ROBERT G. COLSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 3, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002834-MR
ROBERT G. COLSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Robert G. Colson brings this appeal from a
November 15, 1999, judgment and sentence of the Calloway Circuit
Court, sitting without jury.
We reverse.
Our gleaning of the record generally reveals the
following: On January 11, 1999, Colson was indicted for
possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense).
Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.500(2).
On February 11, 1999, Colson
filed a motion to suppress evidence.
The evidence consisted of
what was referred to as “rolling papers (rice papers)” found in
search of Colson's person.
It was this material upon which
Colson was prosecuted for possession of drug paraphernalia.
On March 22, 1999, the court held a suppression
hearing.
During the hearing, Officer Chris Garland and Officer
Doug Chaney testified about the events surrounding the seizure on
October 29, 1998.
Officer Garland testified that he was the
first officer to arrive at the scene around 5:30 p.m.
He stated
that he saw a white pickup truck, appearing to have mechanical
trouble.
Officer Garland pulled up behind the truck and turned
on his warning lights to warn other traffic.
into a parking lot and stopped.
The pickup pulled
Officer Garland did likewise.
Officer Garland stated that he got out of his patrol car and
offered his assistance to the driver, a person later identified
as one Michael Duncan.
He stated that Colson was a passenger.
Duncan said that he wanted to try to get the car home.
Garland called Officer Chaney to the scene.
Officer
Because Officer
Garland was not a certified patrolman, it was up to Officer
Chaney to decide whether the vehicle was safe to return to the
road.
Officer Chaney arrived and decided that the occupants
should try to fix the vehicle in the parking lot or to call a tow
truck.
Officer Chaney did not want Duncan to take the ailing
vehicle back onto the road.
When the two men began working on
the vehicle, Officer Chaney took a “quick glance” into the cab of
the truck through the driver's window and noticed Duncan giving
him “some odd looks.”
Based upon the suspicion created by
Duncan's action, Officer Chaney had the following conversation
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with him.
He asked if Duncan had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons
in the vehicle.
In response thereto, Officer Chaney stated that
Duncan said “I have some marijuana” and pulled out a tin
container containing marijuana seeds, marijuana, and
paraphernalia.
At this time, Colson was working under the vehicle.
Officer Chaney placed Duncan under arrest and seated him in the
patrol car.
Officer Chaney then proceeded to look through the
vehicle which was owned by Duncan.
the vehicle during this time.
Colson remained underneath
Officer Chaney asked another
officer who had arrived on the scene, Patrolman Scott Svebakken,
to stand by Colson, who was still working on the vehicle.
He did
this as a precaution because he thought something might be found
in the vehicle implicating Colson.
As Officer Chaney looked
through the vehicle, he discovered a leather portfolio bag
between the gear shift and passenger seat.
Upon examining the
contents of the vehicle, Officer Chaney also found a loaded
revolver, a knife, and three or four bags of marijuana.1
Chaney testified under direct examination as follows:
Commonwealth:
Chaney:
1
What did you do once you
found those items?
Once I found the firearm and
the other bags of marijuana
in a possession where Officer
Garland said both of the
people were sitting, I had
Officer Svebakken cuff Mr.
Colson, or Mr. Duncan, excuse
me, and uh placed him under
arrest also. And upon
patting down Mr. Duncan,
There was also within the vehicle a can of tobacco.
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Officer
found a pack of rolling
papers on his person in his
back right pocket . . .
West:
Excuse me your honor, he said
Mr. Duncan, did he mean Mr.
Colson? Sorry to interrupt.
Judge:
Yes, I'm curious, too.
Commonwealth:
Mr. Duncan? I thought you
had already placed him under
arrest?
Chaney:
Correct.
Commonwealth:
So who did you pat down after
you found the guns or gun and
marijuana?
Chaney:
I patted down Mr. Colson,
excuse me.
Commonwealth:
This person over here?
(motioning towards defense
table.)
Chaney:
Yes Ma'am.
During Colson's cross-examination of Officer Chaney,
the following transpired:
West:
What if anything did you use
as a basis for searching Mr.
Colson?
Chaney:
Upon finding the items inside
the vehicle placed where both
people, as stated by Officer
Garland, had been seated I
arrested him for the same
charges and upon further
investigation I found out
that Mr. Duncan claimed
responsibility for the
marijuana and the firearm,
however, like I said I did
detect an odor of marijuana
in the vehicle.
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. . . .
Chaney:
The reason Mr. Colson was
searched is that he was
placed under arrest.
West:
What was the reason you
placed him under arrest?
Chaney:
For all of the items that
were found in the vehicle and
for what, the items he had on
his person.
West:
But you didn't find the items
on his person until after you
placed him under arrest.
Chaney:
Correct.
West:
So why did you place him
under arrest?
Chaney:
I initially was going to
charge everyone with what was
found inside the vehicle.
Mr. Colson asked me if, you
know, we could find out who
it belonged to. Michael
Duncan claimed that it was
his . . .
West:
At the point in time . . .
Chaney:
I didn't see any point in
charging . . . (inaudible
because Mr. West is speaking
over Officer Chaney).
West:
At the point in time you
placed Mr. Colson under
arrest, Mr. Duncan had
already told you that all
that other stuff was his.
Chaney:
No sir, it was after I
arrested him.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, Colson's counsel
argued that the search abridged his constitutional rights.2
On
March 31, 1999, the circuit court denied Colson's motion to
suppress.
The court concluded that at some point in time it
became clear that the officers had probable cause to arrest
Colson, and that the search of his person discovered “rolling
papers” which formed the basis for his indictment for second
offense possession of drug paraphernalia.
On July 21, 1999,
after a bench trial, the court found Colson guilty of possessing
drug paraphernalia (rolling papers).
On November 15, 1999, the
court sentenced Colson to three years' imprisonment, thus
precipitating this appeal.
The Commonwealth claims the search of Colson was
incident to a lawful arrest and perforce the evidence was
admissible.
Colson argues the seizure of the material from his
hip pocket was improper and should have been excluded by the
circuit court.
In the order denying suppression, the circuit court
concluded as follows:
1. The facts are very simple in that
Defendant and another individual were in
another automobile which was marked in a
parking lot. A local police officer stopped
to render assistance to the individuals and
called for another officer to assist him with
this matter. When this occurred, the officer
saw contraband in plain view and discussed it
2
Our federal and state constitution protections are coextensive. See Holbrook v. Knopf, Ky., 847 S.W.2d 52 (1993).
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with the individuals, including the
Defendant.
2. At some point, it became clear that
the officers had probable cause to arrest the
Defendant and his co-defendant. During a
search incident to a lawful arrest, rolling
papers were found on the Defendant, and the
Defendant was subsequently indicted for
second offense Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia.
3. The Court is of the opinion that
because the search was incident to a lawful
arrest, that Defendant is not entitled to
suppression, and hence Defendant's Motion is
DENIED. (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing, the circuit court obviously
considered the search of Colson as incident to his arrest.
From
Officer Chaney's testimony, Colson's arrest was based upon the
contraband found in the vehicle -- marijuana, knife, and
revolver.
We, therefore, look to the validity of the arrest in
determining whether the seizure from his person was permissible.
His arrest was, of course, without a warrant.
Under the law of
this Commonwealth, a police officer may make an arrest without a
warrant “when he has probable cause to believe that the person
being arrested has committed a felony.”
KRS 431.005(1)(c).
Of
course, probable cause must exist and must be known by the
arresting officer at the time of the arrest.
It is not
sufficient that probable cause is founded upon retrospect after
viewing evidence.
See Sampson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 609 S.W.2d
355 (1980).
It is well established that a person who owns or
exercises dominion or control over a motor vehicle is legally
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deemed to possess any contraband found therein.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 765 S.W.2d 24 (1988).
See Paul v.
In the case at
hand, there is no evidence that Colson owned or exercised
dominion or control over the vehicle; rather, the evidence
established that Colson was a mere passenger.
Moreover, the
evidence fails to establish that Colson exercised dominion or
control over the contraband found in the vehicle so as to be in
constructive possession of same.
In fact, Colson was never
charged with a crime growing out of the contraband seized from
the vehicle.
Officer Chaney apparently concluded that the seized
contraband belonged to Duncan, the owner of the vehicle.
In Paul at 26, the Court concluded that “a person's
mere presence in the same car with a criminal offender does not
authorize an inference of participation in a conspiracy.”
We
simply do not believe that probable cause existed to arrest
Colson based upon the contraband found in the vehicle.
As such,
we view the search incident to Colson's arrest as improper.
It has also been suggested that the search of Colson
was proper under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889 (1968), accord, Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 592
S.W.2d 134 (1979).
In Terry, the Court recognized an exception
of the warrant requirement by sanctioning both investigatory
stops and limited pat-down searches of suspects.
When there is
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, a police
officer may briefly detain an individual on the street even
though there exist no probable cause to arrest him.
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Id.
Terry
also acknowledged the legitimacy of a police officer taking steps
to assure himself that a person with whom he is dealing is not
armed and dangerous by permitting a limited search for weapons.
In Commonwealth v. Crowder, Ky, 884 S.W.2d 649, 651
(1994), our Supreme Court examined a Terry pat-down seizure:
[T]he premise of Terry is that an officer
will be able to detect the presence of a
weapon through the sense of touch when the
police “pats down a suspect’s outer clothing
and feels an object whose contour or mass
makes its identity immediately apparent,
there has been no invasion of the suspect’s
privacy beyond that already authorized by the
officer’s search for weapons; if the object
is contraband, its warrantless seizure would
be justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain view
context.” . . . [Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 375-376, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L.
Ed. 2d 334 (1993)] (footnote omitted). Thus,
if the non-threatening contraband is
immediately apparent from the sense of touch,
during an otherwise lawful patdown, an
officer should not be required to ignore it.
See e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).
(Emphases added.)
In the case at hand, we do not believe that the rolling
papers constituted “non-threatening contraband” that was
“immediately apparent from the sense of touch.”
Simply stated,
we do not believe that the contour and mass of the rolling papers
made their identity immediately apparent as contraband.
A
syringe or certain other drug paraphernalia could be readily
identified as contraband by an officer's touch; however, the
contour and mass of rolling papers are simply not uniquely
distinctive of contraband.
Considering the totality of
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circumstances, we are of the opinion that the seizure of rolling
papers from Colson was unconstitutional.
See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).
In sum, the circuit court erred by failing to exclude
from evidence the rolling papers seized from Colson's person.
Under the precepts of Johantgen v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 571 S.
W.2d 110 (1978), we reverse as a conviction is impossible absent
the unconstitutionally seized rolling papers.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Calloway
Circuit Court is reversed.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Shaw
Richmond, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Kathryn H. Dunnigan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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