PRECAST SERVICES, INC. v. CHRIS CROWLEY; SPECIAL FUND; SHEILA C. LOWTHER, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: October 1, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-000118-WC
PRECAST SERVICES, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-01484
CHRIS CROWLEY;
SPECIAL FUND;
SHEILA C. LOWTHER,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, HUDDLESTON and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Precast Services, Inc. appeals from an opinion
of the Workers' Compensation Board that dismissed its appeal and
affirmed an administrative law judge’s opinion which held that
Chris Crowley, a former Precast employee, now has a 55 percent
permanent partial occupational disability as the result of an
injury Crowley received while working for Precast.
In Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685
(1992), the Supreme Court of Kentucky set forth the standard of
review to be utilized when reviewing the Workers' Compensation
Board:
“[T]he Court of Appeals is to correct the Board only where
the [ ] Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling
statutes
or
precedent,
or
committed
an
error
in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
Id. at 687.
Perceiving no error, we adopt the opinion of the Board
as our own:
GREATHOUSE, Member.
Precast Services, Inc., (“Precast”)
appeals from an Opinion and Award rendered by Hon. Sheila
C. Lowther, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), awarding
the claimant, Chris Crowley (“Crowley”), benefits for a
55% occupational disability as a result of an injury to
his
low
Precast.
back,
allegedly
incurred
while
employed
by
On appeal, Precast argues that the ALJ's award
of occupational disability benefits is not supported by
substantial evidence, that the ALJ's finding that Crowley
suffered a work-related injury is not supported by the
evidence, and that the ALJ erred in finding Precast
liable for payment of prior medical expenses.
Crowley is 54 years old and has a high school
education.
He has received vocational training as an
ironworker.
Crowley began working as an ironworker in
1975 and has worked continuously until November 1995.
Crowley testified that he was injured on November
21, 1995 when he fell at a construction site.
-2-
He
initially received medical treatment for an injury to his
knee.
Crowley stated that he was taken by the union
steward to see Dr. Watkins.
On the day following the
accident, Crowley began to experience problems with his
low back.
Crowley stated that he saw Dr. Watkins twice
and was then referred by Watkins to Dr. Jacob O'Neill.
Dr. O'Neill then began treating Crowley for his back
problems.
On January 5, 1996, Crowley was involved in a motor
vehicle accident.
Crowley stated that he attempted to
see Dr. O'Neill following this accident but was told by
someone in Dr. O'Neill's
office that Dr. O'Neill would
no longer be able to treat him because it was no longer
a workers' compensation injury.
Crowley then sought
treatment through his HMO at the Welborn Clinic.
He was
eventually referred to Dr. Oexmann, who performed a
laminectomy in March 1996.
Crowley testified that he thought that Precast's
workers' compensation carrier had denied payment of his
medical expenses.
Crowley's HMO.
Winston,
a
Dr. Oexmann's bills were turned in to
Crowley stated that he spoke to Patrice
claims
adjuster
compensation carrier.
for
Precast's
workers'
Crowley stated that Winston told
him that she wanted him to obtain a second opinion.
Crowley states that he agreed to this but preferred not
to
see
Dr.
O'Neill.
Crowley
stated
knowledge, an IME was never scheduled.
-3-
that
to
his
Crowley has not returned to work since the date of
his
injury.
He
stated
that
following
the
surgery
performed by Dr. Oexmann, he had some improvement of his
symptoms.
However, he does not feel that they have
improved to the point that he can return to work.
In support of his claim, Crowley submitted a report
and records from Dr. James B. Oexmann, his treating
neurosurgeon. Dr. Oexmann stated that a myelogram and CT
scan indicated lumbar stenosis at the L4-5 level and to
a lesser extent at the L3-4 level. Dr. Oexmann also felt
that there was some nerve root impingement.
He stated
that there was no frank disc herniation, however.
Dr.
Oexmann stated that he performed a laminectomy on March
19, 1996.
He stated that this apparently relieved
Crowley's symptoms to some extent.
Dr. Oexmann assessed
a 16% impairment under the AMA Guides.
In a statement given in a civil action resulting
from Crowley's January 1996 motor vehicle accident, Dr.
Oexmann stated that the motor vehicle accident aggravated
Crowley's low back symptoms.
He stated that there was a
good chance that Crowley would have had further back
problems even without the second accident.
Dr. Oexmann
stated that Crowley probably would have required surgery
at some point in the future even if the second accident
had not occurred.
Crowley
also
Methodist Hospital.
submitted
records
from
Community
These records indicate that he
-4-
underwent physical therapy there in December 1995 at the
direction of Dr. O'Neill.
Crowley
had
complaints
There records indicate that
of
back
pain
and
difficulty
performing the physical therapy maneuvers.
Precast submitted records from Dr. David Watkins,
the family physician that initially treated Crowley.
These records indicate that Crowley was initially seen
for an injury to his knee.
Subsequently, he began to
complain of low back problems and was referred to Dr.
O'Neill.
Precast
also
submitted
records
O'Neill, an orthopedic surgeon.
from
Dr.
Jacob
Dr. O'Neill stated that
Crowley presented with a bizarre gait, walking in a
stooped position with his knees flexed.
Dr. O'Neill
stated that this did not correspond very well with his
diagnosis.
Dr. O'Neill stated, however, that by January
2, 1996, Crowley was exhibiting a normal gait.
O'Neill
diagnosed
a
healed
sprain
and
flare-up
Dr.
of
degenerative arthritis in the right knee, lumbosacral
strain, and degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1.
He felt that Crowley would be able to return to work
without restrictions as of January 15, 1996, therefore,
there was no impairment rate under the AMA Guides.
Precast also submitted a report from Dr. Robert L.
Keisler, an orthopedic surgeon.
Crowley's
medical
records.
Dr. Keisler reviewed
His
impression
was
of
multiple level degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
-5-
spine with spinal stenosis syndrome and a history of two
or more acute episodes.
He stated that the traumatic
event in November 1995 produced a temporary exacerbation
of symptoms that was expected to last for 6 to 12 weeks.
Dr. Keisler felt that the surgery performed in March 1996
was done for long-standing pre-existing changes and not
for any condition that developed as a result of the 1995
or 1996 injuries.
Precast also submitted records from the Welborn
Clinic.
These records indicate that Crowley was treated
in 1989 for complaints of pain in both legs. The records
indicate that hereditary polyneuropathy was suspected.
In September 1995, Crowley was seen with complaints of
bilateral foot pain with a duration of some eight or nine
years.
These records indicate that this may have been
due to damage caused by childhood polyneuropathy.
A
January 17, 1996 note indicates that Crowley was seen at
the
clinic
following
his
motor
vehicle
accident.
According to the note, Crowley did not feel that his back
was any worse following the motor vehicle accident than
it had been following the work-related injury in November
1995.
Precast
Winston,
also
the
compensation
submitted
adjuster
claim.
an
handling
Winston
affidavit
of
Crowley's
stated
that
Patrice
workers'
Crowley
designated Dr. O'Neill as his treating physician and
never
notified
them
of
-6-
an
intent
to
change
the
designation to Dr. Oexmann.
She stated that she asked
Crowley to continue treatment with Dr. O'Neill but that
Crowley refused to do so. TTD benefits were discontinued
on January 15, 1996, the date on which Dr. O'Neill
indicated that Crowley would be able to return to work.
Winston stated that Crowley never informed her that Dr.
Oexmann was going to perform surgery on his low back.
She stated that the first notification of the March 1996
surgery that she received was a letter from Crowley's
attorney dated September 27, 1996.
She further stated
that Dr. Oexmann had not submitted a treatment plan in
accordance with 803 KAR 25:096(5), nor had any medical
bills been received from Dr. Oexmann within 45 days of
the date that the service was rendered.
After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ concluded that
Crowley's ongoing complaints and his back surgery were
related to the November 1995 injury.
In reaching this
conclusion, she relied primarily upon the testimony of
Dr. Oexmann.
The ALJ also found that Crowley suffered a 55%
occupational disability, stating:
Mr. Crowley is 53 years old.
Essentially his
entire work life has been spent as an ironworker.
The Petitioner-employee testified concerning the
rigorous demands of this employment.
Both Dr.
Oexmann
that
and
Dr.
Keisler
acknowledged
Mr.
Crowley retains a significant degree of functional
-7-
impairment.
is
not
Mr. Crowley himself testified that he
capable
of
returning
to
the
type
of
employment which he has done in the past.
In fact,
Mr.
form
Crowley
has
not
returned
to
employment since the 1995 accident.
Administrative
Law
Judge
is
any
of
However, the
aware
that
the
Petitioner-employee also suffers from a hereditary
form of polyneuropathy which may be a factor in
that.
his
Taking into consideration Mr. Crowley's age,
education,
his
employment
history,
and
the
functional impairment which he retains as a result
of his back condition, it is the finding of the
Administrative
employee
Law
retains
Judge
a
occupational disability.
that
55%
the
Petitioner-
permanent
partial
Liability for this is
apportioned equally between the Respondent-employer
and the Special Fund, pursuant to the parties [sic]
stipulation.
In the Opinion and Award, the ALJ stated that the
issue of Precast's liability for medical expenses was not
yet ripe since none of Dr. Oexmann's bills had been
submitted.
Precast filed a petition for reconsideration
requesting that the ALJ rule on this issue, pointing out
that if it is required to contest the expenses later by
filing a motion to reopen, the burden of proof will be
upon it rather than on Crowley.
In an order dated
September 9, 1998, the ALJ held that the 45-day rule
-8-
found in KRS 342.020(1) was only applicable post-award,
likening this situation to the one in R.J. Corman R.R.
Const. v. Haddix, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 915 (1993).
The ALJ
did not address Precast's argument that it should not be
held liable for Dr. Oexmann's bills because Dr. Oexmann
was never designated as Crowley's treating physician
pursuant to 803 KAR 25:096, Section 3.
Precast now appeals from the ALJ's opinion, arguing
that
her
finding
of
permanent
partial
occupational
disability is not warranted by the evidence because there
is uncontradicted evidence that Crowley does not suffer
any occupational disability.
ALJ's
award
of
55%
It also argues that the
occupational
supported by substantial evidence.
disability
is
not
We disagree.
The claimant in a worker's compensation claim bears
the burden of proving each of the essential elements of
his claim.
Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 276
(1979). Where the party that does not bear the burden of
proof is unsuccessful before the ALJ, the question on
appeal is whether the ALJ's opinion is supported by
substantial evidence. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.
App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
Substantial evidence is
defined as evidence of relevant consequence having the
fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
persons.
Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co., Ky., 474
S.W.2d 367 (1971).
It is not enough for Precast to show
that there is merely some evidence which would support a
-9-
contrary conclusion. McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky.,
514 S.W.2d 46 (1974).
As long as the ALJ's opinion is
supported by any evidence of substance, we must affirm.
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
The ALJ, as fact-finder, has the sole authority to
determine
the
weight,
credibility,
substance,
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
and
Paramount
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985).
Where the evidence is conflicting, the ALJ may choose
whom and what to believe.
547 S.W.2d 123 (1977).
Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers, Ky.,
The ALJ may choose to believe
parts of the evidence and disbelieve other parts, even
when it comes from the same witness or the same party's
total proof.
Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores, Ky.,
560 S.W.2d 15 (1977).
Furthermore, this Board may not
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ in matters
involving the weight to be afforded the evidence in
questions of fact.
KRS 342.285(2).
Dr. Oexmann assessed a 16% impairment under the AMA
Guides.
Dr. Keisler clearly stated that Crowley had a
significant degree of impairment.
None of the medical
evidence discusses specific restrictions to be placed on
Crowley.
Crowley testified that he did not feel he was
able to return to the sort of work he has done in the
past.
The claimant's own testimony can be evidence of
probative value in making a determination of occupational
disability. Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores, supra.
-10-
We believe that this is substantial evidence supporting
a
finding
that
disability.
Crowley
does
suffer
an
occupational
The ALJ has wide discretion in translating
evidence of functional impairment into an assessment of
occupational disability.
Seventh Street Road Tobacco
Warehouse v. Stillwell, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 469 (1976).
We
therefore find no error with the ALJ's award of 55%
occupational disability benefits.
Precast next argues that the ALJ's finding that
Crowley's medical condition is causally related to his
work injury is not supported by substantial evidence.
Precast argues that the only evidence regarding a causal
connection is mere speculation by Dr. Oexmann.
We
disagree.
In the statement given by Dr. Oexmann in the civil
action concerning Crowley's motor vehicle accident, he
stated:
Q
Is there any way to say whether or not, given
the fact that he had improved to the point
that he was going to go back to work — never
did, but was getting ready to go back to work
— if we assume that to be true between the two
accidents, and then after the second accident,
he ultimately ended up with you, is there any
reason to believe that he would not have been
able
to
start
-11-
functioning
again
and
maybe
avoid the surgery had it not been for the auto
accident in January 1996?
A
This would be speculation, and most patients
that become symptomatic from spinal stenosis
will eventually
progress and have surgery or
— and so I think there's a
good chance he
would have had problems with or without
the
second accident.
Q
Would the second accident have accelerated the
symptoms and the problems that necessitated
the surgery?
A
It may have contributed some.
It would be
very hard to quantify any amount.
* * *
Q
Okay.
So
ultimately
it's
your
opinion
he
probably would have ended up with surgical
intervention at some point in the future -A
Yes, sir.
Q
— Based on the stenosis and the fact that it
was symptomatic?
A
Yes, sir.
In his December 4, 1997 report, Dr. Oexmann stated
that the January 1996 motor vehicle accident aggravated
Crowley's symptoms.
The
ALJ
is
empowered
to
draw
all
reasonable
inferences from the evidence, and where more than one
-12-
reasonable inference may be drawn, the ALJ is free to
choose which to draw.
Jackson v. General Refractories
Company, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 10 (1979).
We believe that the
above evidence from Dr. Oexmann, taken as a whole, is
sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that
the November 1995 injury was the cause of Crowley's low
back problems and that the January 1996 injury merely
aggravated his symptoms.
Certainly, the ALJ could have
drawn other conclusions from this same evidence, but we
will not substitute our judgment in factual matters for
that of the ALJ.
KRS 342.285(2).
Lastly, Precast argues that the ALJ's finding that
the medical bills of Dr. Oexmann would be compensable is
contrary to law.
Although Precast has not yet received
any bills from Dr. Oexmann, it points out that Dr.
Oexmann
was
never
designated
as
Crowley's
treating
physician pursuant to 803 KAR 25:096, Section 3, and that
if any bills for past treatment are received from Dr.
Oexmann, they will have been submitted more than 45 days
from
the
date
that
the
service
is
rendered
in
contravention of the requires of KRS 342.020(1).
We believe that the ALJ was correct in her Opinion
and Award when she stated that this issue was prematurely
raised.
The compensability of a medical bill cannot
properly be determined until such time as it is actually
submitted to the employer or its carrier for payment.
Furthermore, since it appears that the Welborn HMO may
-13-
have already paid Dr. Oexmann's bills, it would have an
interest in any proceedings regarding the compensability
of those bills under KRS Chapter 342 and should therefore
be a party in such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, on the Board's own
motion, the ALJ's order on petition for reconsideration
be, and the same is hereby REVERSED and VACATED and the
ALJ's original ruling regarding the compensability of Dr.
Oexmann's bills is hereby REINSTATED.
Accordingly, the decision by Hon. Sheila C. Lowther,
Administrative Law Judge, as originally rendered, is
hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal by Precast Services, Inc.
is hereby DISMISSED.
ALL CONCUR.
The
opinion
of
the
Workers’
Compensation
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James G. Fogle
FERRERI, FOGLE, POHL
& PICKLESIMER
Louisville, Kentucky
Jeanie Owen Miller
Owensboro, Kentucky
-14-
Board
is
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