GARY LEE HASTY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: May 5, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002803-MR
GARY LEE HASTY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CR-00021
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HUDDLESTON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE.
Gary Lee Hasty appeals from an order of the
Marion Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate, alter, amend
or correct sentence brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
After reviewing the record, we affirm.
In April 1989, Hasty left the Marion County Adjustment
Center, where he was serving a nine year sentence for two
burglary convictions, without authorization.
few days later on a charge of escape.
He was arrested a
In May 1989, the Marion
County Grand Jury indicted Hasty on one felony count of escape in
the second degree (Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 520.030) and
one count of being a persistent felony offender in the first
degree (PFO I)(KRS 532.080).
On September 25, 1989, Hasty
entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth to second-degree escape and the amended count of
being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II).
Under the agreement, the Commonwealth moved to amend the PFO I
count to PFO II and recommended a sentence of seven years
enhanced by the PFO conviction.
At that time, Hasty waived
preparation of a presentence investigation report and the trial
court sentenced him consistent with the Commonwealth’s
recommendation to serve seven years in prison for second-degree
escape and being a PFO II.
On July 30, 1998, Hasty filed an RCr 11.42 motion
seeking to correct his sentence.
He alleged that the trial court
failed to sentence him on the PFO II conviction and that the
sentence of seven years violated KRS 532.060(2) because the
maximum sentence for second-degree escape was five years.
Hasty
also asked the court to consider his RCr 11.42 motion despite the
fact that it was untimely under Subsection 10 because he did not
have access to an adequate law library.
He stated that he had
attempted to pursue vindication of his rights prior to his
release on parole in July 1997, but he did not have access to
Kentucky case law while in prison.
Therefor, he maintained that
the time limitation for filing his RCr 11.42 should be tolled.1
1
In support of his tolling claim, Hasty submitted affidavits
from Juliana Weber, the custodian of the Legal Library at the
Green River Correctional Complex (GRCC), and Doug Ward, another
inmate at GRCC. Both stated that Hasty did not have access to
the published Kentucky cases for general research during a four
(continued...)
-2-
He also filed accompanying motions for appointment of counsel and
an evidentiary hearing.
On September 18, 1998, the trial court
summarily overruled the motions.
This appeal followed.
RCr 11.42 provides persons in custody under sentence a
procedure for raising collateral challenges to judgments entered
against them.
A movant, however, is not automatically entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
Wilson v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 901, 904 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119
S. Ct. 1263, 143 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1999).
An evidentiary hearing is
not required on an RCr 11.42 motion where the issues raised in
the motion are refuted on the record, or where the allegations,
even if true, would not be sufficient to invalidate the
conviction.
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 908
(1998), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 119 S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed.
2d 361 (1999); Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 314
(1998), cert. denied,
2d 527 (1999).
U.S.
, 119 S. Ct. 1367, 143 L. Ed.
Similarly, a person is not constitutionally
entitled to appointment of counsel in a post-conviction
collateral proceeding.
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d
545, 552 (1998), cert. denied,
L. Ed. 2d 778 (1999).
U.S.
, 119 S. Ct. 2375, 144
A movant also is not entitled to
appointment of counsel on an RCr 11.42 motion under state law
where the substantive claim is refuted on the face of the record
or appointment of counsel would be futile.
Commonwealth v.
Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336 (1984); Maggard v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
394 S.W.2d 893 (1965).
1
(...continued)
month period in 1997 while he was imprisoned at GRCC.
-3-
Given the trial court’s failure to provide an explanation
for its denial, we will first address the procedural issue in
this case.
The 1994 amendments created a three year time
limitation for the filing of RCr 11.42 motions.
Subsection 10
states as follows:
(10) Any motion under this rule shall be
filed within three years after the judgment
becomes final, unless the motion alleges and
the movant proves either:
(a)
that the facts upon which the claim
is predicated were unknown to the
movant and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(b)
that the fundamental constitutional
right asserted was not established
within the period provided for
herein and has been held to apply
retroactively.
If the judgment becomes final before the
effective date of this rule, the time for
filing the motion shall commence upon the
effective date of this rule. If the motion
qualifies under one of the foregoing
exceptions to the three year time limit, the
motion shall be filed within three years
after the event establishing the exception
occurred. Nothing in this section shall
preclude the Commonwealth from relying upon
the defense of laches to bar a motion upon
the ground of unreasonable delay in filing
when the delay has prejudiced the
Commonwealth’s opportunity to present
relevant evidence to contradict or impeach
the movant’s evidence.
Hasty was convicted and sentenced on the second-degree
escape and PFO II offenses involved in his RCr 11.42 motion on
September 25, 1989.
Since his conviction occurred prior to
October 1997 and he did not appeal the conviction, Hasty was
obligated to file his RCr 11.42 motion on or before October 1,
1997.
RCr 11.42(10)(b).
See, e.g., Palmer v. Commonwealth, Ky.
-4-
App., 3 S.W.2d 763, 765 (1999)(stating that “final judgment” for
purposes of RCr 11.42(10) refers to the judgment of the trial
court where no direct appeal is taken).
Hasty did not file his
motion until July 30, 1998; therefore, it was untimely and he has
not presented any evidence that the exceptions contained in
Subsection 10(a) or (b) apply.
Indeed, Hasty has recognized that his motion was
untimely, but he argued in the circuit court that the limitations
period should be tolled because he did not have access to
necessary legal materials.
Hasty has presented no statutory or
case law to support his tolling argument.
The three-year
limitations period in RCr 11.42(10) is akin to a statute of
limitations.
Generally, the person seeking to take advantage of
equitable tolling bears the burden of proof on that issue.
See
Southeast Kentucky Baptist Hospital v. Gaylor, Ky., 756 S.W.2d
467, 469 (1988).
The principle of equitable tolling permits a
plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if
despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital
information bearing on the existence of his claim.
See EEOC v.
Kentucky State Police Dept., 80 F.3d 1086, 1095 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 963, 117 S. Ct. 385, 136 L. Ed.2d 302 (1996).
Factors relevant to the application of equitable tolling include:
1) lack of actual notice of filing requirement; 2) lack of
constructive notice of filing requirement; 3) diligence in
pursuing one’s rights; 4) absence of prejudice to defendant; and
5) a plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the
filing requirements.
Id. at 1094 (citing Andrews v. Orr, 851
F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1988)).
-5-
Hasty’s argument lacks merit for several reasons.
First, he had actual knowledge of the alleged illegal sentence
from the date of sentencing in September 1989.
Second, he has
not alleged that he was not aware of the claim he now raises.
Third, and most importantly, he was not diligent in pursuing his
claim. The affidavits indicate that Hasty had restricted access
to Kentucky case law between March and July 1997.
Hasty’s
limitations during this short period of time clearly would not
justify tolling the time limitations which allowed him a three
year period to file the RCr 11.42 motion.
almost nine years to file the motion.
In fact, he waited
He has not shown why he
did not or could not have filed his motion at some point prior to
the end of the limitations period.
Accordingly, he has not
established sufficient grounds to toll the three year limitations
period of RCr 11.42 (10) and his motion was subject to dismissal
for being untimely.
In addition, Hasty’s motion lacks merit on substantive
grounds.
He makes two inconsistent assertions that the trial
court failed to sentence him on the escape conviction and that it
sentenced him to seven years on the escape conviction.
In fact,
in response to an inquiry from the trial judge during the guilty
plea hearing, Hasty acknowledged that the maximum sentence for
second-degree escape was five years.
While the record does not
reveal that the trial judge imposed a sentence on the escape
conviction for a precise number of years, Hasty has not
demonstrated any prejudice from the omission.
His enhanced seven
year sentence on the PFO II conviction in lieu of a sentence on
the escape conviction was within the statutory guidelines set out
-6-
in KRS 532.080(6).
Thus, Hasty has failed to establish a
sufficient claim justifying relief.
See Hulett v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App, 834 S.W.2d 688 (1992); Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
819 S.W.2d 713 (1991)(failure of jury to fix sentence on
underlying principle offense in addition to sentence on PFO was
mere procedural error).
Furthermore, Hasty’s reliance on Davis v. Manis, Ky.,
812 S.W.2d 505 (1991) and Commonwealth v. Hayes, Ky., 734 S.W.2d
467 (1987) is misplaced.
Both of those cases dealt with
situations in which the defendants received fines, rather than
imprisonment on the underlying principal offenses.
Those cases
are distinguishable from the present situation because Hasty
knowingly pled guilty to second-degree escape with a possible
sentence of 1-5 years imprisonment.
See Hulett, 834 S.W.2d at
690.
In conclusion, Hasty’s RCr 11.42 motion was subject to
dismissal on both procedural and substantive grounds.
The trial
court did not err in denying his request to vacate the sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Marion Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary Lee Hasty - Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.