JOSEPH MCCLURE HARRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 20, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001711-MR
JOSEPH MCCLURE HARRIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-00105
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
This is an opinion affirming in part, and
reversing in part, the sentencing order of the Fayette Circuit
Court.
Appellant Joseph McClure Harris entered a plea of
guilty to a charge of flagrant non-support.
He was sentenced to
two and one-half years imprisonment, probated for three years.
As terms of probation, Harris was required to enter an in-patient
drug treatment program and remain current in his child support
payments.
At Harris’ request, the court agreed to drop the in-
house drug treatment program requirement which was modified to
require Harris to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous meetings.
The sentence was rendered in 1994 and
modified in 1995.
A probation revocation hearing was held in 1997.
Harris was in arrears in his child support payments at that time.
The probation was extended until June, 2000.
In 1998, Harris was
arrested for trafficking in a controlled substance, loitering,
and criminal trespass in the third degree.
Harris failed to
appear for a probation revocation hearing and a warrant was
issued for his arrest on July 16, 1998.
The Division of
Probation and Parole made a motion that Harris’ probation be
revoked as a result of his failure to pay child support, failure
to report to his probation officer, and failure to report the new
charges against him.
on August 21, 1998.
A second warrant for his arrest was issued
A Fayette County detainer was placed upon
him on December 12, 1998.
In January 1999, Harris entered a plea of guilty to the
new non-felony charges against him.
A probation revocation
hearing was set for March 26, 1999.
That hearing was continued
at Harris’ request.
On April 22, 1999, Harris filed a motion to
dismiss the Commonwealth’s probation revocation request due to
the trial court’s non-compliance with KRS 533.040(3).
The trial
court overruled Harris’ motion to dismiss, and ordered Harris to
serve the original sentence consecutively with any other felony
sentence.
Harris appealed the trial court’s order.
KRS 533.040(3) provides that a defendant has a
statutory right to a probation revocation hearing within ninety
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days after being detained for a violation of probation.
This
statute holds, in pertinent part:
The revocation [of probation] shall take
place prior to parole under or expiration of
the sentence of imprisonment or within ninety
(90) days after the grounds for revocation
first come to the attention of the Department
of Corrections, whichever
occurs first.
The phrase “whichever comes first” is to insure that the
Department of Corrections act quickly to revoke sentences of
probation.
Sutherland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 910 S.W.2d 235, 237
(1995).
The trial court held, in its order denying motion to
dismiss, that at the time the arrest warrants were issued for
Harris his whereabouts were unknown, and the arrest warrants
could not be served upon him.
The trial court cited Sutherland,
supra, as showing that KRS 533.040(3) does not preclude a court
from conducting a parole revocation hearing after the ninety day
period has expired.
We concur, and find that Harris was not
entitled to dismissal of the probation revocation proceeding.
That portion of the trial court’s ruling is affirmed.
Harris argued, in the alternative, that the sentence
which was probated should run concurrently with any other
sentence he may have to serve.
review on appeal.
This argument is preserved for
KRS 533.040(3) holds that the probated
sentence shall run concurrently with any other sentence after the
ninety day period has expired.
KRS 533.060 holds that probated
sentences run consecutively with sentences on new charges only
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where the more recent conviction is for a felony offense.
The
statute states that:
When a person has been convicted of a felony
and is committed to a correctional detention
facility and is released on parole or has
been released by the court on probation,
shock probation, or conditional discharge,
and is convicted or enters a plea of guilty
to a felony committed while on parole,
probation, shock probation or conditional
discharge, the person shall not be eligible
for probation, shock probation or conditional
discharge and the period of confinement for
that felony shall not run concurrently with
any other sentence.
Sentences shall be run consecutively, rather than
concurrently, where the newer sentence is for a felony offense.
Brewer v. Commonwealth, 922 S.W.2d at 382.
Harris asserts that he did not plead guilty to a felony
offense.
The trial court’s order revoking probation cites only
the charge of probation violations.
No felony offense is found
in the record on appeal. The Commonwealth claims that Escape II,
to which Harris pleaded, is a Class B felony, pursuant to KRS
520.030.
The Commonwealth claims that the plea agreement on the
Escape II charge is omitted from the record, but that any such
omission is the fault of the appellant.
As a general rule,
Kentucky law holds that a silent record supports the finding of
the trial court.
144-45 (1985).
Commonwealth v. Thompson, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 143,
However, no order issued by the trial court dealt
with the propriety of the consecutive sentencing, or the
existence of the felony conviction referred to by the
Commonwealth.
Escape in the Second Degree is a Class D felony.
Class D felony convictions and misdemeanor convictions may be
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viewed more leniently by the trial court in the exercise of its
discretion as they are non-violent offenses.
Harris claims that the Sutherland ruling was incorrect
in determining that the two general statutes, KRS 533.020(1) and
KRS 533.050, take precedence over the more specific statute, KRS
533.040(3).
KRS 533.040 deals with the remedy available to a
defendant when a revocation proceeding does not take place in a
speedy manner.
Harris argues that this statute provides that
when revocation proceedings do not take place in a timely
fashion, the revoked sentence must run concurrently, rather than
consecutively, with any new or additional sentence.
v. Commonwealth, supra, at 237.
Sutherland
Recognizing that KRS 533.060(2)
mandated that individuals who commit other crimes while on
probation are to be denied probation, shock probation, or parole,
and that concurrent sentencing is forbidden under such factual
circumstances, the Sutherland court stated:
Reading KRS 533.040(3) within the context of
the entire legislative scheme, it appears to
be the legislative intent to require the
Department of Corrections to push for
revocation proceedings in a speedy manner, if
any subsequent term of sentence is to be
served consecutive to any time spent in
incarceration as a result of a revocation of
probation.
Id., at 237.
The Court ruled that if the ninety day period
expired, the directive found in KRS 533.060(2) could not be
applied to require consecutive sentencing.
The Court held “it
is the Legislature which provided the 90-day time limitation. . .
the statute provides that any revocation of probation (which
-5-
occurs outside of the 90-day period) is to be run concurrently
with any other offense.”
Id.
This Court has affirmed that:
Although concurrent sentencing is the general
rule, KRS 533.040(3) creates an exception for
cases in which probation is revoked. By
providing this exception, the General
Assembly has implied that consecutive
sentencing is an option when
probation is revoked within the required
ninety day period.
Warren v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 981 S.W.2d 134, 137 (1998),
citing Snow v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 927 S.W.2d 841 (1996).
Thus, when judgment was rendered on the earlier conviction, the
Commonwealth had ninety days to hold a revocation hearing.
If
the hearing date fell after that ninety day period, then KRS
533.040(3) requires that the probated sentence run concurrently
with any new sentence.
Snow v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 927
S.W.2d 841, 841-43 (1996).
The Court in Warren v. Commonwealth,
supra, discussed the impact of KRS 533.040(3) on other statutes
relating to sentencing, and held that:
Even though Snow involved revocation of a
probated felony sentence following conviction
for a misdemeanor offense, rather than the
reverse, the language of KRS 533.040(3) would
readily apply in either situation. . . . As
the court in Snow v. Commonwealth, supra.,
held, KRS 533.040(3) is more specifically
directed toward situations involving the
running of revoked sentences and therefore
takes precedence over the more general KRS
532.110(1) in these cases.
Id. at 137.
Similarly, we find that KRS 533.040(2), relating
directly to the fact pattern at issue here, should take
precedence over the more general KRS 533.060(2).
In the present case, a detainer was placed upon Harris
on December 12, 1998.
Harris plead guilty to the Jefferson
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County offenses on January 20, 1999.
He was not scheduled to be
brought before the Fayette Circuit Court for a revocation hearing
until March 26, 1999, more than ninety days after the initial
detainer.
For this reason, the sentence rendered by the Fayette
Circuit Court in the probation revocation proceeding should be
reversed with regard to that portion of the order holding that
the Fayette Circuit Court sentence is to run consecutively with
the Jefferson Circuit Court sentence.
The case shall be remanded
for a sentencing order consistent with this opinion.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART AND
FURNISHES SEPARATE OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
I concur with the majority in its opinion that Harris was
not entitled to a dismissal of the probation revocation
proceeding.
However, I must dissent as to that portion of the
opinion which determined that the sentences should not run
consecutively.
I believe that when both statutory law and case
law is applied to the facts of the case, the probation revocation
hearing was timely held.
As such, the trial court properly ran
Harris’s time consecutively.
Therefore, I would affirm the trial
court’s order.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alicia A. Sneed
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
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Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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