FLOYD OAKS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 19, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000390-MR
FLOYD OAKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 97-CR-00080 & 97-CR-00081
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a conviction of two
counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.
Because the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in 1) admitting evidence of
prior uncharged acts, 2) denying appellant's motion for mistrial,
and 3) not granting probation, and because the prosecutor's
remarks during the closing argument were not palpable error, we
affirm.
On July 21, 1997, appellant, Floyd Oaks, was indicted
by the Russell County Grand Jury on two counts of sexual abuse in
the first degree, for having sexual contact with two eleven year
old girls, N.P and C.L.
The incidents occurred on July 4, 1997,
in the Lake Cumberland area, where appellant owned a vacation
house.
N.P. and her cousin C.L. had come to the area with their
families to visit N.P.'s grandparents.
At the time of the
incidents, appellant was 91 years old and suffering from prostate
cancer.
Appellant's trial was held on September 4, 1998.
C.L.
and N.P. testified that they went for a walk, saw appellant
sitting on his porch, and walked over to say hello.
N.P. was
acquainted with appellant from previous summer vacations to Lake
Cumberland with her family.
They testified that appellant was
sitting down, and when they came over, he hugged them.
N.P.
testified that appellant then patted her on the back and squeezed
her rear end and legs, then put his hand under her dress and
squeezed her rear end and legs.
She stated that appellant then
pulled her onto his lap and had his arm around her and put his
hand between her legs.
C.L. testified that appellant touched her
hip and her rear end and put his hand between her legs.
They
testified that appellant held onto both of them, and when they
said they had to leave, appellant pretended like he couldn't hear
them.
They managed to pull away from appellant, after which they
went to a nearby trailer where an acquaintance lived.
Appellant,
who was 92 years old at the time of the trial, testified in his
own defense, denying that the incidents happened.
The Commonwealth, over appellant's objection, also
presented testimony at trial from four women, J.B., A.B., C.B.,
and K.P., who claimed they too had been sexually abused by
appellant when they were young girls.
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J.B. testified about an
incident which allegedly occurred in the summer of 1989, when she
was nine years old, when she and her parents had gone to their
vacation home at Lake Cumberland.
J.B. stated that appellant
would come on his "4-wheeler" to visit her parents, and would
take her and her brother for rides.
J.B. testified that when she
was sitting behind appellant on the 4-wheeler, he put his hand
under her shorts and touched her genital area.
She testified
that he tried again to put his hand in her shorts on another
occasion while riding on the 4-wheeler, but she put her legs
together to prevent him from doing so.
A.B. testified about an incident that occurred in
either 1979 or 1980, when she was 11 or 12 years old.
A.B.
testified that she was friends with appellant's granddaughter,
and was at appellant's house for dinner.
A.B. to go tell appellant to come eat.
Appellant's wife asked
A.B. stated that she went
into the garage of appellant's house to tell him, and appellant
grabbed her and put one hand down her shorts and touched her
breasts with his other hand.
A.B. said that appellant let her go
when she told him that his wife was going to be out there in a
minute to get him to come eat.
C.B., A.B.'s younger sister, testified that she
remembered several encounters with appellant where he touched her
inappropriately, which occurred around 1978, 1979 and 1980, when
she would have been between 8 and 10 years old.
with appellant's youngest granddaughter.
C.B. was friends
C.B. testified that
there were two instances that she remembered particularly.
She
stated that she was at appellant's house, and that appellant was
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pretending to tickle her and touched her breasts and put his hand
between her legs, over her clothing.
She testified that he tried
again on another occasion, when he hugged her and then put his
hand under her shorts.
K.P. testified that her family were summer visitors to
Lake Cumberland, and described an incident that occurred in the
summer of 1982 when she was six or seven years old.
K.P.
testified that she went with her mother and aunt to appellant's
house to visit.
K.P.'s mother and aunt went to visit a next-
door neighbor, leaving K.P. with appellant in appellant's front
yard.
K.P. testified that appellant put his hand down the front
of her shorts and touched her between her legs.
K.P. also
testified that in 1985, her mother asked her to go to appellant's
house to borrow a tool.
K.P. went to appellant's house.
Appellant gave her the tool and as she was about to go out the
door, appellant grabbed her from behind and pulled her against
him.
None of these four women reported the incidents when they
occurred, but testified that they came forward after hearing
about N.P. and C.L.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it
allowed the Commonwealth to present this evidence of other
uncharged sexual acts.
KRE 404(b)(1) provides as follows:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident;
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Evidence of other acts is admissible only if probative of an
issue independent of character or criminal predisposition and
only if its probative value on that issue outweighs the unfair
prejudice with respect to character.
Ky., 843 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1992).
Billings v. Commonwealth,
"[T]rial courts must apply [KRE
404(b)] cautiously, with an eye towards eliminating evidence
which is relevant only as proof of an accused's propensity to
commit a certain type of crime."
Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875
S.W.2d 882, 889 (1994).
The degree of similarity between the charged and the
uncharged acts is a critical factor in establishing a direct
relationship independent of character.
892.
Billings, 843 S.W.2d at
It is not sufficient that the charged and uncharged acts
are both of a sexual nature.
Lear v. Commonwealth, Ky., 884
S.W.2d 657 (1994); Billings, 843 S.W.2d 890.
With regard to the
degree of similarity required for prior sexual acts to be
admissible, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that
. . . collateral bad acts evidence offered to
prove corpus delicti should satisfy the same
criteria as such evidence offered to indicate
modus operandi. That is, evidence of other
acts of sexual deviance offered to prove the
existence of a common scheme or plan must be
so similar to the crime on trial as to
constitute a so-called signature crime.
Rearick v. Commonwealth, Ky., 858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (1993);
Billings, 843 S.W.2d at 893.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the evidence of the uncharged acts because there is a
lack of similarity between the uncharged acts and the two charged
acts.
Appellant contends that there is nothing in the evidence
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to indicate any type of "signature" crime.
Appellant further
argues that the remoteness of the uncharged acts should render
them inadmissible, as they occurred anywhere from eight to
nineteen years prior to the charged offenses.
We disagree with appellant, and believe that the acts
were "strikingly similar" so as to indicate a modus operandi
relevant to the charged acts.
S.W.2d 895 (1992).
Gray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 843
All of the victims were young girls, who knew
appellant as a friend of their families.
With the exception of
the incident on the 4-wheeler testified to by J.B., the
encounters all took place when the girls were visiting
appellant's Lake Cumberland residence.
The girls all trusted
appellant, and thought of him as a "grandfather" type figure.
Appellant's approach was always the same - he appeared to take
advantage of opportunities when he happened to have a moment with
young girls when other adults weren't watching.
Further, the
acts committed by appellant were basically the same - appellant
always put his hand between the victim's legs and touched or
attempted to touch their genital area.
The acts were also
similar in that he did not attempt any sexual acts other than
touching.
Accordingly, we adjudge the acts are "strikingly
similar" enough to establish a modus operandi.
Id.
We agree with appellant that the uncharged acts were
remote in time, particularly the incidents testified to by C.B.
and A.B. which allegedly took place 17-19 years prior to when the
charged offenses occurred.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has not
adopted a bright line rule concerning the temporal remoteness of
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other crimes with regard to admissibility.
Robey v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 943 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1997).
"The remoteness
in time of uncharged acts is a concern which must be carefully
weighed as part of the trial court's decision."
at 660.
Lear, 884 S.W.2d
Remoteness tends to lessen the probative value of
evidence of prior sexual misconduct.
993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
Commonwealth v. English,
However, in English, the Court held
that an appellant's uncharged acts of sexual misconduct which
appear to be at least, if not more, remote in time than the
uncharged acts in the instant case, were not so remote as to
render them inadmissible.
In English, the appellant was charged
with sexually abusing his six- and eight-year-old grand-nieces,
by touching them between their legs while they were visiting.
At
trial, two adult nieces of the appellant's wife, D.B. and T.N.,
testified that appellant similarly abused them when D.B. was six
or seven, and T.N. was eight or nine.
Id., at 942.
Neither D.B.
nor T.N. testified to their present ages at trial, but D.B.
testified that she was now married with a six-month-old son, and
T.N. testified that she was now married with her oldest child a
sixteen year old.
Id. at 943.
This Court concluded that these
instances of prior conduct were too remote in time to the charged
offenses to establish a "common scheme or plan" and therefore the
evidence should have been suppressed.
Id.
The Supreme Court
reversed, noting that temporal proximity is more significant with
respect to evidence offered to prove a common scheme or plan than
evidence offered to prove modus operandi.
Court stated:
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Id., at 944.
The
Neither Rule 404 nor Rule 401 mentions
temporal proximity as a condition of
admissibility. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d
215, 220 (Ind. 1997). Temporal remoteness
generally is held to go to the weight of the
evidence, but not to render it inadmissible
per se. (Citations omitted). Thus, if the
prior wrongful act, or a particular aspect
thereof, is so similar to the charged offense
as to show a modus operandi which tends to
prove an element of the charged offense,
remoteness alone does not require suppression
of the evidence of the prior misconduct.
Adrian v. People, 770 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Colo.
1989).
Id.
The Court explained that once that test of relevancy is
satisfied by proof of a modus operandi, the court will then weigh
the probative value of the evidence versus danger of undue
prejudice, at which point the issue of temporal remoteness
becomes a factor in determining admissibility.
403.
Id. at 945; KRE
This balancing test is a task reserved for the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
Id.
The decision of the trial
court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Anastasi v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 860 (1988).
We have
previously determined that the uncharged acts in the instant case
were "strikingly similar" to the charged acts so as to establish
a modus operandi.
Although the remoteness of the acts,
particularly those alleged by A.B. and C.B., tends to lessen
their probative value, we believe that the probative value is
increased by the fact that there were four "uncharged acts"
witnesses.
Accordingly, we believe that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence of appellant's
prior acts of sexual misconduct.
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Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth committed
reversible error by failing to disclose until the penalty phase
of the trial that C.L. had received psychological counseling
related to the incidents alleged in this case.
During the
penalty phase, C.L.'s mother testified that C.L. had been under
the care of a psychologist since August of 1997.
Appellant moved
for a mistrial on the basis of the Commonwealth's failure to
disclose this information prior to trial, but the motion was
denied.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth was under a good
faith obligation to disclose this evidence prior to trial, as it
may have been exculpatory to appellant.
Appellant contends that
the knowledge that C.L. had received counseling was important, as
it may have led to evidence which would have impeached the
credibility of C.L.
While it is true that a defendant is
entitled to exculpatory evidence in preparation for trial, Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215
(1963), concealment of such evidence is reversible only if it is
material to guilt or to punishment.
Ky., 743 S.W.2d 21 (1988).
Ballard v. Commonwealth,
Information that affects the
credibility of prosecution witnesses falls within the category of
exculpatory evidence.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct.
1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959);
678 S.W.2d 800, 802 (1984).
Rolli v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
The Supreme Court has defined the
Brady materiality requirement as "a concern that the suppressed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial".
United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.
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Ed. 2d 342 (1976); see also, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 674, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3379, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985).
The
incidents occurred on July 4, 1997, and C.L.'s mother testified
that C.L. went into counseling in August, 1997.
We believe it
unlikely that this evidence would have been exculpatory to
appellant or affected the outcome of the trial.
Rather, it seems
that the fact that the child went into counseling shortly after
the alleged incident would tend to enhance the credibility of the
child.
Further, the communications between C.L. and her
psychologist would be subject to privilege pursuant to KRE 506 or
507.
The question of whether there was a Brady violation and
whether, because of it, a mistrial was necessary is addressed to
the judgment and discretion of the trial court.
Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1989).
Carter v.
We cannot say
that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion.
Appellant's third argument is that the prosecutor's
closing argument consisted of impermissible Bible quotations,
along with multiple references to the jury's need and
responsibility to protect N.P, C.L, and other children, and
restore N.P.'s and C.L.'s trust by believing their story.
record reflects that early in her closing argument, the
prosecutor stated:
One of the things that as adults that . . .
we have a responsibility for are the
children, whether our children, other
people's children, the children in our
community. In Psalms 127 it says that the
children are the heritage of the Lord, and it
is for us, as adults, to take that
responsibility.
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The
Near the end of her closing argument the prosecutor stated, "Give
back that trust in adults to those six that have testified . . .
to let them know that there are adults who do believe that
children are a heritage of the Lord."
Appellant contends that
the prosecutor's statements constituted an improper "golden rule"
type argument, as well as a prohibited request for a conviction
based on religious beliefs.
This alleged error was not
preserved, nevertheless, we will review it for palpable error
under RCr 10.26.
A golden rule argument is "one that urges the jurors
collectively or singularly to place themselves or members of
their families or friends in the place of the person who has been
offended and to render a verdict as if they or either of them or
a member of their families or friends was similarly situated."
Lycans v. Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 303, 305 (1978).
Although the prosecutor made references to the need to protect
"our" children, her argument did not rise to the level of asking
the jury to put themselves in a similar situation.
As such, we
conclude there was no "golden rule" problem with the prosecutor's
closing argument.
An argument demanding a conviction based on religious
beliefs rather than legal grounds, is prohibited, and, depending
on the circumstances, reversible error.
Ky., 744 S.W.2d 421 (1987).
Estes v. Commonwealth,
For example, in Estes, the Supreme
Court held that the prosecutor's closing argument was such an
improper demand, as he quoted from the Old Testament to the
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effect that when a man kills, "[t]he avenger of blood may execute
the murderer on sight" and then told the jury "you have to act as
the avenger of blood on behalf of the [victim's] family".
426.
Id. at
However, in Lucas v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 840 S.W.2d
212, 214 (1992), the prosecutor stated in her closing argument
that the Ten Commandments say "Thou shalt not kill".
This Court
held that while the prosecutor's comments were perhaps illconsidered, they were harmless.
Id. at 215.
Similarly, in the
instant case, although the prosecutor's Biblical references were
inappropriate, we adjudge them to be harmless error, as the
argument did not rise to the level of "demanding a conviction
based on religious beliefs".
Estes, 744 S.W. 2d at 426.
Appellant's final argument is that appellant's sentence
of imprisonment is unlawful, and that appellant should have been
placed on probation with an alternative sentencing plan.
533.010 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who has been convicted of a
crime and who has not been sentenced to death
may be sentenced to probation, probation with
an alternative sentencing plan, or
conditional discharge as provided in this
chapter.
. . . .
(3) In the event the court determines that
probation is not appropriate after due
consideration of the nature and circumstances
of the crime, and the history, character, and
condition of the defendant, probation with an
alternative sentencing plan shall be granted
unless the court is of the opinion that
imprisonment is necessary for the protection
of the public because:
(a) There is a likelihood that during a
period of probation with an alternative
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KRS
sentencing plan or conditional discharge the
defendant will commit a Class D or Class C
felony or a substantial risk that the
defendant will commit a Class B or Class A
felony;
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional
treatment that can be provided most
effectively by commitment to a correctional
institution; or
(c) A disposition under this chapter will
unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
defendant's crime.
Appellant's counsel filed an alternative sentencing
plan, which included two years supervised probation with three
years conditional discharge, completion of a sex offender
treatment program, and restrictions on appellant's access to
children.
However, at appellant's sentencing on December 21,
1998, the court denied probation and sentenced appellant in
accordance with the recommendation of the jury, to four years
imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run
concurrently.
At the sentencing, the trial court stated that to
grant probation would be "tantamount to permitting [appellant] to
commit the same kind of crime".
Appellant filed a motion
pursuant to CR 60.02 to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment and
sentence entered on December 21, 1998, on the grounds that the
court did not make specific findings of fact, other than the one
noted above, as to why appellant was denied probation.
On
January 20, 1999, the court entered an order setting aside and
vacating the final judgment of December 21, 1998 and scheduling a
re-sentencing of appellant for February 15, 1999.
At the second
sentencing hearing, the court again denied probation, sentencing
appellant to the same sentence as before.
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The court made
findings that 1) there is a substantial risk that appellant would
commit another crime if probated, 2) that appellant is in need of
correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by
appellant's commitment to a correctional institution, and 3) that
probation or conditional discharge would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the crime.
Appellant argues that because the court failed to make
any of the required statutory findings at the first sentencing,
appellant's sentence should be reversed and appellant placed on
probation or probation under the Alternative Sentencing Plan.
Appellant argues, based on double jeopardy principles, that the
court did not have the right simply to vacate the first sentence
and reinstate a new sentence with new findings.
The
determination by the court to grant probation or conditional
discharge is discretionary, rather than mandatory.
Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 474 (1977).
Brewer v.
However, the record of
the proceedings leading up to the entry of the judgment should
clearly reflect the fact that the consideration required by KRS
533.010 has been afforded the convicted person before the
judgment is finally entered.
Id. at 478.
If the record does
not indicate that such consideration has been given, the case may
be remanded back for re-sentencing.
Id.
Accordingly, it was
proper for the court to vacate the original sentence and hold a
subsequent sentencing hearing.
Additionally, appellant contends that the findings made
by the trial court at the second sentencing are not supported by
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the evidence.
As a result, appellant argues that the sentence of
imprisonment is unlawful and that appellant is entitled to be
placed on probation with the alternative sentencing plan.
disagree.
We
In support of its findings, the court stated that
based upon the evidence at trial, appellant had a longestablished pattern of fondling and abusing young women.
The
record shows that the court considered the relevant criteria
pursuant to KRS 533.010.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of
discretion by the court in denying appellant probation with the
alternative sentencing plan.
Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 914
S.W.2d 343 (1996); Brewer, 550 S.W.2d 474.
The judgment of the Russell Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas G. Eagle
Franklin, Ohio
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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