CASTILLE, INC. V. VIRGIL BASS; HONORABLE RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 21, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003153-WC
CASTILLE, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-92-41154
VIRGIL BASS;
HONORABLE RONALD W. MAY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Castille, Inc. (Castille) appeals from an
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board) entered
December 10, 1999, which affirmed an opinion, award and order
entered by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on July 22, 1999,
finding Virgil Bass (Bass) to be totally disabled.
We affirm.
Bass sustained a work-related back injury on October
17, 1991, while employed by Castille.
Bass filed a claim for
benefits which was ultimately settled on July 30, 1993, for a
lump sum payment of $25,386.27 representing a 28% occupational
disability rating.
Neither party joined the Special Fund to
Bass’s original claim for benefits.
On July 30, 1998, Bass filed a motion to reopen his
prior claim on the ground that his occupational disability had
increased since the time he settled his original claim.
Although
the Special Fund was not a party to the original claim, it was
listed as a defendant on the motion to reopen.
reopen was granted.
The motion to
Bass submitted testimony and/or medical
records from Dr. George Raque (Dr. Raque) and Dr. Gregory Gleis
(Dr. Gleis).
Castille submitted medical records from Dr. Martyn
Goldman (Dr. Goldman).
Dr. Raque testified by deposition.
He stated that a CT
scan and MRI of Bass’s lumbar spine taken five months after his
original injury showed degenerative disc disease at L4-5.
In Dr.
Raque’s opinion, this condition predated his injury because
“[t]hat kind of thing takes years to form[,] [i]t doesn’t form in
five months.”
According to Dr. Raque, the pre-existing
degenerative changes at L4-5 were aroused into disabling reality
as a result of the 1991 injury and contributed to his injury and
current impairment.
Neither Dr. Gleis nor Dr. Goldman noted the
existence of any pre-existing degenerative condition.
In an opinion and award entered July 22, 1999, the ALJ
found Bass to be totally disabled.
As to whether any portion of
the reopening award could be apportioned to the Special Fund
based on the testimony of Dr. Raque, the ALJ held:
The Special Fund was not a party to the
original proceeding and apparently became a
party to this reopening procedure because the
plaintiff erroneously listed the Special Fund
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as a party on his motion to reopen. Any
attempt to apportion liability to the Special
Fund on this reopening is now barred by the
statute of limitations. Although I find no
order joining the Special Fund, out of an
abundance of precaution the ALJ shall include
an order dismissing the Special Fund from
this case.
In an order denying Castille’s petition for reconsideration, the
ALJ stated:
Neither plaintiff nor the employer thought it
necessary from 1991 through the settlement .
. . to join the Special Fund as a party on
the basis of the medical [sic] then
available. The ALJ was not persuaded by a
medical opinion, made six years after the
fact, that plaintiff’s disability was due in
part to injury arousal of a pre-existing
dormant condition.
The Board affirmed and this appeal followed.
Castille maintains that the ALJ erred in failing to
apportion liability for the award obtained on reopening based on
the testimony of Dr. Raque.
We disagree.
We agree with Castille that under the dictates of
Dickerson v. Twentieth Century Hoov-R-Line, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 365
(1995), an employer cannot be held liable for the Special Fund’s
share of an award when there has been no joinder of the Special
Fund to the action.
In that case, neither the claimant nor the
employer moved to join the Special Fund despite the fact that
both were aware that overwhelming evidence supported the
existence of a pre-existing condition which was aroused into
disabling reality as a result of the injury.
In holding that the
employer could not be held responsible for the Special Fund’s
portion of the award, the Court stated:
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In 1982, the scheme for payment of workers’
compensation benefits which is set forth in
KRS 342.120 was amended. Since that time,
the employer has paid the injured employee
only to the extent of its own liability, and
the Special Fund has paid its liability
directly to the worker. Therefore, the
employer and the Special Fund are now in the
posture of co-defendants . . . and the
liability of the Special Fund is considered
to be direct and not derivative. Palmore v.
Helton, Ky., 779 S.W.2d 196 (1989). As codefendants, neither the employer nor the
Special Fund bears responsibility for the
other’s liability, As between the employer
and the Special Fund, there is no third party
defense.
Workers’ compensation proceedings are
adversarial in nature, and it is the
responsibility of each party to protect its
own interests. As in any other adversarial
procedure, a plaintiff cannot rely upon a
named defendant to join another defendant who
is directly liable to the plaintiff.
Although it is often the employer who joins
the Special Fund, KRS 342.120(2) provides
that either claimant or the employer could
have moved to have the Special Fund named a
party to the claim. As noted by the Board
and the Court of Appeals, claimant was aware
of the contents of Dr. Donleu’s testimony at
the time of his deposition, had sufficient
time thereafter to move for joinder of the
Special Fund in compliance with KRS
342.120(2), and had an obligation to protect
her own interests by moving to name the
Special Fund as a party to the claim. Under
these circumstances, we are not persuaded
that the equitable relief which she requests
is justified.
Dickerson, Ky., 893 S.W.2d at 367-368 (1995).
See also Leistner
v. Concession Air, Inc., Ky. 892 S.W.2d 567 (1995).
However, the
difference between Dickerson and the case at hand is that in this
case there is no overwhelming evidence to support Castille’s
assertion that Bass had a pre-existing dormant condition which
was aroused into disabling reality by the injury.
-4-
As both the ALJ and the Board pointed out, Dr. Raque is
the only doctor to state that Bass’s injury aroused a preexisting condition into disabling reality.
Neither Dr. Gleis nor
Dr. Goldman noted the existence of a pre-existing condition.
Thus, we agree with the Board that the ALJ’s opinion was
supported by substantial evidence, and adopt the following
portion of the Board’s opinion as our own:
The claimant in a workers’ compensation claim
bears the burden of proving each of the
essential elements of his claim. Snawder v.
Stice, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Where the party that does not bear the burden
of proof is unsuccessful before the ALJ, the
question on appeal is whether the ALJ’s
opinion is supported by substantial evidence.
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673
S.W.2d 735 (1984). Substantial evidence is
defined as evidence of relevant consequence,
having the fitness to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable persons. Smyzer v.
B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d
367 (1971). It is not enough for Castille to
show that there is merely some evidence which
would support a contrary conclusion. McCloud
v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46
(1974). As long as the ALJ’s opinion is
supported by any evidence of substance, we
may not reverse. Special Fund v. Francis,
Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
The ALJ, as fact finder, has the sole
authority to determine the weight,
credibility, substance, and inferences to be
drawn from the evidence. Paramount Foods
Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418
(1985). Where the medical evidence is
conflicting, the ALJ may choose whom and what
to believe. Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers, Ky.,
547 S.W.2d 123 (1977). The ALJ may choose to
believe parts of the evidence and disbelieve
other parts, even when it comes from the same
witness or the same party’s total proof.
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky.,
560 S.W.2d 15 (1977).
. . . .
-5-
Initially, the ALJ stated that he was
dismissing the Special Fund because it was
not a party to the original claim and that
any claim would now be barred by limitations.
In response to Castille’s petition for
reconsideration, the ALJ stated that he was
simply unpersuaded by Dr. Raque’s testimony
made six years after the fact that Bass had a
pre-existing condition that had been aroused
into disabling reality by his 1991 injury.
The ALJ further noted that neither party
thought it necessary to join the Special Fund
as a party based upon the medical evidence
available during the pendency of the original
claim.
Castille is correct that the only explicit
evidence concerning the arousal of a preexisting condition is Dr. Raque’s statement
that degenerative conditions were present
prior to the 1991 injury and were aroused by
that injury. However, both Dr. Goldman and
Dr. Gleis reviewed medical reports and
imaging studies. Neither doctor diagnosed
any pre-existing condition. The ALJ is
empowered to draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence. Jackson v. General
Refractories Co., Ky., 581 S.W.2d 10 (1979).
Where the issue is the existence or
nonexistence of a medical condition, we do
not believe that it is unreasonable for the
ALJ to conclude that a physician will
diagnose all conditions which he feels are
present. Therefore, in this case, we believe
that the fact that neither Dr. Goldman nor
Dr. Gleis diagnosed any pre-existing dormant
condition that was aroused by the 1991 injury
is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
finding that there were no pre-existing
dormant conditions that were aroused by the
1992 injury.
Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
L. J. Hollenbach
Louisville, KY
Charles Ched Jennings
Louisville, KY
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