The
record also reflects that Jurors No. 7, 66, 105, and 138 should
also have been stricken for cause due to their failure to observe
the fundamental rule that the defendant’s election not to testify
should not be taken as evidence of guilt or innocence.
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During voir dire, an additional two jurors, Numbers 222
and 97 stated that they believed that police officers were more
credible than other witnesses.
Defense counsel made a motion to
strike these jurors for cause.
Defense counsel also argued that
Juror Number 222 knew many police officers personally and had
long been acquainted with Detective Watson, the Commonwealth’s
main witness at trial.
The juror stated that she had met
Detective Watson, but assured the Commonwealth that having met
Detective Watson was not “going to cause a problem” for her.
Juror Number 222's husband had also been a police officer for 23
years.
The trial judge knew Juror Number 222 from his work in
the Justice Administration Department at the University of
Louisville, stated that he knew that she was “extremely proprosecution”, and initially indicated that the challenge for
cause was appropriate.
Nevertheless Hamby’s motion was
ultimately denied by the trial court, with the Commonwealth’s
encouragement.
The trial court held that the jurors had answered
the questions in such a way that they were qualified to sit.
Hamby was forced to use two peremptory challenges to strike these
jurors.
The discussion between the Commonwealth and the trial
court indicates that the trial court suspected he should strike
Juror Number 222 for cause, but was dissuaded from doing so by
the prosecution.
Defense counsel requested that Juror Number 222
be stricken for cause due to her familiarity with the
prosecution’s main police witness, her job in justice
administration, and her stated belief that police officers were
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more credible than other witnesses.
The following colloquy
ensued:
Judge: You know, I don’t think your entitled
to it [striking the juror for cause]for that
reason, but I do know Ms. Friar because I am
on the Board out there at Justice
Administration and I’m gonna grant your
motion only because I know her situation,
she’s extremely pro-prosecution. . . .
Commonwealth: Your honor, that’s unfair, you
using your knowledge of her as to anything
she expressed here in court. She never once
expressed an opinion that she stated that she
would be unfair to the defendant in this
case. I think you can be extremely proprosecution and still be fair to the
defendant. I think I could still be a fair
juror even though I’m pro-prosecution. I
think that it is truly unfair for the
Commonwealth to be placed now to have to
argue against what you know from this woman
as to what she expressed in court.
Judge: You’re probably right on that. I
probably shouldn’t take into account what I
know.
Following denial of the motion to strike, Hamby exercised a
peremptory challenge to remove Juror Number 222 from the panel.
Hamby argues that where the judge has personal knowledge about a
juror, this knowledge should play a part in the court’s ruling on
a motion to strike for cause.
The Commonwealth argues that police officers and their
families are not automatically disqualified to serve as jurors in
criminal cases.
665 (1990).
See: Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d
The law requires that the defendant show something
more than a casual acquaintance between the juror and the police
to support a motion to strike for cause.
Sholler v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 706, 708 (1998).
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The Commonwealth
asserts that Juror 222 did not express any substantial bias
during voir dire, and for this reason the trial court was correct
in denying the motion to strike her for cause.
However, in light
of the totality of the challenged juror’s circumstances, as well
as the trial court’s personal knowledge of bias on the part of
the witness, whether or not she admitted such bias or was even
aware of it while under questioning, the proper course of action
is to strike the juror for cause.
Failure to do so was in error.
No such significant showing of bias or prejudice was made with
regard to Juror Number 97.
In absence of additional evidence, we
cannot hold that denial of the motion to strike that juror for
cause was in error.
The Commonwealth argues that where a prospective juror
has stated that he can decide the case impartially, any bias
suggested by previous answers is erased.
accordance with Kentucky law.
This argument is not in
The Courts have held that it makes
no difference whether jurors claim they can act in an unbiased
fashion.
“It is the probability of bias or prejudice that is
determinative in ruling on a challenge for cause. . . .”
Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 718 (1992).
The Kentucky Supreme Court has stated that:
The voir dire examination plays a critical
role in securing the right to an impartial
jury . . . While the peremptory challenge and
the challenge for cause serve the same end,
that of securing an impartial jury, they
offer the parties two distinct, although
complementary, methods of challenging biased
jurors. Both types of challenges are
important to the effort to obtain a fair
tribunal.
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Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (1993), citing
Betelsman & Phillips, Kentucky Practice, (Civil Rules) 4th Ed.,
Vol. 7, Rule 47.01(2) (1984).
As the Thomas Court went on to
say, “[t]he object of voir dire is to start the trial on a level
playing field; it is not a level playing field if there are
jurors on the panel who are predisposed to decide one way or the
other.”
Thomas v. Commonwealth, supra at 259 (emphasis in
original).
A challenge for cause should be made where “there is
reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence . . . .”
Humble v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 887 S.W.2d 567, 570 (1994).
The “determination of whether to exclude a juror for cause lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 405, 407 (1982).
Caldwell v.
The trial court
has discretion to determine whether to excuse a juror for cause,
and must make this decision based upon the particular facts and
circumstances in each case.
S.W.2d 556, 558 (1960).
Tayloe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335
We note that the trial court’s decision
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
953 S.W.2d 924, 932 (1997).
The Constitution entitles a defendant to a hearing by a
jury panel which is fair and impartial.
Ky., 809 S.W.2d 852, 853 (1991).
Dunbar v. Commonwealth,
The jury panel must be free
from bias and prejudice, actual, implied or inferred.
“This
principle of justice is as old as the history of the judicial
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system.”
Tayloe v. Commonwealth, supra at 558.
Where questions
arise about the composition of a jury panel, “doubt about
unfairness is to be resolved in [the defendant’s] favor.”
Fugate
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 931, 939 (1999), citing Randolph
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 253, 255 (1986).
“Even where
jurors disclaim any bias and state that they can give the
defendant a fair trial, conditions may be such that their
connection would probably subconsciously affect their decision in
the case.”
Farris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 451, 455
(1992), citing Randolph v. Commonwealth, supra.
Due to her
close connection with law enforcement, her stated belief that
police officers were more credible than private citizens, and the
trial court’s personal knowledge of her “extremely proprosecution” bias, Juror Number 222 should have been stricken for
cause.
The trial court’s denial of the motion to strike that
juror for cause was in error.
Hamby argues that because she was forced to use her
peremptory strikes to challenge jurors who should have been
stricken for cause, and because she was unable to strike one of
the unqualified jurors, who actually served on the panel, the
trial court’s actions were prejudicial.
As Hamby used all her
peremptory challenges during jury selection, including the four
used to eliminate jurors who should have been found unqualified
to sit, she argues that this establishes reversible error.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (1994).
Hamby
argues that there is no need to show prejudice because prejudice
is presumed by the Court.
Humble v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 887
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S.W.2d 567 (1994).
This Court has held that ”[t]o obtain a
reversal of a judgment based on failure of a trial court to grant
a challenge for cause, prejudice from the failure to strike the
challenged juror must be shown.
Prejudice is not demonstrated
unless the party challenging the juror is forced to exercise all
his peremptory challenges.”
S.W.2d 144, 147 (1990).
Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 805
In contrast with the laws of some other
states, Kentucky law presumes prejudice where a defendant is
forced to exercise all her peremptory challenges to excuse jurors
who should have been stricken for cause.
supra at 570.
Humble v. Commonwealth,
This Court held that “The longstanding rule in
Kentucky requires only that a party must exercise all of his
peremptory challenges in order to sustain a claim of prejudice
due to the failure of the court to grant a requested challenge
for cause.”
Id.
Hamby argues that at least one of the disputed
jurors, Juror Number 7, served on the jury which convicted Hamby
due to her lack of any additional peremptory strikes.
She
asserts that she was unable to fairly use her peremptory strikes
because all the strikes were used to remove jurors who should
have been stricken for cause.
Failure to remove a juror for
cause where implied or subconscious bias or prejudice has been
shown can constitute reversible error where the use of a
peremptory challenge to remove that juror “resulted in a
subsequent inability to remove further unacceptable jury panel
members.”
Farris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 451, 455
(1992), citing Smith v. Commonwalth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 444
(1987)
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The Commonwealth relies upon Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1988), and United States
v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S. Ct. 774, 145 L. Ed. 2d
792 (2000) as holding that requiring a defendant to remove
prospective jurors with peremptory strikes when the jurors should
have been stricken for cause does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
The defendants in the above-referenced
cases failed, however, to argue that an incompetent juror was
selected for the panel due to the exhaustion of their peremptory
challenges.
The United States Supreme Court indicated that such
factual circumstances might well have affected its ruling.
In the present case, Hamby has argued that incompetent
jurors were placed on the panel, or that the outcome of the case
was affected by the fact that she exhausted her peremptory
challenges on jurors who should have been stricken for cause.
Further, extensive citation to Kentucky law by Hamby shows that,
in this Commonwealth, the fact that a defendant has used all her
peremptory challenges to remove jurors who were unfit to serve
creates a presumption of prejudice.
Commonwealth, supra at 570.
See, e.g., Humble v.
As Hamby properly objected to the
failure to strike unfit jurors for cause, exhausted her
peremptory challenges before she could remove the final biased
juror, and was subsequently convicted of the felony offense, she
has met the burden of demonstrating prejudice.
Under such
circumstances, we hold that the failure to strike Jurors Number
7, 43, 105 and 222 for cause constitutes reversible error.
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Therefore, we reverse Jefferson Circuit Court’s judgment and
remand this matter for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce P. Hackett
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Jefferson
District Public Defender
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Kathryn H. Dunnigan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public
Defender of Counsel
Louisville, KY
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