SABRINA LEWIS SMITH v. HAZARD APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HOSPITAL; SPECIAL FUND; HON. RICHARD H. CAMPBELL, JR., Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: July 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002696-WC
SABRINA LEWIS SMITH
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-89-32092
v.
HAZARD APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HOSPITAL;
SPECIAL FUND; HON. RICHARD H. CAMPBELL, JR.,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GARDNER, and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Sabrina Lewis Smith appeals from the decision of
the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) affirming the
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) denial of her request to resolve
a medical fee dispute.
After reviewing the record, we affirm in
part and reverse in part.
Smith sustained work-related back injuries in June and
October 1988 and in July 1989 while employed by Hazard
Appalachian Regional Hospital (Hazard ARH).
On February 13,
1991, she settled claims for those injuries for the temporary
total disability benefits previously paid -- plus a lump-sum
payment of $15,000.00.
Hazard ARH remained liable for the costs
of any ongoing reasonable or necessary medical treatment arising
from those work-related injuries.
On December 18, 1995, Smith moved to reopen, alleging a
worsening of her condition and consequent increased occupational
disability — as well as seeking to compel payment of various
medical expenses.
The expenses involved medical treatment
rendered for Smith's low back by Dr. James Thomas on May 21, July
5, and August 16, 1996.
On January 30, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Thomas A.
Dockter issued his opinion and order denying Smith's motion to
reopen on the grounds that she had not proven an increase in
occupational disability attributable to her work-related
injuries.
In his opinion, the ALJ stated as follows:
Therefore, this Administrative Law Judge finds that the
Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal nexus
between the injuries which she suffered for the
Defendant-Employer in 1988 and 1989 and the physical
symptoms which now adversely affect her. The
intervening accidents and injuries to Plaintiff's low
back break the causal link between the work-related
injuries involved in the initial claim and those which
she now suffers.
In dismissing Smith’s case on the issue of the
reopening, ALJ Thomas Dockter did not specifically address the
issue of medical expenses.
Hazard ARH raised this omission in
its petition for reconsideration in February, 1997 — specifically
requesting a ruling that it be absolved and released from all
liability for all medical expenses.
Judge Dockter denied this
request — perhaps mindful of the fact that the original
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settlement agreement between the parties had provided that Hazard
ARH would remain liable for ongoing medical expenses.
He entered
his order accordingly on March 10, 1997, dismissing petitions for
reconsideration from both Smith and Hazard ARH, rejecting Smith’s
claim for a worsening of her condition, and refusing to absolve
Hazard ARH from liability for medical expenses related to the
original injuries.
Smith appealed to the Workers’ Compensation
Board, which affirmed ALJ Dockter as to the worsening of her
medical condition.
Smith pursued that portion of her claim that pertained
to reimbursement of medical expenses — which is the sole issue on
appeal before us now.
On September 17, 1997, Smith filed a Form
112 (Request to Resolve Medical Fee Dispute), which she attached
to her affidavit alleging that Hazard ARH had refused to pay
bills from Marymount Hospital and Mary Breckinridge or to
reimburse her for past medical bills and medicine.
Also attached
to the Form 112 was an invoice dated August 5, 1997, from Dr.
Thomas in the amount of $33 for the treatment of "back pain";
invoices from Mary Breckinridge Healthcare for treatment of a
nonspecific nature from February 1997 through August 1997 in the
total amount of $959.25; and invoices from Marymount Medical
Center relating to discharges of December 18, 1995, and May 30,
1996, with no references to what treatment was rendered.
The matter was initially referred to an Arbitrator, who
denied Smith's motion on the basis that ALJ Dockter’s previous
opinion and award affirmed by the Board had made a finding to the
effect that her current back problems were not shown to be
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causally related to her work injury.
The arbitrator summarily
rejected the medical expenses without a finding as to whether
they had arisen from her original injuries.
Thereafter, Smith
requested and was granted a de novo review before an ALJ.
Administrative Law Judge Richard H. Campbell, Jr., conducted
the de novo review and issued an opinion and order denying
Smith's motion.
Like the Arbitrator, Judge Campbell relied upon
the earlier opinion and order of ALJ Dockter, now interpreting it
to mean that Hazard ARH was not obligated to provide any further
medical benefits to Smith.
ALJ Campbell analyzed the earlier
opinion as follows:
Notwithstanding Judge Dockter’s failure to
offer any comment when he overruled the
petition for reconsideration Hazard ARH filed
subsequent to the issuance of the January 30,
1997, Opinion and Order, it appears that the
findings and rulings contained in that
decision included a determination that
Smith’s low back condition following a March,
1995, nonwork-related incident and injury
could no longer be related to the 1988 and
1989 work injuries that were the subject
matter of this claim and the February 13,
1991, settlement agreement. Although the
Court of Appeals decision in Addington
Resources, Inc. v. Perkins, Id., indicates
that medical expenses arising from a
subsequent injury attributable to a nonworkrelated incident may be deemed a consequence
of a prior work injury and therefore
compensable, a contrary decision was rendered
in the instant claim, and that decision has
not been set aside. Thus, effective with the
finality of Judge Dockter’s January 30, 1997,
Opinion and Order, Hazard ARH was relieved of
any further obligation to provide smith
medical benefits for her work injuries. Such
is the law of this case, despite the avenue
to compensability that the holding in
Addington Resources could have provided Smith
had that decision been available to her and
Judge Dockter before January 30, 1997.
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Opinion and Order of ALJ Richard H. Campbell, Jr., April 29,
1998, pp.7-8.
(Emphasis added.)
The Board affirmed this line of
reasoning, and we believe that it erred in doing so.
Judge Campbell was correct in rejecting the
applicability of Addington Resources, Inc. v. Perkins, Ky.App.
947 S.W.2d 421 (1997), to this case since ALJ Dockter’s opinion
preceded that decision and no appeal was taken beyond the
Workers’ Compensation Board.
Thus, the law of the case doctrine
dictates that there may be no re-litigation of the issue of
compensability of any intervening back injury.
Beale, Ky. App., 840 S.W.2d 830 (1992).
Pennwalt Corp. v.
However, we find error
in his finding that "Hazard ARH was relieved of any further
obligation to provide Smith medical benefits for her work
injuries."
That statement is logically flawed and factually
inconsistent — both with ALJ Dockter’s actions (i.e., he
specifically denied such an outcome sought by Hazard ARH) and
with the terms of the original settlement between the parties
guaranteeing ongoing liability of Hazard ARH for Smith’s medical
expenses arising from the original injuries.
As to the specific medical bills involved in the case
at this juncture, ALJ Campbell noted that the affidavit submitted
by Smith lacked any information as to when the disputed medical
expenses had been presented to her employer for payment and that
the face of the contested billings failed to reflect any
information in support of Smith's contention that the treatment
underlying those billings was rendered for the effects of Smith's
1988 and 1989 work-related injuries.
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On appeal, the Board resolved the dispute wholly on
procedural grounds, explaining as follows:
KRS 342.020 requires an employer to pay
medical expenses incurred for the cure and
relief from the effects of a work-related
injury. The provider of services is required
to submit the statement for services within
45 days of the date the treatment is
initiated and every 45 days thereafter so
long as medical services are rendered, with
the employer or its payment obligor being
required to make payments for those services
directly to the provider within 30 days of
receipt of that statement.
803 KAR 25.012, § 1, establishes the
procedure for resolving medical fee disputes.
It requires the filing of a Form 112
accompanied by copies of all disputed bills
and a supporting affidavit setting forth
facts sufficient to show that the moving
party is entitled to the relief sought
together with necessary supporting expert
testimony. It further requires that, if the
injury claims upon which the medical fee
dispute is based has [sic] been resolved by
an opinion or order of an ALJ, a motion to
reopen under 803 KAR 25:010 be filed in
addition to the Form 112. Under 803 KAR
25:010, a motion to reopen is to be
accompanied by, in this claim, at least an
affidavit evidencing the grounds to support
reopening.
In the instant proceeding, none of the
documents attached to Smith's Form 112 or
motion to reopen establish [sic] that the
medical expenses in question were for the
treatment of her work-related injuries. As
noted both in Pikeville Coal Co. v. Sullivan,
Ky., 895 S.W.2d 574 (1995), and Stambaugh v.
Cedar Creek Mining Co., Ky., 488 S.W.2d 681
(1972), in a reopening proceeding, the moving
party must make a prima facie showing before
the respondent is required to marshal its
defenses. Smith, having failed to make such
a prima facie showing, the ALJ correctly
overruled her request to resolve the medical
fee dispute herein.
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(Board opinion at 6-8).
Having resolved the issue on procedural
grounds, the Board declined to consider the legal effect of the
original opinion and order denying Smith's motion to reopen.
In her petition for review, Smith alleges that the
Board "misconceived the appeal" and urges the court to hold that
any past and future medical expenses related to her work injury
are indeed compensable.
We agree that the Board misconceived her
appeal substantively by affirming ALJ Campbell as to this issue
of general compensability of medical expenses related to the 1988
and 1989 injuries.
While we cannot dispute the finding that
Smith failed procedurally to make a prima facie showing that the
medical bills at issue here were causally related to the original
injuries, that failure is procedurally fatal only as to this
particular batch of bills and is in no way a bar to her right to
assert a claim for medical reimbursements in the future if she
can properly document that they arose from the original injuries
and make her prima facie case accordingly.
The opinion of the Worker's Compensation Board is
therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE HAZARD
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HOSPITAL:
Phyllis L. Robinson
London, KY
Joel W. Aubrey
Sherri P. Brown
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SPECIAL
FUND:
Joel D. Zakem
Louisville, KY
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