TERRI TURNER; WILLIAM TURNER; SHERRY SEGER; SANDRA MOUNTS; DANNY MOUNTS; AND STACY WINDOWS (NOW COMBS) v. EXPRESS SERVICES, INC.
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 8, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000132-MR
TERRI TURNER; WILLIAM TURNER;
SHERRY SEGER; SANDRA MOUNTS;
DANNY MOUNTS; AND STACY
WINDOWS (NOW COMBS)
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-01296
v.
EXPRESS SERVICES, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, EMBERTON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
Terri Turner, William Turner, Sherry Seger, Sandra
Mounts, Danny Mounts, and Stacy Windows appeal from an order of
the Boone Circuit Court granting the summary judgment motion of
Express Services, Inc.
We affirm.
Express is a privately owned Colorado corporation, with
its principal place of business in Oklahoma, that is in the
business of franchising temporary personnel firms.
The franchise
agreement used by Express with its franchisees details the rights
and responsibilities of both Express and the franchisee.
CMS Services, Inc., is a Kentucky corporation owned and
operated by Charles Scroggin.
CMS is in the business of
providing temporary personnel services as a franchisee of
Express.
CMS and Express entered into the franchise agreement in
October, 1994.
Appellants were full-time employees of CMS:
Terri
Turner was the Marketing Manager; Sherry Seger was the Associate
Personnel Supervisor; Sandra Mounts was the Staffing Supervisor;
and Stacy Windows was the Personnel Supervisor.
On December 2, 1997, appellants filed a complaint
against CMS, Express, and Scroggin, individually and as president
of CMS, alleging that Scroggin had violated their civil rights by
sexually harassing them.1
complaint:
Appellants listed nine counts in their
(1) a sexually hostile work environment; (2) sexual
harassment; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4)
failure to provide a safe workplace; (5) negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (6) assault; (7) retaliation; (8) defamation;
and (9) loss of consortium.
They claimed that as a result of
Scroggin's conduct, they were all either discharged or
constructively discharged from employment with CMS.
They further
charged that Express was an employer within the meaning of
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 344.030, and that CMS and
1
William Turner and Danny Mounts, husbands of Terri Turner
and Sandra Mounts, respectively, were included as plaintiffs,
claiming loss of consortium.
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Scroggin were agents of Express as a result of the franchise
agreement.
The trial court granted motions by Scroggin and CMS
dismissing the first, second, and seventh counts as concerned
them, apparently concluding that Scroggin and CMS did not meet
the statutory definition of "employer" under KRS 344.030.
Express then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it
was not appellants' employer; no agency relationship existed
between Express and CMS or Scroggin; that even if the court found
an agency relationship, Express could not be held liable as
principal; and that it could not be held liable for acts of its
franchisee.
Appellants responded by arguing that Express and CMS
should properly be combined as a single employer, and that an
agency relationship existed between Express and both CMS and
Scroggin.
On December 16, 1999, the circuit court granted
summary judgment to Express.
This appeal followed.
Appellants advance three theories before this Court:
(1) Express and CMS are joint employers of appellants; (2)
Express and CMS should be considered a single employer of
appellants; and (3) an agency relationship existed between
Express and CMS and Scroggin.
Express notes that appellants did not argue the "joint
employer" theory before the trial court and should be prevented
from arguing it before this Court.
We agree.
As stated by
Justice Lukowsky, appellants "will not be permitted to feed one
can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate
court."
Kennedy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 219, 222
-3-
(1976).
Appellants claim in their reply brief that the joint
employer theory is merely an "extension" of the single employer
theory argued before the trial court, and argue that the trial
court erred by not finding that Express and CMS were joint
employers.
In their initial brief, however, they were careful to
distinguish between the two, and even indicated that courts
sometimes mislabel the "single employer" doctrine as that of a
joint employer.
The trial court did not err by failing to adopt
a theory that was not advanced before it, and neither will we
consider it.
See Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Bookstores, Inc.,
128 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1997)(court declined to address joint
employer doctrine where it had not previously been raised but
addressed single employer doctrine on the merits).
The single employer doctrine states that two distinct
companies can be so interrelated in their operations that they
are essentially acting as a single employer, subject to liability
under the civil rights laws.
KRS Chapter 344 was modeled after
the federal statute in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b), thus we can be guided in our
attempt to define "employer" as used in KRS 344.030 by federal
cases.
Palmer v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Ky., 882
S.W.2d 117, 119 (1994).
Four factors are used in determining
whether two entities are considered a single employer:
(1)
interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3)
centralized control of labor; and (4) common ownership or
financial control.
Id.; Evans v. McDonald's Corporation, 936
F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1991).
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The determination of what
constitutes an employer is made on a case-by-case basis applying
the four factors.
Palmer, 882 S.W.2d at 119.
"None of these
factors is conclusive, and all four need not be met in every
case.
Nevertheless, control over labor relations is a central
concern."
Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994 (citations omitted).
Examining the four factors as they apply to this case,
we are not persuaded that Express was appellants' employer.
While the franchise agreement required some interrelation between
Express and CMS for operating the business, those activities were
not so intermingled that they dissolved the distinctions between
the two entities or their individual functions.
The agreement
provided that CMS was solely responsible for its operational
expenses, including "payment of wages to [its] permanent
employees, taxes, insurance, advertising, rent, telephone, and
leased or rented equipment."
CMS kept records separate and
distinct from Express, although CMS was required to make those
records available to Express for review upon request.
The other
examples offered of related operations — temporary employees
placed on the Express payroll; invoices sent to clients as
Express invoices; purchasing office equipment and software from
Express; and maintaining a telephone listing in the name of
Express — are not indicia of interrelated operations, but rather
are typical of the nature of the franchisor/franchisee
relationship.
There is likewise no evidence of common management
between Express and CMS.
The companies are independently owned
and operated and share no common directors or boards.
-5-
While
Robert Fellinger, a regional representative for Express, might
have been present during the interview process for one of
appellants, there is no indication that he made the hiring
decision.
Both Scroggin and Fellinger indicated that the
decision was Scroggin's alone.
Many of the examples cited by
appellants as evidence of common management are also merely
indicative of the ordinary franchise relationship.
As the court recognized in Evans,
McDonald's did not exert the type of control
that would make it liable as an employer
under Title VII. McDonald's may have
stringently controlled the manner of its
franchisee's operations, conducted frequent
inspections, and provided training for
franchise employees. The record also
indicates, however, that McDonald's did not
have control over Everett Allen's labor
relations with his employees. McDonald's did
not have financial control over Everett
Allen's franchises. Outside of the necessary
control over conformity to standard
operational details inherent in many
franchise settings, McDonald's only real
control over Everett Allen was its power to
terminate his franchises.
Evans, 936 F.2d at 1090.
See also Palmer, 882 S.W.2d at 119.
As indicated in Swallows, supra, control over labor
relations is central to determining single employer status.
We
can not find that Express asserted control over CMS in such a
manner that would make Express and CMS a single employer.
The
central decision in labor relations — whether to hire or fire an
employee — rested with Scroggin, not with Express.
In Swallows,
the court noted that while Tennessee Technological University
(TTU) had a voice in certain employment decisions at Barnes &
Noble, the independent contractor managing the campus bookstore,
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TTU did not control those decisions in such a manner that would
transform the two entities into a single employer.
995.
128 F.3d at
Similarly, while Express may have formulated some policies
which CMS subsequently adopted, that is not indicia of sufficient
control to make these two corporations a single employer.
Likewise, there is no evidence of common ownership or
financial control that would make Express and CMS a single
employer.
"If neither of the entities is a sham then the fourth
test is not met."
Swallows, 128 F.3d at 995 (quoting EEOC v.
Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566, 572 (6th
Cir. 1984).
is a sham.
There is no evidence that either of these entities
Weighing all four factors, the circuit court
correctly found that Express and CMS were not a single employer.
Appellants remaining argument is that Scroggin and CMS
were agents of Express, and therefore as principal Express is
liable for the actions of its agents.
Unfortunately, there is no
help for appellants in this theory either.
agreement clearly prevents agency.
First, the franchise
Section XIV.A. of the
franchise agreement states:
It is understood that [CMS is] an independent
contractor. Nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to constitute [CMS] as
[Express's] employee, agent, or
representative or to constitute [CMS] and
[Express] as partners, or joint venturers,
legal representatives, general or special
agents, employees or servants of the other
for any purpose.
Even if we were persuaded by the agency argument, the
actions for which appellants complain fall outside of any
conceivable agency relationship.
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"A principal is not liable for
the torts of an agent, unless the tort committed was under the
instruction of the principal, or within the apparent authority of
the agent."
Home Insurance Co. v. Cohen, Ky., 357 S.W.2d 674,
676 (1962).
Scroggin's actions were not committed in the course
of his employment, they were not committed under the instruction
of Express, and they were not within his apparent authority.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Civil Procedure 56.03.
Kentucky Rules of
"[A] party opposing a properly supported
summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without presenting at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial."
Steelvest, Inc. v Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (1991).
Appellants presented no affirmative evidence which would satisfy
the four factor test enunciated in Palmer and Evans, thus Express
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The judgment of the Boone Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William C. Knapp
Cincinnati, Ohio
Kenneth S. Handmaker
Louisville, Kentucky
Margo L. Grubbs
Covington, Kentucky
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