RONALD STOKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000530-MR
RONALD STOKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HUGH W. ROARK, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 88-CR-00142, 89-CR-00004,
AND 89-CR-00008
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, KNOPF, and TACKETT, Judges.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order of the Hardin
Circuit Court denying Ronald Stoker’s motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Stoker’s motion was denied without
an evidentiary hearing.
Stoker was convicted of three counts of first-degree
rape, and he was sentenced to 50 years on each count;
three
counts of first-degree sodomy, 30 years on each count; three
counts of first-degree sexual abuse, 5 years on each count; and
eight counts of first-degree criminal abuse, 7 years on each
count.
All sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a
total sentence of 311 years.
Stoker was also convicted of
terroristic threatening, for which he received an additional 12
months, to run concurrently with the felony convictions.
Stoker’s live-in girl friend and co-defendant, Sheila Davis, was
tried jointly with Stoker and was convicted of three counts of
first-degree sodomy, eight counts of first-degree criminal abuse,
and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse.
The convictions stemmed from allegations that Stoker
and Davis had abused Davis's three daughters, A. D., C. M. D.,
and C. D., and a neighbor girl, R. K.
The testimony of the
children at trial established that Davis and Stoker tied them up,
taped their mouths, made them watch pornographic movies, made the
children perform oral sex on them, and that Stoker committed acts
of rape and anal sodomy.
Further physical abuse occurred when
Stoker administered discipline with a wire coat hanger, with
Davis’s consent.
On March 12, 1992, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered
an opinion affirming Stoker’s convictions, but remanding the case
with directions that all sentences be run concurrently, for a
total of fifty years to serve.
828 S.W.2d 619 (1992).
See Stoker v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
On September 30, 1997, Stoker filed a
motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42.
On February
8, 1999, the trial court entered an order denying Stoker’s motion
to vacate.
This appeal followed.
Stoker contends that he is entitled to have his
conviction vacated and receive a new trial because he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at his August 1989 trial.
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In
order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a person
must satisfy a two-part test showing (1) that counsel's
performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficiency resulted
in actual prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984);
accord
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724
(1986).
Unless the movant makes both showings, he cannot prevail
in his attack.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
"The burden of proof [is] upon the appellant to show that he was
not adequately represented by appointed counsel."
Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878, 879 (1969).
Jordan v.
A reviewing
court, in determining whether counsel was ineffective, must be
highly deferential in scrutinizing counsel's performance, and the
tendency and temptation to second guess should be avoided.
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311 (1998).
We must look
to the particular facts of the case and determine whether the
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.
Id.
In ascertaining whether Stoker is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing, "[o]ur review is confined to
whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would
invalidate the conviction."
Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
992 S.W.2d 860, 864 (1998) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967)).
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Stoker’s brief identifies nine instances of alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel.1
First, Stoker contends that
trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial.
Specifically, Stoker states that trial counsel failed to file a
motion to sever his and Davis’s case; that trial counsel failed
to subpoena or inspect police and social workers’ files; that
trial counsel ignored “evidence and witnesses developed by Mr.
Stoker”; and that trial counsel failed to challenge the
introduction of physical and psychological examinations of the
children.
Stoker is equivocal as to whether trial counsel filed a
motion to sever, stating only that “the record is silent” on this
issue.
However, in paragraph five of his September 19, 1997,
affidavit in support of his RCr 11.42 motion, Stoker states “[m]y
attorney did, in fact, move for a separate trial from that of my
codefendant[.]” The record does not contain a written motion by
trial counsel to sever; however, according to Stoker’s affidavit,
the effort to sever was nevertheless made.
Moreover, even if
trial counsel did not move for separate trials, Stoker does not
demonstrate why it would not be considered legitimate trial
strategy to have the cases tried together, nor has Stoker
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the joint trial.
1
Several of the arguments in Stoker’s brief concern
incidents which would more properly be characterized as trial
errors. However, since the sole issue raised by Stoker is
ineffective assistance of counsel, where applicable, we consider
the trial errors within the context of trial counsel’s failure to
object to the errors.
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With regard to trial counsel’s alleged failure to
subpoena or inspect police and social worker files, we note that
a discovery order was in effect requiring the Commonwealth to
“provide the attorney for Defendant with all information required
by Kentucky law[.]”
Beyond that, Stoker has failed to identify
any evidence in the files that may have been exculpatory and why
trial counsel’s failure to review the files was prejudicial.
Similarly, because Stoker has failed to explain what “evidence
and witnesses” he “developed” which were “ignored by trial
counsel,” we are not persuaded that there was any prejudice if in
fact trial counsel “ignored” this “evidence.”
With regard to the
physical and psychological examinations, Stoker has failed to
identify any basis or rule of evidence for excluding the
introduction of the examinations.
Based upon the argument Stoker
has presented to us, we are not persuaded that trial counsel
rendered deficient performance by failing to challenge the
admission of the examinations.
Next, Stoker contends that trial counsel failed to
prepare a proper cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert
physician, Dr. Roche, who, Stoker contends, gave “false
testimony” at his trial.
examination of R. K.
Dr. Roche conducted a physical
We have reviewed trial counsel’s cross-
examination of Dr. Roche and are not persuaded that his
questioning fell below the wide range of reasonably competent
performance required under Strickland.
Trial counsel’s cross-
examination of Dr. Roche was aggressive and sought to undermine
his opinions concerning his physical examination of R. K.
-5-
While
it may have been possible for an attorney to have conducted a
better cross-examination of Roche, we do not review a defense
counsel’s performance using the advantage of hindsight, nor do we
question legitimate trial strategies in conducting crossexamination.
Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479 (1998).
Trial counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Roche was not
constitutionally deficient.
Next, Stoker argues that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to retain expert witnesses to
challenge the testimony of the victims, who, Stoker contends, had
been coached.
In support of this argument, Stoker attached as
exhibits to his RCr 11.42 motion a letter signed by Dr. Stephen
R. Guertin, Director of the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit at
Sparrow Regional Children’s Center in Louisville, and an
affidavit signed by Dr. Melvin Guyer, a professor of Psychology
in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Michigan.
Dr. Guertin states in his letter that the statements
made by R. K. in her trial testimony were “quite fantastic and
resound loudly of a child who has been repeatedly coaxed and
coached.”
Guertin also dismisses Dr. Roche’s conclusion that R.
K. had been penetrated.
Dr. Guertin states that “You will see
that everything Dr. Roche has described is completely normal.
It
seems very clear from his testimony that he simply does not
actually know what he is doing in this regard and has very little
experience in it.”
-6-
Dr. Guyer’s affidavit consists of a general attack on
the credibility of the three children who testified at trial.2
Guyer’s affidavit includes such statements as: “[T]he testimony
of the child witnesses appears to be tainted and the product of
much interviewer induced suggestion and distortion.”
“[T]he
child witness interviews show many indications of substantial
contamination and substantial fabrication.”
And “[T]he witness
reports and interviews have the character of children’s story
telling play, fabrication and invention[.]”
"The burden is upon the accused to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which
would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the
postconviction proceedings provided in
RCr 11.42."
Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (1968).
Dorton v.
“He must do more
than raise a doubt about the regularity of the proceedings under
which he was convicted.
He must establish convincingly that he
has been deprived of some substantial right which would justify
the extraordinary relief afforded by this postconviction
proceeding."
(1967).
Commonwealth v. Campbell, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 614, 616
“It is well settled that judicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential.”
Commonwealth v.
Pelfrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065).
The proper standard, under
Strickland, is that "The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
2
In addition to R. K., the two oldest Davis children, A. D.
and C. M. D. testified. Because of her age, the youngest Davis
child, C. D., did not testify.
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errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."
Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d at
488 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 698.
The inconsistencies in the children’s testimony were
numerous and obvious.
Trial counsel ably brought out the
inconsistencies, both the inconsistencies among the children’s
different versions, and the inconsistencies of each child’s trial
testimony versus her pre-trial statements.
The jury was made
well aware of the inconsistencies, and trial counsel fully
developed this issue.
Given the success of trial counsel in this
regard, we are persuaded that it was legitimate trial strategy to
challenge the credibility of the children without the use of
expert testimony.
“[A]n unfavorable report does not require
counsel to search until an expert supporting the defense theory
can be found.”
(1998).
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 545, 550
Trial counsel was not deficient in failing to procure
expert witnesses.
Next, Stoker contends that the “mental state” of his
co-defendant was never properly addressed or questioned by
defense counsel.
In this regard, Stoker again refers to the
severance issue.
As previously noted, Stoker admitted in the
affidavit attached to his RCr 11.42 motion that his trial counsel
had moved to sever.
Further, Stoker and Davis presented a
unified defense to the effect that the events described by the
children did not occur.
Davis did not seek to blame Stoker and
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exonerate herself.
Their defenses were not antagonistic.
Even
if trial counsel had actively sought a consolidated trial, this
would have been legitimate trial strategy in view of the codefendants’ harmonious defenses.
Next, Stoker contends that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the composition of
the jury.
Specifically Stoker alleges that “[s]everal distinct
peer groups were not represented, or were under-represented in
the panel, to wit: no active military/Asians/Hispanics and only
one (1) African-American.
Eighty-three percent (83%) of the
panel came from the southern part of Hardin County - an area in
which people tend to be conservative and fundamental in their
opinions and beliefs.”
Accepting, for the sake of argument,
Stoker’s description of the jury composition as true, Stoker has
failed to articulate how this jury composition demonstrates
deficient performance by trial counsel.
Similarly, Stoker has
failed to identify how he was prejudiced by this jury
composition.
Stoker and Davis are Caucasian, so we are
unpersuaded that there was racial prejudice associated with the
verdict.
"The burden of proof [is] upon the appellant to show
that he was not adequately represented by appointed counsel."
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d at 879;
Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d at 863.
Osborne v.
Stoker has failed to meet this
burden as concerns the jury composition.
The record reflects
that trial counsel asked several thought-provoking questions
during voir dire directed at discovering any bias or inability to
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fairly judge the evidence presented.
Trial counsel's performance
was well within the range of acceptable professional judgment in
regard to the jury selection process.
Moore v. Commonwealth,
983 S.W.2d at 487.
In conjunction with the foregoing argument, Stoker also
states “[f]undamentalist religion was used by the trial court and
prosecution in violation of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.”
This issue was a matter which could have been raised on direct
appeal and, as a result, is not a proper issue for an RCr 11.42
motion.
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 500, 501 (1990).
Next, Stoker contends that, despite the invocation of
the separation of witnesses rule, RCr 9.48, a social worker was
permitted to remain at the prosecution table during the trial and
was “free to discuss testimony with other witnesses and coax
them[.]”
This issue could have been raised on direct appeal and
is not a proper issue for an RCr 11.42 motion.
Brown, supra.
Moreover, trial counsel’s decision to waive the separation of
witness rule as to the social worker was sound trial strategy.
The Commonwealth sought to introduce, and play for the jury, the
pornographic video tapes Stoker and Davis played in front of the
victims.
In lieu of playing the tapes, trial counsel agreed to
permit the social worker to testify and describe the contents of
the videos.
It was legitimate trial strategy for trial counsel
to choose this option, despite the fact that the social worker
was otherwise present during the trial.
Next, Stoker contends that the prosecutor engaged in a
pattern of misconduct which went unchallenged by defense counsel.
-10-
Specifically, Stoker alleges that trial counsel failed to object
to the following:
the prosecutor’s referring to him as
“pumkinman”; the prosecutor’s suggestions that the defense was
somehow cheating because each of the co-defendants got an opening
statement; the prosecutor’s reference in closing arguments to
pills not introduced into evidence, to adultery, and to potential
future crime; the prosecutor’s “highly suggestive”
identifications of Mr. Stoker; and the prosecutor’s trying Stoker
by inference and innuendo for the murder of his co-defendant’s
husband.3
The issues identified as misconduct did not exceed the
limit of fair comment by the prosecutor.
The prosecutor referred
to Stoker as “pumpkinman” because that was his nickname among the
children.
While Stoker’s CB handle was “pumpkinman,” the
children referred to him by that name for the innocent reason
that Stoker on one occasion brought several bushels of pumpkins
to them.
In this context we discern nothing suggestive or
prejudicial associated with the nickname “pumpkinman.”
Trial
counsel’s failure to object to this was not deficient
performance.
The prosecutor’s comment in his opening statement that
the defendants may elect to give one opening statement before the
Commonwealth began its case and another before the defense
commenced its case was an innocuous prediction of how he expected
3
In August 1988, Sheila Davis was convicted of murdering her
husband. See Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 942 (1990).
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the trial to unfold.
Trial counsel’s failure to object to this
was not deficient performance.
The pills were discussed extensively during the
victims’ testimony and the prosecutor’s reference to them in
closing was fair comment on the evidence.
Trial counsel’s
failure to object to this was not deficient performance.
The prosecutor’s reference to adultery was proper
because the evidence at trial was that the parties began an
intimate relationship while Stoker was married.
Trial counsel’s
failure to object to this was not deficient performance.
Trial counsel strenuously objected to references to
Stoker’s involvement in Davis’s murder of her husband, so there
was not deficient performance in regard to this issue.
Trial counsel aggressively posed objections and moved
for mistrial throughout these proceedings.
"RCr 11.42 motions
attempting to denigrate the conscientious efforts of counsel on
the basis that someone else would have handled the case
differently or better will be accorded short shrift in this
court."
Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d at 485 (citing Penn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 427 S.W.2d 808, 809 (1968)).
Trial counsel’s
decisions not to object to the incidents above does not rise to
the level of constitutionally deficient performance.
Next, Stoker contends that trial counsel failed to
tender appropriate jury instructions.
Specifically, Stoker
argues that trial counsel failed to submit a “use of force”
instruction pursuant to KRS 503.110(1).
Where the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is that counsel erred by failing to
-12-
object to jury instructions, it must first be shown that the jury
instructions were given in error.
S.W.3d 9 (1999).
Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 14
KRS 503.110(1) justifies the use of physical
force under certain circumstances when the defendant is a parent,
guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision
of a child.
Stoker admitted that on several occasions he hit the
children with a coat hanger.
Stoker testified that he struck the
children with the coat hanger to discipline them.
Presumably it
is Stoker’s argument that the instruction was warranted on the
basis that this conduct was justifiable under the statute as
permissible corporal discipline.
However, the first-degree
criminal abuse charge was not premised exclusively upon the
“disciplining” of the children with the coat hanger.
On direct
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the criminal abuse charges
based upon Stoker and Davis’s conduct in tying up the children,
putting tape over their mouths, and forcing them to watch
pornographic movies.
Stoker, 828 S.W.2d at 625.
There was no
prejudice connected with the failure to include a use-of-force
instruction.
Finally, Stoker contends that trial counsel failed to
expose or ignored “planted evidence, altered evidence, Dr.
Roche’s false testimony, incorrect jury instructions, coercive
incommunicado interrogation, coaching of a child witness during
trial by a spectator, media bias, illegal search and seizure, and
more on his Presentence Investigation Questionnaire in writing.”
[sic]
These allegations substantially overlap with the arguments
already addressed.
To the extent that they do not, they are too
-13-
general to permit further review.
“Conclusionary allegations
which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an
evidentiary hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing
to serve the function of discovery.”
Sanborn v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (1998).
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the
appellant’s motion for RCr 11.42 relief is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Fred R. Radolovich
Radolovich Law Office
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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